MANLIKE MONSTERS ON TRIAL

EARLY RECORDS AND MODERN EVIDENCE

edited by MARJORIE HALPIN
MICHAEL M. AMES



ABOMINABLE SNOWMAN BIGFOOT SASQUATCH GRENDEL

MANLIKE MONSTERS ON TRIAL



Actual size of footprint found in California.

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

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Early Records and Modern Evidence

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Phonetic Key

VOWELS

i—as in "pizza"
ε—as in "bet"
ı—as in "bit"
a—the a of "father"
ə—the a of "comma"
e—the a in "gate" or "fare"
o—the o of "so" or "more"
u—the oo of "boot"
. —shows vowels are held longer than usual

CONSONANTS

θ—th as in "thin"
c—ts as in "gets"
č—ch as in "church"
š—sh as in "she"
ž—as in azure
ɬ—voiceless or whispered l, the ll of the Welsh language
ƛ—t plus ɬ
x or *η*—ch of German "ich"
x^{w}—same with the lips rounded, occasionally heard for English wh
ɣ—voiced x, the sound of gargling
k^{w}—qu as in "quick"
q—a sound resembling k but made farther back in the throat
q^{w}—the same with the lips rounded
x̣—the ch of German "ach," made back in the throat like the q
x̣^{w}—same with rounding of the lips
g^{y}—the sound of g followed by y as in "big year"
ʔ—the glottal stop, a catch in the throat as in "Hawaii"
ɹ—the ear of "earth"
´`—accent marks, placed after stressed syllables or over stressed vowels

Some consonants may be glottalized, that is, pronounced with more force and with the glottis closed; this is indicated by a raised apostrophe (') placed over the letter or following it, as p̓ or p'

Preface

The papers in this book were occasioned by a unique conference on "Sasquatch and Similar Phenomena" convened in May, 1978, by the Museum of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia with the assistance of the Canada Council, the university's Centre for Continuing Education, and the University of British Columbia Press.

Sasquatch is the Canadian name for an ape-like creature which is also known in the United States as Bigfoot, in the Himalayas as Yeti, and in Russia as Alma or Almasti. It may have many other names as well, since it is beginning to appear that people of many cultures throughout time have described a similar beast.

Officially, scientifically, it does not exist—no carcass has been collected and it is not recognized by zoologists as real. At the conference, and in this book, this raised fundamental questions of What is real, and What is science?

The Sasquatch has a strong enough claim on reality that it is actively sought in Canada, the United States, Russia, and, we have recently learned, in China. Researchers at the Institute of Paleoanthropology and Vertebrate Paleontology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences have reported sightings and investigations in an article in *China Reconstructs* 27, no. 7(1979), which they conclude as follows:

> The centuries-old "wild man" riddle remains unsolved. Like the Loch Ness investigators who have not yet found their monster, we still do not have enough to prove—or disprove—the existence of "wild men" in the primeval forests of China's temperate and subtropical regions. But science has been challenged, and we have taken up the challenge.

This book does not resolve the question either. Since we do not yet know if the Sasquatch question will be resolved in terms of matter or belief, authors in the book investigate both. Not knowing the real nature of the phenomenon, we do not know who its "experts" are, and so we invited potential experts of all sorts to the conference, including specialists on monsters of other kinds from other cultures, primarily those of North American Indians.

Since monsters by definition do not fit the normal categories of experience, the scholarship of the monstrous cannot, as yet, be confined within any one academic discipline. The authors in this book include physical scientists (investigating "hard" evidence, such as footprints, excrement, hair, and recordings of sound), social scientists (anthropologists and a sociologist), folklorists, historians, and a psychoanalyst. Significantly, they all present interesting and important perspectives on the monster. Such is the nature of the beast which has not yet been classified that, perhaps, this book will allow us to glimpse the nature of the prescientific world—when facts were still fulsome with potentiality and not yet consigned to their appropriate masters.

The idea of a conference on human-like monsters was first formulated by Marjorie Halpin in 1976, and she enlisted the support of Michael Ames and others at the University of British Columbia to bring it about. We have for many years shared an interest in the study of monsters, and we saw this conference as a good way of attracting serious attention to the matter. We are grateful to the Canada Council for assisting with a conference grant, and we are pleased to acknowledge the support of our colleagues, including especially Mr. Hank Rosenthal of the U.B.C. Centre for Continuing Education, Mr. J. Michael Yates, then with U.B.C. Press, Mrs. Elena Perkins, volunteer and graduate student in museum studies, and the staff and volunteers of the Museum of Anthropology.

It was not possible to include in this volume all of the papers presented at the conference; there were too many. Nor can a book contain films, though two were presented. We have included still photographs from one of those films, however: the well-known and visually compelling film shot by Roger Patterson in northern California in 1967. The five frames published here show the unthinkable—a huge, upright furry beast with hanging breasts. Is the Patterson film true or a fake? The essays in this book suggest a number of ways to think about this question and about the monster that film depicts.

Marjorie M. Halpin.
Michael M. Ames.

PART I

Monsters in the Forests of the Mind

In order to put modern evidence of manlike monsters into a broader historical and psychological context, the articles in this introductory section consider the origin and purpose of these monsters—imaginary or real—in our society. The first two demonstrate the fallibility of our perception of the world around us and show that we see what we are taught to see—our experience is divided into categories provided for it by our culture. The third article describes monsters which emerge from the minds of patients under psychoanalysis. The next two detail the concept of the Wild Man of the Woods which comes to us from European tradition, the latter showing how this tradition may have prejudiced early explorers' impressions of New World natives. The next article suggests that this same overreliance on preordained categories may still affect the way in which Newfoundlanders interpret manlike creatures which they encounter. The section concludes with a discussion of how the characteristics which we attribute to the manlike monster make it particularly suited to an urban culture which stresses peaceful, non-violent values.

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Marjorie M. Halpin

Investigating the Goblin Universe

Are manlike monsters figments of human nature or creatures of external nature? This article considers the problems we face in interpreting the world around us. In particular, the author discusses the strong influence of social consensus and established science in determining what is "believable" and comments upon the consequent sanctions against reporting phenomena which fall outside accepted limits. She further explores how the concept of manlike monsters affects our definition of what is human.

Each year in North America an unknown number of otherwise apparently unremarkable and ordinary people encounter Sasquatch (usually known in the United States as Bigfoot)—a large, hairy, upright-walking, primate-like creature. Usually, these encounters occur in isolated places, commonly when the person is alone. Some of these people report their experience to local authorities or to the media. The reports are routinely ignored or denied by the scientific and academic establishments. There is a strong consensus among both academics and non-academics that the creature described by these people does not, and cannot, exist.

Science, especially natural science, has the task of describing the natural world, of identifying and naming its parts and their relationships. There is no room in the scheme of things as known by natural science for the Sasquatch to exist: it is a classificatory anomaly which is essentially "unthinkable" in scientific terms. "The fascination of the subject, for me," writes John Green, the journalist who has written more about the Sasquatch than anyone else, "involves the very thing that I am most inclined to complain about—that the scientific world ignores it."[1] Considering that scientists, with few exceptions, are convinced that the Sasquatch does not exist, it is hardly surprising that they do not actively investigate it. Such a pursuit would be looking for something that cannot exist, and hence it would be defined in advance as a supreme waste of time.

Yet it is difficult to ignore the continued reports that the Sasquatch is manifesting out there in the wilderness. John Napier, one of the few scientists who has carefully examined the Sasquatch reports, calls his colleagues to task on their refusal to examine the situation. Consider Sir Peter Medawar's definition of science as the "art of the soluble. . . . Good scientists study the most important problems they think they can solve. It is, after all, their professional business to solve problems, not merely to grapple with them."[2] Napier asserts that such a "stultifying directive" is "dismally flat" as a "clarion call for the venturesome. . . . Solubility is surely not the principle by which great discoveries have been made."[3]

Ron Westrum in Part I of this book chronicles a startling episode in the history of science in which conformity to accepted scientific principles prevented scientists from investigating reports by ordinary people about stones that fell from the sky. It was only after they had a theory which could explain the origin of meteorites that scientists took such reports seriously. This conservatism results from what is now called "prematurity." A discovery is defined as premature "if its implications cannot be connected by a series of simple logical steps to canonical, or generally accepted, knowledge."[4] It is possible that Sasquatch is one of those things whose time for acknowledgement has not yet come. Equally importantly, the concept of prematurity reminds us that scientific description of the world must remain open or unfinished and that a world which has been totally described, or completely known, is one in which all potential has disappeared.

Part III of this book presents a short history, in the articles by Green and Suttles, of how the Sasquatch became perceived as problematic, as well as the tentative results, all inconclusive, of the application of modern techniques of scientific investigation to evidence purported by its collectors to be from the Sasquatch, in the articles by Gill, Kirlin and Hertel, and Bryant and Trevor-Deutsch. These are the articles that give this book its peculiar flavour, for they contain the assumption that the Sasquatch *might be real* and thereby constitute a serious challenge to scientific control over knowledge of the natural world. This is what keeps the issue alive and makes Sasquatch a genuine mystery. Mystery is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "a hidden or secret thing; a matter unexplained or inexplicable; something beyond human knowledge or comprehension." Whereas science itself is replete with mystery, most of us live in an essentially humdrum or uninteresting world in which things are as they are. Sasquatch presents us with the tantalizing possibility that things are as they are not. Uncaptured and unknown, but possibly real, Sasquatch is pure potentiality, pure possibility.

As our scientific knowledge of it increases, Sasquatch will lose the potentiality, the mystery, that it now has. We can already see this happening. In order for the creature to be real for John Green, its potentiality to be humanlike must be destroyed: "They are all animal. Magnificent animals, completely self-sufficient on their physical endowments alone, but no more than animals."[5] Grover Krantz, a scientist, also reduces it to an animal, one that supposedly became extinct millenia ago: "the Sasquatch is not human, it is probably *Gigantopithecus*, and its reality can be established only with an actual specimen."[6] As a relict primate, Sasquatch retains a certain evolutionary potentiality (it did not become extinct when it was *supposed* to), but its assignment to a known category, however improbable, reduces its mystery to a more comfortable level. At least it has a place, a category or location, in which to manifest; it has been included in the evolutionary scheme of things.

Normally, however, Sasquatch is consigned to what John Napier calls the "Goblin Universe." Let us explore this category and assume for the purposes of argument that the inhabitants of the Goblin Universe include all beings or creatures which human beings have reported from their experience but which have not been catalogued as real by natural science. Section II of this book describes a number of these, which are but a small fraction of the total number which could be found. The realms of history, art, literature, and anthropology include an incredibly rich and varied pageant of unreal beings, uncountable numbers of which have streamed out of the human mind as far back as records and images go.

Sasquatch, the Loch Ness monster, U.F.O. beings, God, and the Devil are distinguished in this category insofar as they are those of its inhabitants which are regularly reported by members of modern, Western, post-industrial society; the rest of the inhabitants of the Goblin Universe are usually encountered by members of exotic societies, and they were familiar to members of our own society prior to the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century. Most of us, however, have not personally experienced Sasquatch, the Loch Ness monster, U.F.O. beings, God, or the Devil, and we accept the reigning social consensus that they do not exist, although there is some confusion in our minds about God. For us, then, the Goblin Universe does not exist. How different are we, we wonder, from most of the other human beings on the planet, whom we have reason to believe still accept the Goblin Universe as real? This book can be read as an examination of the process whereby we destroyed our Goblin Universe and whereby we are now quite ruthlessly destroying those of other cultures through the imposition of our rationality and reality upon them.

In his essay for this book Robin Ridington describes giant animals that he was told about by the Dunne-za Indians of northeastern British Columbia:

> Monsters of mythic time are real to the Dunne-za because they are an inherent property of culturally instructed experience. They cannot be real in the same way within the experience of an anthropologist or any other member of modern historical society.

How does this work? Ridington explains it in different ways. "The giant animals," he says, "are encountered directly by every normal person at the time of the childhood vision quest experience and they remain a constant presence behind the appearance of everyday reality." He also says that "the mythic giant animals are metaphoric transformations of everyday events, not a separate occult reality." Nelson Graburn, who describes part of the Goblin Universe of the Inuit, refuses to even discuss the question of its reality. It "is a question which is best answered," he writes, "from an existential or inter-subjective point of view." Thomas Buckley approaches the reality of monsters to the Yurok Indians another way: "monsters may be 'explained' as infantile oral-aggressive fears projected outwards . . . yet such explanations must not be mistaken for real comprehension." Richard Preston, who discusses the giant cannibal Witiko of the Algonkian Indians of eastern Canada, agrees:

> The problem of translating the Algonkian idiom of experience into terms that are understandable and worthwhile within our own tradition of urbane intellectual inquiry is poorly served by psychodynamic and structuralist theories, unless the effort includes the judicious use of Algonkian phenomena.

These scholars are not dodging the question. As anthropologists, they have learned that reality as it is experienced by members of other cultures is not the same reality as experienced by ourselves. This is formulated in anthropology as a principle of cultural relativity—reality as experienced by human beings is a function of the culture within which their knowledge is acquired. Sociologists term it the "social contruction of reality."[7] Graburn expresses this principle in his article when he states that "the realities and knowledge of any culture stem from the nature of that culture and its modes of communication, most specifically from the modes and media of communication." Ridington writes that "implicit in the anthropological understanding is a sense of the relativity of the information that constitutes a culture's reality."

Thus, in order to investigate the status of the reality of the Sasquatch and other inhabitants of the Goblin Universe for ourselves, it is necessary to look at how our culture defines reality and how that definition is communicated to us. Insofar as Sasquatch investigators continually call for the study of Sasquatch phenomena by scientists, there is an implicit recognition that the reality in terms of which we deny the Goblin Universe is essentially a scientifically constructed or defined one.



"We lack one thing, gentlemen—a motive."

Drawing by Geo. Price; © 1937, 1965 The New
Yorker Magazine, Inc.


LOCH NESS HATCHERY
FISH AND GAME COMMISSIO
Alan Dunn

Drawing by Alan Dunn; © 1960 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

One of the most significant things that a non-scientist can know about science is that it frequently contradicts the knowledge of common sense and direct experience. This is as true of social and behavioural science as it is of physics. From our experience of the world, for example, we cannot verify the following statement by Sir Karl Popper about the reality of matter based upon the knowledge of physicists:

> matter [is] highly packed energy, transformable into other forms of energy; and therefore something of the nature of a *process*, since it can be converted into other processes such as light and . . . motion and heat. . . . [Thus] one may say that the results of modern physics suggest that we should give up the idea of a substance or essence. . . . The universe now appears to be not a collection of things, but an interacting set of events or processes.[8]

Whereas we *experience* the world as "a collection of things," as matter having qualities of hardness, endurance, or colour, science creates a way of penetrating matter, a way of knowing it, in which matter itself disappears, is transformed into energy. The larger implication of this is that anything which is known scientifically, which is penetrated in a scientific way, changes from the form in which it was known in the world of common sense. Another way to say this is that the things known to common sense "disappear" once they are known scientifically. This includes human beings themselves. In order to describe society, science analyzes human action in terms of its patterns or regularities. Once the social dimension of human action is recognized, the self-determining individual whom we believe ourselves to be disappears—we discover that we are socially programmed. This has profound implications—it means that scientific knowledge creates a definition of reality that is unavailable to common sense and ordinary experience.

We experience the world through our perception of it, by means of data about the world being delivered to our brain through our senses. Perception can be defined as "the process by which an individual maintains contact with his environment."[9] Let us restrict this to visual perception for a moment. From somewhere inside our heads, which we locate just behind our eyes, we see things in the world outside ourselves. Until we learn otherwise, we are persuaded by common sense that we see things as they really are. Scientifically, however, this is known as naive realism, for scientists who study perception have repeatedly demonstrated that what we see out there is not the same thing as what is really out there.[10] We do not hold the thing itself in our minds but only an image of it, and the image is always different from the thing. All that we can perceive of what is out there is what our sensory organs are capable of delivering to us. The more we penetrate the capabilities of these organs scientifically, the more limitations we discover. Neurologist V.B. Mountcastle gives us an indication of how profound the implications of these limitations are:

> Each of us believes himself to live directly within the world that surrounds him, to sense its objects and events precisely, to live in real and current time. I assert that these are perceptual illusions, for each of us confronts the world from a brain linked to what is 'out there' by a few million fragile sensory nerve fibres. These are our only information channels, our lifelines to reality.[11]

The few million nerve fibres by means of which we can establish perceptual contact with the world are not capable of delivering information to our brain about everything that is out there.

Consider the visual perception of the frog. Scientists have discovered that a frog can only see an insect when the insect is in motion; the frog does not have the visual capacity to see insects at rest. "The frog's eye does not even signal to its brain a fly within reach if [the fly] does not move."[12] The frog is programmed to catch moving flies; its environment does not include motionless insects. The frog's eye mirrors a moving world.

Many experiments have been designed to measure the capacities of the human perceptual programme. A very simple one is the Mueller-Lyer illusion. When you look at this drawing, you will perceive that the two horizontal lines are different in length.



FIGURE 1. THE MUELLER-LYER ILLUSION[13]

Your perception is in error, as you can readily discover by measuring the two lines with any physical object. The act of measurement is an objective or independent correction of your false perception. You now know more than you see. Notice, however, that you cannot use what you know to change your perception: the two lines still appear to be of different lengths. This illusion is a vivid demonstration of a contradiction between objective knowledge and personal experience. The relationship between our brains and our eyes is so constructed that the eyes cannot deliver a correct perception of this simple drawing. When we consider the multiplicity of lines and angles and other sensible qualities of the environment, we can begin to appreciate the opportunities the world offers for perceptual distortion.

Furthermore, any complex animal—whether frog or human—responds to its environment in a creative rather than a passive way. It does not just receive perceptual information; perception is not wide open to the world. "A hungry animal divides the environment into edible and inedible things. An animal in flight sees roads to escape and hiding places."[14] The animal's perception is affected by its internal state or disposition. Between the object and our perception of it, a critical act of attention intervenes. In a very profound way, we see what we are looking for. This can be demonstrated with another familiar illusion.



FIGURE 2. FIGURE AND GROUND ILLUSION[15]

You can interpret this figure either as a black vase on a white ground, or as two heads facing each other on a black ground. Notice that you can direct your attention from one image to the other and back again. Notice also that if you engage in more sustained contemplation of the drawing, it will change on you automatically. This is the brain working independently of active intention. Even more significantly, notice that when you focus on one aspect of the drawing, such as the faces, you are forced to make the other aspect, the vase, disappear. While you remember that it is there, you cannot see it until you refocus your attention, at which point the faces disappear.

Becoming critical of our own perception, as in the above exercises, allows us to become aware that we are superior in some fashion to the operations of our own brain, insofar as we can direct it and play with it. But it also shows us that the brain cannot be trusted. That part of us which is critical of the brain can be called the self. John Eccles states that "there is a special sense in which the self or the mind is superior to the brain, which we can *catch* in the operations of memory and visual perception."[16] We all experience the act of searching our memories looking for a word or a name. The thing we are searching with is the conscious self. Eccles further asserts that the self "is superior to the objects which are delivered, and it is superior in that it can accept or reject them and use or modify them and put them into the brain storage."[17]

The process by which the self scans the brain's memory is not yet scientifically known, although neurologists are working on it intensively. We do not yet know how certain images become easily available to consciousness and others do not, nor how the images are found and retrieved.[18] One of the great discoveries of Freud was that we construct barriers to memory which prevent certain painful or inadmissible memories from surfacing. Freud also demonstrated that such memories influence behaviour even though they remain below conscious awareness. This has been verified by experiments in subliminal perception, which confirm the broader principle that we can be influenced by stimuli of which we have no conscious awareness at any time. Information which we receive below the level of conscious awareness has been reported to influence eight different categories of experience: dreams, memory, adaptation level, conscious perception, verbal behaviour, emotional responses, drive-related behaviour, and perceptual thresholds.[19]

What we also cannot know from the perspective of common sense is that "most of the acquired information received through our senses is also unconscious."[20] Here is how this has been summarized by Karl Popper:

> The self . . . has often been compared to an iceberg, with the unconscious self as the vast submerged part and the conscious self as the tip projecting from the water. Although there is little basis for estimating magnitude here, it nevertheless appears that at any given moment what is selected, filtered, and admitted to full consciousness, is only a small fraction of all that we act upon and which acts upon us. Most of what we 'learn', what we acquire and integrate into our personality, our self, what we make use of in action or in contemplation, remains unconscious or subconscious.[21]

It could not be otherwise, since our efficiency in behaviour depends upon automatic operation of our previous programming. This is how we survive in a complicated world. Consider learning to drive a car. At first we are hesitant and confused as we learn to make a new set of decisions with which to control our behaviour. As our mastery increases, these decisions are relegated to unconsciousness, and we perform automatically. We have all experienced the realization while driving that we have come from one place to another without conscious awareness of having done so, and with no memory of it. We have been attending to something else in our conscious awareness. The unconscious operation of our programme for driving frees conscious awareness for other tasks.

Anthropologists and sociologists examine human behaviour in order to detect patterns which reveal the operation of socially derived programmes.

Most of these are unavailable to us from the perspective of common sense and operate below the level of awareness. A famous example is Emile Durkheim's study of suicide.[22] Durkheim discovered that the suicide rate in any one society at any period of time is extremely stable, a given number of people destroying themselves year after year in a consistent pattern. He concluded that such a pattern can only be explained from the social, rather than the individual, perspective:

> the social suicide-rate can be explained only sociologically. At any given moment the moral constitution of society establishes the contingent of voluntary deaths. There is, therefore, for each people a collective force of a definite amount of energy, impelling men to self-destruction . . . . Each human society . . . has a greater or lesser aptitude for suicide.[23]

The startling regularity with which predicted numbers of people destroy themselves in automobile accidents at holiday periods is of the same order. The isolation of the regularity, the pattern, locates the source of the behaviour in a social context, rather than individual decision or even individual error.

To the extent that the social and behavioural sciences locate patterns in human behaviour, individual human control over behaviour seems to disappear. In extreme formulations, humans are reduced to socially programmed automatons, passively responding to environmental requirements by means of automatically triggered programming.

While the philosophical issues raised in the last paragraph cannot be addressed here, we can now restate the problem of the Sasquatch in more accurate terms. Are the reported experiences of Sasquatch witnesses the result of cultural programming or the result of an actual encounter with an animal corresponding to the one described? It is clear that Sasquatch reports over both time and space reveal the existence of a pattern: the creature is large, hairy, of a certain form, and announced by an offensive smell (see Green's article in Part III). But what is the source of the pattern? Is its source inside or outside the human brain? Each essay in this book examines this pattern, or what seems to be the same or a similar pattern, in terms of different manifestations of it. Yet each of them can be resolved in terms of either an inside or an outside source. Thus none of the authors can achieve a definite resolution to the problem posed by the Sasquatch—no one really knows how.

But there is another reformulation of the Sasquatch question which I believe makes a significant advance toward resolution of it. This involves enlarging the context within which the Sasquatch phenomena are considered. Specifically, I believe we should examine the full context within which the creature is seen, rather than continue to dwell almost exclusively on *what* is seen, on the object as a thing in itself.

I believe that this places the investigation much more closely in tune with the scientific spirit of our time. The science of perception, for example, is currently being reformulated so that internal and external factors become interdependent aspects of the same event. The basic assumption of this reformulation has been stated by Shaw, McIntyre, and Mace as follows:

> Experiences are logically coextensive with events. The relation between the two is direct rather than mediated. An event is not the cause of an experience nor the experience a response to an event. Experiences and events accompany one another as different but equally important aspects of the same dynamic phenomenon in the ecosystem—that is, as the terms of the relationship between organism and environment. To paraphrase the distinction made by Bertrand Russell: An *event* is the experience described from the point of view of the environment, while an *experience* is the event described from the point of view of the organism.[24]

The importance of this reformulation cannot be overstressed. It means that scientific attention is now focussed on the terms of the relationship between inside and outside as different aspects of the same thing. Instead of focussing on the object of experience as reported, attention shifts to the larger context within which the object is experienced and examines the interdependent and necessary relationship between object and experience. Ultimately, the direction of this reformulation is toward a synthesis in which "the universe is a constructed interaction between the observer and the observed."[25]

This is subtle point which, I think, can enlarge our consideration of the Sasquatch problem and point us toward its possible resolution.

We have seen that when we focus on Sasquatch as the object of experience, without examining the context of that experience, we cannot resolve the question of its source. It is either out there or it is not. We are restricted to examining the reported qualities of the thing itself. If, however, we turn our attention to the context within which it is experienced, we can bring new information to bear upon it. This holds true for many of the inhabitants of the Goblin Universe. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that supernatural encounters have an experiential dimension the interpretation of which depends upon the context (including the consciousness of the observer) within which the encounter occurs. Kenneth Pelletier has already requested that scientific observations

> be qualified by the observer's particular state of consciousness . . . that places him in a particular relationship to the events observed. If the observer were in a different state of consciousness, it is very likely that he would observe other variables, other interactions, and formulate different hypotheses about the events that have been observed.[26]

I have already quoted Robin Ridington as saying that the Dunne-za experience of giant animals normally occurs "at the time of the childhood vision quest." Is it possible that the vision quest creates a special context within which things that cannot normally be experienced *can* be experienced? To bring this question even closer to the Sasquatch, let us look at the context in which the Coast Salish Indians of British Columbia experienced the being which now we call Sasquatch (see Suttles's article in this book). This was one of a class of beings called *slalakums,* which have been described by Wilson Duff as follows:

> Supernatural creatures living in the natural world were generally called "slalakums," and the same word was used as an adjective to describe anything strange and unnatural. Some of the slalakums had quite definite forms and characteristics, as, for example, the cannibal woman *Θu'xia,* the powerful double-headed creature *si'xqi,* and the notorious hairy giants or *sE'sx̣ac.* Certain bodies of water were called slalakum places, being the homes of slalakums or having slalakum properties of their own. Illness was the usual result of seeing a slalakum.[27]

Wayne Suttles has previously examined whether the slalakums are real to the Coast Salish and concluded that they are.[28] While he notes that there does exist a dichotomy in Coast Salish thought between a vision experience and an ordinary experience, the fact that the beings encountered in both kinds of experience are real leads him to dismiss this distinction as not being "relevant to our enquiry."[29] Here I must take exception, since under the terms of the argument I am constructing, it is precisely the context of the experience that is most relevant.

In the reports of Coast Salish encounters with Sasquatch-like beings published by Suttles we find the following information: "when you see them, it makes you crazy"; they "had some kind of poison which they could throw at a person and make him crazy"; "it put him to sleep right away"; "they make you sleep"; they could "make people crazy."[30] Such things did not happen when the Coast Salish encountered beavers or other animals in the course of normal experience. Indeed, the latter would have been absurd to a hunting and fishing people.

A sickness called "soul loss" was one of the results of having a slalakum experience. It was described by Duff as follows:

> A man's soul might leave his body when he was visiting some strange, unnatural place; it might be shocked out of him by an encounter with a supernatural creature (slalakum); or it might be stolen by a malignant shaman. In any case, unless it was returned to his body fairly soon, he would die.[31]

The soul that leaves the body was called *smisti'yux* by Duff's informants, and the belief was that "the only time the soul can leave the body without ill effects is during sleep, when it wanders around, seeing other places and meeting the souls and ghosts of other people, resulting in dreams."[32] It appears, then, that the part of the self which disappears in a slalakum Sasquatch encounter is also that part of the self which dreams. In an ethnography of the Katzie (a group of the Coast Salish people) written by Diamond Jenness, this same part of the self is glossed as "vitality" and "thought," while the term "soul" has a different connotation.[33] Assuming that both native terms are the same and that Jenness provided an accurate gloss, the following description of this aspect is relevant:

> Man's vitality or thought pervades his whole body so that if he loses an arm or a leg, he loses some of his vitality and his character may change. Unlike the soul or the shadow, whose departure brings instant death, it can leave his body for a short period and return, as when a person dreams or faints or goes into a trance. . . .
>
> The vitality or thought is responsible for memory. Thus Old Pierre announced one morning that his vitality or thought had visited a certain rock during the night, and that he was now able to tell me the legend about it which he had forgotten the day before. It is partly responsible, again, for another attribute. If a man keeps himself

> absolutely pure by continence, and frequent bathing, then at some time or other his thought may leave his body and, travelling to some holy place invisible to normal eyes, gain an excess of talent or power (swia'm') which it will impart to its owner when it returns; but if it fails to return, the man will become crazy and die.[34]

This vitality or thought is imagined as a miniature likeness of its owner, which enables it to be distinguished when it is wandering about. All animals and plants, wind and water, and the celestial bodies possess vitality and can add their own to that of a person's, as a gift.[35] There are other creatures or beings that do not manifest on earth at all which are able to confer superior vitality or power to shamans. These beings live in "mystic realms" and can be known to a man "through visions only, when his vitality leaves his body and travels to their homes."[36]

The dreams or visions in which supernatural encounters occur are called *sulia.* In some cases a sulia experience is described as a true dream (occurring in sleep), in other cases somewhat differently, as in the following example:

> They go away into the woods and fast as long as they can stand it, until they meet their power. It is a dream (sulia), and appears to them as a nice young man or girl who sings for them, dances for them. . . . Most of them wouldn't be sleeping when they see this thing.[37]

Duff was told by one informant that meeting a slalakum was "not a sulia experience." It seems that slalakum and sulia experiences are different in kind and certainly in their desirability to humans.

In order to have a sulia experience and receive additional vitality or power, the Coast Salish began active training as children, beginning in special cases as young as three years old. Duff's description of such training for a boy of about twelve years of age is as follows:

> He might go out on successive overnight vigils, returning home at dawn, or he might stay away from home several days at a time, going increasingly farther from home on each successive vigil. Coming to a lake, a stream, a waterfall, he would stay for several days, fasting the whole time. He would make himself thoroughly clean by chewing

> laxative bark and by tickling his throat with a stick to induce vomiting, by sweating in a sweat-house, by frequent bathing and swimming, and by rubbing his body with boughs. All night long he would sing and dance. He would sleep only when exhausted, and then try to dream of the power he wanted. When he did go home, he would observe strict continence, and would avoid everything that was impure.[38]

It was said that slalakum places were good places to go for the spirit vigil.

The reason for examining Coast Salish belief in such detail has been to demonstrate through example the importance of context to the interpretation of phenomena. While all the beings described were real to the Coast Salish people, the slalakums (including the sEsx̣a'c) were experienced in the natural world as unnatural and frightening beings, and the experience itself was believed to cause "craziness," unconsciousness, and soul loss. These experiences appear to have been spontaneous, not sought after, and occurred when persons were alone in isolated places reputed to be dangerous. In this they contrast sharply with the desirable and sought-after experience of spiritual beings in sulia or dream for which children were put through rigorous training designed to produce altered states of consciousness. Both kinds of experience affected that portion of the self identified as thought or vitality, the critical difference being that the encounter with a slalakum caused the conscious self to disappear, while the encounter in sulia bestowed upon it an increase in vitality or power. The image or being was beneficent when manifesting in sulia or mind and maleficent when manifesting in nature.

My point is this: although supernatural beings were experienced by the Coast Salish as real, such experiences occurred in non-ordinary or heightened contexts, apparently involving altered states of consciousness, including dreams. Sasquatch was no more a mundane or ordinary animal to the Coast Salish than it is to us.

It is instructive to compare the Coast Salish contexts for supernatural encounters with those reported for the people of Tahiti by Robert Levy.[39] This is not to assert anything so bold as a human universal, but only to show that encounters with the supernatural have similar experiential dimensions in two widely separated cultures.

Tahitians experience encounters with the supernatural in the natural world as well as in dreams, and they also explain dreaming as the wandering of the soul. When the supernatural is encountered in the natural world, the encounter is accompanied by a feeling state called *mehameha*, which may be glossed as "uncanny feelings."[40] People describe sensations of "a swollen, enlarged head, hair standing on end, and gooseflesh as the body reaction of mehameha." It is summarized as "a specific type of feeling in a specific context, the context of the 'unknown'." This is made especially vivid in the following statement by one of Levy's informants: "If you don't know what is causing the noise, you are mehameha; but if you do know it, it disappears."[41] The feeling of mehameha occurs when one is alone, "because being with somebody else, no matter who, prevents the feeling of mehameha."[42] Levy concludes:

> The sense of mehameha is taken as immediate and strong evidence that one is in the presence of the supernatural. It is almost a *perception* of the supernatural as warmth is a perception of heat. One may be mistaken, have an illusion—'It was only a rat'—but usually it directly indicates the presence of a supernatural situation.[43]

After careful examination of the contexts of the uncanny, Levy decides that "the sense of mehameha does seem to arise in situations of possible contextual confusion," and he relates this to a difficulty in categorization. He uses a quotation from Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin which is significant to the argument being developed here:

> Categorizing is the means *by which the objects of the world about us are identified.* The act of identifying some thing or event is an act of "placing" it in a class. Identification implies that we are able to say either, "There is thingumbob again" or "There is another thingumbob." While these identifications may vary in the richness of their elaboration, they are never absent. A certain sound may be heard simply as "that sound which comes from outdoors late at night." Or it may be heard as "those porcupines chewing on that old tree stump." When an event cannot be thus categorized and identified, we experience terror in the face of the uncanny. And indeed, "the uncanny" is itself a category, even if only a residual one.[44]

Levy adds that the uncanny "is the residual category of things that go bump in the night."

The direction of my argument should be clear by now. In situations of sensory deprivation (considering the term broadly to include solitude, night, dreams, and other states in which people receive reduced sensory input from their environment), people in other cultures interpret extraordinary experience as an appropriate context for a supernatural encounter. The specific category by which they categorize or label the experience will depend upon the culturally defined image available to them and stored in their memory bank. In at least some cases the experience of a supernatural being in the natural world causes insanity. That is, a creature from another realm is found in the natural world, and the shock of it causes illness of the mind. A plausible explanation for this is that the categorical confusion of realms is so "unthinkable" as to cause the thinking or conscious mind to temporarily "disappear." The object is too powerful for the rational mind to contain. When, however, the supernatural appears to the mind in an altered state of consciousness, one in which the normal categories of thought do not obtain, it not only can be contained but also can be conceptualized as conferring power to the person who encounters it.

The conclusion to which I am led by this line of reasoning is that supernatural encounters can be experientially real in the same way that anything else out there in the world is real. Whether or not an experience is classified as a supernatural encounter, a misperception, or a manifestation of disease depends upon the cultural explanation available for it. In each case, however, it is defined as unnatural or extraordinary, and its manifestation is somehow linked to the condition of mind of the person who is having the experience. It appears to me that the Sasquatch as experienced by members of modern Western society is at least comparable to creatures experienced in other cultures as supernatural. Data to test this hypothesis are not yet available, since Sasquatch investigators have so far concentrated on the object of experience rather than the experiencing subject. Perhaps this book will inspire professional phenomenological investigation of the Sasquatch event.

Far from resolving the issue, however, this hypothetical reconstruction of the experiential context for a Sasquatch sighting merely leads to another level of the problem, one which is even more challenging to our systems of explanation. As documented in Parts I and II of this book, Sasquatch-like creatures have been reported by people living in societies widely separated in time and space. Consider, for example, the following description of the fearsome Witiko (or Windigo), a creature reported by Algonkian Indians in eastern Canada:

> Those who claim to have seen the Wetikoo say that he is a terrible looking creature; his hair is long and matted. Living like a wild beast, ever exposed to the elements, never washing himself, he has a face which brings horror to those who see him. He has the look of ever grinning as his lips are eaten away by himself as far as his teeth can reach. He uses as hair oil the feces of human beings and that partly

> explains the terrible odour which is said to be most noticeable when he is near.[45]

This is remarkably consistent with the Sasquatch descriptions summarized by John Green in his paper. However, the Algonkian cultural explanation for the Witiko is that it was once a normal person who was transformed to this grotesque condition as a result of extreme stress (see Preston's paper).

How do such consistent descriptions of wild or animalized humans occur from culture to culture, regardless of how they are explained, especially if there is no such creature out there in the world? We are forced to assume that the consistency is a product of the mind and that it somehow arises in imagination out of the action of the brain upon the environment. According to the structuralist perspective in anthropology, anomalous creatures (monsters) are created when the mind rearranges elements of normal experience as an intellectual act of understanding the relationship between man and nature. The essays in this book by Ridington, Buckley, Fogelson, Graburn, and myself are essentially structural in logic.

One of the leading architects of structural theory in anthropology is Victor Turner, who has discussed monsters as follows:

> monsters and dragons are compounded from various *discriminata*, each of them originally an element in the common sense construction of social reality. In a sense they have the pedagogical function of stimulating [people's] powers of analysis and revealing to them the building blocks from which their hitherto taken-for-granted world has been constructed. But in another way they reveal the freedom, the indeterminancy underlying all culturally constructed worlds, the free play of mankind's cognitive capacities. Synthesis, as well as analysis, is encouraged by monster construction.[46]

The creation of monsters frees humans from their day-to-day location in the world of common sense. In the act of imaginative recombination of elements of the world, these elements are seen from a new perspective and new qualities of their nature are revealed. Thus a being which is both human and animal stimulates new awareness of the categories out of which it is composed, the human and the animal categories of being.

Even more significant for my argument is that Turner locates this potential for freedom or creativity in what he calls *liminality*, a condition experienced in ritual contexts. While it is not confined to formal ritual space, liminality is commonly experienced there, especially in traditional societies. Liminality is an elusive concept, one that has not yet been thoroughly explored. Turner calls it the "betwixt and between," referring to its location between ordinary states of being in which humans are confined to or limited by social roles. The "between" is the liminal, outside of normal time and space. It is where masks are worn and the inhabitants of the Goblin Universe appear. It is where the sacred is revealed and its power acquired. It is where the normal rules of thought and life do not obtain and miracles of transformation occur, where the creatures of dream and imagination become real.

The precondition for liminal experience is that a person be removed from his or her normal location in social time, space, and relationship. This can obviously occur in isolation as well as in ritual. Significantly, this posits that the person's anchor in a social context is also his or her anchor in common sense. To say it more boldly, society and common sense are different aspects of the same thing. Thus, Turner argues that liminality is an escape from the constraints of society, including normal or rational categorization of the world:

> But for me the essence of liminality is to be found in its release from normal constraints, making possible the deconstruction of the 'uninteresting' constructions of common sense, the 'meaningfulness of ordinary life' . . . into cultural units which may then be reconstructed in novel ways, some of them bizarre to the point of monstrosity. . . . Liminality is thus the domain of the 'interesting' or of uncommon sense.[47]

The mind freed from social constraints can move into the limitless domain of liminal creativity, from which emerge not only monsters but many of the images we call Art.

My paper on the Tsimshian monkey mask presents evidence of a Sasquatch-like image which is also refracted or dispersed into different human-like qualities perceived in various natural phenomena, such as a bird's cry that sounds like a human baby crying. The common feature of such manifestations is contained in the Tsimshian word *ba'wis* ("monkey," "ape," "Sasquatch"), which is glossed by the linguist John Dunn as meaning "any animal that can imitate human behaviour with great alacrity and deftness."[48] Here I think we can discover the process by which Turner's monsters are created—in the confusion of two of the basic categories according to which the world is ordered, human and animal. Sasquatch is just such an impossible form combining human and animal aspects. It accords comfortably with Turner's thesis in that it is a good liminal image.

But Nelson Graburn's paper in Part II takes us to the even more fundamental process by which forms emerge from the formless. For the Inuit, the Goblin Universe not only contains monsters composed of recombined natural elements, but also it includes beings which have no form at all. Graburn describes certain beings called *turngak* as "the unknown and inexplicable sighting. Strange noises, sights and events are usually described as the work of unnamed spirits which are free-roaming and inhabit everywhere." While they can assume form, appearing as "turngak in the form of ———," they themselves possess no form. In this they contrast with other turngak who do possess stable characteristics and consistent behaviour and locality. The formless turngak seem to exist in a condition of pure indeterminacy or unbounded potentiality. It appears, however, that this potentiality is being lost as the Inuit manifest their turngak in three-dimensional artistic form for sale.

Prior to the late 1950's, the Inuit of the Canadian Arctic did not represent extra-ordinary beings in material form. They were only manifested in the traditional oral form of storytelling. A large proportion of contemporary commercial prints and drawings made since then illustrate spirits or "creations along the same lines as the traditional turngak." The two modes of communication of these forms, storytelling and artistic or tangible representation, differ from each other in important ways that Graburn suggests permit us a glimpse of how the traditional Inuit Goblin Universe is being "reduced to" reality in the process of tangible manifestation. In the change from communication as a social process (storytelling) to individually created permanent forms (art), an "organization of intellectual closure" or "logical totality" has been forced upon the unknowable and inexplicable. As it is manifested in tangible form, the potentiality of the unknowable is reduced. It might be said that the Inuit artist is creating an increasingly determinate reality in order to sell it to us.

Something similar is happening to the dimensions of the Sasquatch in our culture as its image is increasingly appropriated by the mass media. It is significant that Sasquatch lore as it pertains to encounters in nature is singularly free of elaborate symbolic elements, as has been noted by Napier as follows:

> On the face of it, the Bigfoot tales do not qualify for a place in the triumvirate of legend, myth or folktale because they are not really tales at all. There are no complicated constructions or sequences of events in the Bigfoot sagas, there is no social purpose, no fulfilment element, no

> fertility symbolism, no ingenuity or trickery. Bigfoot stories are rather static affairs, in which the narrative style of myth and legend is absent . . . . The poverty of these stories is in striking contrast to the richness of traditional tales from other parts of the world.[49]

A comparable poverty of associated myths is noted by John Colarusso in his paper in this volume. He reports that his informant was offended that the Almasti (the Sasquatch of the Caucasus region of the U.S.S.R.) should be considered a mythological beast; he was proud of his culture's mythology and felt that the Almasti, a mundane animal, had no place in it.

This neglect is changing rapidly in North America, as product and media hucksters discover that the Sasquatch is a highly saleable image. In my office, I have some pastries made in the shape of a human footprint, with toenails of chocolate icing; a large canvas bag in the shape of a tennis shoe with "Bigfoot" written on it; a board game called "Bigfoot," in which a player is out when the foot lands on him; and two novels in which Sasquatch encounters humans in contexts of sex and violence. Sasquatch has been widely featured on television, in the movies, and in advertisements. One of Canada's most celebrated writers, Margaret Atwood, has written a poem about it (see Michael Ames's epilogue). Our preoccupation with the monster is growing. Indeed, in her paper in this volume, Carole Carpenter argues that Sasquatch has become Canada's number one monster.

A pattern is emerging, and this book is just another of its manifestations. We are increasingly communicating to each other with symbols from the Goblin Universe. The media have located an appetite for these symbols and are feeding it. It is their business to discover the hidden symbolic connections in our culture and exploit them commercially.[50] What are we really saying? As an anthropologist, I must assume that we are talking about ourselves and expressing something that we dare not say directly. Something is standing there, waiting to be recognized.

Which brings us to the footprints. No matter where a Sasquatch discussion begins, nor how far it wanders, one must always return to the footprints. Napier discovered this when he reviewed the evidence:

> I am convinced that the Sasquatch exists, but whether it is all that it is cracked up to be is another matter altogether. There must be *something* in northwest America that needs explaining, and that something leaves manlike footprints. The evidence I have adduced in favour of the reality of the Sasquatch is not hard evidence; few physicists, biologists

> or chemists would accept it, but nevertheless it *is* evidence and cannot be ignored.[51]

Notice that Napier does not say what it is that leaves the footprints, but he was unable to deny the evidence that there are footprints.

Our definition of reality as that which is tangibly manifested requires that there be footprints. Otherwise, Sasquatch would not be a problem; it would only be a symbol. It would have disappeared into the mind by now, as have the other inhabitants of the Goblin Universe. In his great novel about human survival, Daniel Defoe announces the presence of the man Friday with footprints on the beach. When he saw them, Robinson Crusoe *knew* that he was not alone. Who can leave a footprint without being there? This concept was recently expressed by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., in his novel, *Breakfast of Champions*, when the science-fiction writer, Kilgore Trout, fantasizes about leaving wet footprints on the carpet of a new Holiday Inn:

> It was Trout's fantasy that somebody would be outraged by the footprints. This would give him the opportunity to reply grandly, "What is it that offends you so? I am simply using man's first printing press. You are reading a bold and universal headline which says, 'I am here, I am here, I am here.' "[52]

More grandly, I have seen it reported that Michelangelo said that man was the footprint of God.

The footprints have already acquired some respectable scientific validation. Grover Krantz has published two analyses based upon the assumption that their anatomical complexity and precision could not be readily faked without expert (that is, scientific) knowledge.[53] Other scientists have, like Napier, found them impossible to deny.

I am struck with the symbolism of it. Our footprints are evidence that we have touched the earth, that we are corporeal and of nature. The foot itself is generally despised, and almost denied altogether in women's high-heeled shoes. If the great Sasquatch foot symbolically contains man's animal mortality, then it is even more imperative to look at it than if it is just another animal. Even if Sasquatch encounters are only perceptual errors by people who are temporarily away from their ordinary minds, we share with these people a common humanity, and it is therefore also our perceptual error, one which repeatedly occurs. In answering the question of whether killing a Sasquatch would be murder, Grover Krantz wrote: "The crux of this exchange is whether the sasquatch is human in any sense of the word, and the answer is no."[55] I think we should reverse the question. The crux of the matter is whether humans are in any way like the Sasquatch, and the answer is yes.

Sasquatch is a fulsome liminal symbol, containing fundamental paradoxes of being and non-being, mind and matter, life and death. It straddles and incorporates boundaries that we consider absolute, that are fundamentally required by our system of rationality. To the extent that it is as it appears to be—a being of the mind which leaves footprints in the earth—Sasquatch remains absolutely inexplicable, a genuine mystery. And so my suggested reformulation of the Sasquatch encounter as a classic experience of the supernatural fails in the end, since our culture denies that the supernatural can manifest directly in the world, leaving material traces in the ground. Looking at a plaster cast of a Sasquatch footprint, I must confess to total bafflement. There are no further intellectual formulations I can muster to dispel the mystery of this wonderful phenomenon. Nor do the other essays in this book solve the problem—but they do make it all the more compelling.

Notes

1. John Green, *Sasquatch: The Apes Among Us* (Saanichton, B.C.: Cheam Publishing Ltd. and Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), p. 11.
2. Quoted in John Napier, *Bigfoot* (New York: Dutton, 1972), p. 12.
3. Ibid.
4. Guenther Stent, "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," *Scientific American* 227 (1972): 84–93; quoted in Kenneth R. Pelletier, *Toward a Science of Consciousness* (New York: Dell, 1978), p. 250.
5. Green, *Apes Among Us*, p. 461.
6. Grover S. Krantz, "Introduction and Commentary," in Roderick Sprague and Grover S. Krantz, eds., *The Scientist Looks at the Sasquatch* (Moscow: University Press of Idaho, 1977), p. 9.
7. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).
8. Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain* (New York, London, Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer International, 1977).
9. J. J. Gibson, "Perception as a Function of Stimulation," in *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, ed. S. Koch, Vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 457; quoted in Robert B. Macleod and Herbert L. Pick, Jr., eds., *Perception: Essays in Honor of James J. Gibson* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 47.

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Ron Westrum

Sasquatch and Scientists: Reporting Scientific Anomalies

This article explores the dilemma which confronts the observer of an apparent scientific anomaly: should he report the phenomenon and face possible ridicule or should he refrain from reporting and so question the reliability of his own mind or senses? The author examines how the response of the public and the media to observations or obvious hoaxes which resemble the observer's experience may either inhibit or encourage reporting. He concludes by drawing a parallel between public and scientific attitudes toward Sasquatch and U.F.O. phenomena and the reluctance of established science and popular wisdom in late eighteenth-century France to accept the celestial origin of meteorites until confronted by an undeniable, widely witnessed sighting.

In pondering the meaning of Sasquatch reports and trying to determine the reality of the creatures they describe, we must consider the manner in which these reports reach us. In a series of papers[1] I have presented data about the "social intelligence system" which transmits reports of anomaly experiences from those who have the experiences to the rest of society. What I would like to do here is to suggest some of the implications of this work for the reporting of Sasquatch sightings. Unfortunately, I have not been able to do a special study of Sasquatch reporting, although I have read much of the literature. Hence, my remarks are necessarily somewhat impressionistic. I hope, nonetheless, that they will help clarify some of the issues involved in considerations of the reality of Sasquatch.

THE DEFINITION OF "ANOMALY"

"Anomaly" is used here in a very special sense to describe events that are "impossible" in the cultural framework of the person who experiences them. An anomaly is an event that is not supposed to happen. Accordingly, the person who experiences such an event is likely to see it as problematical. He may actually have difficulty recognizing its anomalous character in the first place. Even when he does recognize it as an anomaly, he may try to check his own perceptions in various ways.

The event can fall into one of three categories. It may be a rare event which is known to science, an event which is unknown to science but conforms to current scientific theory, or an event which is unknown to science and which does not conform to current scientific theory. Events of the first type are to be considered anomalies only because the witness does not believe they are scientifically acceptable; however, the phenomenology of these sightings should be the same as the other two types, and therefore they can serve as a useful control group. Some examples of the first type would be meteorite[2] and ball lightning[3] sightings by persons who did not realize that these events are known to science.

Anomalies of the second type might include Sasquatch, sea-serpents, and in fact the whole area that Bernard Heuvelmans has referred to as "cryptozoology."[4] While it is conceivable that there could be other "cryptosciences," as Marcello Truzzi[5] has called them, most anomaly reports which involve unknown but scientifically acceptable events are biological in nature. Sea-serpents, for instance, are in no sense biologically impossible. Indeed, quite formidable sea-serpents, such as mosasaurs, have existed at earlier points in the Earth's history. On the other hand, non-biological anomalies usually involve the violation of one tenet or another of scientific theory. Truzzi has referred to claims of the third type as "parascientific," since they go beyond current scientific theory. Telepathy would clearly be parascientific, and U.F.O.'s might be. Some physicists would consider ball lightning parascientific, for there is no adequate theory to explain its occurrence.[6]

All three of these types, however, are likely to evoke similar reactions on the part of a person who confronts such an event. There may be other important contours to the experience as well: the sense of danger, awe, the degree to which the experience violates the percipient's preconceptions, and so forth. But the common thread that ties anomaly experiences together is that they are socially unacceptable, and this means that the person who has such an experience must face a dilemma: should he report the experience or not? Let us explore this problem a little further.

THE REPORTING DILEMMA

The person who has had an anomaly experience is likely to experience a certain amount of "cognitive dissonance": a lack of agreement between his beliefs and his experience.[7] The more impressive the experience, the more difficult this problem is likely to be. Many witnesses will resolve the problem in their own minds by denying the experience or rationalizing it away or by changing their beliefs about the event in question. It is likely, however, that they will consult others about the meaning of the experience, either for advice or to convince them of its reality. Usually these will be the person's family, friends, or work associates; how these persons react may determine whether any formal attempt at reporting is made. Often, we know, the person's family or friends will not believe him, especially if he was the sole witness.[8] But in any case the witness is often left with the same problem: was the experience real? If it was, then what was the nature of the event experienced?

To get this resolution, however, the person is likely to have to make a public report. Generally, the person's primary group will not have the necessary information, so he must go to the authorities or to scientific "experts." Or, he may report what he has seen to the press, in an effort to convince others of its reality (although more often the press will approach the sighter). But by making a report the person exposes himself to ridicule. This may come in the form of condescension or laughter on the part of the person or persons to whom the report is made, or it may come in the much more damaging form of satire in the press. Captain George Drevar, from whose ship, the *Pauline*, a sea-serpent was sighted in 1875, complained that:

> It is easy for such a paper to make any man, good, great, or interesting, look ridiculous. Little wonder is it that my relatives write saying that they would have seen a hundred sea-serpents and never reported it; and a lady also wrote that she pities anyone related to anyone that had seen the sea-serpent.[9]

Reporting may also be inspired by a sense of civic duty. In the case of U.F.O. reporters, for instance, this is claimed to be the major motivation in forty-three per cent of the cases.[10] From the manner in which the report is often treated, however, one might well infer that the person's civic duty is to keep quiet. Certainly, one of the main reasons that eighty-seven per cent of U.F.O. sighters never tell anyone other than family or friends about their sighting is the fear of this kind of treatment.[11] And furthermore, how can the person be sure that what he saw was really something anomalous and not something normal that "just looked funny"? The concern about being unable to discriminate the anomalous from the normal was found to be the major reason for non-reporting in U.F.O. cases.[12] One thing is certain: the reporter is very unlikely to be rewarded for making the report, except in the achievement of notoriety. Hence, the person who has an anomaly sighting is rewarded for keeping quiet and acting as a buffer for the rest of society from reports of anomalous events. Unfortunately, this may mean that the sighter is unable to "square" his experience; he does not know whether he saw a genuine anomaly, an optical illusion, an hallucination, or simply a rare phenomenon.

On the other hand, persons who see the Loch Ness monster, a U.F.O., or a Sasquatch are lucky: the anomalies they have experienced are well known, they are labeled, and even though the person who sees one has had a deviant experience, at least it is a deviant experience which others have had. I have often wondered about persons, on the other hand, who have anomaly experiences which they, at least, believe to be unique. In one case, for instance, after I had given a talk on U.F.O.'s to a small group, a person brought forward an experience that he had related to very few persons: he had seen a luminous globe roll into and out of a room. Many readers will recognize this immediately as an instance of ball lightning, but the person who had had the sighting had felt very uncomfortable about it, since he did not know he had experienced a recognized (if somewhat controversial) natural phenomenon.

The appearance of reports of anomalies in the press which are similar to the anomaly one has experienced are thus reassuring; they help convince one of the reality and validity of one's own experience. I was pleased one day to get a call from a woman whose distress I had indirectly alleviated by talking about U.F.O.'s. The woman, who was a cook at a nearby airport, had had the misfortune of having a U.F.O. experience on the Fourth of July. For this she had received a merciless ribbing from her friends. When an article about my U.F.O. research appeared in the press, her friends began to feel that perhaps she was not so crazy after all. Finding out that other persons are having the same experience can thus be very important for one's sense of self-esteem and for the esteem of one's friends.

The reports of others are also likely to make a witness more willing to report. In what I have called the "report release phenomenon,"[13] old sightings are often reported after considerable publicity is given to a phenomenon in magazines or the press. Some believe that the "me too" character of this stimulated reporting is evidence of its fraudulence,[14] but I am certain that in some cases, as with the ball lightning sighting mentioned earlier, there is a sense of relief in being able to make one's experience public. There is also, I suspect, a feeling that reporting the experience is worthwhile, that someone is interested in it who can evaluate it properly. In fact, the recipient of the released experiences is frequently the author of the article or the expert interviewed by the press.

FRAUDULENT REPORTS

The appearance of a number of reports in the press is almost certain to awaken another reaction: the desire to demonstrate the gullibility of the public. For this reason and because of the desire for notoriety (particularly on the part of teenagers), a number of hoaxes are likely to be mounted. These take essentially three forms: false witness that an anomaly has been observed; fabricated evidence (such as photographs or physical traces); and the construction of stimuli which will make others believe that they are witnessing an anomalous event. For instance, in regard to Sasquatch reports, we find persons making up stories that they have seen "Bigfoot," making false tracks, and occasionally running around in costumes that will fool a casual observer. Doubtless a study of the persons who thus fabricate anomalous events would be interesting from a variety of perspectives. However, since we do not have such a study, we can only examine the consequences of such hoaxing.

In the first place, it is evident that many hoaxes are likely to be exposed. Some, in fact, are revealed by their perpetrators, since this is an integral part of their demonstration of the gullibility of the public. In other cases the internal evidence of the case contains a subtle contradiction which, when revealed, displays the humorous nature of the report. One way or another a good many, perhaps the majority, of fraudulent cases are exposed. The effect of this exposure on the way in which the public and the scientific community regard reports of anomalous events is almost necessarily negative. Anomalous reports by their very nature are difficult to believe in any case. The existence of fraudulent reports seems to suggest a ready explanation that is appealing to scientists, newspaper reporters, and professional skeptics: all anomalous reports are frauds.

The effect on reporting is correspondingly negative. Few people enjoy being laughed at. The person who is willing to report an anomaly when several fraudulent reports have recently been exposed is hardy indeed. Many persons who would be willing to make a detailed report if they could find someone sympathetic to report to are discouraged by initial negative receptions created by this atmosphere. The fraudulent report is thus likely to constrict the reporting process.

PERCEPTUAL CONTAGION

Another source of difficulty is the low-threshold anomaly experience. I use the term "low-threshold" to refer to those anomaly experiences in which there is a mental set in favour of perceiving the anomaly. With a low threshold of perception, perceptual mistakes are easily made, and it is all too easy to have a Sasquatch "sighting" which will not hold up under analysis.[15] I have personally interviewed persons who have had low-threshold sightings of U.F.O.'s; in these cases the effect of suggestion and preconception on their experiences is obvious to the experienced interviewer.

The difficulty with such sightings is the spread of folklore which describes the parameters of the Sasquatch experience. The person learns, in advance of the experience itself, what kinds of perceptual cues can be used to identify a Sasquatch. He may then require, from a perceptual standpoint, an absolute minimum of stimuli to feel that he has had a Sasquatch experience. But folklore about anomalies follows directly on the heels of publicity. In addition to information contained in newspaper articles, there are more sensational stories in *True*, *Argosy*, *Saga*, and similar magazines. This is further supplemented by "documentary" or dramatized film accounts of real occurrences and by orally transmitted folklore. The latter tends to stress particularly methods of detection and protection against dangers associated with Sasquatch sightings. It is improvised news[16] to fill the specific need of dealing with an uncertain and possibly dangerous situation.

This folklore tends to lower the usefulness of the average sighting, since it makes people more willing to perceive something when nothing is there and incidentally makes them more vulnerable to hoaxes of the second and third kinds. It does a great deal to confuse the question of the anomaly's existence.

REACTIONS OF THE MEDIA

Until a sighter has actually tried to make a report, his perception of the reaction that a report will produce is determined in a large part by what he reads and sees in the media. As we have seen, if news stories present other reporters as fools, he may be very reluctant to report. If the story is presented in a neutral or sympathetic fashion, on the other hand, this may encourage the person to report the sighting. The media controls, to a larger extent than it realizes, the number of reports made public. The mere fact of publicizing anomaly sightings at all, in fact, is likely to stimulate reporting, since it demonstrates to sighters that other persons are having the same experiences.

The presentation in the media of opinions by scientific experts plays a lesser, but still important, role. Scientists can usually be counted upon to reject anomaly reports, but this reaction is recognized and discounted by many people. (The situation is quite different when direct contact with a scientist is involved.) The more important effect of scientific opinion concerns the reaction of the press: the reporter looks to the opinions of the scientific community as a guide for his own treatment of reports of anomalies. Press interviews with scientists are as much for the benefit of the press as they are for the information of media consumers.

Whether or not there is an anomaly sighting "wave," I would like to suggest, is determined by the press in the same way that it determines "crime waves." In fact, the press perhaps plays an even larger role in anomaly reporting, since it can affect the reporting of anomalies to the authorities in the first place, whereas in crime reporting the control of the press is essentially limited to publicizing events that have already been reported to the police. The press are often viewed as stimulating anomaly reports because of the large demand for them on the part of their readers. My strong suspicion is, however, that it is the opinion of their own colleagues that is the major determinant of press behaviour. If other newspapers are printing anomaly reports, then they will too. What is "news," then, is as much determined by the behaviour of the other newspapers as it is by consumer demand. What this means is that the sudden appearance of many publicized reports of Sasquatch or other anomalies may not be a result of a sudden spate of sightings but rather of the imitative behaviour of the press. At the very least we can note that without a massive publication of reports the "wave" will not even exist. I think it is very naive to assume, however, that press coverage of anomaly sightings is only affected by the rate at which sightings are reported. There are also the internal determinants of press behaviour that I have indicated.

SASQUATCH AND SCIENTISTS

In contemporary society we have given to scientists an important task which in previous times was frequently given to the clergy: the management of our "sense of reality." It is science that decides what is real and what is not, what exists and what does not exist. To be sure, other institutions compete with science for this right, but ultimately science is the arbiter. When the reality of creatures like the Sasquatch is put to the question, science has the final say. Even Sasquatch advocates who have nothing good to say about science would be delighted if science would admit these hypothetical creatures to the realm of legitimately researchable objects. Perhaps, therefore, we ought to consider for a minute just how science might go about making such an admission. To do so I am going to call to my aid a little bit of history and discuss the meteorite controversy of the late eighteenth century.[17]

At that time it was fashionable for savants to poke fun at the "absurd" belief that stones could fall from the air. After such a fall of stones at Julliac in France was witnessed by three hundred persons in 1790 and attested in a legal affidavit, the witnesses were ridiculed in the scientific press. An "obviously wrong fact . . . . a phenomenon *physically* impossible," said one editor who felt nothing but pity for the witnesses. However, by 1803 the scientific men of the time had done a complete turnabout and decided that the falling stones were real after all. What had happened? If we can understand how this change took place, perhaps we can make an educated guess at what would change scientists' minds about Sasquatch. I can determine three elements which were involved.

The first element was the discovery that the stones alleged to be aerolites were similar in composition to each other and different in composition from terrestial rocks. This was not so much a matter of what was in them, but rather how it was put together. For instance, the meteorites with a considerable amount of iron had nickel in them, a combination which had not been found in terrestial rocks. Similarly, all the stone meteorites had black crusts and a granular interior: if they did not have a common origin, why did they look so similar? However, these common elements were discovered only through research: some scientists had to take the meteorites seriously enough to detect these similarities.

The second element was a theory about where the rocks came from. Scientists were more willing to consider reports of falling rocks when some of their number proposed that meteorites might be thrown out from volcanoes on the moon. Now it turned out that this theory was erroneous, but the important thing was that *there was a theory*. Established science maintained that unless there was a theory to explain the origin of the meteorites, they could not be considered as a special phenomenon. Of course, we have all been taught in school that theories are proved by experiment, not the other way around, but actually, in this case, it was the existence of the theory which helped the experiment (perhaps we should say the experience) to gain acceptance.

The third element was a sighting which could not be ignored. Exactly why this sighting, which took place near a French village called L'Aigle in 1803, could not be ignored is a complex matter. Partly, it was because the question of meteorites was very controversial at the time, even to the point of becoming the subject of popular songs. Partly, it was because the village was only about seventy miles from Paris, whereas Julliac was in the South of France. And, finally, one of the witnesses to the event was a member of the French

Institut. Also, approximately three thousand stones had fallen. It was not an easy sighting to ignore.

If we consider the Sasquatch, it is evident that not all of these conditions are fulfilled. For instance, while the overall biological characteristics of the Sasquatch are well known to those who have studied the reports, there is no theory linking the occurrence of such large hominid creatures with the rest of evolutionary theory, at least not to my knowledge. Then, there is the problem of why, if they do exist, we do not have a carcass. The third element, the sighting which cannot be ignored, is also clearly not present, no matter how credible the Patterson film may be to Sasquatch advocates.

The meteorite phenomenon passed through three stages: a stage of uncorrelated observations, a stage of intense controversy, and finally the stage of scientific acceptance. Thanks to the efforts of Ivan Sanderson, John Green, and others, Sasquatch reports are no longer uncorrelated observations. They have passed to the stage of controversy. When they will finally reach scientific acceptance depends in part upon the intellectual inventiveness of Sasquatch advocates in devising a theory. But it also depends on an observation which cannot be ignored; in other words, it also depends upon a lucky break.

Notes

1. "Social Intelligence About Anomalies: The Case of Meteorites," *Social Studies of Science* 8 (1978): 461–93; "Social Intelligence About Anomalies: the Case of UFO's," *Social Studies of Science* 7, no. 3 (1977): 271–302; "Knowledge About Sea-Serpents," *Sociological Review Monographs* 27, "On the Margins of Science" (1979), edited by Roy Wallis, pp. 293–314.
2. See H. H. Nininger, *Find A Falling Star* (New York: Paul Eriksson, 1972), p. 30.
3. Stanley Singer, *The Nature of Ball Lightning* (New York: Plenum Press, 1971).
4. See for instance, Bernard Heuvelmans' *On the Track of Unknown Animals* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1959).
5. "Editorial," *Zetetic* 1, no. 2 (1977): p. 3–8.
6. See Eugene Garfield, "When Citation Analysis Strikes Ball Lightning," *Current Contents* 8, no. 20 (1976): 5–16.
7. Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).
8. See John Fuller, *Incident at Exeter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), pp. 13, 54, 140, 176.

9. Quoted in Bernard Heuvelmans, *In the Wake of the Sea-Serpents* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 225.
10. Aldora Lee, "Public Attitudes toward UFO Phenomena," in University of Colorado, *Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 227.
11. Ibid., p. 226.
12. Ibid.
13. See Westrum, "Social Intelligence About Anomalies: The Case of UFO's," p. 285.
14. Urner Liddel, "Phantasmagoria or Unusual Observations in the Atmosphere," *Journal of the Optical Society of America* 43 no. 4 (1953): 314–17; also Herbert Hackett, "The Flying Saucer: A Manufactured Concept," *Sociology and Social Research*, 32 (May-June 1948): 869–73.
15. For a discussion of "low-threshold" sightings and their characteristics, see my article on "Witnesses of UFO's and Other Anomalies," in Richard Haines, editor, *UFO's and the Behavioral Scientist* (Metuchen, N.J.: Shoestring Press, 1979).
16. Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
17. For further details, see my "Science and Social Intelligence about Anomalies: The Case of Meteorites," *Social Studies of Science* 8, no. 4 (November 1978).

Wilfrida Ann Mully

The Unwanted Possession: The Origin of Monsters from a Psychoanalytical Point of View

This article is concerned with the occurrence of monsters in mental life, especially as revealed in the material of psychoanalytic patients. The author gives a brief review of psychoanalytic theories with reference to changing concepts of such monsters. She maintains that, in many instances, monsters represent an objectification of that part of a person's self which is felt to be repulsive. Refering to her own work she describes how, when this phenomenon occurs, the patient needs to be helped to confront the abhorrent self and to examine the real and imaginary experience which led to or fostered its existence.

As a psychoanalyst I entertain little doubt about the existence of certain monster types. Clinical sightings are frequent. The evidence for their existence is confirmed daily, though I can produce no plaster casts of giant footprints, no hair samples, no fuzzy photographs. Over the past two or three years I have developed some ideas based on one particular clinical observation: people in psychoanalytic treatment frequently produce some kind of monster as the essential patient.[1] The monsters of which I speak are products of the human imagination. They do not all possess human form. Often, in fact, they depart from it in being of strange, grotesque, or horrible aspect, thereby creating a response of dread, repulsion, or ridicule. They are phantastic images which occur to individuals by which the self experiences itself as lacking humanity, as unnaturally evil, stupid, or ill. They can be arranged in a rough hierarchy according to their degree of unnaturalness and deviation from human sensibility, and their position in the hierarchy tends to correspond to the severity of the patient's disturbance.

At one extreme comes the least human, the animate "thing," usually the product of schizophrenic delusion: examples would be a judgemental television set, a malevolent machine, a robot devoid of human feeling. Next are the half-alive half-dead, such as Frankenstein's monster, the walking dead, the vampire. Devils, demons, and witches share attributes of unnatural power and malevolence; that is, they lack normal human limitations. Next come animal forms, of which the furthest from human are insect and reptilian forms. The chimera and were-animals are partly human, and the closest to man are the mammals. The significance of this is that it is less disturbing to resemble, or to be identified with, a lion than with a werewolf or a snake. Finally, there are human beings distinguished by distortion of form, character, or behaviour. These include criminals, giants, and cripples and can be permanent in form or alternating like Robert Louis Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Remember, I speak not of "real" giants, criminals, or beasts, but of those produced by human phantasy and encountered in the psychoanalytic setting.

How then does the psychoanalyst encounter the monster? Mainly in the dreams of patients, but also in daytime fantasy. It also frequently occurs in children's play. It can be a self description, and it is sometimes a designation by others of the patient. In summary, a patient may see himself as a monster, or he may view others as such, yet fear to become like them or fear attack from them in nightmares or in reality. The word "monster" is used frequently but not invariably. It may be replaced by others from the category described above, such as devil, demon, beast, or creature. Whatever it is, it is abhorrent to the person seeking help, for it is seen as harmful—it is an unwanted possession. Often, the first request of the applicant for treatment is its removal: the reaction to it is a phobic one and the cure to be hoped for is exorcism.

Interestingly, this is exactly what the founder of psychoanalysis first attempted to do. In the book, *Studies on Hysteria*,[2] Freud describes the case of his patient Frau Emmy von N., who suffered from symptoms of "zoopsia, macropsia and zoophobia"; that is, she saw animals that were not really present, they grew larger in size, and she feared them. This occurred in dreams and wakefulness alike. In one dream she described to Freud, "The legs and arms of the chairs were all turned into snakes; a monster with a vulture's beak was tearing and eating at her all over her body. . . ." He attempted to cure her of this and other unpleasant experiences by wiping out the memories in a series of daily hypnotic sessions. But he reproached himself for failing to enquire into the significance, symbolic or otherwise, of Frau Emmy's fear of animals. Psychoanalysis was not yet born.

The first phase of psychoanalytic thinking was dominated by instinct theory in which Freud envisaged the sexual instinct as a kind of forceful, motivating current of tension capable of accumulation, being dammed up, or turned back, which moulded the course of individual human development. It expressed itself by attempts to reduce tension in special ways at special times in relation to particular objects. For instance, in the period of infancy, instinctual tension was relieved by using the mouth to suck at the breast (or breast substitute). Similarly, Freud described stages of maturity at which different gratifications were sought and expressed in ways appropriate to the phase reached. He formulated that the mature sexual instinct was formed from components which came apart in the perversions, hence the "polymorphous perverse" nature of children.[3] Thus the childish expression of instinct was characterized by a total lack of limitation. Impulses could be directed at any part of the body, any orifice, to any being, animal or human, of either sex, any family, and any generation. Further limitations of reality had not yet been accepted: wishful impulses were expressed for the sex organs of the opposite sex, flying could be possible, as could transformations. The wish, in fact, is supreme. In 1897, Freud wrote a letter to his friend Fliess describing the resemblance of witch and devil cults to children's play and to the perversions.[4] In this age of licence, Freud also pointed out that death wishes could be, and were, freely expressed towards any agency which thwarted wishful gratification.[5] But in normal development, shame and pity gradually brought about the limitation of component instincts of cruelty, voyeurism, and exhibitionism. Fear of castration from the father limited incestuous wishes towards the mother. Further development led to energy being diverted into the maintainance of a repressive barrier by which adults became unaware of their previous primitive functioning, which continued to exist only in disguised, symbolic form in dreams.

In illness, Freud proposed that the individual became sick because of a frustration to the phase-appropriate instinctual gratification. The sexual instinct would then seek to express itself at a more primitive level; that is, regression would occur. This could take place in phantasy, which was most common in neurotic illness, accompanied by painful conflict due to shame and pity. Or worse, it could be acted out in the perversions, which would lead to reactions of horror in others, the perverse person being apparently unaffected by pity and shame and fixated to permanent, infantile erotic excitement. In his first reference to the Oedipus drama in 1897, Freud said,

> Each member of the audience was once, in germ and in phantasy, just such an Oedipus, and each one recoils in horror from the dream-fulfillment here transplanted into reality, with the whole quota of repression which separates his infantile state from his present one.[6]

It follows from this that instinctually regressive behaviour would be unacceptable to the civilized adult, not so much because it is harmful, but because it is shameful and abnormal and ought to have been renounced. Freud saw conscience as the development of the prohibition of early, outgrown impulses. People who dreamed of forbidden activity and those who carried it out alike would be regarded as monsters and were quite frequently described so. This was not peculiar to neurotic and perverse patients described by Freud but was part of late-nineteenth-century culture. For instance, Krafft Ebing described a gardener's boy whose sexual life was restricted to intercourse with rabbits as "this human monster."[7]

In this framework, animals were often convenient symbols for repressed instinctual impulses and were thought to represent them in dreams. In a more complicated way, possession and transformation were seen as defenses against the owning of unacceptable impulses. Early on, in another letter, Freud claimed that the "theory of possession. . .was identical with our theory of a foreign body and a splitting of consciousness."[8] Both possession and transformation to animal form allowed partial disavowal of responsibility for the particular behaviour conjectured, which would be considered "normal" to the shape shifted to or the possessing spirit. Karl Abraham, a contemporary of Freud, further elaborated the instinctual phases. He divided the first, or oral, phase into sucking and biting stages, the latter of which was characterized by desires to bite and devour the object, which Abraham considered to be crucial in the development of depressive illness. He said:

> We see the cannibalistic wish-phantasies very clearly expressed in one particular form of depressive delusion. This delusion was extraordinarily widespread among people in the past and has not wholly disappeared even at present. It is that of being transformed into a wild, man-eating animal—a werewolf. The older psychiatry was so familiar with this delusional self-accusation that it gave to this particular form of "possession" the name of *lycanthropy.*[9]

Nandor Fodor discusses lycanthropy as a mental mechanism whereby destructive or orgiastic impulses can be expressed without guilt by the adoption of alternate identity. He describes a jackal dance, witnessed by someone in Southern Rhodesia, in which there was an orgiastic climax enabling the participants to undergo an "evolutionary regression."[10] Ernest Jones used the same instinctual model. In his monograph, *On The Nightmare*, he discussed the creations of medieval superstition encountered in dream and phantasy, such as vampires, werewolves, demons, and witches, and classified them as phobias, the latent content of which represent elements of infantile, incestuous, and (he also implied) authority-defying wishes.[11]

Some recent American authors explain their cases according to the same model. Galvin describes a case of bewitchment in a seventeen year old Spanish-American girl whose "possession" is explained as a means of expression of regressive dependency needs and incestuous wishes in place of moving into adulthood. Responsibility for this state of affairs could be assigned to a certain aunt, who was held responsible for the bewitchment.[12] Vanden Bergh and Kelly review cases of vampirism (blood-letting and blood-sucking perversion) in terms of regression and fixation to the phase of oral sadism with justification of castration and murderous phantasies and acts found attractive as "forbidden fruit."[13] Arnold Ludwig assigns a psychiatric diagnosis to each of five cases of possession attributed by others to witchcraft.[14] He accepts the Freud-Jones explanation that demoniacal possession is the result of a breakthrough of forbidden, repressed, sexual, incestuous impulses.

Later evolution of psychoanalytic thought led to more psychological and less physical models of mental functioning than instinct theory. According to Freud's structural theory the mental apparatus had two parts or agencies, the id and ego, related respectively to internal and external processes and, in some measure, also to past and future.[15] An internal world formed by the ego was postulated to contain certain portions of the external world, primarily that part of parental authority and supervision with which the ego identified and which therefore became differentiated as the superego.[16] The notion of an inner world as an assumptive world corresponding in certain respects (according to the adequacy of ego functioning) to the subject's experience of himself and his objects expanded to become the special, unique objective of psychoanalytic study. It is now postulated that, by careful attention to psychoanalytic technique in the psychoanalytic setting, the analyst becomes receptive to the patients projections in the transference situation: the analyst passively gets to know and is able to interpret back to the patient the roles that he has become accustomed to expect from the significant others in his life. Thus, it is possible to be invited to share the particular psychic reality of each patient as it has been moulded by phantasies and by the revision of phantasies and their interplay with actual experience into the "myth" by which each person operates.

In this model, reduction of instinctual tension as the prime motivating force is replaced by the need to seek satisfaction through object relationships. Instinctual aims and phases are not abandoned in this theory but are seen as subservient to the type and level of particular relationships. Also, instead of one sexual instinct regulating relationships, Freud later conceived there to be two classes of instinct, called the life and death instincts, whose balance was crucial in human development.[17] It is obvious that an individual can have, at any one moment, differing sorts of relationships with different sorts of object. Ronald Fairbairn modified Freud's structural theory, proposing an internal world consisting of a number of internal objects which could be formed according to the union of parts of the ego with different types of object. Separate entities arose according to the objects' capacities to excite or frustrate the subject.[18] The inner world could then contain internal objects which partly arose from the original ego and partly from its experience with an object, either real or imagined. They might not be clearly classifiable as either self or other, and they could be identified with or repudiated at differing points in time. This was one way to conceptualize an internalized relationship. In somewhat similar fashion, Melanie Klein and her followers proposed that internal objects were formed from interactional sequences of projection and subsequent introjection of objects altered by projection of parts of the subject. These, too, would be difficult to assign definitely to self or to other categories. Kernberg similarly observed in certain patients a switching of "ego states" which seemed to represent a conflict between acting out an impulse and the specific reaction to it which he suggested could be understood as an oscillation between these ego states representing "non-metabolized" object relationships.[19]

In case this seems dry and far from the subject, let me enliven it by quoting from an early paper by Melanie Klein. In previous papers she had drawn attention to one principal mechanism, found alike in dreams and in the play of children, whereby different identifications can be separated and personified and thus worked over in phantasy.[20] In a paper on the development of conscience in the child she wrote that

> the man-eating wolf, the fire spewing dragon and all the evil monsters out of myths flourish and exert their unconscious influence in the phantasy of each individual child, and it feels itself persecuted and threatened by those evil shapes.[21]

Further, she said that "the real objects behind those imaginary, terrifying figures are the child's own parents, and that those dreadful shapes reflect the features of its father and mother, however distorted and phantastic the resemblance may be."[22] The evil and distorted shapes were not realistically arrived at perceptions of the parents, but were seen as distorted by projection onto them of the child's phantasies of violence against the parents, against which they might retaliate. Klein also described the adverse effect on the young child who identifies with a misperceived and distorted perception of the parent. More recently, Winnicott has written about the influence on the developing child of his image reflected in his mother's eyes, and Bion has written a great deal about the genesis of what he has called bizarre objects, compounded partly of real objects and partly of fragments of personality, which are characteristically found in patients' delusions.[23]

In the clinical example which follows I will try to show how a patient, Jane, came to identify a monstrous creature and a victim in the relationship between herself and her mother.

Jane was fourteen when she was expelled from boarding school after an overdose. She had left a note to a schoolfriend, which read in part, "Everyone thinks I'm killing Mummy. I'm wicked and I'm cruel but I can't stop myself. What is inside me is like a cancer eating at my heart and feelings." Jane was very thin, ill-looking girl. Outside the analysis she spent her time inactive in her room, attempts to get her to study or go to school having failed. On the couch, she lay inert and silent most of the time. But she had a repulsive habit of incessantly clawing with the nails of her left hand at the back of her right hand: the skin was a mass of scabs, scars, and raw bleeding areas, sickening to behold. She showed no improvement and in fact grew worse, in that she stopped eating altogether at weekends when I was absent and on one occasion lost the use of her legs when I was away. She was subsequently admitted to hospital, and we continued the analysis there. One night, at a time of great distress when Jane spent most of her time sobbing, she had the following dream in four scenes:

1. She was threatened by someone in a white coat to be turned out of a supermarket because she was a monster.
2. She opened a library door and caught a glimpse of a huge, scaly dragon with claws; terrified, she ran away.
3. She was in a round room, trying to find material to cover the windows so as to obscure the view of prowling monsters outside.
4. She was a beggar, wandering on a beach, with some hippies.

Associations and transference implications of this dream over the following days led us to the core of Jane's illness. This was a persistent and disturbing phantasy of herself as a clawing monster, causing injury to her mother's breast resulting in the danger of her own death by starvation or poison.

The phantasy contained fragments of historic truth in that we discovered that Jane's mother had suffered from both a depressive illness and a breast abscess in Jane's infancy. This had resulted in sudden weaning for Jane. Jane had recently watched a baby sister nursing at the breast and remembered how the baby's fingers curled and uncurled on its surface, a gentler movement but otherwise identical with Jane's clawing. She had also heard from her mother that she had suffered from a scaly scalp as a baby, another feature of the dragon. She was haunted by the fear of rejection based on the kind of monster she saw herself to be.

My impression was that the image of Jane's mother (who was, in the first place, regarded as unfeeling and ungiving) seemed to become distorted by massive projection into it of frantic activity, originally intended as a mobilization, to such an extent that Jane experienced it as hostile and saw it as needing to withdraw. This left her shrunken and helpless and having lost all capacity to act. By comparison, the maternal image is inflated by the addition of large parts of Jane's personality, including her perception and energy. Suddenly, positions are exchanged as Jane seems to see herself in her mother's eyes as an insensitive, clawing, and demanding child. Hospital staff observed that Jane would become excessively depressed when she received any gift: she would feel herself to be unduly demanding. At these moments, the mother image must have been experienced as ripped apart, full of holes and in danger of not being able to hold her. This also was reflected in hospital life in several ways, some quite concrete. One day, for example, Jane saw an exit sign over a door and promptly exited, to become lost in the street. Recoiling in horror from herself as monster, she would hurl the hateful identity back at her mother and flee. This she finally did, from the hospital and from the analysis.

She was excessively helpless, since both perception and activity were felt to be destructive and needing to be renounced. Even her needs had to be renounced. The alternative was to find the monster back inside herself, greedy and demanding, which was most likely to happen when she herself wanted to undertake a maternal identity. This explained, to some extent, why Jane broke down at puberty. Her unending dilemma seemed to revolve around a relationship where one was inevitably cast as prey, the other as predator. Was Jane unduly aggressive or was her mother inaccessible? Was she in danger of starving while her mother waxed and flourished on what Jane had given her, or had Jane greedily drained and depleted a previously benevolent breast and thus exiled herself from the source of supply, as in the supermarket image? When she ran away, it was to the promise of superabundant mothering from a long lost Nanny who turned up to visit her at the hospital. But this dream failed, for the Nanny was married and preoccupied with her own children.

I saw Jane again about four years later. She no longer appeared as vulnerable as when I had known her. But she told me she was no better: "It's just that I've grown a hard skin." She had become a registered heroin addict. It struck me that she had adopted a lifestyle which represented both sides of the relationship, just as her clawing gesture had done. The hard-skinned dragon was represented on the outside—her skin was scarred from old scabs and new ones from the injections and abscesses connected with them. Inside, the starving, vulnerable, helpless self was kept that way in a narcotic trance.

My purpose has been to try to show, however briefly, that a certain kind of disturbing phantasy of a monster, embodying one side of an unhappy relationship, can be presented to the analyst as the real instigator of illness. The creation and discovery of the monster is an achievement by the patient and is helpful to the analysis. It reveals precisely the source and nature of the patient's sense of guilt and outlines the harm he feels he might have done and may still feel trapped and tempted into doing. This is then available for examination in the analysis. At the same time, the monster serves a defensive purpose, for it can be separated from the self and disowned as "not me, but in control of me," as is quite often the case with psychotic patients. And, if it is accepted as within the self, it can yet be regarded as a foreign body for whom the self is not responsible and who, in any case, is only doing as its nature dictates. This is the usual situation in cases of possession. But the fact that the remainder of the personality can be experienced in such cases as innocent, even benevolent, can sometimes help the individual to join forces with a partner, in this case the analyst, and to persist in the struggle with the monster.

Getting rid of part of the personality is impoverishing and is largely how the monster tends to come about in the first place. The analytic task is ultimately the integration of the aspects it represents within the personality. There is no need to detail this process; I will say only that these monsters are timid and elusive by nature. They are hated and unwelcome to their possessor, being experienced as hateful, but they need to be persuaded to stay and be studied. Their role must even be accepted for a time by the analyst, who needs to be strong to accept the experience of himself or herself as cruel, demanding, or hateful. They can only be integrated by understanding the circumstances which have called them into being. When all this becomes clear, the patient is able to dismantle his creation and redistribute the assets and liabilities that it has held for him.

Psychiatrically speaking, one could say about the monster, and about the monstrous state, that the neurotic fears it, the perverse person enjoys it compulsively, and the psychotic dreads it and experiences it as real. It may be identified with, and certain patients may even believe, as in lycanthropy, that they have been transformed into a werewolf, a demon, a monster. An understanding of these delusionary, psychotic fictions can tell us something about the role of the monster in the imagination, and about the compulsion, in some perversions, to act out certain phantasies.

Real humanoid monsters, the subject of this conference, have always existed. Some are the sad result of congenital abnormality. Others populate the unknown world and the edges of the known world. At times they have been no more than unknown or little known neighbours made monstrous by a frightened imagination but eventually known and understood. At other times they have been exotic amalgams of beast and man, and their reality is more uncertain. But to a psychoanalyst, the essential issue is the meaning and importance of strange and hybrid creatures in mental functioning. In this respect, there can be no doubt about their existence.

Notes

1. I have previously expressed these ideas in an unpublished paper, "The Unwanted Possession: Evidence for the Existence of an Id Representation in Mental Life and Its Consequences" (1977).
2. References to Freud's works are to volumes in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated under the general editorship of James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953). *Studies on Hysteria* (1893–95) is S.E. (Standard Edition) 2.
3. All this was described in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) S.E. 7.
4. *Extracts from the Fliess Papers* (1950 [1882–99]) S.E. 1, pp. 242, 243.
5. Ibid., Draft N, p. 255.
6. Ibid., p. 265.
7. R.F. von Krafft Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis* (New York: Bell, 1965).
8. *Fliess Papers*, p. 242.
9. Karl Abraham, *Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis* (New York: Hogarth Press, 1968).
10. Nandor Fodor, "Lycanthropy as a Psychic Mechanism," *Journal of American Folklore* 58 (1945).
11. (London: Hogarth Press, 1931).
12. J. Galvin, "A Case of Witchcraft," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders* 133 (1961): 161–68.
13. R.L. Vanden Bergh and J.F. Kelly, "Vampirism: A Review with New Observations," *Archives of General Psychiatry* 11 (1964): 543–47.
14. Arnold M. Ludwig, "Witchcraft Today," *Diseases of the Nervous System* 26 (1965): 288–91.
15. *The Ego and the Id* (1923) S.E. 19.
16. *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940) S.E. 23.
17. *New Introductory Letters on Psycho-Analysis* (1933) S.E. 22.
18. Ronald D. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (London: Tavistock, 1952).
19. O. Kernberg, "Structural Derivatives of Object Relationships," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 47 (1966): 236–53.
20. See Melanie Klein, "Personification in the Play of Children" (1929) and "The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis" (1926) collected in *Love, Hate and Reparation and Other Works* (London: Hogarth Press, 1975).
21. "The Early Development of the Child," (1933) in ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 249.
23. D.W. Winnicott, "Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in *The Predicament of the Family*, ed. P. Lomas (London: Hogarth Press, 1967) and W.R. Bion, *Second Thoughts: Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis* (New York: Jason Aronson, 1967).

David Lyle Jeffrey

Medieval Monsters

This article notes the widespread occurrence of manlike monsters in the literature and myth of medieval Europe and describes the two explanations of such monsters current at the time. One school, represented by Augustine's *The City of God*, maintained that monsters were "part of the deliberate diversity of Creation"; the other, of Northern European origin, considered monsters to be "embodiments of evil forces." With special reference to the Anglo-Saxon *Beowulf*, the author examines how the merging of the two attitudes as Northern Europe was Christianized led to modification of the popular conception of manlike monsters.

To anthropologists interested in Sasquatch and related phenomena, it may well appear capricious to try to set in relationship to the modern North American myth-maker a medieval science of Old World monsters, even humanoid monsters. Yet if we can eschew for a moment the seductiveness of a simple evolutionary hypothesis and adopt the less ambitious methods of the literary *comparatiste*, I believe that we may discover in the literature and art of the European Middle Ages an engaging introduction to one or two aspects of the present study.

There are two traditions with regard to monsters in the Middle Ages. One is descended from the humane anthropology of St. Augustine, who regarded all reported physiological aberrations, whether individual or of a whole group of peoples, as part of the deliberate diversity of creation in which each rational being is still descended from Adam. The other tradition is more northerly European, later, and influenced by Germanic sources, and it developed stories about monstrous humanoids who are embodiments of evil forces. As these mythologies were Christianized, the Germanic monsters became "descendants of Cain," or evidences of miscreance in the history of the family, embodiments of the perversion of blood relationship and family history. These divergent traditions come together colourfully in the romance literature of the Middle Ages. In the pages which follow I will highlight certain features of the Germanic development against the background of Christian tradition with special reference to the Anglo-Saxon epic poem

Beowulf. In the process I hope to offer an introductory guide to the spiritual history of what we might think of as a kind of unhappy "medieval Sasquatch."

In his monumental treatise *The City of God*, Augustine dealt with a number of essentially anthropological questions. One of these was: *An ex propagine Adam vel filiorum Noe quaedam genera hominum monstrosa prodierint* (Liber XVI, cap. 8), which begins.:

> It is also asked whether we are to believe that certain monstrous races of men, spoken of in secular history, have sprung from Noah's sons, or rather, I should say, from that one man from whom they themselves were descended. For it is reported that some have one eye in the middle of the forehead; some, feet turned backwards from the heel; some, a double sex, the right breast like a man, the left like a woman . . .; others are said to have no mouth, and to breathe only through their nostrils; others are but a cubit high, and are therefore called by the Greeks "Pigmies"—they also say that in some places women conceive in their fifth year and do not live beyond their eighth. . . . Others are said to have no head, having their eyes in their shoulders.

As he continued in this fashion, with reference to "other human or quasi-human races [such as] are depicted in mosaic in the harbour esplanade of Carthage," Augustine observed two points of reference for dealing with the question of all creatures which are extraordinary: the first is a skeptical reservation that "we are not bound to believe all we hear of these monstrosities"; the second is an affirmation, by faith, of the essential humanity which must pertain to such creatures:

> But whoever is born anywhere a man, that is, a rational mortal animal, no matter what unusual appearance he presents in colour, movement, sound, nor how peculiar he is in some power, part, or quality of his nature, no Christian can doubt that he springs from that one protoplast. We can distinguish the common human nature from that which is peculiar and therefore wonderful.[1]

It is this affirmation of faith which enabled Augustine to proceed, in a typical medieval argument by classes, to argue that the same sort of explanation which can be given for monstrous births in individual cases can be

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Plates 1 and 2. These close-ups from Roger Patterson's film (see colour plates 16-20) show the most striking features of the creature: pendulous breasts and manlike foot.

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

Plate 3. Scrub woodlands near Mt. Dashennongjia, Hubei province, China, near where a manlike creature was reported seen on 6 June 1976.

Plate 4. Government researchers with the woman, in the centre, who saw the "wild man," which was rubbing its back against a tree.



Plates 5 and 6. Two views of a plaster cast of a footprint taken near the site

Plate 7. Cross-sectional views of:
(1) human leg hair;
(2) hair taken from tree at Mt. Dashennongjia site;
(3) gorilla back hair;
(4) grizzly bear back hair.


1
2
3
4
1, 人腿毛, X 150
2, "野人"擦痒留在树上的毛, X 170
3. 猩猩背毛, X 200
4. 棕熊背毛, X 250



Plate 8. Russian researcher Igor Bourtsev with plaster cast of footprint found by colleague Zhenya Dobchinskaya on 21 August 1979 in the Varob River valley in Tadzhikistan, U.S.S.R. The footprint was 34 cm long and 16 cm wide at the toes.

Plate 9. This 37.5-cm-long footprint was photographed near Blue Creek Mountain, California, in the Bluff Creek area.





Similiter ibi naſcuntur cenocephali quoſ
noſ conopoenaſ appellamuſ habenteſ iubaſ
equorū · ap rorum denteſ · canina capita ignē
& flammā flanteſ hic ē · ciuitaſ iuxta diuitieſ · om
nib: bonis plena dextiore parte ducit illa
terre ab aegypto ∴

Eac ſƿylce þær beoð cende healfhundingaſ ða
ſyndon hatene conopoenaſ · hi habbað horſeſ
manan ⁊ eoferes tuxaſ ⁊ hunda heafda ⁊
heora oruð byð ſƿylce fyreſ lig · þaſ land beoð
neah ðā burgū þe beoð eallū ƿoruld ƿelū gefylled
þiſ ſuð healfe aegiptna landeſ ∴

ON ſumon lande beoð men acennde ða be
on lenge ſix fotmæla lange hi habbað bearda
oð cneoƿ ſide ⁊ feax oð helan homo dubii h
ſindon hatene þ bioð tƿylice ⁊ be hreaƿan
fixon hi libbað ⁊ þa etað ∴

In aliqua naſcuntur homineſ ſtatura pedū
vi · barbaſ habenteſ uſq: ad genua · comaſ
uſq: ad taloſ qui homo dubii appellantur
& piſceſ crudoſ manducant ∴

Capi fluuiuſ in eodē loco apellat gorgon
ibi naſcunt formice ſtatura canū haben
pedeſ q̄ſi locuſte · rubro colore nigroq: fodie
aurū · & quod p noctem fodiunt ſubterr
pferunt foraſ uſq: diei horā quintā · Homineſ
autem qui audaceſ ſunt illud tollere · Sic
tollent aput cameloſ maſculoſ & feminaſ illaſ
que habent foetaſ · foetaſ aut tranſ flumen
gargulum alligatoſ relinquunt & camelis foe
minis aurum imponunt · Ille aut pietate ad
ſuoſ pulloſ feſtinanteſ · ibi maſculi remanent

Plate 10. Illustration from an eleventh-century manuscript in the British Library shows medieval versions of manlike monsters. David Lyle Jeffrey discusses the European tradition of manlike monsters on pages 47-64.



Trasbrixontem flumen adorientē nascunt̃
homines longi & magni habentes femora &
suras ·xii· pedū latera cum pectore ·vii· pe
dum colore nigro q̊s hostes nte appellant·
Nā q̊scumq; capiunt comedunt :·

Beȝeondan brixonte ðære ea east ðanon
beoð men acende lange ⁊ micle þa habbað
fet ⁊ sceancan tƿelf fota lange sidan mid
breostum seofan fota lange hi beoð sƿear
tes hiƿes ⁊ hi syndan hostes nemde·
Cuðlice sƿa hƿylcne mann sƿa hi ȝefoð
þonne fretað hi hine :·

Sunt & alie bestiolae inbrixonte quae
leraces apellatur aurib: asininis uellere
ouino pedib: ouium :·

Ðonne syndon onbrixonte ƿildeor
þa hatton lertices hi habbað eoseles
earan ⁊ sceapes ƿulle ⁊ fugles fet :·

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Plate 11. Note the variety of creatures, which range from the gentle eaters of fruit and fish (Plate 10) to this lion-headed man and maneating monster.



Plate 12. A large and a small hairy wild man confront a disconcerted nobleman. From a sixteenth-century book on curiosities of nature, which was published in both England and France. Contemporary accounts reported the capture of manlike monsters in Northern Europe.



Plates 13-15. These drawings, made by a psychotic patient, show "William Tell" and his son; the boy is engulfed by the adult, losing his separate features and forming a composite figure, thereby being both devoured and transformed into a monster.





Wilfrida Ann Mully discusses the occurence of monsters in the mental life of patients undergoing psychoanalysis on pages 37-46.

given for whole sub-species of monstrous races: all are part of a created diversity which God's perspective reconciles to the beauty of the whole. Yet the question of the actual existence of whole races or tribes of sub-species men is one over which some skepticism must, for Augustine, still rule. Thus, while his creational anthropology could account for a wide degree of variation in creatures who are human (*rationis capax*), he left himself the skeptics' loophole and concluded with a two-step logical shuffle that would do credit to any academic lawyer or politician:

> We are supposing these stories about various races who differ from one another and from us to be true; but possibly they are not: for if we were not aware that apes, monkeys and sphinxes are not men, but beasts, those historians would possibly describe them as races of men, and flaunt with impunity their false and vainglorious "discoveries." But supposing they are men of whom these marvels are recorded, what if God has seen fit to create some races in this way, that might we not suppose that the monstrous births which appear among ourselves are the failures of that wisdom whereby he fashions the human nature, as we speak of the failure of a less perfect workman? Accordingly, it might not seem absurd to us that as in individual races there are monstrous births, so in the whole race there are monstrous races. Wherefore, to conclude this question cautiously and guardedly, either these things which have been told of some races have no existence at all; or, if they do exist, they are not human races; or, if they are human, they are descended from Adam.[2]

It is with these various angles of advantage in mind, both skeptical and fidestic together, that we can see how Augustine's caginess grew to be central to the early medieval tradition of lore about aberrations and sub-species of *genus humanum*. If a phenomenon is somewhere discovered, it exists, and must be part of creation's plan. If it is discovered to be part of the family, *genus humanum*, then it is to be accorded all of the appropriate sympathies, however curious or even grotesque a departure from the normal creature is involved. This is as true for "normal" physiological curiosities as it is for dog-headed men, headless men, or hairy wild men.

At the philosophical level, the enquiry into humanoid but aberrant creatures became a problem in the study of geography—or perhaps we should say, it embraced the evaluation of information which purported to be geographical and anthropological.

Much of the earliest of this kind of work inclines merely to vague attributions: "travellers say," "it is reported," "X is reported to have seen," and so on. Strabo, before Augustine, was frankly cynical: "Generally speaking," he says, those who have written about such things "were a pack of liars . . . it was they who coined the fables concerning men with ears large enough to sleep in, men without mouths . . . etc."[3] Following Augustine's more liberal views, nevertheless, one sees a growing interest in actual geographical knowledge on the part of medieval writers. In England the subject seems to have been fostered by Alfred the Great's Anglo-Saxon translation of Orosius in the ninth century.[4] This work, really an historical compendium aimed at the "lessons of history," follows in the tradition of Strabo, Pliny, Gellius, and Solinus and is itself followed by a host of later medieval encyclopedic works which take increasingly conspicuous note of unusual humanoids. Yet as this work proceeds it becomes less clear that the monstrous creatures may so easily be embraced as part of human kind. From the tenth and eleventh centuries MS Tiberius B.v and MS Cotton Vitellius A.xv, both in the British Library, contain versions of a well-illustrated book of these curiosities which M.R. James has edited under the title "Marvels of the East."[5] The illustrations from the Vitellius manuscript, which also contains the Anglo-Saxon epic *Beowulf*, are not quite so clearly drawn as those in the Tiberius manuscript, but they follow the same programme in illustrating a menagerie of monsters who are clearly humanoid, plausibly *rationis capax*, yet which are figures of increasingly profound estrangement from the tolerant inclusions of St. Augustine. Both the variants of the *cynocephali*, the dog-headed Christopher creatures to whom Ratramus accorded the capacity of reason[6] (Augustine was here a bit more tentative) and one with a lion's head (Plate 10), seem curiously less frightening to the illustrator than does the fish-eating swamp man, inhabitor of fens, or especially the man-eating *þyrs* (Plate 11), whose figure bears so much relationship to the description of Grendel and his nocturnal feastings in *Beowulf*.[7]

Of these latter creatures, later medieval encyclopedias struggle awkwardly with the question of their humanity. Can anything so apparently inhuman be human? Such beings are treated, along with other monsters, in Vincent of Beauvais' thirteenth-century *Speculum Naturale* and *Speculum Historiale* as though they were part of the history of the dissemination of the human race,[8] but Bartholomaeus Anglicus, in his *De Proprietatibus Rerum*, put his list of the various "marvels" ambiguously in his eighteenth book, which deals with animals.[9] Adam of Bremen found such monsters, as did Augustine, to be rightly classified with the human species, and he transplants all known varieties to northern Europe in his history of the diocese of Hamburg, written in 1072.[10] Rudolf Wittkower has shown that various monsters get included in natural histories from Thomas of Cantimpré to Conrad of

Megensburg,[11] and indeed, they enter even into medical histories of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Apart from literary references, humanoid monsters are recorded in sculpture, such as the early twelfth-century tympanum at Vézelay, in which a representation of Christ's command to "go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature" has rays of light extending out from Christ through the apostles to the peoples of the world, among whom are represented the "fabulous races." Another similar work of sculpture exists at the Cathedral of Autun, also twelfth-century, executed by the famous sculptor Ghisalbertus; this work affords examples, in a less optimistic context, of some of these creatures. Interestingly, the hairy woodman, or *þyrs*, present among the hellish figures at Autun, is not among the "tribes at the end of the earth" portrayed at Vézelay. The real issue, it seems, is not whether our humanoid monsters are merely *rationis capax*, but whether they are capable of redemption—capable therefore not only of reason but of having the virtues of *homo compassionis capax*. As late as Mandeville's *Travels* one of the stories attributed to the life of St. Anthony the Great has him meeting a satyr who asks him to pray for him[12]—so we see that there is a tradition of redeemable monsters until virtually the end of the Middle Ages. The more skeptical and negative views come after that. Dr. Nicolaus Tulp, for example, the Amsterdam physician portrayed in Rembrandt's "Anatomy Lesson," included in his medical treatise *Observationum Medicarum* a section on physiological monstrosities in which he discusses *homo silvestris* under the heading *Satyrus Indicus*, but he came to the conclusion, as if deliberately mirroring Augustine, that either satyrs do not exist, or, if they do, they must in fact be the orang-outang. For Tulp, the practical conclusion is as indicative as Augustine's, if opposite: redemption is not at issue, since those humanoids available for examination seem not to be human.[13]

Somewhere between these two poles, but much closer to the first, lives the *eoten* or *þyrs* of Germanic saga. A rough, hairy, gorilla-like, oversized humanoid, it figures under many names and guises in oral and written literature of the Germanic peoples from the hoary and hungry trolls of northern children's tales to the violent antagonists of *Beowulf*, those "stalkers of shadows" and "inhabitants of the misty marsh," Grendel and his dam. Some of the names given to such creatures are indicative of an initially more benign (or at least morally neutral) character, which has been assigned to a few of them in European mythology. The water-sprite figure, for example, or the woodwose, Old English *wudwasa, wodemwose*, was a hairy, shaggy creature, sometimes depicted as overgrown with moss, having human characteristics, but not necessarily evil.[14] On the other hand, there is a *walt man, homo silvestris*, often associated, naturally enough, with wild women, *wildez wîþ*.

The *walt man* is nevertheless (or perhaps consequently) of a more negative moral character: the Old Norse *îviðr*, used to describe the latter, may, as Grimm noted, signify *malus, perversus, or dolosus.*[15] Another name emerges: of *îviðjur* and *iarnvidjur* little is known, but the *skôgs-ra* (in Sweden *skogsnerte, skogsnufva*) clearly has at least some protected valence in a moral order and is part of a chthonic ecology.[16] As Old High German *scînleih* (*monstrum*) or Anglo-Saxon *scînlâc* (*portentum*), the identification is made explicit.[17] There is not, however, any legitimate connection in philology between “Sasquatch” and *skôgs-ra.*

Grendel and his dam have both a moral valence and an intellectual character. They are not only *rationis capax*, but also they are moral agents of a sort that makes them responsible participants in the human ethos. This much may be gathered as easily from the names and adjectives by which they are described as from their disconcerting antisocial thought and behaviour. The nightly depredations on the Scandinavian clan of Hrothgar, in which Grendel cannibalized his way to notoriety until defeated by Beowulf, are well known and need no special rehearsal here. But his character as a malevolent version of the *skôgs-ra* or *homo silvestris* bears special attention with respect to establishing a place for such figures in the anthropological lore of Northern Europe. For Grendel and his mother have a clearly human tradition: monsters they are, but they are not wholly outside the human condition. We see this in the use of two principal appellations, *eoten* and *þyrs*, both of which mean basically “giant” but have connotations that reach back through Germanic lore to Augustine's discussions in *The City of God*, and a third name, *feond.*

þyrs, which occurs to describe Grendel only once (*Beowulf*, line 846), occurs frequently in the poetic Edda and is described by the *Menologium* as a creature who dwells alone in the inland fens or marshes: *þyrs sceal on fenne gewunian ana innan lande.*[18] But there is a sense here also of deliberate antagonism to divine order. *þyrs* is glossed in Old High German as *orcus duris* (*orcus*-demon), so that while it is true, as Karl Helm put it, that “die Etymologie des Wortes ist unsicher,” the moral associations of *þyrs* are fairly evident.[18] While in southern stories he is occasionally good-natured, in northern stories he is black, hairly, bristly, and always less than hospitable (to put the matter gently). Thor is the enemy of such giants in Scandinavian mythology, which include the *fangboði, bergrísar,* and *bergjarlar* (mountain rulers).[20] N.K. Keissling has made the point that the adjective *mǣre*, by which Grendel is also described (lines 103, 762), is more or less correlative, meaning not “notorious,” as it is sometimes translated (as mǣra with a long dipthong), but mæ̆ra, meaning *incubus*, or night-monster, also glossed as *pilosi*, hairy ones.[21] Therefore, as Grimm said, “there is no clear line to be drawn between giants and the wild hairy wood-sprites."[22] These *incubi*, according to tradition, are offspring of Adam's race and mysterious "female spirits"[23] —a further suggestion that the species of monster we are dealing with is now felt to be not merely *lusus natura*, part of the extravagance of creation, but a result of some perversion of creation brought about by a moral agency. Moreover, the suggestion of moral disturbance in the family history carries over, with explicit references, to the most frequent word for monster used by the *Beowulf* poet for Grendel—*feond.*

Feond is used in *Beowulf* eighteen times to describe Grendel, three times to speak of the dragon which finally defeats Beowulf, once to refer to some giants whom Beowulf met in a swimming match, once to mortal foes in the battle at Finnsburgh, and once to an unsavory human prince, Heremod. Omitting its reference to the dragon, all others are to humans or humanoid monsters of the sort represented by Grendel.[24] But despite the use of this term in later Middle English to mean "devil," or literally, "fiend," it has been sufficiently demonstrated that in Anglo-Saxon usage the term still had a wider use, meaning anything from "tyrant" to "monster" or *fenggi*.[25]

Eoten (lines 112, 766) is fairly rare in Old English but quite common in Icelandic saga, where the *Völuspá* of the Poetic Edda contains seven references to the tribe of "giants." It has human associations, yet is clearly linked not merely to Adam's kin in general, but to the particular malfeasance of fallen men. Thus, for example, in the etymologies Old Norse *iötunn* and Anglo-Saxon *eoten* yield up *etensberg, hedensberg, hethensberg* as the name of an unpleasant mountain of moral exile.[26] Some of the sources cited by Grimm connect *eoten* with *ent* (*"ad giganteam viam, entisken wec," "von enten swarz und grâ kan ich nit vil sagen"*).[27] But this further connection with woods and trees is not at all benign—we have the reference in Old Norse: *"iötun sâ er Brûsi hêti, hann var mikit tröll ok mann-aeta"* [a giant there was called Bruser, it seems a mighty troll or man-eater],[28] and the cannibalistic habit is certainly uppermost in the mind of the *Beowulf* poet as he locates Grendel's "kinship" group for us, in describing his late-night visit to the sleeping court of Hrothgar:

wæs se grimma gǣst   Grendel hāten,
mǣre mearcstapa,   sē þe mōras hēold,
fen ond fæsten;   fīfẹlcynnes eard
wonsǣli wer   weardode hwīle,
siþðan him Scyppend   forscrifen hæfde
in Cāines cynne—   þone cwealm gewræc
ēce Drihten,   þæs þe hē Ābel slōg;

ne gefeah hē þære fæhðe, ac hē hine feor forwræc,
Metod for þȳ māne   mancynne fram.
þanon untȳdras   ealle onwōcon,
eotenas ond ylfe   ond orcné̂as,
swylce gīgantas,   þā wið Gode wunnon
lange þrāge;   hē him ðæs lēan forgeald.

(*Beowulf*, lines 102–14)

[That grim spirit was called Grendel, the renowned traverser of the marches, who held the moors, the fen and fastness; unblessed creature, he dwelt for awhile in the lair of monsters after the Creator had condemned them. On Cain's kindred did the everlasting Lord avenge the murder, for that he had slain Abel; he had no joy of that feud, but the Creator drove him far from mankind for that misdeed. Thence all evil broods were born, ogres and elves and evil spirits—the giants also, who for a long time fought with God, for which he gave them their reward.]

In placing Grendel as "of the race of Cain" the poet at once accomplishes two things. First, he heightens our appreciation for the violation of hospitality and sanctuary which is taking place by alluding to a figure from biblical literature who is profoundly associated with such a violation. Secondly, by using Cain he applies specific Christian traditions concerning pollution of family order and outcast experience which at once strengthens the human character of Grendel and elevates the character of his depredation to that of a conscious moral agency. The passage comes immediately after a minstrel has sung a song in praise of creation. Grendel is a monster, yes, but one with human properties, despite all, who has reflective capacities, but who is committed, being of the kinship of Cain, against the kinship of those men who are responsive to the order of divine creation and God's redempton. He is also, however, as a member of *Caines cyn*, part of the order of monsters and unnatural births generally, in a clear suggestion that the agency of all such creational aberrations is to be seen as the moral evil figured in Cain—not the mere or neutral prolixity of creation. In fact, we are told that Grendel has been condemned.

Here we have a context for our *eoten*, or *skôgs-ra*, which is now overtly Christian, yet in which the monster is not any longer really part of the community of men. Like them he is *sāwlberendra* (line 1004), a soul-bearer, and reflective—he runs for the fens after his arm is wrenched out of its socket by Beowulf, wretched in spirit, with, as Stephen Bandy puts it, "the certainty that his days were numbered and his life at an end."[29] He has a kinship grouping of his own, represented by his relationship to that awesome mother with whom he lives in the underwater cave. But his position is far from neutral as a son of Noah or Adam. In fact, he is now explicitly linked with the first blood-carnage, the first excommunication, and an archetypal, exiled, outcast state. This represents an important modification of the simple Augustinian tradition and is a metamorphosis which, in its responsiveness to the darker side of Germanic monster-lore, bears further examination.

A key to what has happened to the tradition may be available in a description of Cain's progeny which occurs in the Middle High German *Genesis* of the twelfth century. In it, the Germanic traditions of darker, more malevolent monstrosities may be seen to fuse with the gentler cultural anthropology of Augustinian and southern tradition to make of the various monsters—including a hairy *homo silvestris* whose eyes shine in the dark like Grendel's—creatures of the outcast sort:

> . . . sumelich hieton hobet als ein hunt
> sumelich hieten an den brusten munt
> an den ahselen ogen
> dei musen sich des hobetes geloben;
> sumelich bedahten sich mit den oren
> wnderlich ist ez ze horen.
> Etlicher het einen fuz
> der was michel unde groz.
> der lief also balde
> sam ein tier datzze walde.
> Etlichir gebar ein chint
> duz gie an allen useren sam ein rint.
> Sumelich uleren begarwe
> (ir uil) schone uarwe,
> si werden swarz und eislich,
> (dem) do nich was gelich,
> dei ogen schinen in alle stunde
> die zene waren lanch in den munde;
> (swenne si) die liezzen plechen
> so mahten si den tieuil schrechen.
> alsolich leben liezzen die uer (chornen)
> al ir aftir chomen.
> Swic diese (inne) warin (getan)
> die geschaft musen diese ozzen han.[30]

> [Some had a head like a dog,
> some had their mouth on the chest
> and eyes on their shoulders:
> these were obliged to do without a head.
> Some thought with their ears
> (this is strange to hear!)
> one kind had a foot
> which was big and thick;
> he ran swiftly
> like an animal in the forest.
> One kind gave birth to a child
> which walks on all fours like a beast.
> Some are marked (garbed) in beautiful colour,
> some appear black and disgusting
> beyond comparison
> —the eyes glowed continuously,
> the teeth were angled in the mouth
> (and) when they flash them
> they (would) frighten the devil.
> Similarly did all their offspring
> use their teeth as weapons.
> Made as they were,
> the order of creation must keep them on the outside.]

This account bears an evident relationship to St. Augustine's discussions concerning similar creatures in *The City of God*—the same sorts of aberration are discussed. But the greater Germanic instinct for kinship purity could also find a corollary—with respect to gigantic monsters particularly—in Augustine. The reference in question comes in a passage not often noticed in Book XV of *The City of God*, almost immediately preceding the discussion of *genera homina monstrosa*. Suggesting that there is much fabulous or apocryphal literature about giants, Augustine acknowledges, in respect of Genesis 6:1–4, that there were indeed such creatures (and, by a contemporary example, still may be), but suggests that while their existence demonstrates, as with other monsters, the diversity of creation, it also affords us a specific sort of moral instruction. He says,

> And it pleased the Creator to produce them, that it might thus be demonstrated that neither beauty, nor yet size and strength, are of much moment to the wise man, whose blessedness lies in spiritual and immortal blessings, in far better and more enduring gifts, in the good

> things that are the peculiar property of the good, and are not shared by good and bad alike. It is this that another prophet confirms when he says, "These were the giants, famous from the beginning, that were of so great stature, and so expert in war. Those did *not* the Lord choose, neither gave He the way of Knowledge unto them; but they were destroyed because they had no wisdom, and perished through their own foolishness."[31]

Old King Hrothgar's sermon to Beowulf following his victory over the monsters, in which he gives advice on the wisdom of charity, now begins to take on force. In *Beowulf* it is by opposing the wisdom of God's order—and by implication, of human order—that Grendel and his dam have rejected wisdom for a foolishness of their own devising, through which they perish in their exiled state. Here the theological provision that some things of creational merit are shared only by the good, and not by "good and bad alike," would seem to reinforce the later Germanic association with an extra or anti-kin-kinship role for monsters. Indeed, it is almost certainly on this basis that the tyrant Hygelac, one of the less happy warrior princes in *Beowulf*, actually gets included in the tenth century *Liber Monstrorum* along with creatures of the sort Augustine's Carthaginian pavements depict and the Middle High German *Genesis* describes as being of the race of Cain.[32] Such creatures are considered as part of the family of man—they are *rationis capax*—but by their own rebellious choice they have chosen against wisdom and become incapable of compassion, relationship, and the society of ordinary persons. Thus, they now actively participate in their own exile and ultimately reflect the murderous sociopathology of their archetype Cain.

Yet there is more conflation here. The writer of the apocryphal *Baruch* does not actually mention Cain in this connection, neither does Augustine. The Middle High German *Genesis* does, as does *Beowulf*. And the connection that is made in the Germanic literature seems clearly to be with exile from the family, with an outcast state, then secondarily with murderousness when any social encounter occurs. Cain becomes an ideal figure for this conflation, standing as he does (in Jung's sense) on the shadow side of human reality. The Cain figure is responsive to strongly Germanic visions of the monstrous, embodying a perversion of human character and a threat to family solidarity such as is manifest in antagonists from the earliest Germanic tales, such as the trolls, orcs, *eotenas*, and *fenggi*. Thus it is that the potentially benign version of the monster from southern tales (Italian *orca*; Neopolitan *huorca*; French *ogre*)—who will as often protect and cheer up children they discover lost in the forest as eat them[33]—or the tolerant inclusion of such monstrosities by St. Augustine in the normal canons of human communality are supplanted in the north by a Germanic concern for blood relationship and family solidarity. These find a ready analogue in the story of Cain, the human who is rational and relational,[34] but fundamentally anti-cultural. In Germanic story, as in *Beowulf*, it becomes thus the triumph of family history and an act of cultural heroism to meet and eradicate such a creature.[35]

The history of our medieval "Sasquatch" type begins to decline with the onset of the Renaissance. But Mandeville's *Travels*, written in 1370, includes the conventional monstrosities listed by Pliny, Solinus, Isidore, and Augustine and still offers us a typical description of the *þyrs* or *skôgs-ra*:

> And þei han no clothynge but of skynnes of bestes þat þey hange upon hem, And þei eten no breed, but all raw flesch & þei drynken mylk of bestes. . . . And þei haue none houses to lyen jnne. And þei eten more gladly mannes flesch þanne any oþer flesch.[36]

We have little trouble recognizing the creatures from the Tiberius and Cotton manuscript illustrations or *Beowulf* here. Yet, for all that, the description lacks the force it had earlier—it is as though a mere daily commonplace is offered, subject for a *moralité*. This impression, moreover, is strengthened when we read immediately following of another isle, inhabited by women who

> ben of þat Kynde, þat ʒif þei beholden ony man with wratthe þei slen him anon with the beholdynge, as doth the Basilisk.[37]

When we meet ladies who slay with a look, surely we cannot be very far from the ordinary world after all.

Mandeville, the fourteenth-century pseudo-geographer, did address one awkward question not dealt with by those earlier poets who made the Germanic *þyrs* a member of the race of Cain. It is this: how could Cain's race have survived the flood? Augustine you will remember, made his panoply of aberrant species descendent from the sons of Noah and blessed them accordingly. Well, there is a clever trick involved here, one which ought to warn anthropologists against too much reliance upon those of us who pursue their subject via the shadowy routes of philology and etymology. After a description, in chapter twenty-four, of the court of the notorious Ghengis Khan (called in Middle English "the grete Chane") Mandeville tells us why the historical Chane is so called:

> ʒee schull vndirstonde þat all the world was destroyed be Noes flood

> saf only Noe & his wif & his children. Noe had iij sones Sem, Cham & Iapeth. This Cam was he þat saugh his faderes preuy membres naked when he slepte & scorned hem . . . & þerfore was cursed of god. . . . Cham was the grettest & the most myghty & of him camen mo generaciouns þan of the othere. And of his sone Chuse was engendered Membroth, the geaunt þat was the firste Kyng þat euer was in the world & he began the fundacioun of the tour of Babylone. And þat tyme the fendes of helle camen many tymes & leyen with the wommen of his generacioun & engendered on hem dyuerse folk as MONSTRES & folk disfigured. Summe withauten hedes, summe with grete eres, summe with on eye, summe geauntes, sum with hors feet & many oþer of dyuerse schapp aȝenst kynde. And of þat generacioun of Cham ben comen the Paynemes. . . . [38]

Here, by a not very subtle etymological play, Cain's lineage has been inserted into the family of Noah via Ham (Cham). The same conflation which has come to govern the role of monsters in earlier medieval saga now provides for a continuation, in quasi-biblical literature, of the race of Cain (Caym, Cane) as the generations of Chane (Cam, Caym). By late medieval times, in homilies and in biblical drama, the conflation is almost complete. It begins, however, in early Germanic folklore with the *skôgs-ra* or *þyrs*.

By the end of the Middle Ages the function of monsters is almost purely moral exegesis. The 175th tale of the *Gesta Romanorum, "De mirabilibus mundi,"* gives an account of the full conventional listing, moralizing the dog-headed men as preachers, the people with an elephantine lower lip as symbols of humility, and so on. In a French translation of Thomas of Camtimpré's *Liber de monstruosis hominibus* the *cynocephali* are now transposed as symbols of calumny, "and the people without heads are the lawyers who take excessive fees in order to fill their bellies."[39] By the fifteenth century, in another manuscript of Cantimpré,[40] the monsters are all dressed up in the costume of a middle-class Flemish burgher (looking more or less like Smokey the Bear).

With the coming of the Renaissance itself, however, this moral allegorizing takes a sadder turn, and monstrous creatures begin to be interpreted in a literal, almost pagan way, as apocalyptic portents, harbingers, or ill omens of an end to come. There is a remarkable little volume by Pierre Boaistauau, entitled *Histoires Prodigieuses* which will repay reading by the historian of anthropology, from more than one point of view. Having something of a scholarly nature, it nevertheless has a tone about it which falls somewhere between the *Guinness Book of World Records* and the *National Enquirer.* Boaistauau first dedicated it hopefully to Queen Elizabeth in 1560, who rejected the book on sight. Although poor Boaistauau died six years later, three years after that the book was published again in London under the title *Histories of Wonderfull Secrets in Nature.* And on the subject of humanoid monsters, of which it has a great deal to say, this work takes a characteristically northern view:

> It is most certaine, that these monstrous creatures for the most part do proceede of the judgment, justice, chastisement and curse of God, which suffreth that the fathers and mothers bring forth these abhominations, as a horrour of their sinne, sufferying themselves to run headlong, as do brute beasts without guide, to the puddle and stinke of their filthie appetites, having no respecte or regard to the age, place, tyme or other lawes ordeined of Nature . . . [41]

Boaistauau illustrates his work at this point with two such humanoid monsters standing before a sixteenth-century king or emperor (Plate 12)—ill omens of some fate the king cannot apparently construe.

But the tone of Boaistauau's work is indicative of the development of monster study at the end of the period. As Wittkower has shown, even Lycosthenes's work "leads away from cosmologies and encyclopaedias and back into the world of magic." He concludes:

> We are faced with the curious paradox that the superstitious Middle Ages pleaded in a broad minded spirit for the monsters as belonging to God's inexplicable plan of the world, while the "enlightened" period of humanism returned to Varro's 'contra naturam' and regarded them as creations of God's wrath to foreshadow extraordinary events.[42]

We might now wish to correct Wittkower's synopsis with the evidence of Northern European literature in the Middle Ages; as we have seen, that mythological history does not accord with Augustine's famous passage either. But the point he attempts to make, interesting in the southern and Renaissance context, may also cast light on another, more contemporary question involving even our present conference.

I refer to the phenomenology of our subject. In the work of Boaistauau just cited there is a special chapter given over to one type of humanoid monster, having as the incipit says "the shape of the face of a man, who was taken in the forrest of Haueberg, in the yere 1531. Whose portrait Georgius Fabritus sent to Gesnerus, drawn naturally, as he is here figured."[43] The account is introduced with solemn promises of scholarly accuracy and integrity, and the citation of Gesnerus' *De quadrupedibus viuiparis* in particular, which records:

> that in the forest of *Saxonie* in the coast of Dace, there was taken certaine monstrous beasts, having the shape of a face of a man, whereof the female in chase by chaunce was killed of hunters, and the male taken by them, was brought alive, who afterwards became domesticall, and tame, in such sorte as he began to talke a little, albeit hys words were imperfect and hoolt, much like unto a Goate: and touching the rest of his actions, they were more brutall than humaine. For at such time as he was moved by the ardent heates and motions of nature, the women were not in safety with him, for he would endeavor himselfe by force to violate them openly. And as another like to this, was taken in the yere 1531 in the Forest *de la seigneurie de Salcebourge* in *Almaine*, who wold never be made tame, nor yet endure the loke of a man; but living in such sorte certaine dayes, in the ende died of hunger, refusing to be fed of any living creature.[44]

Whether with the extrovert or the introvert, by 1531 we are well away from the purely literary mythology of humanoid monsters and into material which must at least interest the naturalist. Moreover, we appear to be dealing here not merely with an individual case, but with a whole species. The account goes on:

> Even so in the time that Iames the fourth king raigned in *Scotland*, which was in the yere 1409 . . . he sent *Iacobus Egilinus* in embassage to the French king, who by tempest of the seas was cast on land in a certaine Isle of *Norway*, where he saw monsters like unto these spoken of before, as he witnessed at his return: and enquiring of the people of that countrey what kinde of creatures they were, they answered, that they were certaine beasts having the shape of the face of men, who accustomed very often to come by night to their houses, which being not repulsed by dogges, would devour as well their men as children.[45]

Were these creatures reported by naturalists and ambassadors then of the same species as Grendel and his dam? The drawing, by Fabritius originally, hardly makes it seem so: the poet's description and the illustrations of humanoid monsters found in the same manuscript are all clearly much more anthropoid. But there is an interesting parallel to this drawing in Thévet,[44] where in fact a chimpanzee or gorilla was rendered by that notably competent naturalist in almost the same way: although he was looking at an anthropoid ape, Thévet *saw* a medieval manticore, a mythological creature from the bestiaries and travel books with which he was familiar. It seems likely that the same phenomenological operation could have governed the drawing by Fabritius reproduced by Boaistauau, and that the creature depicted here as a variant of the manticore may have, in actuality, just as much resembled Tulp's *homo silvestris* or the Tiberius manuscript monstrous humanoids (Plates 10 and 11). The problem that confronts everyone working with rare phenomena, one supposes, is that he is too likely to see what he is looking for, rather than what is there.

The question which continually dogs medieval as well as renaissance and modern students of the subject is whether or not such creatures actually participate in the human condition. It is fitting, from the point of prospect in this essay at any rate, that Boaistauau should conclude his remarkable chapter as follows:

> And I remember that S. Augustine in his boke of the Citye of God, maketh mention of sundrye monsters of straunge formes, who were founde in deserts or elsewhere, whereupon grew a question, whether they were descended of the first man Adam, or that they had a reasonable soule or not, or whether they sould rise as others shall at the generall day of resurrection.[47]

By way of conclusion, we have seen that the Grendel figure, or *þyrs, eoten, skôgs-ra*, has two aspects or lines of lineage by the time of the Beowulf poet. As a descendant of those manifold Germanic monsters—*skôgs-ra, þyrs, bergrisar, orcneas,* or *iviðr*—he is an evil force representing a threat to society from outside its moral and domestic order. As a descendant of Augustine's *genera homina monstrosa* he is a descendant of Noah and actually part of the family. But for all that, as a descendant particularly of Cain (or Cham) he becomes an outcast from the family, forced outside Christian moral and domestic order. He is rational and reflective, but a rebel against either or both aspects of the order open to him. Thus he comes to dramatize factors which are spiritually negative on all counts. He is therefore, for early medieval society, truly a "shadow," representative of a force which must be overcome.

Notes

* The following phonetic values should be associated with the orthography of the Northern languages represented in this article: þ—th as in "thin"; ð—th as in "thine"; æ—resembling the vowel in "bat."

1. Translation from Marcus Dods, *The Works of Aurelius Augustine,* Vol. 2: *The City of God,* Vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1871), 116–17. This position is one held to, even late in the Middle Ages, by a theologian comparably oriented to Scripture, John Wyclif, in his *De logica* (London, 1893), pp. 170–71. Wyclif is conscious, however, that his position is more biblical than cultural by the late fourteenth century.
2. *City of God,* XVI, 8, p. 118.
3. *The Geography of Strabo,* trans. H.C. Hamilton (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1912), vol. 2, book 1, chap. 9.
4. Edited and translated by B. Thorpe (London, 1853).
5. M.R. James, ed. *Marvels of the East* (Oxford: Roxburghe Club, 1929).
6. Ratramus: "De Gigantibus vero qui inter hace povtenta numerantur, homines fuisse de hominibus natos nemo fere qui dubitet, quando quidem divinarum auctoritate litterarum, hoc astrui non ignoremus," *Epistola de Cynocephalis, Patralogia Latina* 121, cols. 1155–56.
7. *Beowulf,* ed. Fr. Klaeber (London, 1923), ll.740–55. Where translations occur they are from J.R. Clark Hall, as revised by C.L. Wrenn and J.R.R. Tolkien (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950).
8. From the 1624 edition, Vol. I, Lib. 1, c.64; also Lib.31, c.118–27; also Lib.4, c.24; c.131.
9. M.C. Seymour, ed., *On the Properties of Things*: John Trevisa's Translation of *Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De proprietatibus rerum,* 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
10. See the excellent article by Rudolf Wittkower, "Marvels of the East: a study in the history of monsters, "*Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 5 (1942), 159–97, to which, along with James' edition, I am much indebted.
11. Wittkower, "Marvels," p. 170.
12. *Mandeville's Travels,* Vol. I, ed. P. Hamelius (London: Early English Text Society, 1919), p. 30.
13. Nicolaus Tulpius, *Obesevationum Medicarum Libri Tres* (Amsterdam, 1641), cap. 56, p. 247ff. See Wittkower, "Marvels," p. 191.
14. See Jacob Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology,* trans. J.S. Stallybrass (London: G. Bell 1882), vol. 1, 434; 4, 1406 and 1427 [compare Grendel's hairyness—ll. 1647–48]. Notker's Chronicle, in 1000, still pictures the maneating *hazessa* as part of Saxon realities—*Patralogia Latina* 89, col. 870.
15. Karl Helm, *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte,* Vol. 2 ("Die Westgermanen") (Heidelberg, 1953), writes:

Der Wald, in alter Zeit ein unwirtlicher Aufenthalt, ist der Bereich riesiger wilder Männer und der zahlreicheren wilden Frauen. Sie sind gross wie Bäume; ihr Aussehen ist schreckhaft, oft sehen sie selbst wie die Bäume aus. Einsam hausen sie im Wald, Verirrte festhaltend, der Hexe im Märchen von Hansel und Gretel vergleichbar (p. 97).
[The forest, which in ancient times was an inhospitable environment, is the kingdom of giant wild men and countless wild women. They are big as trees; their appearance is terrifying and often they even look like trees. They hole up alone in the woods, persevering in aberrant life like the witch in the fairy-tale of Hansel and Gretel.]

16. Grimm, 4, 1427; 2, 487.
17. Compare the Gothic neuter *skôhsl* (devil?), *skôhs* or *skôgs*, which Grimm relates to Old Norse *skôgr* (silva). He suggests (2, 487) that *scheusal* (monstrum) may come from *scheuen*, to shy at.
18. *Menologium seu Calendarium Poeticum, ex Hickesiano Thesauro*, ed. S. Fox (London, 1830), 1.545.
19. *Altergermanische* p. 89; see also Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2, 486.
20. Renauld-Krantz, *Structures de la mythologie nordique* (Paris, 1972), 234ff.
21. "New Aspects of the Monsters in *Beowulf*," (Ph.d. diss. University of Wisconsin, 1967), p. 11.
22. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2, 553.
23. *Thesauvus Paleohibernicus* 1:2, 1.5.
24. Stephen C. Bandy, "Caines Cyn: A study of Beowulf and the Legends of Cain," (Ph.d. diss. Princeton University, 1967), p.104. But see his article, "Christliche Eschatologie und alterglische Dichtung, dargestellt am Beispiel des *Beowulf*," *Germanisch, Romanische Monatsscher* 26 (1973): 19–25.
25. M.P. Hamilton, "The Religious Principle in *Beowulf*," *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 61 (1946): 321–22.
26. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 4, 1437. See also Helm, *Altgermanische*, pp. 90–92.
27. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 4, 1438. *Ad giganteam viam* [in the giants' path] translates as *entisken wec; von enten swarz und gra kan ich nit vill sagen* as "of the big black giants I can't speak well."
28. Ibid., 1447.
29. Bandy, "Caines Cyn," p. 93.
30. *Genesis und Exodus*, ed. Joseph Diemer (Vienna, 1862), p. 26.
31. Augustine, *City of God*, XV, 23, pp. 96–7. The Scriptural reference is to the Apocrypha, Baruch 3:26–28.
32. *Liber Monstrorum*, ed. Moriz Haupt (Berlin, 1663).
33. Grimm, *Teutonic Methology*, 2, 486.
34. In fact, *chanach* himself, in Genesis, is said, ironically, to be the founder of cities.
35. The sense of a need for encounter is not as strong in the Alexander romances, for example, which are earlier and where the matter is largely southern. But it is still a factor in later romance literature from northern Europe, as, for example, in Arthur's encounter with the Monster of Mont St. Michel.
36. Mandeville, *Travels*, p. 189.
37. Ibid., p. 190.
38. Ibid., ch. xxv, p. 163.
39. Wittkower, "Marvels," p. 178. His discussion of the Renaissance reinterpretations here is very helpful.
40. Manuscript Bruges, codex 411.
41. Pierre Boaistauau, *Histories of Wonderfull Secrets in Nature* (London, 1569), p. 12v.
42. Wittkower, "Marvels," p. 186:
43. Boaistauau, *Histories*, p. 110v.
44. Ibid.,
45. Ibid., p. 111v.
46. André Thévet, *Cosmographie universelle* (Paris, 1575) I, 52.
47. Boaistauau, *Histories*, p. 111v.

Olive Patricia Dickason

The Concept of *L'Homme Sauvage*

With reference to contemporary accounts, this article demonstrates how the tradition of the Renaissance folklore figure of the Wild Man, along with earlier European analogues, prejudiced early explorers' perceptions of New World natives. The author demonstrates how these attitudes altered through continuing contact with the natives and discusses how consideration of the natives as "savages" rather than as civilized peoples helped justify colonial attitudes to aboriginal property, religious, and legal rights.

The concept of *l'homme sauvage* is usually traced to Europe's discovery of the New World and its inhabitants. According to this view, Europe's introduction to Amerindians was also her introduction to natural man, at least in any numbers. This event is seen as being largely responsible for the development of the idea of *l'homme sauvage*: the savage who could be either noble or debased, but who in any event was not civilized. Civilization was not considered to have developed anywhere in North America; such achievements as the city-states of Mexico, Central America, or Peru were either ignored or dismissed as being at best barbarous. However, an examination of the European concept of savagery reveals that its origins are both more complex and far older than such a view would indicate. In fact it involves, among other things, the well-known Renaissance folkloric figure of the Wild Man, early Christian perceptions of monkeys, apes, and baboons, and the classical Greek and Roman tradition of the noble savage. Even after having considered all this we will still not have arrived at the origins of the concept, which is at least as old as civilization itself. This paper will consider *l'homme sauvage* from the vantage point of France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as being most pertinent to our early Canadian experience, even though the idea itself is universal.[1]

Columbus's encounter with the Arawaks of San Salvador presented Europe with a problem of classification. Here was a New World inhabited by multitudes whose existence had not previously been suspected and for whom no provision appeared to have been made in Christian orthodoxy. Awkward as the fact was to deal with, the New World seemed to have been left out of the division of the world among Noah's three sons, Shem having peopled Asia, Japhet, Europe, and Ham, Africa. To Renaissance Europe the immediate task was to fit this new world into the three-fold *oikoumene*, exemplified by the Pope's triple crown. In the simplest terms, were Amerindians descended from Noah, or did they present an earlier form of humanity akin to beasts? Pope Alexander VI ruled, in 1493, that these people "being in peace, and, as reported going unclothed and not eating flesh," were human and capable of being Christianized. This was reaffirmed by Pope Paul III in 1537.[2]

But a tantalizing question remained: if the world represented a single order, as taught by Christian orthodoxy, how had it been possible for other "civilities"[3] to develop value scales so totally different from those of Europe? Conversely, how could human societies possess similar cultural traits without having been in contact with each other? Renaissance Europe's attempts to answer these questions only multiplied the contradictions. In the face of such difficulties, the simplest solution, at least in the realm of practical affairs, was to place New World cultures beyond the pale of "civility" and to think of Amerindians as *hommes sauvages*. But even that solution presented problems; just one example was how to define the word "sauvage."

A modern definition, that of Larousse, says that among other things it means not cultivated, tamed, nor domesticated, or that which frightens easily. Applied to men, it denotes he who lives away from society, beyond the pale of its laws, without fixed abode—by analogy, he who is rude and fierce.[4] Larousse introduces these definitions with the statement that in ancient French the adjective "salvage" or "sauvage" simply signified the forest habitat and was a synonym of the Latin *sylvaticus*. The time boundaries implied by the word "ancient" are not specified.

I will take the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to be included in that term. A survey of French writing during that period does not support the thesis that at that epoch "sauvage" meant simply living in the woods. In that intensely religious age, the medieval habit of viewing man in moral terms was still far too deeply implanted for such a neutral use to have been anything but desultory. While shades of emphasis could and did vary from writer to writer, the general implication was always clear: to be savage meant to be living according to nature, in the manner "plus approchant des bêtes farouches que des hommes."[5] To cosmographer Sebastian Münster, barbarians, savages, and monsters were all in the same category.[6]

La Curne de Sainte-Pallaye placed such a usage of the word even earlier. In his *Dictionnaire historique*, in which he traced the meanings of words from their origins to the time of Louis XIV, he listed eight meanings for "sauvage," of which the first was "not tamed" and the last, "extraordinary." In between are such definitions as solitary, uncivilized, ferocious, demented, and foreign.[7]

Richelet, whose dictionary was published in 1680, said the word applied to fierce persons who were the enemies of society and agreeable conversation.[8] Furetière in his *Dictionnaire universel,* 1691, defined a savage as a man without regular habitation, without religion, law, or civility. Nearly all of America, he said, had been found peopled with savages, most of whom were cannibals. He added, "Les Sauvages vont nuds, & sont velus, couvert de poil."[9] Nowhere was it implied that "sauvage" meant simply living in the woods.

I will return shortly to that rather startling description of Amerindians as naked hairy savages. But first let us see how Europeans initially spoke of Arawaks, cannibal Caribs, and other New World men. Columbus called them "Indians" and did not refer to them as "savages" except in the case of armed encounters.[10] Neither did Vespucci, although he found some of them brutish and loathsome in appearance, cruel of nature, and barbarous in their manner of living; however, he said the cannibals were "very savage."[11] But in general, apart from Columbus's "Indians," early explorers used such terms as "hommes," "gens," "habitants," "indigènes," or perhaps "cannibals." In spite of this it is evident from reading early voyage accounts that New World men had been quickly equated with savagery. This is indicated by Cartier's comment, reporting on Amerindians he met on his first voyage:

> This people may well be called savage, for they are the sorriest folk there can be in the world, and the whole lot of them had not anything above the value of five sous, their canoes and fishing nets excepted.[12]

Cartier did not explain what he meant by the word "savage" beyond the lack of material possessions and a consequent style of living which he did not consider acceptable. The appelation "savage" for New World people does not appear frequently in print until about the middle of the sixteenth century; by the third quarter, it was in general use. In the seventeenth century, the French and English called the inhabitants of the New World "savages," whether they were descended from the court poets of the city-states of Central and South America or were nomadic hunters following caribou in the austere north; Spaniards and Portuguese, however, used the term "indios."

In his benign aspects the "savage" was represented during these two centuries as living in "l'enfance de la Nature" or, more ideally, in a Golden Age, that concept from classical antiquity that had not ceased to haunt Europeans' minds. "Ils se content, en effet, de si peu;"[13] or, in the words of Vespucci, "they live content with what nature gives them."[14] In his adverse aspect the savage was "un Statue vegetale, un Phantosme de chair et d'os, un Homme artificiel qui ne se remue que par force."[15] He was without heart for his natural responsibilities, had no eye for the beauties of nature, did not even have names for painting and sculpture; he could not appreciate music or fine perfume and ate his food raw, bloody, and still living. Solitary and alone in the midst of others, he was indifferent to suffering and cruelty, "n'ayant pas affections honnestes et naturelles."[16]

Such representations, while graphic, were not considered satisfactory explanations of savagery, even at the time. But how was it to be defined? First of all, that it was far removed from reason. In the words of cosmographer Pierre d'Avity, "On doit estimer barbare ceux dont les façons & coustumes s'éloignent extraordinairement de la droite raison."[17] The belief of the day held that this was a natural consequence of a lack of knowledge of God, which was a prerequisite for mental activity. This was Augustine's position. That it had long been held to be applicable to Amerindians is indicated by the commission Jacques Cartier received for his third Canadian voyage from Francis I, which refers to the people of Canada "vivans sans cognoissance de Dieu et Sans usaige de raison."[18] Emeric de Crucé, eminent theorist in politics and economics, wrote, "Je mets au rang des bestes les peuples sauvages que n'usent point de raison."[19]

To d'Avity, this non-use of reason was the most important of five "degrés de brutalité."[20] By using the term "degré" he imparted a hierarchy to brutishness, a concept congenial to the Renaissance ethos. The second level of savagery he found in the manner of procuring food—hunting and gathering, living like beasts off the land, rather than practicing agriculture. There was also the nature of the food to consider. The Amerindian diet contained elements which Europeans had traditionally believed to be linked with demonism; at best, these could be considered "savage." Herrera said of the people of Cuba that they ate "many filthy things, as large Spiders, Worms breeding in rotten Wood and other nasty Places, and Fish half raw, for as soon as taken, before boiling, they pull'd out their Eyes, and eat them, which things any Spaniard would loath."[21]

This concern with the diet of the Amerindian was the logical consequence of the widespread belief "que nostre complexion suit la nourriture."[22] The implication of this, of course, was that "il faut que la nourriture sauvage soit suivi d'un complexion & nature sauvage."[23] Amerindians made similar observations concerning Europeans. A shaman accused Hennepin of eating serpents and poison, adding that such folk as the Recollet missionary ate thunderbolts.[24] Amerindians also shared the European belief that one develops the characteristics of the food one eats. A hunter, for instance, who ate of a slow-moving animal risked losing his speed of action; and as is well known in the case of cannibalism, eating the heart of a brave enemy was at least partly motivated by the desire to acquire his courage. Lack of regular meal hours was also cited to prove savagery.[25] Even worse, Amerindians took their food from the ground, without napkin or any other cloth, eating out of earthen pots or calabashes.[26] According to one unsympathetic observer, "ils mangent souvent couché comme les chiens; Enfin ils ne se gênent aucunement dans leurs actions & suivent le pur animal."[27]

Nudity was d'Avity's third degree of "brutishness": "car quelqu'uns n'ayants nul sentiment de honnesté ne couvrent pas mesmes leurs parties honteuses."[28] In fact, held d'Avity, it was a sense of shame that distinguished men from animals. His fourth level concerned the type of habitation: the most barbarous people lived in caves and trees, although nomads living in tents were not much better. Lack of government was fifth: "car quelques uns entièrement barbares vivent sans aucunes loix, & sans aucuns chefs, tant en temps de paix que de guerre, quelques autres n'ont ny loix ny chefs en temps de paix, mais seulement aux occurrences de guerres."[29] On this point, however, d'Avity conceded that some New World peoples, such as those of "Tlascalla and Chilolla" and New Spain, had what qualified by European standards as government. Peruvians even had a form of civility, although they did not have the arch. But their ingenuity in building bridges had to be admired: "ils en font de très grands sur des rivières fort larges & profondes . . .on voit. . .un de ces ponts long de 300 pieds."[30] Others were not so prepared as d'Avity to grant that the Peruvian government could be classed as civilized. Acosta, for one, found that it was tyrannical as it treated the people as beasts and the rulers as gods.[31] To him that was barbarous; in others words, it was an ameliorated form of savagery. Acosta discerned three classes of barbarians: those who were not far from reason and had governments and cities, such as the Chinese or Japanese; those who did not have writing, but who still had government, such as the Peruvians or Mexicans; and those who lived in the woods without fixed abode, as did the Caribs.

A concomitant to the lack of writing as a characteristic of brutishness was the "elusive" or even "defective" structure of languages which impeded the communication of Christian doctrine.[32] Without the letters "f, l, r," how could Amerindians have "foy, loy et roy"?[33] A favorite word for describing their languages was "baragouin," gibberish.

These efforts at definition were based on the assumption that if savagery were a condition, it must have certain characteristics that would make it recognizable as such. From this point of view, d'Avity's list is as interesting for what it leaves out as for what it contains. Contemporaries would have been struck by the fact that the cosmographer did not include lack of order in sexual matters, although this had been widely reported of New World peoples. This indicates some independence of judgement on his part, for although it was being realized that such reports were exaggerated, to say the least, this was by no means generally believed.[34] One of the omissions that strikes today's observer is dirtiness, particularly as later it came to be considered a standard indication of savagery, Amerindian or otherwise. But during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans were struck by the frequency with which Amerindians bathed. It was told of Moctezuma, "the chief shoots to heaven when he is angry," that he bathed every day "were it ever so cold."[35] Jean de Léry considered it worth reporting that the Tupinambá of Brazil washed their mouths and hands before and after eating.[36] The refusal of the Brazilians to wear clothes on the grounds that it interfered with bathing struck Europeans as being at the very least absurd. Gilbert Chinard goes further and says that they regarded it as being actually barbarous.[37]

An even more striking omission is that of cruelty, particularly as historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been at great pains to prove the savagery of Amerindians because of their war practices. Apart from their cannibalistic aspects, these practices were not considered in the days of d'Avity to be more cruel than those of Europe. Quite the contrary, in fact, as far as torture was concerned. Sixteenth-century accounts are dominated by reports of Spanish torture of Amerindians, particularly during the early part of the century when decimation of the New World peoples was at its height. The description "très cruel" which Europeans so often applied to New World men was a label habitually tagged onto unfamiliar people as well as onto enemies in war and did not usually refer to specific practices.

Geronimo Cardano (1501–1576), Italian physician and mathematician, did not consider cruelty a particular characteristic of savages, as he noted that such people were often very gentle. Observing that they could be more humane than many Greeks and Italians, he went on to say that they were neither immoral nor lacking in intelligence. Their savagery lay, rather, in a psychological instability: "Before a matter is understood they begin to rage and after they have become excited it is very difficult to quiet them."[38] This lack of emotional control made them liberty-loving and seditious; it also left them vulnerable to being imposed upon.

Cardano thought he was realistically depicting men of the New World, among other "savages." Actually his description, as well as the definitions we have been considering, was strongly influenced by one of the most familiar of the folk figures of this period, the Wild Man of the Wood. In much of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writings on savagery, the influence of this figure is evident. Found throughout Europe, but particularly in the northern and central regions, he was known by such names as *Wildeman* in Flanders and Germany; Wild Man, wodewose, or woodhouse in England, Ireland, and Scotland; and *l'homme sauvage* in France. He was also known as *pilosus, orcus, Schrat* and ogre; or perhaps as *homo sylvestris* or *homine agreste.*

All of these terms were more or less synonymous with savage, satyr, or faun. To concentrate on "wodewose" for a moment, it derived from the Old English *wode* or *wod*, meaning furious or in a state of insanity. Like Odin or Wodin, the great god of the northern nations who presided over war and feasted on the slain, *wode* expressed the rage of battle. It also had implications of unrestrained sensuality and of the demonic. We get a glimpse of forerunners of *wodewoses* or wild men in Pausanias, who during the second century told of satyrs attacking a woman from a Greek ship and treating her "in such a way as we will not venture to describe."[39] The following century we read of a satyr causing panic among village women.[40]

The Wild Man was first pictorialized during the mid-thirteenth century in grotesques decorating manuscript margins.[41] His popularity gained momentum during the latter part of the fourteenth century, reaching its peak during the Renaissance; after the seventeenth century it went into a decline. His origins can be traced back to classical antiquity or even to Babylon and Uruk, as well as to the ancient Hebrews. In Roman mythology, his antecedent descended from the Titan Saturn whose reign was described as a Golden Age of innocence and purity, although Saturn himself was a monster who ate all but three of his own children: Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Orcus, also descended from Saturn, carried the dead to the underworld. Saturn has certain similarities with the Greek Cronos, the youngest of the Titans, who was the son of Gaia and Ouranos, Earth and Heaven, two aspects of the same identity before they were separated by their son. Although associated with the Golden Age, Saturn symbolized life-devouring hunger and insatiable desire. Incapable of allowing his people to evolve, he was emasculated by his son and returned to the heavens.[42] The Wild Man's physical resemblance to the satyr Silenus has frequently been noted,[43] and he has even been identified with Hercules. For the Hebrews, the Wild Man was represented as a spiritual rather than as a physical condition; he was a rebel against the Lord, insane, accursed, and destructive.[44]

These traditions merged to produce the Renaissance *wodewose* or *l'homme sauvage*. He was a popular figure representing the negation of the Christian ideal, a folk version of the Antichrist. In the days of courtly love he was the embodiment of brute sensuality as opposed to the chivalrous love of the knight. He was usually depicted as covered all over with hair, except for knees, elbows, and face, and he had a full beard. His hairiness symbolized his enormous strength on which he depended as he stood alone against all, even his own kind. This strength was also indicated by his habit of carrying a knotty club or an uprooted tree. Unable to speak, he shunned man and was devoid of knowledge of God, which meant either he did not have the use of his reason or else he did not possess it.[45] Unable to control his passions, he assaulted lone women in the woods.[46] However, he was intimately acquainted with nature's secrets, which he sometimes shared with peasants; at times he would tend their cattle or would heal a wounded knight with herbs. But his closest associates were bears and devils.[47]

One of the most vivid portrayals of this figure is that by Edmund Spenser, who made him outsized, "All overgrowne with haire . . . with huge great teeth." He "fed on fleshly gore, the signe whereof yet stain'd his bloudy lips afore." This unprepossessing figure lived on the "spoile of women," whom he raped and then ate. He had already caught and eaten seven by the time he appeared in *The Faerie Queene*.[48] A gentler version of the Wild Man in the same work is Satyrane, whose father was a satyr; he rescued ladies instead of preying on them. In the English folk imagination of the day, the hairy man was considered to be green, hair and all. But whether he was shown as fierce or gentle, physical portrayals of him were remarkably uniform in manuscript illustration, tapestries, and sculpture.

The first record of a Wild Man play dates from Padua in 1208.[49] But it was in pageants and spectacles where he was most in evidence, particularly those of Carnival and Twelfth Night, when his disguise was regarded as a licence for rampaging violence.[50] At one point he was even taking part in tournaments, challenging knights. One of the best-known incidents involving a Wild Man masquerade occurred on 28 January 1392 at the Bal des Ardents at the court of Charles VI, "le fou," of France, when several revellers dressed as Wild Men burned to death.[51] Sometimes the Carnival Wild Man, girdled and crowned with feathers, pretended to feed only on raw meat which was handed to him on the end of a stick.[52] Father Paul Le Jeune, seeing his first Amerindians with painted faces at Tadoussac in 1632, remarked, "je voyois ces masques qui courent en France a Carème."[53] Denonville, governor-general of New France in 1685–1689, noted that such customs had reached the point where his predecessor, de La Barre, had had to suppress them. However, he had not entirely succeeded:

> A way of dressing up like savages, stark naked, not only on carnival days, but on all days of feasting and debauchery, has been treated as a nice action and a joke. These manners tend only to maintain the young people in the spirit of living like savages and to communicate with them to be eternally profligate like them.[54]

From pageantry the Wild Man retired into heraldry, where he is seen today as a supporting figure that at times is hard to distinguish from Silenus. More than two hundred European families have the Wild Man as emblem. There was also a Wild Woman, but she never attained the importance of the Wild

Man. This may have been partially because the Church tolerated the latter, albeit reluctantly, but in the case of the Wild Woman, her rituals called for offerings, which the Church would not countenance. Also, she was far more closely connected with the old religions, which the church still sought to suppress. In Spain, dancing disguised as Orca could draw a year's penitence.[55]

Most Europeans who sailed to the New World must have been aware of the Wild Man, who was as familiar a figure as Santa Claus is today. Columbus referred to Amerindians as "wild" but suitable for slavery; an observer, describing the New World men brought to Portugal by Corte-Real in 1501 (who have been variously identified as Inuit, Naskapi, Beothuck, or Micmac), said they had most gentle countenances but most bestial habits and manners, "like wild men."[56] The seven Amerindians brought to Rouen in 1509 were described as *homines sylvestres*.[57] Shakespeare's Caliban, whose name is an anagram of "cannibal," is more Wild Man than Amerindian, although he is supposed to be a New World native.

The Wild Man was believed to actually exist, as was indicated by reports of hairy men in far-off places. Pliny, for example, had told of such creatures in India.[58] The Borgia Map, drawn in the fifteenth century before Columbus's voyage, is illustrated with hairy Amazons.[59] Occasionally hairy men appear in Renaissance voyage accounts, such as those of Pigafetta.[60] A century and a half later, the newspaper *Le Mercure Galant* reported on "les Sauvages de l'Amérique, Hommes cruels et sans raison, à qui nos Pescheurs sont obligez de faire la chasse comme à des Bestes, puis qu'ils ont outre leur férocité le corps hérisseé de poil, & armé d'ongles merveilleusement longs & crochus."[61]

That the Wild Man had become confused in the popular mind with Amerindians is evident not only from such obviously misinformed reports, but particularly from the repeated attempts of missionaries and colonial officials to discredit the notion that New World men were hairy.[62] Their efforts were unavailing. The first denial I have found was published by André Thevet in *Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique*, which appeared in 1557. In a chapter entitled "Contre l'opinion de ceux qui estiment les Sauvages estre pelus," Thevet asserted that those who insisted that Amerindians were hairy had obviously never seen them, for the truth was the opposite: they took great care to remove all body hair.[63] Later he theorized that the custom of the northern Amerindians of wearing furs had given rise to the belief.[64] Jean de Léry felt strongly enough about the matter to mention it twice, and he also speculated that the belief had risen from the custom of the Brazilian Tupinambá of glueing themselves all over with down or little feathers, which gave them a furred appearance.[65] Lescarbot repeated that line of reasoning.[66] Among the better-known names of those who issued denials were Sagard, Lahontan, Bressani, LeClercq, and Du Tertre.[67] Two centuries after Thevet, a French officer wrote, "Les sauvages du Canada sont fort different de l'idée que l'on s'en fait communément en France. Loin d'être velus, comme on le croit, ils sont beaucoup moins couverts de poil que nous."[68] As long as the Wild Man existed in folk imagination, he influenced the European conception of the Amerindian.

Unaffected by all this, *l'homme sauvage* continued his solitary way, "noir et velu com ours enchainé." The line between man, monkeys, anthropoid apes, and even bears was by no means always clear to the Renaissance mind. Besides his descent from the mythologies of classical Greece, Rome, and the Middle East, and his connection with bears, the Wild Man contained elements from early reports of anthropoid apes, who were usually described as speechless human beings, *homines sylvestres.* According to Pliny,

> the Choromandae are a savage and wild people; distinct voice and speech have they none, but in steed thereof, they keepe an horrible gnashing and hideous noise: rough they are and hairie all over their bodies, eies they have red like the houlets and toothed they be like dogs.[69]

There is now no doubt that this was actually describing a troop of large monkeys or gibbons. The tendency was to transform these animals into quasi-human beings by exaggerating their human aspects. The Spanish, for instance, were reported to regard baboons as a race of people who refused to speak so that they would not be forced to live in subjection.[70] Similarly, the great apes and orang-outangs were said to be descended from people who had grown weary of work and the restraints of village life and so had retreated to the forests and an animal-like existence. They were also supposed to have been the products of miscegenation between women and animals.[71] Albertus Magnus saw apes as being intermediate between man and beast, *similtudines hominis*, an early version of the missing link.[72] Prester John's list of wild creatures, dated 1164, included *homines agrestes*,[73] which Cardano said resembled Wild Men.[74] As late as the mid-eighteenth century, an Englishman published an illustration of a "man in the wood," complete with his gnarled stick, and labelled him "The Satier, Savage, Wild-Man, Pigmy, Orang-outang, Chimp-anzee, etc."[75]

From such hesitations and confusions, it was not a long step to the idea of dual creation, of the Devil acting in competition with God but being capable only of producing a distorted version of the original. This concept was firmly established in Christian folklore: horse and ass, lion and cat, sun and moon, day and night.[76] An ape, as imperfected man, symbolized carnal desire; the apple-eating ape was seen in very much the same perspective as the Wild Man. This was reinforced by another characteristic that was applied to apes during the Middle Ages: that of remembering injuries and harbouring hatred for a long time.[77] From this it followed that men who were of a vengeful disposition or who nursed the desire for revenge were acting in the manner of apes rather than as full-fledged human beings. In describing Amerindians as people who never forgot an injury, who were so vengeful that they even ate the lice which tormented them, and who had no order in their sexual relations, Renaissance writers were putting them into a context popularly associated with apes and Wild Men.

The position of *l'homme sauvage* between man and animal meant that he could act in concert with beasts as an intermediary between man and the underworld. In Renaissance Flanders he was included with the wild animals who guarded the fountain of life in the forest: "un géant à figure et à membres chevelus, armé d'un sapin déracineé . . . . ses sourcils s'unissent au dessus du nez. Il refuse ou accorde l'entrée du ciel."[78] Near the forest was the *Nobiskrug* where one obtained a passport to the other world; its insignia was a figure of a giant. We have already noted that in this capacity the Wild Man was also known as Orcus. To this day the sign "In dem Wildeman" is a favourite for inns and taverns in Belgium and The Netherlands. In Rouen during the sixteenth century this figure was frequently placed above doors of houses and appeared as a fireplace guardian.[79] He is found on the North Portal of Rouen Cathedral and guards the principal entrance to San Gregorio in Valladolid in Spain, as well as that of Casa de Montejo in Yucatán, built in 1549. In his demonic aspect he appears on tombs, usually being trampled underfoot by the commemorated figure.

In the France of this period the dark side of *l'homme sauvage* prevailed, and he became identified with the older Germanic comic devil, Hellekin, leader of the Wild Horde. Hellekin was particularly strongly entrenched in the mythology of the north; his marriage to the equally mythical Luque La Maudite in Rouen during the thirteenth century is said to have resulted in an actual spree that caused considerable damage to the city.[80] When animal skins and feathers were not available for the costuming of Hellekin in pageants, rags were substituted, which eventually became stylized into the diamond design which we associate with his theatrical descendant, Harlequin.[81] In this connection it is interesting to note that one of the theatrical successes of eighteenth-century Paris was *Arlequin Sauvage*, first presented at Théâtre des Italiens on 17 June 1721. This play, by Louis-François de La Drévetière, Sieur de l'Isle (1682–1756), concerns Arlequin, an Amerindian brought to Europe, who proceeds to run afoul of the law, both written (in an encounter with a merchant, when he mistakes proferred goods as a gift) and unwritten (his amatory adventures with Violette). Arlequin's simple truthfulness eventually prevails over social considerations, and he wins Violette. This tale of the triumph of "le bon sauvage" reflects the later transmutation of the Wild

Man into a "paragon of virtue lost in unfolding civilization."[82] This purging of *l'homme sauvage* of his bestial and demonic aspects resulted in his idealization into "le bon sauvage," a fate which he shared with the Amerindians during the eighteenth century. This was the folkloric counterpart of the evangelization of the New World peoples, "auparavant sauvages & maintenant sacrez."[83]

The idea of "le bon sauvage" is, of course, as ancient as that of the Wild Man, as it is another aspect of the same general concept. According to Boas and Lovejoy, "from the 4th century BC, the Scythians were to the ancients what the American Indians were to the primitivists of the 16th to the 18th centuries in modern Europe."[84] While several different peoples were cast in this role at various times, the Scythians were the favorite. Christian Europe, remoulding the ideal of the Golden Age into the vision of the Garden of Eden, developed two traditions concerning the Scythians, one considering them admirable, the other as detestable.[85] But in either case they were regarded as savage. With the emergence of the Amerindian within the European range of vision, it was a comparatively simple matter to fit them into existing perspectives, particularly as there seemed to be resemblances between the two "savage" peoples, from the Old World and the New.

The inaccuracy of the view that Amerindians lived "comme bêtes irraisonables, ainsi que nature les a produits"[86] was soon recognized by those associated with them. As Father Claude d'Abbeville observed, he had gone to Brazil expecting to find fierce men, rude and savage, but instead he found a people who in the perfection of their senses in some ways excelled Europeans.[87] De Tertre agreed that Amerindians were savage only in name, and in the *Jesuit Relations* we find several assertions that the procedures of Amerindians were not those of brute beasts.[88] But instead of convincing Europeans that Amerindians were not savage, such statements were regarded as a defence of "le bon sauvage." The Jesuits, for instance, were accused of being more interested in finding civilization among the "savages" than they were in evangelizing them. Europeans, by transforming the Amerindians into an idealized and thus essentially unreal image, evaded accepting them as fellow human beings with a viable civilization of their own. At the same time, they quickly found a practical use for "le bon sauvage." He was moulded into an instrument for criticizing European society.[89]

As an aside to all this, it is interesting to note a seventeenth-century report of Amerindians taking exception to being called savages. They were said to have retorted that as far as they were concerned, it was the French who were the savages, "parce que nous [that is, the French] ne vivons pas à leur mode; qu'ils ont leur science & nous la nostre, comme si il y avoit deux façons de sçavoir les choses dans la vérité."[90] In Renaissance Europe, to admit that the truth could be seen in more than one way was to risk the charge of heresy. As for Amerindian opinions, Montaigne reported the simple fact when he wrote that they would not be heard because these people were "sans culottes."

The irony of Europe's confusion of the Wild Man with the Amerindian was the latter's horror of hairiness. Both Columbus and Vespucci were struck by this, as was anyone who had anything to do with Amerindians during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[91] To cite Vespucci, "they do not allow any hair to grow on their eyebrows nor their eyelids nor anywhere on the body (with the exception of the head), for this reason—because they deem it coarse and animal-like."[92] Jesuits in the Canadian missions observed that their charges were repelled by the hairiness of Europeans, and sometimes openly mocked them on the subject. The crowning irony is that the Amerindians had a mythological hairy man of their own, who was also a forest figure. But this personage, who was sometimes female, preyed on young children rather than on women. Among the better-known manifestations of this figure is the Sasquatch of the Northwest Coast, who is as familiar to Canadians as Bigfoot is to Americans of the Pacific Coast.

The hairy man illustrates the tenacity of folklore in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. It was easier to prove orthodoxy wrong about the habitability of the Antipodes than it was to dispel popular mythology. The first was a case of intellectual argument in which there was some glee in discomfiting authority; but in the second we are dealing with a type of belief that exists independently of scientific fact. As the Jesuits were to say of the Hurons, beliefs, no matter how apparently ridiculous, are hard to eradicate.[93]

More importantly, however, Europe's belief in the savagery of Amerindians was to have profound consequences in the realm of practical politics in the New World. For example, if Amerindians were savage, then they could not be counted as belonging to the family of nations; consequently, they were not sovereign and, by extension, did not possess proprietary rights. The French in New France sometimes negotiated alliances with Amerindians even as they claimed their territories, but this involved neither acknowledgement of aboriginal rights nor payment for lands. When an Amerindian converted to Christianity he was legally considered to be a French citizen, with full rights, including the privilege of living in France without any further declaration of naturalization. But whatever property he acquired was granted either by the French Crown or by arrangement with French individuals, and not by aboriginal right.[94] Total assimilation seemed only logical to the French, who during the days of New France never seriously doubted their *mission civilisatrice* any more than other European nations doubted theirs. Thus the way was paved for one of the great movements of Western civilization, the colonization of the New World.

Notes

1. This paper is largely derived from the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas" (University of Ottawa, 1977).
2. Alexander actually issued four bulls in 1493 relating to the discovery of the New World, two of them called *Inter Caetera.* The texts and bibliographies of all four are reproduced by Francis Gardiner Davenport in *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies,* 4 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1917), I: 56–83. See also Robert Streit, *Bibliotheca Missionum,* 29 vols., (Rome: Herder, 1916–), II: 1–4; and II: 281 and XXIV: 3 for a bibliography of Paul's bull, which is usually referred to as *Sublimis Deus Sic Dilexit* but which is also known as *Excelsis Deus* and *Veritas Ipsa.*
3. The word "civilization" did not come into general use until toward the end of the seventeenth century.
4. Pierre Larousse (1817–1875), *Grand Dictionnaire Universel,* 17 vols. (Pâris, 1905).
5. Giovanni Pietro Maffei (Jean-Pierre Maffé) (1533–1603), *Histoire des Indes* (Lyon: Jean Pillehotte, 1603), 98.
6. Sebastian Münster (1489–1552), *La Cosmographie universelle* (Bâle, 1556).
7. Jean-Baptiste de La Curne de Sainte-Palaye (1697–1781), *Dictionnaire historique de l'ancien langage françois; ou Glossaire de la langue françoise depuis son origine jusqu'au siècle de Louis XIV.* 10 vols. (Niort: Le Favre, 1875–1882).
8. Pierre Richelet (1631–1698), *Dictionnaire Françoise* . . . (Génève: Jean Herman Widerhold, 1680).
9. Abbé Antoine Furetière (1619–1688), *Dictionnaire universel* . . . , 2 vols. (La Haye & Rotterdam: Arnout et Renier Leers, 1691).
10. Christopher Columbus (c. 1451–1506) *Oeuvres,* translated and annotated by Alexandre Cioranescu (Paris: Gallimard, 1973).
11. *The First Four Voyages of Amerigo Vespucci,* (1451–1512), (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1893). See also, Martin Waldseemüller, (1470–1521?) *Cosmographiae Introductio,* trans. Joseph Fischer and Franz von Wieser (Ann Arbor University Microfilms, March of America Facsimile Series no. 2, 1966).
12. Henry Percival Biggar, *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier* (Ottawa: Acland, 1924), p. 60.
13. Pietro Martire d'Anghiera (Pierre Martyr) (1455–1526), *De Orbe Novo,* Traduit avec notes et commentaires par Paul Gaffarel (Paris: E. Leroux, 1907), p. 55.
14. Sir Clements Robert Markham, ed., *The Letters of Amerigo Vespucci and other documents illustrative of his career* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1894), p. 9.
15. Le Père Pierre Le Moyne (1602–1671), *Les Peintures Morales* . . . 2 vols. (Paris: S. Cramoisy, 1640–43), II: 620–29.
16. Ibid.
17. Pierre d'Avity, Seigneur de Montmartin (1573–1635), *Les Estats, Empires et principautez du monde* (Paris: P. Chevalier, 1619), p. 315.
18. Public Archives of Canada, Archives des Colonies, C11A I:10–11.
19. Emeric de Crucé (c.1590–1648), *Le Nouveau Cynée* (Paris, 1623), 26.
20. d'Avity, *Les Estats,* p. 315.
21. Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas (1559–1625), *The General history of the vast continent and islands of America, commonly called the West Indies* . . . . Translated into English by Capt. John Stevens, 6 vols. (London: J. Batley, 1725–26), I:58.
22. d'Avity, *Les Estats,* 316.
23. Ibid.
24. Le Père Louis Hennepin (1626–c.1705), *A New Discovery of a Vast Country in America,* 2 vols. (London, 1698), II:84.

25. Markham, *Letters of Amerigo Vespucci,* p. 7.
26. Ibid.
27. Le Père Louis Hennepin, *Description de la Louisiane,* (Paris: Sebastian Hure, 1683), p. 55.
28. d'Avity, *Les Estats,* pp. 316–317.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp. 317–18.
31. José de Acosta (c.1539–1600), *Histoire naturelle et moralle des Indes* (Paris, 1600), pp. 287v–288.
32. R.G. Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents,* 73 vols., (Cleveland; Burrows Bros., 1896), I:11, 13; III: 193–97; XX:71. For a Spanish view on this subject, see the letter of Friar Domingo de Betanzos, written in 1534, which argued that the limitations of Indian languages could easily lead to gross errors in explaining Christian doctrine. It is reproduced by Lewis Hanke in "Pope Paul III and the American Indians", *The Harvard Theological Review* 30 no. 2 (April 1937): 102. Two centuries later the same point was being argued. See H.G. Loskiel, *History of the Missions of the United Brethren Among the Indians in North America* (London, 1794), pp. 20–21.
33. Jean-Pierre Maffée, in Claude Duret, *Thresor de l'histoire des langues de cest univers* (Cologne: Matth. Berjon, 1613), p. 945. Cited by Stephen J. Greenblatt in his paper "Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century" presented at the conference "The First Image of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old," at the University of California, 6–9 February 1975. Canadian Indians also had difficulties with the letters f, l, r. See Public Archives of Canada, AC C11D 10, Mémoire de Lamothe Cadillac, 1693. Also, Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, *Old John Neptune and other Maine Indian Shamans* (Portland: Anthoensen Press, 1946).
34. For instance, Frobisher's sailors, acting on the assumption that New World natives mated indiscriminately at first encounter, brought together an Inuit man and woman who had been captured separately. The sailors were disappointed. Richard Hakluyt (1552?–1616), *Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation,* 12 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose, 1903–1905), VII: 306–307.
35. Henry Hawks, in Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* IX:397. Later, Thomas Jefferys made a similar observation about Canadian Indians during summer in *The natural and civil history of the French dominions in North and South America* (London, 1761), p. 93.
36. Jean de Léry (1534–1611), *Histoire d'un Voyage fait en la terre du Brésil* (Lausanne: Bibliothèque Romande, 1972) [based on Geneva edition of 1580], p. 118.
37. Gilbert Chinard, *L'Exotisme américain dans la litterature française au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1911), p. 135.
38. Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science,* 8 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964–1966), V:577, citing Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576), *De Rerum Varietate,* Lib. VIII: Chap. 40.
39. *Pausanias' Description of Greece,* trans. Arthur Richard Shilleto (London: George Bell, 1886), I:XX111:13.
40. Flavius Philostratus, *The Life of Appollonius of Tyana,* trans. F.C. Conybeare, 2 vols. (London: Heineman, 1948-50), V1:XXV11.
41. H.W. Janson, "A 'Memento Mori' Among Early Italian Prints", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 3 (1939–41): 248.
42. See Jean Chevalier, *Dictionnaire des Symboles* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969). Also, Pierre Grimal, ed., *Larousse World Mythology* (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1965).
43. Silenus began as a woodland deity who presided over springs and running streams. According to *Pausanias,* I:XXIII, the name Silenus at one point was applied to all satyrs. In any event, he was shaggy and full-bearded, had horse's ears, and was extraordinarily wise. In the sixth century he became associated with Dionysus. Socrates was compared to Silenus in wisdom, irony, and appearance.
44. Hayden White, "The Forms of Wildness" in Edward Dudley and Maximillian Novak, *The Wild Man Within* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1942), pp. 3–38.

45. Richard Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages: A Study in Art, Sentiment and Demonology* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 1–33.
46. However, an extremely ancient version of the Wild Man, Enkidu, was the embodiment of natural innocence. Seduced by a harlot, and consequently rejected by his former companions the wild animals, he had no recourse except to go to the the city and become civilized. See N.K. Sandars, *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), pp. 60–67.
47. Merlin, the master of nature, was descended from an incubus in the guise of a Wild Man. See Russell Hope Robbins, *The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology* (New York: Crown, 1966), p. 462.
48. Edmund Spenser (1552?–1599), *The Faerie Queene* (Oxford: Limited Editions Club, 1953), IV:VII.
49. Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages*, p. 51.
50. Ibid., p. 58.
51. Ibid. Also, Richard Barber and Anne Riches, *A Dictionary of Fabulous Beasts* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 154.
52. A. Van Gennep, *Manuel de folklore francais contemporain* (Paris: A. Picard, 1937–), I:924.
53. *Le Dix-huictième tome du Mercure Francais* (Paris: Estienne Richer, 1633), p. 59.
54. Public Archives of Canada, AC CIIA 7:45–47. Denonville to the minister, 13 November 1685.
55. Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages*, p. 43
56. Henry Percival Biggar, *The Precursors of Jacques Cartier 1497–1534* (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1911), p. 66, Letter of Pietro Pasqualigo, 19 October 1501.
57. Prosper and Mathieu Paulmier, *Eusebii Caesariensis Episcopi Chronicon* (Paris: Henri Estienne, 1512). Entry for 1509.
58. Caius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (AD 23/24–79), *Historia Naturalis*, VII:II:24.
59. Nordenskiöld, Adolf Erik, (1832–1901), *Periplus, An Essay on the Early History of Charts & Sailing Directions* (Stockholm, 1897), plate 39.
60. Antonio Pigafetta (c. 1480/91–c. 1534), *Le Voyage et navigation faict par les Espaignolz es Isles de Mollucques* (Paris: Simon de Colines, 1522). Section II: 54. Another contemporary reference is found in J-A-C Buchon, *Faictz et dictz de bonne mémoire maistre Jehan Molinet* (Paris, 1531), cvii.
61. *Le Mercure Galant*, April 1681, p. 143.
62. The confusion exists even today. When I first encountered the hairy man while researching in Paris, my first reaction was to regard this figure as being somehow derived from early reports of Amerindians. A recent edition of the *Mémoire* of Nicolas Perrot, that of Editions Elysée (Montreal, 1973), has figures of the Wild Man and Wild Woman on its endpapers; obviously the editors were under the same impression.
63. André Thevet (1502–1590), *Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique*. Notes et commentaires par Paul Gaffarel (Paris: Maisonneuve & Cie, 1878). Chapter XXXI.
64. Ibid., 413.
65. Léry, *Histoire d'un Voyage*, pp. 60, 97.
66. Marc Lescarbot (c.1570–1642), *Nova Francia: or the Description of that part of New France, which is one continent with Virginia*, trans. "P.E." (London, George Bishop, 1609), p. 200.
67. George Wrong, ed., *The Long Journey to the Country of the Hurons by Father Gabriel Sagard* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1939), p. 138; Louis Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan, *Mémoires de l'Amérique Septentrionale*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: François l'Honore, 1705), II:95; Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, XXXVIII: 257; William F. Ganong, ed., *New Relation of Gaspesia by Father Chrestien LeClercq* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1910), p. 92; Père Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre (1610–1687), *Histoire générale des Isles des Christophe . . . et autres dans l'Amérique* (Paris: Jacques Langlois, 1654), pp. 296, 398.
68. Charles Coste, ed., *Avantures militaires au XVIIIe siècle d'après les mémoires de Jean-*

Baptiste d'Aleyrac (1737–1796) (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1925), p. 36. Another aspect of the European iconography of Amerindians drew much less attention but indicated even more surely the identification of New World man with the Wild Man. This was the depiction of Amerindian women with sagging breasts, a characteristic of the Wild Woman. See Bernadette Boucher, *La sauvage aux seins pendants* (Paris: Hermann, 1977).

69. *The historie of the world. Commonly called The Natural historie of C. Plinius Secundus*, trans. Philomen Holland (London: A. Islip, 1601), p. 156.
70. Horst Waldemar Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute, 1952), p. 337.
71. Robert M. and Ada W. Yertes, *The Great Apes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 12; Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore*, p. 351 n47.
72. Ibid., p. 83, citing Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus.*
73. Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages*, p. 92.
74. Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore*, p. 207, citing Cardano, *De subtilitate* (Basel, 1547), Lib. X.
75. Yerkes, *Great Apes*, p. 18, citing George Edwards, *Gleanings of natural history* . . . ., 3 vols. (London, 1758–64).
76. Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore*, p. 86.
77. Ibid., p. 80, citing Thomas Cantimprensis, *Liber de natura rerum* (1240).
78. William Frederic Creeney (1825–1897), *A Book of Fac-similes of Monumental Brasses of the Continent of Europe, with brief descriptive notes* (Norwich, 1884), p. 21.
79. Such a figure, cast in iron, is to be seen in the Musée Le Secq de Tournelles in Rouen.
80. Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages*, p. 65.
81. Ibid., p. 84. For an illustration indicating how this came about, see the Breughel painting reproduced in Bernheimer, fig. 16. According to Chevalier, Arlequin (Harlequin) symbolized a malicious buffoon of unstable personality, a being who was not yet individualized. He was a stock character of *la commedia dell'arte.*
82. Bernheimer, *Wild Men in the Middle Ages*, p. 102. Bernheimer theorizes that this development indicated the uneasiness of Europeans with their own civilization, particularly its organized violence.
83. Charles Chaulmer (d. 1680), *Le Nouveau Monde ou l'Amérique Chrétienne* (Paris: S. Piget, 1659), p. 8.
84. George Boas and Arthur O. Lovejoy, eds., *Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 289.
85. George Boas, *Essays on Primitivism and Related Ideas in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), p. 137.
86. Thevet, *Singularitez de la France Antarctique*, p. 135.
87. Père Claude, d'Abbeville, (d. 1632), *Histoire de la Mission des Pères Capucins en l'Isle de Maragnan et terres circonvoisins* (Paris: François Huby, 1614; facsimile edition by Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, Granz, Austria, 1963), pp. 311–311b.
88. Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Isles des Christophe*, p. 396; Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, XXI:55; L: 171, among others.
89. For one of the earliest examples of this usage of the Amerindian "bon sauvage", see Pierre Martyr, *Extrait ou recueil des Iles nouvellement trouvées en la grand mer Oceane* . . . (Paris: Simon de Colines, 1532), pp. 68v–69.
90. Sieur de La Borde, "Relation de l'origine, moeurs, coustumes, religion, guerres et voyages des Caraibes, sauvages des isles Antilles de l'Amerique," p. 15, in Henri Justel, *Recueil de Diverses Voyages Faits En Afrique et en l'Amerique* . . . (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1674).
91. See Thevet's comment, *Singularitez de la France Antarctique*, pp. 13–14.
92. Waldseemüller, *Cosmographiae Introductio*, pp. 92–97.
93. Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, XII:181.
94. George F.G. Stanley, "The First Indian 'Reserves' in Canada," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 4 (1950): 209–10.

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Sasquatch-Like Creatures in Newfoundland: A Study in the Problems of Belief, Perception, and Reportage[1]

This article describes types of monsters and supernatural beings which inhabit the folklore of European settlers of the island. The author notes that there is no specific Sasquatch-like being in this mythology but suggests, with reference to recorded accounts of sightings, that such phenomena would be perceived in terms of either physical nature or the ready categories of the settlers' imported mythology.

In the one-thousand-year history of the exploration and settlement of Newfoundland by European peoples there have been a great many encounters with half-human half-animal creatures and human-like supernatural beings on the island. In about the year 1000 a Norse sailor was killed by an arrow from a sciapod, a hopping one-footed humanoid.[2] In 1610 sailors and dockworkers in the Newfoundland port of St. John's were sent fleeing by a rather malevolent and unattractive mermaid.[3]

The traditional culture of Newfoundlanders allows for the existence of fairies, devils, ghosts, Jack O'Lanterns, spirits, mermaids, witches, magicians, wraiths, and a host of other human, part-human, or human-like creatures. Stories of encounters with these various beings abound in Newfoundland,[4] and these phenomena are recognized by many islanders as distinct and identifiable parts of the world in which they live. For example, fairies are described by Newfoundlanders according to certain rather standard characteristics, behaviour patterns, and places of habitation, and are called "fairies," "little people," or "the good people" to distinguish them from other perceived phenomena. Likewise, the other beings which I listed above can all be described and given a taxonomic name by people within the traditional island culture. In short, the Newfoundlander's world view includes a number of well-defined and taxonomically distinct beings not found in the scientific or "official" lists of island flora and fauna.

One might say that all the above beings are relatively well defined within the "cultural language" of Newfoundlanders.[5] When confronted with a fairy, ghost, or devil, the Newfoundlander recognizes it as such and can report his encounter to others in terms which will properly identify the phenomenon he has observed.

The traditional world view of the Newfoundlander, however, does not include Sasquatch-like creatures; that is, large, human-like bipeds covered with fur or long hair. Unlike certain cultures in the Pacific Northwest or in the Himalayas, there is no word in the Newfoundlander's traditional cultural language (or in his actual language for that matter) which would describe such a creature. Quite simply, the Sasquatch does not exist within the traditional cosmology of the Newfoundlander.[6]

This does not mean that Sasquatch-like creatures do not inhabit the province, nor does it mean that encounters with such creatures have not occurred in Newfoundland. When such encounters are made, however, the Newfoundlander has no way of describing the creature as a distinct phenomenon according to his cultural language and can only perceive and report the encounter in terms which conform to his world view. Toelken, in his excellent essay on the nature of world view and communication, writes that a person is "inclined to view many, if not most, phenomena in those conceptual terms which seem 'logical' to his society; that is, he is taught by his society *how* to see."[7]

Since the world view of the Newfoundlander prevents him from seeing and reporting a Sasquatch as a "Sasquatch," "Bigfoot," or "Yeti," he perceives and reports a creature with which he is familiar, while at the same time he describes a creature with the characteristics of the Sasquatch. I will illustrate this peculiarity of perception and reportage with some examples of Sasquatch-like sightings or encounters in Newfoundland.

One of the more intriguing ways in which Newfoundlanders have perceived and reported the Sasquatch is as an "Indian." The indigenous Indians of the island were the Beothucks, who were extinct by the third decade of the nineteenth century. Micmac Indians from Nova Scotia settled on the island in comparatively recent times, but their numbers are small and they are not very widespread. The average Newfoundlander, therefore, would have little, if any, knowledge of Indian behaviour or characteristics. Few would have ever met an Indian, and those Indians they did meet were likely to be the highly acculturated Micmacs.

There is, however, an image within the Newfoundlander's cultural language of the "savage" Indian of the wilderness, no doubt created out of a combination of legends about the Beothucks and the popular literature on Indians found throughout North America. It is this image of the wild, savage, or hostile Indian which some Newfoundlanders have used to describe encounters with Sasquatch-like creatures.

In 1915 James P. Howley wrote a history of the Beothucks in which he compiled many reports, both written and oral, of encounters with this extinct tribe. It is of interest that several of these reports describe these Indians as a tall and massive race of people:

> A man killed in Trinity Bay by the fishermen is described as a huge savage, and another said to have been seen by one Richards, in Notre Dame Bay was pronounced to be seven feet tall. . . .
> Mr. Watts remembers many years ago, hearing from a reliable source, that some hunters being in the interior of Labrador near Forteau came across the footprints of men, who judging by their great strides, must have been of immense stature.
> One Richmond, a noted Indian killer, told many stories about them [Beothucks]. He said he once saw a dead Indian 7 feet tall.[8]

Although it is true that the Beothucks were somewhat taller than most aboriginal tribes in North America, the above descriptions would seem to be either exaggerations[9] or accounts of beings other than Beothucks.

In the mid to late nineteenth century the following encounter occurred, as described by the grandson of the witness:

> Way back a number of years ago, Indian Head, the northernmost point of White Sands, derived its name from the fact that Indians [were] frequently down there. The first fishermen in that area came from Caplin Harbour and used to moor their boat off shore. Often when the fishermen came back to their camps on shore, they found their fishing gear mutilated. Their fishing gear mutilated, their cooking utensils—but rarely anything stolen, just broken and destroyed. So my grandfather told me that this occurred many times, but they did not see the Indians personally.
>
> When he was some eight years old, he lived in Caplin Harbour. He came up to White Sands fishing with some other men, and, one time, in search of caplin or bait, they went on to and landed on the south side of White Sands, White Sands Beach, and as they rowed in there in the early morning, there were two Indians in the sands. There were two or three boats of them [fishermen] and one of the boats had a gun—an old cap and ball musket, the gun of the era. So, as the two Indians got to their feet to start to retreat towards the bank and forest, one of the men raised the gun and shot one of the Indians.
>
> That Indian, according to my grandfather, was approximately nine feet tall, covered with hair from an inch to an inch and a half. He had

> on no clothing whatsoever. They did not take him in their boat, but they towed it in the water—back to Caplin Harbour and it's buried down in Caplin Harbour in a place called Shark Cove.[10]

There are, of course, many unanswerable questions about this story. Who were the Indians who destroyed the gear of the fishermen? The Beothucks were long gone by the time this encounter occurred. It is conceivable that the Indians were Micmacs, but it would be more likely that the Micmacs would have stolen the gear, rather than simply destroying it. The description of the random destruction of the fishing gear is not unlike similar descriptions of the destruction of equipment in woods camps in the Pacific Northwest.[11]

The description of the dead Indian displays the characteristics of a Sasquatch-like creature rather than those of a man. Yet, in attempting to find a logical explanation for both the random destruction of their gear and the strange creature which they had killed, these nineteenth-century Newfoundlanders made use of the image and characteristics of the wild Indian which was already implanted within their world view.

The following account combines both the large footprint motif and the sighting of a hairy, human-like creature. The encounter took place sometime in the first half of this century, and the collector of this story tells us that the narrator-witness is illiterate and has little conception of time or number:

> "Meself and Mista Jim L. were huntin' this fall 'bout. . .oh. . .twas (scratching his head) twenty or forty years ago (he couldn't tell two from ten years). Anyway we was walkin' through the woods down in Willwood Harbour when bine-by sher I sees this thing runnin' through the woods. It had hair on it 'bout ten feet long. He was all covered with long black hair. Be gar the reckly he vanished. I says to Mista J. (Mr.) it must be an indin. Well we looked around and the reckly I sees his fut print. It was a large fut."
>
> He went on with a lengthy description [of] the foot print which according to him wore tannels. He concluded his description by reminding us we had often seen a picture of the indian's foot in the books. I believe everyone present had seen a picture of an indian's foot except Mr. W. because from his description I know he didn't have a clue.
>
> He continued, "We followed his tracks and then I sees him sittin' up in a branch. I took out the horn and put six fingers and two three-quarter pistol balls in the musseloader. Mista J. L. fired first. He only scarred him. I raised the gun, took good sight and fired. The pistol balls went right in his heart. He fell from the branch into a big hole.

> I started to load again but Mista J. told me the gun would bust open. I was just going to fire again when he stopped kicking and died (he then removed his cap)."[12]

Whether the narrator-witness was as ignorant of dimensions and of Indians as the collector believed is impossible to determine. The meaning of "tannels" as given in this context is obscure, but it would seem to refer to some kind of footwear.[13] The important fact, however, is that this man truly believed he had shot and killed an Indian, rather than some unknown beast. In a later part of his narrative, he actually warns his audience not to talk too much about the incident, since "you can get strung up for a thing like this."

The perception of a Sasquatch-like creature as an Indian may seem preposterous, yet in the context of traditional Newfoundland culture such a view is not altogether strange. The Indian, whether Micmac or Beothuck, was at home in the wooded and marshy interior of the island, whereas the European was mostly a man of the sea and only occasionally ventured inland. Thus, the Newfoundlander may well have associated Indians with the wild, unknown, and dangerous forests and marshes of the island. At the same time, the Newfoundlander's view of the acculturated Micmacs of the coast was that they were strange and magical persons. There are many stories told among Newfoundlanders connecting Micmacs with witchcraft and black magic.[14]

In the mind of the Newfoundlander, then, the Indian had both human and non-human characteristics—a creature of the woods rather than a dweller on the coast, a witch and a sorcerer rather than a simple mortal. Given this view, an encounter with a half-human half-creature in the woods or on an uninhabited stretch of beach might very well be perceived as an Indian by the Newfoundlander.

The association of Sasquatch-like creatures with part-human part-supernatural beings is evident in other encounter stories. Given a different context in which the creature is seen, the Newfoundlander interprets what he sees in a manner different from the above stories. Note the following narrative of an incident which happened around 1930 to 1935. Again, the narrator is the grandson of the witness:

> When they (his grandfather's family) were living down on Battle Point, he used to sell rum—bootleg rum. There were usually rangers on the go and grandfather used to keep his rum buried up in the garden—in different places. One night he went up as usual to get a bottle of rum and just as he had dug up the bottle he saw a very bright light coming

> towards him. It was so bright he could not look at it. But as it got closer, it sort of got dull enough so that he could look at it and he saw that it was really a monster with two very bright eyes. Grandfather used to say that the creature had eyes like two big saucers. It was about the size of a man—a big man over six feet tall, was very black and hairy all over. Grandfather wasn't frightened—the devil wouldn't frighten him—but he didn't know what to do because the light was so bright he was almost blind. He started digging again just to see what would happen and the light began to get brighter and come closer. He stopped digging—filled in the hole and the monster disappeared. Grandfather was sure that the monster was protecting something that was buried in this spot—and it was afraid that he. . . was going to find it. He figured that there was some treasure buried there by pirates and that they had killed one of the crew and buried him near the treasure to protect it, until the pirates themselves got back. The pirates never came back and so the monster which was really the old pirate was still there.[15]

The story goes on to tell that the man tried again on another night, but the monster or guardian spirit appeared once more. The legend of a pirate's ghost as a guardian spirit over buried treasure is extremely common in Newfoundland.[16] The guardian spirit, however, usually does not have the Sasquatch-like characteristics described above.[17]

What may have been another encounter under similar conditions is described by the same informant in response to questions about his first story:

> There's lots of stories like that in Newfoundland [buried treasure stories]. Grandfather knew a man in Otto River somewhere who saw a monster up in the cliff and a few days later when he and some other men went back to the spot they saw where a chest or a trunk had been dragged over the rocks to the water's edge.[18]

The sudden appearance of the creature while the witness was digging, or shortly before a newly dug hole was discovered, as in the above stories, places the anomalous being under the taxonomic designation "treasure guard," according to Newfoundland folklore. Once again, a strange and unexplainable event is rationalized or made logical within the world view of the traditional island culture.

Under other conditions, it is possible that encounters with Sasquatch-like creatures have been perceived and reported as other supernatural beings by Newfoundlanders. But unless the Newfoundlander describes in detail what he saw or heard, rather than simply stating what he assumed the creature to be, it is impossible for the researcher to determine whether the report might be a Sasquatch sighting. Thus, the many times in which Newfoundlanders have reported hearing strange or eerie sounds in the woods may be interpreted by the researcher as the whistling of a Sasquatch, but may be described by the Newfoundlander as music made by fairies.

In an unpublished paper Laurie Lacey discusses the possibility that a large footprint found in Nova Scotia and assumed by the locals to be "the Devil's footprint" may actually be the mark of a Sasquatch.[19] Since "Devil's footprint" legends are quite common in Newfoundland, similar perceptions and reports may have also occurred there.

Of course not all sightings of Sasquatch-like creatures are interpreted by Newfoundlanders in the ways described above. Despite the belief traditions of the island culture, individual Newfoundlanders may not include devils, spirits, and savage Indians within their own personal world views. In addition, encounters with Sasquatch-like creatures may occur under conditions which would not be associated in the mind of the Newfoundlander with any of the above-mentioned creatures. Under such conditions, descriptions of the creature and reports of what it was might differ little from Sasquatch reports in other parts of North America.

The following two accounts exhibit more mainstream North American perceptions of the Sasquatch phenomenon. The first report, dating from the late nineteenth century, occurred in Labrador, the mainland part of the province:

> one afternoon a young girl was playing in front of her parents' cabin when she saw a large animal covered with short white fur, walking erect and appearing to have practically no neck, come out of the forest and start toward her. She very reasonably ran screaming into the house where her mother barred the door and the creature went away. However, it returned at night and walked around the cabin beating on the walls, apparently with a branch or other piece of wood. During the following days the men of the area tracked it hoping to shoot it. They claimed to have seen it at a distance several times, but never got a clear shot at it. For some time it continued to come back at night, frightening the inhabitants of the community, and then at length it simply disappeared. The local people explained it as apparently being a gorilla which had somehow found its way into the local forest.[20]

Note that the creature is perceived as a gorilla in this account.[21] Once again, an unexplainable phenomenon is seen in terms of an explainable one, according to the world views of the witnesses. As with the image of the wild Indian, the image of the gorilla was probably incorporated into the belief systems of these Labrador inhabitants through popular literature. Under the circumstances of the encounter, which occurred within the community rather than in the wilderness, perceptions of the creature as a spirit, savage Indian, or other such being may not have been appropriate . A "gorilla," however, if perceived as a wild animal which had abandoned its natural habitat and "found its way" into Labrador, might be expected to wander into a community either to seek human companionship or simply out of misdirection.

In the second account the witness does not identify the creature according to any traditional taxonomy, but simply describes it without an accompanying belief statement:

> The man who is supposed to have seen our version of the Abominable Snowman was William Decker, who lived in one of the small settlements on the Newfoundland side of the Strait of Belle Isle. The time was in the 1890s, when Decker was spending the winter in Pistolet Bay, hunting and fishing.
>
> One frosty morning he took his muzzle-loader and headed back into the country. As he reached a marsh, about 300 yards across, he heard a loud and frightening roar. He turned and what he saw made him almost faint in his tracks. A huge animal, or huge man, a giant creature anyway, was coming at him in gigantic leaps.
>
> Decker had already charged his gun with plenty of powder and shot. He knelt down and took steady aim and waited till the creature was very close, *too* close for comfort. Then he fired. The weight of the charge brought the beast-man to his knees; but it was up again very quickly. But Decker was ready with a second volley and the creature fell the second time letting out a bellow that could be heard for miles. Taking no chances, he reloaded and fired a third volley. The creature did not stir again.
>
> The story relates that Decker measured the creature. It was ten to twelve feet tall, with an outstretched arm-span of fourteen feet. Its feet left tracks in the snow that Decker's snowshoes couldn't cover. The body, he said, was covered with long hair. He figured the creature weighed about one thousand pounds! Apparently. He left the carcase or corpse where it lay . . . .[22]

Note that in the above account, the present-day narrator adds a belief statement that the creature was an abominable snowman. Again, he is simply applying his own world view in order to make sense out of an anomalous story. In a later part of this radio script, the narrator gives us a clue as to why he perceives this incident as a Sasquatch encounter:

> the general details are very similar to the other tales that are current with respect to the Abominable Snowman and the Sasquatch and a number of other frightening apparitions reported from other parts of the world.

Just as previous Newfoundlanders had incorporated the image of the savage Indian and the gorilla into their world views, the narrator took the image of the Sasquatch from popular culture and applied it to a local story as an explanation of the phenomenon.

If we assume, and it can only be an assumption, that all of the above reports refer to a single phenomenon—that is, a Sasquatch-like creature native to Newfoundland—then the major variable present in all these accounts is the different perceptions of the phenomenon. The researcher, looking for evidence of the Sasquatch phenomenon in Newfoundland, must be aware of this variable; otherwise, he will run the risk of rejecting, out of hand, important and useful data for his research.

Because the researcher is likely to have a different world view from the people he is studying, he may mistakenly reject data because it is described in terms which he finds unbelievable or ridiculous. In reference to both Sasquatch-like creatures and U.F.O.'s in Newfoundland, David Hufford has made this very point:

> there is one other logical error to which folklorists and other scholars all too often fall prey when considering belief materials, and which is relevant to the ABSM [Sasquatch] and UFO material. This is the discounting of the possible objective reality of a phenomenon because it is accompanied, either in tradition or the account of the informant, by an unacceptable explanation. For example, the statement that UFO's are spaceships and ABSM's are their occupants may well accompany or even replace an informant's report of having heard recent stories of lights in the sky and having personally seen a large hairy biped. The former is an interpretation which may well derive totally from tradition while the latter is an alleged observation which may or may not come from tradition. Obviously most informants will not make statements with a high degree of phenomenological clarity. Therefore

> our assessment of likelihood (where appropriate), as well as our need for data relevant to a wide variety of linguistic and cultural questions, requires that we carefully distinguish between interpretation and observation in belief materials.
>
> As soon as we become truly careful about our logic and our understanding of our own assumptive sets we shall be able to begin to work seriously with a huge body of material of great importance within our culture, and to do so in ways that promise a variety of very exciting possibilities.[23]

Bearing in mind the close relationship between belief, perception and reportage, the discovery of accounts of any given phenomenon becomes difficult. For example, the rationale often given for Sasquatch reports by those who cannot accept the existence of such a creature is that the witness mistook a bear or some other animal or object for a Sasquatch. Although, as I shall discuss shortly, there are some problems with such a rationale, some Sasquatch reports may well be cases of a "mistaken bear," and the researcher must be prepared to accept this possibility when gathering reports of Sasquatch sightings.

The "mistaken bear" theory of Sasquatch sightings finds its greatest support in the examination of the Newfoundland psyche. John D. A. Widdowson, in an extensive study of frightening and threatening figures in Newfoundland, demonstrates the various ways in which Newfoundlanders embody or personify fear.[24] In different contexts and under different circumstances, the Newfoundlander's mental picture of fear will vary; thus, parents might use the priest, the devil, Santa Claus, mummers, the policeman, ghosts, fairies, or almost anything else to both threaten and control children.

There is, however, one context in which a particular mental image of fear seems to predominate: the threatening figure of the wilderness, when described by parents or children, often resembles a Sasquatch-like creature. In order to understand this, one must know something of the Newfoundland way of life. The Newfoundlander is surrounded by two potentially dangerous wildernesses—the forest (or marsh) and the sea. Stories of misfortune in the wilderness, of both a natural and a supernatural variety, abound in the narrative traditions of the island. The people are well aware of the great risks they take when they leave the relative safety of their community to fish in the sea or hunt in the interior. It is thus quite understandable that Newfoundland parents would do their utmost to keep their children away from the forests and marshes of the interior and the uninhabited landwash or coastline.

The threatening figure used to keep children away from the wilderness is often called the 'bogey man" (or some variation on this name), and it is this figure, embodying the fear of the wilderness, which is often pictured as a Sasquatch-like creature.[25] The following mental picture (in this instance called a "boo-bagger") has several Sasquatch-like characteristics:

> The Boo-bagger is similar to the bear—hairy, same height and size, but without claws. It is entirely black with a blunt face rather than a sharp one like a bear. Its tail is like that of a bear's.[26]

In other reports, this threatening figure is described as a "half-human beast . . . covered with long black hair."[27] Others, instead of refering to this figure as a "bogey man," make more direct reference to its characteristics by calling it the "Hairy Man" or "the big hairy monster."[28] In at least one instance, the link between the threatening figure and the Sasquatch has been made directly. One Newfoundland college student remembers being threatened with the "abdominal [sic] snowman."[29]

Thus, although the Newfoundlander has no word in his cultural language for a Sasquatch as a true and distinct phenomenon, he does have a word for such a creature within his mental conception of fear. No adult Newfoundlander believes in the existence of the Sasquatch-like bogey man, yet many have the image of such a creature firmly implanted in their psyches from childhood fears.

Of course, an intriguing question which immediately comes to mind in respect to the Newfoundland bogey man is where this particular image of fear came from. Is a large, hairy, manlike biped a natural and universal symbol of fear among human beings of different cultures—an "archetype of the collective unconscious" in Jungian terms?[30] Or does the image of the bogey man stem from some natural phenomenon on the island? Is it only a coincidence that both the Newfoundland Sasquatch and the make-believe bogey man inhabit the same wild forests, marshes, and coastline of the ilsand? Just as the image of the wild and savage Indian of the wilderness might be traced partially to memories and legends of the Beothucks, might the image of the bogey man be traced to some other natural island phenomenon?

I am not sure what effect this mental image has upon the actual perception and reportage of a Sasquatch encounter in Newfoundland, but it may indeed add weight to the "mistaken bear" theory as an explanation for such encounters. If the Newfoundlander is in a particularly fearful state while in the wilderness, might not his fear take concrete form, forcing him to perceive a bear or a tree as a bogey man or Sasquatch?

The "mistaken bear" theory, however, may not adequately explain all reports. Others have already pointed out the behavioural and anatomical differences between the creature reported and the bear,[31] but there is another argument against this rationale which has to do with belief and perception. Many of the Sasquatch sightings, both in Newfoundland and elsewhere, were made by hunters, woodsmen, or others familiar with the flora and fauna of the wilderness. Is it reasonable to assume that such experts, well acquainted with bears, would perceive a bear as something other than what it is? In discussing mermaids, Horace Beck has made the same point:

> since the northern fishermen . . . live out their lives in proximity to thousands of seals, it would be ridiculous to think that atmospheric conditions or even strong drink could prompt them to mistake seals for mermaids.[32]

It seems more likely that the reverse situation would occur: when confronted with an anomalous creature, the witness might perceive it in terms of a similar, recognizable creature. Thus, a great problem for the researcher are those witnesses who have seen a Sasquatch, but who assume that they were looking at a bear. Such a rationalization seems quite likely in view of the fact that almost all Newfoundlanders accept the bear as a part of their world view, whereas few accept the Sasquatch. Thus, the simple statement, "I saw a bear in the woods today," may conceal an actual Sasquatch encounter.

The researcher, who may be alert to reports of encounters with spirits, devils, Indians, gorillas, and other such unlikely beings, will still miss reports of bear, moose, or lynx, since these encounters seem "reasonable and normal" according to the researcher's world view. Thus, what may have been a true sighting of a Sasquatch-like creature could, through subsequent tellings, become no more than a story about a frightening encounter with a bear.

The researcher, then, is faced with the problem of a world view which does not accept the Sasquatch when it is actually there, but rather rationalizes it as an Indian, spirit, devil, fairy, or as nothing more than a bear. At the same time, the researcher must deal with the problem of a psyche which might accept the Sasquatch when it isn't there. The Newfoundlander's world view and his conception of fear are in contradiction, so that when confronted with an unexplainable phenomenon, he may well be torn between a cosmological and a psychical rationalization of the event.

The problems of a researcher who attempts to interpret Sasquatch reports in Newfoundland are great. The islander's way of reporting the Sasquatch phenomenon may totally obscure the "actuality" of the event, from the researcher's point of view. In a culture such as that of Newfoundland, these problems may seem insurmountable, yet the reports gathered so far are intriguing, and further work may, in time, overcome the barriers of belief, perception, and reportage.

Notes

1. I should like to thank David J. Hufford and John D. A. Widdowson for many of the ideas presented in this paper, and for the inspiration to write it. I should also like to thank the Memorial University of Newfoundland Folklore and Language Archive (hereafter MUNFLA) for allowing me access to their collections.
2. Gwyn Jones, ed. and trans., *The Norse Atlantic Saga: Being the Norse Voyages of Discovery and Settlement to Iceland, Greenland, America* (London: Oxford, 1964), pp. 184–85. The sciapod, monocole or footshade man was well known to European culture; see Heinz Mode, *Fabulous Beasts and Demons* (London: Phaidon, 1973), pp. 206–7.
3. Richard Whitebourne, *A Discoervs and Discovery of New-Found-Land . . .* (London, 1623), pp. [100–101].
4. The greatest repository for such stories is the MUNFLA collection. All references to stories from this collection will include the MUNFLA accession number.
5. I have taken this term from Barre Toelken, "Folklore, Worldview, and Communication," in *Folklore: Performance and Communication*, eds. Dan Ben-Amos and Kenneth S. Goldstein (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1975), p. 267.
6. David J. Hufford has made this same point in "Humanoids and Anomalous Lights: Taxonomic and Epistemological Problems," *Fabula* 18 (1977): 234–41. See also Wayne Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6 (1972): 65–90, for a discussion of belief and perception of Sasquatch among Pacific Northwest Indians. For a good survey of recent folkloristic studies on the relationship of perception to belief, see Donald Ward, "The Little Man Who Wasn't There: Encounters with the Supranormal," *Fabula* 18 (1977): 212–25.
7. Toelken, p. 265.
8. *The Beothucks or Red Indians: The Aboriginal Inhabitants of Newfoundland* (1915; reprint ed., Toronto: Coles, 1974), pp. 257–58, 266, 273.
9. Ibid., pp. 257–61.
10. MUNFLA Q68–49, p. 12. Names and places have been changed.
11. For accounts of this type of random destruction, see Don Hunter and René Dahinden, *Sasquatch* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973), pp. 19–20; and John Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam, 1968), pp. 28–29.
12. MUNFLA Q68–247, p. 12. Names and places have been changed. Middle paragraph and parenthetical remarks are by the collector.
13. I should like to thank William Kirwin for searching, albeit in vain, for this word in the Newfoundland Dictionary Centre, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
14. See Peggy Martin, "Drop Dead: Witchcraft Images and Ambiguities in Newfoundland Society," *Culture & Tradition* 2 (1977): 35–50.
15. MUNFLA 68–17, p. 137. The place name has been changed. Parenthetical remarks are by the collector.

16. See motifs N570ff. in Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature,* rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), for international analogues to this legend.
17. The strange shining eyes have been described in other Sasquatch encounters. See Ivan Sanderson, *Abominable Snowmen: Legend Come to Life* (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton, 1961), p. 122; Hunter and Dahinden, *Sasquatch,* pp. 46, 67; and Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch,* p. 63.
18. MUNFLA 68–17, p. 137. The place name has been changed.
19. "Sasquatch/Bigfoot: A Canadian Perspective," typescript, 1976. See motif A972.2.2. *The Devil's Footprint* in Thompson, *Motif-Index.*
20. As quoted in Hufford, "Humanoids," p. 236. Hufford was unable to track down the source of this story, noting that, according to his informant, it appeared in an "old travel book." Another account of the "Traverspine Gorilla" of Labrador is given in Elliott Merrick, *True North* (New York: Scribners, 1933), pp. 24–26.
21. Similar perceptions of the Sasquatch as a gorilla occurred in the report of the capture of a creature, subsequently named Jacko, in British Columbia in 1884; see Hunter and Dahinden, *Sasquatch,* pp. 22–25. See also Green, *On the Track,* p. 41, for a similar perception.
22. *Abominable Snowman in Newfoundland,* writ. & narr. Michael Harrington, CBC Radio, St. John's, *Jamboree—Friends and Neighbors,* 8 June 1977. The source of this story is not given. I should like to thank CBC St. John's for allowing me access to the radio script.
23. Hufford, "Humanoids," p. 241.
24. "Aspects of Traditional Verbal Control: Threats and Threatening Figures in Newfoundland Folklore," Ph.d. diss., Memorial University of Newfoundland 1972. A slightly abridged version of this dissertation has been published as *If You Don't be Good: Verbal Social Control in Newfoundland,* Social and Economic Studies, No. 21 (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977).
25. Hunter and Dahinden, *Sasquatch,* p. 35, allude to the bogey man-Sasquatch relationship, but do not explore the question.
26. MUNFLA Q67–213, as quoted in Widdowson, *If You Don't Be Good,* p. 166.
27. MUNFLA Q63B, as quoted in Widdowson, *If You Don't Be Good,* p. 179, and MUNFLA 67–1, as quoted in Widdowson, "Aspects," p. 367, respectively.
28. MUNFLA Q67–158, as quoted in Widdowson, *If You Don't Be Good,* p. 195, and MUNFLA Q67–427, as quoted in Widdowson, *If You Don't Be Good,* p. 151, respectively.
29. Reported by the student in a class on Newfoundland Folklore at Memorial University of Newfoundland, taught by Herbert Halpert, in the autumn of 1972.
30. See C. G. Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,* trans. R. F. C. Hall, *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung,* vol. 9, part. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959). For a discussion of the ape as a universal "figura diaboli," see H. W. Janson, *Apes and Apelore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,* Studies of the Warburg Institute, No. 20 (London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1952), pp. 13–27.
31. Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch,* pp. 33, 41–42; and Bernard Heuvelmans, *On the Track of Unknown Animals,* trans. Richard Garnett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), pp. 91–92.
32. *Folklore of the Sea* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press for the Marine Historical Assn., Mystic Seaport, 1973), p. 228.

Carole Henderson Carpenter

The Cultural Role of Monsters in Canada

This article considers the nature and function of monsters in Canadian society. The author maintains that recurring themes and motifs in a people's monster tales reflect social concerns and attitudes toward the environment. She suggests that peaceful, non-violent cultural values in Canada are well suited to the relegation of violent, aggressive attitudes to manlike monsters of the wilderness and that the vastness of the land conveniently permits the plausibility of these monsters existing in remote regions.

In their recent quest for a distinctive cultural identity, Canadians have, perhaps too often, tried to find what is unique and exclusive to their country. Such efforts have resulted largely in frustration and disillusionment, for there is little significant material of this nature to be found. The disillusioned have consequently fallen prey to and often joined the ranks of those who question the very existence of a Canadian culture. Of course, to the cultural scholar, such questioning is absurd, since all peoples have culture—only the nature of their culture is open to question.

Canadians might far more profitably look for that which is quantitatively rather than qualitatively Canadian in order to define and understand their culture. Little in the developed world, especially the heavily industrialized West, is unique to one country. Modern technology, travel, and immigration preclude the isolation which fosters such cultural distinctiveness. The cultures of most developed countries, particularly relatively recently settled ones like Canada, are mélanges of aspects and traits found and perhaps originating elsewhere, with very few characteristics that are indisputably indigenous. One could reasonably argue that this has always been the case, for people invariably transport cultural baggage when they move, and they have been moving, creating "new" cultures, since time immemorial.

What actually makes a "new" culture is the particular mixture of aspects that evolves and settles into the shared set of beliefs, concepts, and resulting behavioural patterns which constitute a culture. Basically, the distinctions among cultures must, given the tremendous similarities and shared characteristics within the Western, developed world, be viewed as quantitative, not qualitative. It is from the emphases shown through the disparate quantities of identifiable traits that one can best discern the different natures of the cultures, specifically, their themes and preoccupations, their moral and ethical principles that make them what they are. Naturally there are, in some instances, unique characteristics which specify and isolate a given culture, but such cases are exceptional in the modern world.

It is important to demonstrate the validity of these ideas, not only to indicate to Canadians the futility of their search for "Canadianness" in exclusivity but also to clarify the nature of modern cultures. In such a validation it is best to isolate one aspect of Canadian culture, seek to demonstrate its international commonalities through cross-cultural analysis, identify the Canadian peculiarities if there are any, and note variances from international "norms" such as they are, watching for particular concentrations and recurring themes.

I propose here to undertake such an analysis of extraordinary beings in Canadian folklore.[1] Since the international parallels of the extant or known Canadian "monsters"[2] are readily available in standard folklore reference works[3] and are being considered by other scholars in some depth, I will focus my discussion on the particular concentrations and themes which are discernible in the Canadian lore. The actual existence of these extraordinary beings does not concern me here at all. Rather, it is the cultural phenomenon —real or imaginary—that is the issue. Since the stories about the creatures exist in Canadian folklore, the beings are part of the nation's culture. It is as such that I investigate them.

In one of her commentaries on Canadian literature, Margaret Atwood stated that "magic and monsters aren't usually associated with Canadian literature."[4] One could quite validly extend this comment to apply to all Canadian culture which, typically, is considered to be of a rather unimaginative, prosaic, and decidedly unmystical nature. Atwood argues that the supernatural does, indeed, exist in Canadian literature, as the past fifteen years of Canadian literary criticism have indicated. She labels this critical activity a "process of exhumation," since the "discoveries" of the supernatural pertain not merely to current works but to earlier ones as well. The process might better be considered a naked glance at the reality of Canadian culture as opposed to the previously common view of it within a predetermined paradigm. Most Canadians have tended to see their culture as they wished to, rather than as it was or is, and many persist in this tendency. Since the monsters have not popularly been associated with Canada, they have not assumed the cultural position they merit as a result of their prevalence and distribution.

Certainly there are and have been many extraordinary beings—most of them quite legitimately categorized as monsters—in the folklore of the peoples of Canada. Tales about such creatures exist from coast to coast, among adults as well as children, and within most if not all cultural groups in Canada. The stories also stretch over the span of Canadian history, found among the native people prior to European contact and through the years to the present, although great variation in the level of belief held by people in the actual existence of the creatures is evident.

There is a wide but not unusual variety of extraordinary beings in Canadian oral tradition. Apart from the multitudinous ghosts and similar revenants which legitimately constitute a separate tradition, these extraordinary beings can be grouped loosely into the following six categories: frightening figures, mostly in childhood tradition;[3] little creatures of the elf or so-called fairy variety; cultural heroes in several human, animal, and super-being forms; evil creatures who are humans, humans invested with an evil spirit, or transformed humans; wild woods creatures, basically humanoid; and numerous lake and sea beasts considered to be wild, non-sentient beings. Many examples could be given for each of these categories, but a few will suffice to specify the nature and some important characteristics of the creatures under consideration.

The frightening figures belonging to the first category range from the generalized bogey man known to so many of us from our childhood to more specific apparitions such as "Raw Flesh and Bloody Bones," a Newfoundland creature matching his descriptive name.[6] Most everyone is willing to admit the "reality" in fancy of a range of such figures used mostly to discipline or control children. In their traditional cultures the native people had numerous such beings, including the cannibal woman D'Sonoqua of the Pacific North Coast Indians, who was said to devour youngsters who strayed into the woods,[7] and the Kudloopudlooaluk, which is "a fanciful kind of sea creature. Eskimo children are warned not to play too near the water for the Kudloopudlooaluk will get you if you don't watch out."[8] It is noteworthy, though not unique to Canadian tradition, that these figures are uniformly malevolent in nature and most commonly associated with dark and dangerous places like the forest or water. There is little, if any, adult belief in such beings, which was probably also the case in the traditional native cultures, as Wayne Suttles suggests in his article, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch."[9]

Canadian elves or fairies are most common today in Newfoundland, though they have been known in French Canada and, very occasionally, in Nova Scotia. The Newfoundland fairy is a little creature of evil temperament known to do harm to animals and people rather than to concern his usually male self with inanimate things like land and homes. The Scots-Irish helpful elves or fairies did not cross the water (as according to belief they could not) to the New World, despite the fact that some charming literary tales for children exist concerning a jolly, helpful race of "little people" in Nova Scotia. French-Canadian fairies are generally pesky and mischievous but relatively harmless, though they might lead someone astray in the dark or in the forest.

Culture heroes in Canada are far more common among the native people than any other group. The Mike Fink, Barney Beale, Jessie James, and similar type-heroes seldom appear in Canadian tales. There are, of course, some Paul Bunyan stories as well as some about the Cape Breton giants, especially Angus McAskill, and some tall tales in various locales.[10] Basically, Canada is not (despite its seemingly favourable natural and historical conditions) a cultural milieu conducive to heroes, since the majority of Canadians have long denigrated hero-worship. The native cultures differed markedly, for they considered hero adulation and emulation in a positive light. Many, in fact probably most, of their cultural heroes might be classified as Tricksters or Trickster-like figures. These include Raven, the transformer on the Pacific North Coast; Nanabozho, the man-god of the Eastern Woodlands; and Glooscap, the supernatural giant of the Micmacs. Paul Radin discusses the characteristics of such creatures at length, with specific reference to Canadian examples, in his classic study, *The Trickster*.[11] It is important to note here that these characteristics include unpredictability, disregard for social mores and practices, and the mixing of instinctual behaviour and cultivated traits.

The various creatures possessed of or manifesting evil are a particularly interesting form of extraordinary being in Canadian tradition. These creatures may be basically human, like the vampire or Dracula figures found in belief legends told by some Ontarian Kashubs,[12] humans possessed of evil, like the unfortunate Algonkian Indians who become cannibalistic Windigos,[13] or transformed humans, like the "loup-garou" or werewolf found quite frequently in French-Canadian tradition. The distinctions among these categories rest in the extent of deviation from the human norm. The so-called vampires may simply have characteristics (such as being the seventh son of a seventh son or a caul at birth) which others perceive as evidence of difference and therefore of their predestined fate, whereas the possessed human overtly displays aberrant behaviour. The transformed human no longer has the form of a man, having assumed a bestial shape as a result of his evil behaviour when human. For instance, the "loup-garou" is frequently considered to be a blasphemer turned beast because he failed to live up to the religious precepts of his culture. One such tale is included in Claude Aubry's popular collection, *The Magic Fiddler and Other Legends from French Canada*.[14] The evil beings like the "loup-garou" are, invariably, some form of a Man-Beast, in whom the beast is, sometimes at least, predominant.

The wild woods creatures of the fifth category are somewhat similar, though they are seldom considered to be evil—dangerous and frightening perhaps, but not truly evil. They are humanoid, generally larger than life, and sentient, though not particularly intelligent. The best example, and the most widely known Canadian monster, is the Sasquatch. There are more reports of, publications about, and attempts to authenticate the existence of this creature than of any other extraordinary being in Canada. Rather complete descriptions exist,[15] obviating any necessity to discuss at length the characteristics of this Canadian version of the Yeti or abominable snowman. However, it should be noted that, according to the accounts, these creatures either ignore or harass mankind, never help him, are commonly reported near water, and strongly resemble an enlarged form of a very primitive human.

The next best known Canadian monster is the most famous of the creatures in the last category. This is Ogopogo, the Okanagan relative of the Loch Ness monster. This beast is but one of the many lake and sea monsters reported in Canadian waters: such water beasts comprise the largest single category of extraordinary beings found in Canadian tradition. Many of the recent publications concerning monsters, like Betty Sanders Garner's *Canada's Monsters*, Mary Moon's *Ogopogo*, and Arlene Gaal's *Beneath the Depths*,[16] focus on the water beasts, giving accounts of creatures, mostly eel-like or serpentine and of various colours and sizes, reported in the oceans and lakes of Canada, including Lake Erie, Lake Simcoe, Lake Superior, and Lake Ainslie in Cape Breton Island, among many others. Somewhat different beasts are also represented in the accounts, such as the giant, (twenty-to-twenty-five-metre-long), fast-moving, "shark-like" creature with a long mouth like an alligator's which is lined with menacing teeth, as described in Ralph Surette's article "The Creature Who Waits for Men at Sea," in John Braddock's discussion of "Monsters of the Maritimes," and elsewhere.[17] Cold Lake, on the border between Saskatchewan and Alberta, is said to harbour a white humpbacked creature supposedly the size of a whale and called "Kinosoo" by the local Indians.[18] And there is Sedna, the sea hag of Inuit tradition, whose amputated fingers became the first seal and walrus, but whose temper was fearsome and credited with vicious storms and other disasters. Finally, there is the giant squid of Atlantic-Canadian folklore, bearing marked resemblance to the monster in Jules Verne's *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*. This creature has provided great incentive and encouragement to the monster hunters and believers who put particular stock in the fact that until early in this century the giant squid was thought to exist only in folktales. It was, however, actually found, and various specimens have been studied by, among others, marine biologist F. A. Aldrich and his colleagues at the Memorial University of Newfoundland. Seemingly, all the Canadian water monsters are believed to be wild beasts of non-sentient varieties.

There are obvious international parallels for virtually all the motifs which occur in Canadian monster tales, and one need only refer to the Aarne-Thompson or Baughman indices of folktale types to discover related stories from many nations. I cannot say for certain that no exclusively Canadian monster tales exist, for I have not yet completed the necessary but time-consuming cross-cultural analysis of motifs, motif-clusters, and tales. Nonetheless, on the basis of my studies to date, I am fairly certain that few, if any, tales exist that are unique to Canada and that the difference between the type of motif found in the Canadian versions of monster tales and those of other nations is scarcely significant. It is the relative proportion of the occurence of certain motifs that distinguishes the Canadian traditions from those of other countries.

There are a number of features that recur frequently in the Canadian tales of extraordinary beings but which are in no way to be considered unique to them. The most obvious feature of the corpus of Canadian monster beliefs is the generally negative aspect of the creatures portrayed. Mostly, they are malevolent and, when not, disinterested, but they are almost never purposefully helpful to humankind. Evil is a, if not the, primary characteristic of many Canadian monsters—either they bring or do evil or they appear as a result of evil having been done.

Another immediately apparent aspect of Canadian monsters is their association with wild places, that is, the sea, the dark or dense forest, deep lakes, and so on. There is an unpredictable quality about most of these milieux and a decided aura of the Unknown. The Kudloopudlooaluk, for instance, frequents the frigid and, to the Inuit, dangerous sea with its shifting ice; Lake Okanagan, the Ogopogo's haunt, is like most "monster" lakes in that it is supposedly bottomless and given to frequent squalls; the Coast Mountains that the Sasquatch calls home are renowned for dense jungle-like growth and variable weather. It must be noted, however, that this environmental relationship is not seemingly deterministic, for there is no predictability involved—not all wild areas harbour monsters, though most seem capable of doing so.

There is an interesting, though not entirely unexpected, religious or ethical aspect to many of the extraordinary beings in Canadian folklore. The "loup-garou," the Windigo, and the goblin-like devils described in the tale of "Le Corriveau"[19] are examples of evil beings whose existence is the result of religious or moral-ethical transgressions. In the instance of the Windigo, the transgression may be merely one of thought, not action, since cannibalistic desires alone are considered antisocial and disgusting in the culture.

Most of the monsters found in the larger Canadian culture are, interestingly enough, also found among the native people's traditions. The aboriginal Canadians did not necessarily consider such creatures to be supernatural, as both Wayne Suttles and Morton Teicher cogently argue,[20] but rather saw them as a part of their natural world. Just how much of Canadian monster tradition is derived from the native cultures is debatable; the relationships, however, are undeniable.

Finally, there is a decided importance of water in Canadian monster tales. Most frequently, the creatures are reported in or near water, or water figures in some other way in the stories.

Having identified these recurring features, it is now necessary to consider the possible explanations for them and the cultural information they contain. Psychological theories might be useful but need not be employed to discern some of the underlying meanings of the prevalence of these characteristics. One could, for example, follow Freudian or Jungian theory in suggesting that the negative aspect of Canadian monsters is a reflection of the dark, evil side Canadians see in themselves and therefore, as humans generally do, project on the environment. Certainly Jung's interpretation of the Trickster figure (or, in his terms, archetype) in Radin's famous study is in this vein, where such cultural heroes are, in their very nature, a reflection of man's perception of reality and, more important, of himself within that reality.

Psychoanalytic interpretations aside, Canadians have settled only a small portion of their country, establishing pockets of civilization in a vast, wild land and protecting themselves from the larger environment or reality which they continue to fear. Few Canadians know the wilderness that comprises the larger part of their country; most regard it as unpredictable, malevolent, and uncontrollable, just like the infamous Canadian climate. Most commonly, Canadians seem to view nature as a force (which is frequently portrayed as a tangible thing or being in the nation's literature) apart from themselves and working upon them. Nature is larger than life; one might say it is "monstrous." It is the exception when Canadians see nature as a part of their reality with which they are in some sort of symbiotic relationship. The wilderness tends to be associated both with the native people and with danger or evil, an interesting duality since the Indians were considered by many people of former times to be savages and therefore evil. Certainly, British cultural tradition—which has been so influential in Canada—seems to dichotomize civilization and savagery, settlement and wilderness, the controlled and the uncontrollable. The monsters in Canada, then, represent the antithesis of the culture the British sought to foster here—the beasts are negative; civilization is positive. The monsters personify the uncivilized and the underdeveloped in Canada and are an indication of beliefs held by Canadians and foreigners alike that the country is, to an extent, primitive or undercivilized. Extraordinary beings are the embodiment of the wilderness which, according to their "garrison mentality," Canadians have tried to separate and protect themselves from. Such noted scholars of Canada as Northrop Frye argue that this mentality has characterized Canadian culture since its naissance,[21] and certainly it is evident in the settlement pattern, the artistic products (especially the literature), and the current demographic mosaic character of the country.[22]

It is worth noting that the French settlers were less prone to having a garrison mentality than were the British. Consequently, the French Canadian view of the wilderness was not so whole-heartedly negative, just as the extraordinary beings, like the "lutins" or fairies, which are in their tradition and represent that wilderness are not. Nor did the French Canadians see themselves as quite so separate from the wilderness as the British wished to be. The French Canadians did not bifurcate their reality into civilized and savage to the same degree as the English Canadians have done, with the result that they saw an interaction between men and monsters and a certain responsibility in man's actions for the presence of the beasts. In the few cases where interaction occurs between monsters and English Canadians, the persons involved are almost invariably "familiars" of the wild like Alfred Ostman, who is supposed to have lived as a captive among a Sasquatch family for six days in 1924.[23]

The French settlers in Canada seem to have had a more realistic view than their British counterparts of the native people and their natural milieu and to have developed a healthy respect for both. Certain commonalities of world view between the French Canadians and the native people emerged, especially a dualistic view of the natural world such as is represented in native culture by the Trickster figure, who is good and evil, cruel often to be kind, helpful and harmful, but, above all else, powerful. However, French-Canadian tradition does not contain many more Trickster figures than does the English Canadian; the duality in the French-Canadian world view is more frequently revealed through two separate figures or sets of figures, hence the prevalence in their folklore of the Devil and devil-like creatures symbolizing evil aspects. The presence of such figures as opposed to Tricksters concurs with the teleological perspective of the French Canadians which held that all was as ordained by God. It was God's will that the Devil exist; it was man's fate to abide with and follow God's will. The intensely religious outlook on life possessed by the French settlers was passed on to their descendants for generations.

The religiosity of Canadian monster beliefs is by no means, however, owing exclusively to the French settlers, for religion in its broadest moral and ethical sense (as well as actual ecclesiastical orderings) has been a dominant force in Canada for many years, and Canadians continue to consider themselves a religious people.[24] The nation prides itself on its morality, it peacefulness and non-aggressiveness, its Christian charity, its tolerance, and its concern for law and order. Certainly, the presence of creatures in the national folklore who are evil by virtue of disobeying cultural moral-ethical precepts is in keeping with this Canadian concern for "goodness."

That so many monster beliefs existing in the Canadian culture-at-large are also found in the native people's folklore suggests a considerable influence of the native cultures on the larger one or, at least, a strong relationship between the two. In fact, there has been a decided, though far from fully recognized, influence of the native people on Canadian culture, especially on the national psyche as expressed in attitudes present in the folklore. For the non-native Canadian, the native people have, for some time but generally without the knowledge of either group, symbolized the nation itself. They seem to embody attitudes that many Canadians have about their country, that they think foreigners have towards Canada, and that some foreigners do, indeed, have—namely, that the country is savage, backward, close to nature, and largely uncultivated. If one figure from the national folklore were to be selected to represent this image, no better one than the Sasquatch could be chosen. Besides possessing all the characteristics listed above, he is associated with the Indians and is big and dull, just as Canada is to many people.

Upon their arrival in Canada, many British settlers tended to see themselves as a particular goodness transported into a domain of evil.[25] This attitude was in keeping with their imperialist and social-Darwinist notions as well as the garrison mentality, all of which contributed to making relations with the native people difficult, to say the least. Any negative opinions of the native people aside, the newcomers did of necessity rely upon the indigenous people for their knowledge of the country, just as today many non-native Canadians depend on the native people and their culture for that which is truly Canadian. The prevalence, then, of native-related monster beliefs reflects this generally unaccepted relationship between the natives' traditions and the larger culture, although it must not be considered to indicate that the beliefs necessarily originated in the native cultures.

The importance of water in the monster tales is in keeping with the prominence of water in Canada, not only physically but also historically. The waterways were of unquestionable importance in the settlement of the country and, in its subsequent development, they were crucial to economic enterprises, transportation, and communication. It can logically be argued, as Donald Creighton has done in *The Empire of the St. Lawrence*,[26] that the waterways, especially the east-west river systems, made Canada feasible as a nation. Today, water maintains its significance for leisure-time activities, generation of power, various manufacturing and other economic activities, and transportation. That water figures prominently in the Canadian monster tales is, then, predictable and expected, given both the environment and culture in which they occur.

The recurring features in the monster tales obviously indicate and reflect preoccupations and themes in Canadian culture. The tales exhibit the attitudes of Canadians towards their natural environment and, undoubtedly, towards themselves as well. Within Canadian culture, the monster tales and beliefs therefore have a several-faceted role. First, they permit the expression of basic concerns, of which many Canadians are not aware, in the culture. In this respect, these tales are similar to any other artistic or creative medium. Second, they permit the existence of evil in a culture which has denied violence, aggression, and rebellion. These negative characteristics are invested in supernatural beings, thus permitting the persistence of the treasured cultural beliefs. Finally, the monster tales and beliefs express the feelings many Canadians have towards their country, in particular, the mixture of fear and fascination they possess towards the land, the prime source of imagery in Canada. There is a heavy dependence on nature in many parts of Canada and a close relationship with the natural elements, yet a helplessness in the face of the natural world and an inability to control and capitalize upon its power. The monsters symbolize and "explain" this inability, for they are beyond nature and are uncontrollable. Man's ambivalence towards nature is, therefore, explicable.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that there is nothing particularly "Canadian" about the country's monster beliefs in the sense of there being aspects which are found only in this culture. My investigation suggests that there is little point within a country such as Canada, which assumed its national identity during the industrialized era, in pursuing cultural uniqueness and exclusivity such as is typically associated with pre-industrial, peasant states. Nonetheless, extraordinary beings are a surprisingly profitable area of investigation since they are a part of the people's own culture—the unofficial or folk level of culture—which persists not through official or institutional support, but because it is of particular and peculiar importance to the people themselves. Canadian monsters are a means to understand the Canadian mind and the real Canadian culture.

Notes

1. I have been investigating the folklore of these creatures for some time and have published a previous article on the subject, "Monsters of the West: the Sasquatch and the Ogopogo," in Edith Fowke, ed. *Folklore of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), pp. 251–62. In 1977–78 I had a Canada Council Leave Fellowship for a project entitled "Extraordinary Beings in Canadian Folklore." I am grateful to the Canada Council for this support.
2. I am using the term "monsters" interchangeably with "extraordinary beings" to mean creatures currently considered beyond the ordinary and not extant according to modern natural science. I prefer the latter term to the more common "monsters," which connotes creatures of grandiose proportions and evil nature—characteristics that are not necessarily possessed by all beings for which the word is popularly used.
3. See Antti Aarne and Stith Thompson, *The Types of the Folktale* (Helsinki: Academia Scientarium Fennica, 1973); Ernest W. Baughman, *Type and Motif Index of the Folktales of England and North America* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), and Stith Thompson, *Motif Index of Folk Literature*, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).
4. "Canadian Monsters: Some Aspects of the Supernatural in Canadian Fiction," in David Staines, ed., *The Canadian Imagination: Dimensions of a Literary Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 98.
5. Meaning the traditions taught to or provided for children as opposed to children's traditions which are those they learn from each other and pass amongst themselves apart from adult involvement.
6. See John D. A. Widdowson, "Aspects of Traditional Verbal Control: Threats and Threatening Figures in Newfoundland Folklore" (Ph.D. diss., Memorial University, 1972) for a discussion of this and related frightening figures.
7. See Emily Carr's sensitive account of this aspect of B.C. Indian tradition in *Klee Wyck* (Toronto: Clark, Irwin, 1941), pp. 32–40.
8. *Baker Lake Prints 1971* (Yellowknife: Government of the Northwest Territories, 1971), p. 14.
9. *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 1 (1972): 65–90.
10. Pertinent Canadian tall tale collections and discussions include the following: Robert Gard, *Johnny Chinook, Tall Tales and True from the Canadian West* (London: Longmans, Green, 1945); Herbert Halpert, "Tall Tales and Other Yarns from Calgary, Alberta," *California Folklore Quarterly* 4 (1945): 29–49; B. V. Bedore, *Tall Tales of Joe Mufferaw* (Arnprior, Ont.: Mufferaw, 1966); and Richard Tallman, "The Tall Tale Tradition and the Teller: a biographical contextual study of a storyteller, Robert Coffil of Blomidon, Nova Scotia" (Ph.D. diss., Memorial University, 1974).
11. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1956).
12. As described in Jan Perkowski, *Vampires, Dwarves, and Witches among the Ontario Kashubs* (Ottawa: National Museum, Canadian Centre for Folk Culture Studies, Mercury Series no. 1, 1972).
13. The subject of Morton Teicher's valuable work, *Windigo Psychosis: A study of a relationship between belief and behavior among the Indians of Northeastern Canada* (Seattle: University of Washington Press for the American Ethnological Society, 1971).
14. (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968), pp. 79–93.
15. See John Green's several publications including *On the Track of the Sasquatch, The Sasquatch File*, and *Year of the Sasquatch* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1969, 1970, and 1970 respectively); Don Hunter and René Dahinden, *Sasquatch* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973); and John R. Napier, *Bigfoot; The Yeti and Sasquatch in Myth and Reality* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) for description and numerous accounts of sightings.

16. Garner, (Hamilton: Potlatch Publications, 1976); Moon, (Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1977); and Gaal, ([Creston, B.C.]: *Valley Review*, 1976).
17. Surette, *Weekend Magazine*, 30 October 1976, p. 8; and Braddock, *Atlantic Advocate* 58, no. 5 (1968): 12–17.
18. *Weekend Magazine*, 6 November 1976, p. 8.
19. One of the several folktales included in Phillipe Aubert de Gaspé's semi-autobiographical novel, *Les anciens Canadiens* (Québec: Desbarats and Derbishire, 1863), translated by C. G. D. Roberts as *Canadians of Old* (1890; rpt. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974).
20. See Wayne Suttles' article mentioned in the text and Teicher's study cited in note 11.
21. As he discusses in his "Conclusion" in Carl F. Klinck, ed., *Literary History of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 822–49.
22. I discuss the relationships between the garrison mentality and both the settlement pattern and the mosaic in my book, *Many Voices: A Study of Folklore Activities in Canada and Their Role in Canadian Culture* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Folk Culture Studies, Mercury Series no. 26, 1979). See Chapters 2 and 8.
23. As recounted to John Green in 1958 and reported in detail in his book, *On the Track of the Sasquatch.*
24. There was a popular survey taken several years ago in which an overwhelming majority of the Canadian people declared themselves to be religious and maintained that Canada was a religious country, though many persons interviewed did not claim to belong to any given church.
25. Susannah Moodie's accounts of life in frontier Canada, especially *Roughing it in the Bush* (1852; rpt. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), is exemplary of many works by British settlers which reflect this attitude.
26. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956).

PART II

Manlike Monsters of the Native New World

This section is divided into two parts. In the first, the articles detail myths of manlike but superhuman monsters in native beliefs and suggest reasons why these myths arise and why they have such widespread distribution. The second half considers examples of such beliefs as they are expressed in a more concrete, artistic form. The first two articles of this part show how imaginative, amorphous native beliefs are fixed and altered through contact with the more materialistic Western culture. The concluding two articles offer artifacts which may represent the particular manlike monster known as Sasquatch and consider the implications of such an anomalous creature when it is used in ritual.

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IN MYTH

Richard J. Preston

The Witiko: Algonkian Knowledge and Whiteman Knowledge

This article examines the nature of the Witiko, a cannibalistic, monstrous, manlike creature, widely reported in Algonkian myth, which is believed to possess certain individuals, causing them to behave in a hostile and violent manner. The author recounts academic interpretations of the phenomenon, including the prevalent explanation that it is a socially accepted and reinforced psychosis. He argues that the qualities attributed to the Witiko, or to the possessed person, are attitudes and actions experienced by persons in severe physical deprivation or psychological stress, and that the transfiguration of these qualities as a monstrous being is the Algonkian society's attempt to come to terms with radically antisocial behaviour.

The *Witiko* (sometimes spelled "Wendigo" or "Windigo") is a cannibalistic, monstrous person reported to have been encountered by Algonkian Indians in the northern forest; it is a phenomenon which has been interpreted in many different ways by students of Algonkian cultures. This paper examines the literature on Witiko to determine how these interpretations have varied as a result of internal changes in anthropology and in Algonkian cultures.

The Algonkians' views are usually embodied in narratives which range from recent and personally experienced events to mythic events.[1] The few Algonkian persons who have commented in a more critical fashion on the topic regard Witiko as either a mundane outcome of deprivation and despair or as the product of people's imaginations. These will be detailed and discussed in the latter half of this paper.

For some years anthropological reference to the Witiko has been in the context of a postulated Witiko psychosis. Viewing this practice critically, John Honigmann argues that interpretation by anthropologists of Witiko as delusion, thereby defining an Algonkian type of psychopathological disorder, is not acceptable "because the belief is fully supported by the community. The belief in transformation itself is not diagnostic of psychopathology."[2] Assessing Morton Teicher's compilation of seventy cases, Honigmann does not find that any one of them consists of a "trustworthy observer's eyewitness report of a person who in his own words or by his own actions clearly admits to a compulsion to eat human flesh."[3]

We have made the diagnosis without seeing the patient, and so the case for Witiko remains to be made. Some kind of compulsion and transformation is believed in by Northern Algonkians, but their words are too often taken as literal (rather than imagic or symbolic) representations of events, which we then use to construct our definition of a Witiko psychopathology. We have also isolated Witiko from the context of other acts of cannibalism that do not appear to have included compulsion and from the context of other apparently problematical forms of loss of self-control.

In order to place the study of Witiko in its proper context, I will proceed first to a rough chronological sketch of writings about the Witiko from 1900 to 1977.

Earliest writers either ignore or resist ethnological interpretation. Algernon Blackwood's superb story of "The Wendigo" as essentially a terrifying experience presents the idea of horrible transformation without a translation of culture. That is, the author is not concerned with presenting Algonkian culture as distinct from our own, but rather with portraying emotions that are presumed pan-human.[4]

J. Emile Saindon, an Oblate priest, refers to the Algonkians among whom he lived as expressing "undisciplined imagination in fantastic vagaries . . . [which] block rational thought and judgement."[5] When told of a Cree woman who was becoming Witiko, he asks

> What was to be done? Her case had been explained to me in detail and I made up my mind to use all of this information if an opportunity presented. I went to visit her and observed her condition *without giving her a chance to describe her symptoms.* I made an analysis of her condition on my own account. I said to her with all the assurance of which I was capable: 'You are going to get well. I am certain of it, absolutely certain. Go to confession. Tomorrow receive Communion. Go out abroad as you used to do formerly.' The suggestion succeeded perfectly. [italics added][6]

Saindon's confidence in his understanding of the situation precluded his asking the woman how and what she felt; her account might have provided us with a great deal more knowledge than we have, perhaps comparable to the intriguing but confusing testimonies of the Moostoos case.[7]

Father Guinard obtained descriptions of Witiko from Tête-de-Boule informants and set them in a rather melodramatic English translation. The Witiko, he says, are solitary, aggressive cannibals, naked but impervious to cold, with black skin covered by resin-glued sand. They have no lips, large crooked teeth, hissing breath, and big bloodshot eyes, something like owls' eyes. Their feet are more than two feet long, with long, pointed heels, and have only one big toe: "This is the way his tracks appear on sand and snow." Fingers and fingernails are "like the claws of the great mountain bears." The voice is strident, reverberating, and drawn-out into howls, and "his food was rotten wood, swamp moss, mushrooms, corpses, and human flesh."[8] Witiko has extraordinary strength and is invulnerable. He is a nocturnal hunter of men; when he is close, his heart beats twice as quickly as normal with joy, sounding like the drumming of a grouse. They can fly and also swim under water, making large waves to capsize canoes. They have foreknowledge of their victims' location.

CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS

The 1920's and 1930's saw a surge of interest in psychoanalytical implications for ethnological interpretation. John Cooper summarized his position in this way:

> A common psychosis among the eastern Cree and some kindred tribes shows two peculiar characteristics: the victim develops an "unnatural' craving for human flesh; he turns into an ice-hearted Witiko. The craving for human flesh appears pretty clearly to be derived *directly* from prevalent environmental and cultural conditions. The transformation into an ice-hearted Witiko seems to be derived indirectly, through the Witiko folk-lore concept, from the same conditions. [italics added][9]

These conditions are the environmental fact of periodic starvation and the cultural prohibition towards, and horror of, cannibalism. Within a few years of Cooper, Landes and Hallowell went more deeply into psychiatric explanations of the process of becoming Witiko. Ruth Landes gave a two-stage interpretation, in which the first stage is characterized by melancholia, inertia, brooding, and a desire to eat humans while being afraid to actually do so. Stage two is characterized by violent cannibalistic actions.[10] This seems logical, but we later find that only two cases out of the seventy reported by Teicher include both stages. A. Irving Hallowell offered a much more complex psychoanalytical interpretation of a particular case. One has the sense that these scholars (and later ones) in treating of the Witiko, suspended their normal standards of critical and judicious interpretation, being for some reason drawn to make imaginative suggestions without a positive factual basis.

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SYMBOLIC FROM THE LITERAL

In a 1951 paper Hallowell differentiates two categories of Witiko: "The first comprises actual persons who have turned into cannibals. . . . The second consists of mythical cannibal giants."[12] This initial differentiation of the reports about the phenomena was to have useful consequences.

SYNTHESIS OF THE DATA

Teicher, in 1960, drew together the available data into a major study, separating the materials into categories parallel to Hallowell's. He used thirty-one examples of folklore and case accounts of seventy persons reported to be Witiko. His interpretation is that ecological compulsion originally causes psychological compulsion, which then maintains itself and determines behaviour.[13] This rather unconvincing monocausal reasoning from environment to belief is repeated later by Bishop.[14] Sometimes Teicher seems to assume that Algonkian Indians, including those who are psychotic, are completely literal-minded. He is not alone in this.

THE PROBLEM OF OVERPOWERING THE DATA

To sum up the first half-century of explanations of the Witiko, it seems that we have taken an exotic notion out of its native context of the images of terror, and with much seriousness we have overinterpreted the meagre data. In this sense we have taken our interpretations more seriously than the phenomena we are trying to explain. For this reason it may be appropriate to indulge in taking our interpretations less seriously, for a moment at least, so the next section of this paper constitutes an opposition between satire and scholarship, mediated by hope and moderated by brevity.

I will quote first from the report of Dr. Rousseau, an ethnobotanist of the Noveau-Quebec region:

> I have known a windigo: he was my cook in the tundra. He made excellent bread, but I cared less for his meat sauces.[15]

Why are we so interested in a phenomenon for which the evidence is scant and for which the potential for further primary evidence is similarly modest? It is entirely reasonable in principle, for we are interested in many things (gods, spirits, souls, deep structures, and history, for example) with similar problems of evidence. But why the Witiko?

Are we erecting a myth of inhuman savagery in order to rationalize colonial dominance over "our" natives? Natives have long been defined as soulless beasts fit for the labour of colonial empire and perhaps for salvation. Cannibals have been particularly apt subjects for this colonialist interpretation. But this century has produced strong counter-interpretations, and we are now more likely to find self-castigation for introducing savage conditions to the native populations, whereby the Witiko, for instance, would be really Our Fault, instead of an indigenous beast. One consistently notable thing about our writings on the Witiko is that they rely heavily on the argumentative impact of drama.

WEAKNESSES IN MODELS OF WITIKO PSYCHOSIS

American anthropology in the 1960's put less confidence in psychoanalysis and more emphasis on model building. Raymond Fogelson developed a model to differentiate types of Witiko psychosis in order to make more coherent sense of the problem. He found his drama in emotional states of "insatiable craving" and "anti-social appetite,"[16] and although he thought that there were some "subtle psychological implications,"[17] I was unable to find any. Rather perversely, I have abstracted from his paper what can be found as the basis for a Psychological Theory of Witiko:

1. It occurs without starvation, as a group frenzy.
2. It occurs at the point of extreme starvation, as a solitary act.
3. One becomes Witiko through a vision quest, starvation, or sorcery.
4. It occurs only in men.
5. It occurs in women.
6. It is an evil spirit or possession by an evil spirit.
7. It is a human with a malevolent soul or a person who has lost humanity.
8. It is a transformation of being to a non-human order.
9. It is a mental disorder.

10. "Strangers become metamorphosed in her eyes into wild animals—wolves, bears, lynxes."[18]
11. "His family around him look like luscious beavers heavy with fat."[19]
12. He remains, solitary, in the bush.
13. They live in lodges, at some distance from the rest of the tribe.[20]
14. "They avoid him, and he lives among the savages like a timid head of game."[21]
15. These people are not molested, but rather are pitied.
16. It may be killed with an axe blow in the head.
17. It must be burned to ashes, to prevent regeneration.
18. Witiko belief is a case of Freudian displacement of aggression.
19. Witiko belief is a case of Freudian oral fixation.
20. The belief determines the behaviour.
21. The behaviour determines the belief.

It is not surprising that, faced with this range of variability, Fogelson decided to try to differentiate types of Witiko. What is surprising is that his first illustrative case of Witiko did not involve cannibalism in either ideas, motives, or acts. Therefore:

22. Witiko does not necessarily include aspects of cannibalism.

Clearly, the plot has thickened. Witiko is not necessarily a cannibal; he may be only a murderer of his fellows, urged on by dreams, melancholy, and brooding, in some sense bestial but possibly manifesting the desperate plight of the colonial oppressed.

AN ECOLOGICAL WITIKO

The early 1970's found optimism in the possibility of developing causal explanations or models from an empirical anchor in ecological variables. Charles Bishop argued for a dramatic rise in Witiko cannibalism in the 1800's caused by a dramatic increase in the incidence of starvation, which was, in turn, caused by a drop in the carrying capacity of the human ecology as a result of a dramatic increase in killing of large game to feed European colonial agents and Indian migrants into the northern Ontario fur trade.[22] This is only a superficially plausible explanation, since cannibalism may in some instances be caused by a single materialist aspect of starvation. But the Witiko phenomena constitute a more treacherous problem. We are not here faced with a simple task of filling empty stomachs, but rather with the elaboration of an implicitly symbolic system of belief. It is *implicitly* symbolic because what scholars might regard as symbolic phenomena (a psychotic episode of "insatiable craving" or a giant, hairy wild man in the bush, stalking human food), the Algonkian-speaking Indians regard as in some sense constituting real but transformed persons and events in the environment. Bishop could be ecologically correct,[23] but he is probably historically, culturally, and psychologically wrong. A major reason for this is that he fails to consider the ecology of *mind*.[24]

OUR PRECONCEPTIONS OF THE WILD MAN OF THE FOREST

When we read what others have written about the mind in relation to Witiko, we find some speculative excesses of "mentalism" that make me wonder how we can get ourselves into such a conceptual muddle. Perhaps our interest is a mixture of liberal guilt and the less self-aware motive of our colonial past atavistically urging us to *cherchez les bêtes.*

But I think that there is a more likely and more important sort of atavism to question in our motives. Are we simply finding the familiar in exotic settings? Ethnography, diffusion studies, and other work in the first half of this century have been characterized as a search for cultural inventories set in terms of our own traits, or at least our own categories and concepts. The Wild Man of the wilderness, often a hairy and solitary being who lurks just out of sight, is one of the oldest and most persistent folk beliefs in Western culture. Faced with a New World, and a New Wilderness, we might be expected to show considerable interest in a New Wild Man. We have certainly carried with us a traditional perception of primeval or virgin forest as embodying the opposition of nature to culture. The boreal forest winter is perceived as a continuous blast fraught with dangers, "a region so harsh in its natural aspects as to affright the sensibilities of some who feel its desolation, yet exerting an almost irresistible allurement upon the wandering instincts of others."[25] But we do not have good evidence that the Indians view it in this way, and we do have some strong suggestions to the contrary.[26] The separation of nature and culture and the notion of the forest as magically inimical to man are probably much more Western than Algonkian in origin, so we may chronically and uncritically find these familiar aspects in new forests, whether or not they are there for the Indians who occupy the area.

Why the fascination, which is of very great traditional depth, with eating people or with being eaten by people? I would like to rather uncautiously suggest two possible reasons. Robert Murphy suggests that Freud's impact was partly due to the fact that he hit a very sensitive spot in telling an androcentric society that they were being eaten.[27] Further, we may wonder about a Western ethos expressed in the juxtaposition of consumer and consumed, not only in the business of getting a living, but also in love and friendship.

Not only are we likely to seek strangely familiar Wild Men in the bush, since this is a part of the traditional knowledge that we bring to the new situation; we are also following the dictates of our intellectual tradition of inquiry, testing existing knowledge (the familiar) against new data (the exotic settings). There is, in addition, an intellectualist trend in the past half-century, less intuitive and more analytical, less oriented towards phenomena and more concerned with logical parsimony. Fogelson's model-building is a case in point. Model-building may be in the form of algebraic equations or flow charts, structural taxonomies or cognitive frame-networks, or it may be more essayistic in its use, as with Freudian interpretations.

But to me, at least, models of Witiko are a retrograde step in approaching the problem. They are too facile, or have a superficial plausibility, because they are expressions of our own ecology of mind, too little a refraction of the phenomenal world of Algonkians. Or, to put it another way, they are too easy to be real. To give a final, satirical plunge into overinterpretation, I offer this desperate, schematic, psychiatric plot with a bit of structure thrown in for effect.

WITIKO AND "PSYCHIC UNITY"

The Witiko psychosis is an Algonkian re-enactment of Freud's primal parricide. Freud has told us that what began in relation to the father is completed in relation to the group, and to the extent that the primal parricide is psychologically real, the lure of the Witiko for our psyche is simply our search for our lost, primal selves lurking just out of sight of society and waiting for an unguarded moment when they may snatch a recapitulation of the Oedipal *fête*. We imagine the Witiko, lost in space and time, in the boreal wilderness, waiting to grab the next hapless Algonkian that he can get his brutish hands on. Where has the Witiko come from? Why, he was from humans to begin with, but became separated, and liminal, and then. . . Ooops! Witiko has inverted the Turner-Gennep sequence and is reincorporating human society, victim by victim.

Freud's ghost should be smiling at the scene, to see old, repressive society being eaten by the young, primeval, natural man; Oedipus wins again. But the Indians lose again. The plot is absurd, if rationally plausible, and leaves us where this paper began, wondering why we write so much, and make such a mess, on a topic about which we know so little.

CURRENT PSYCHODYNAMIC VIEWS

Psychodynamic explanations have been taken much more seriously by several writers, among whom I have chosen the most recent major contributor, Thomas Hay. Hay takes the existence of the psychosis as given and finds that the dynamics compare closely to other kinds of cannibalism that are not psychotic (and not Eastern Subarctic) and to other kinds of psychoses in which cannibalistic impulses occur but are not acted upon.[28]

He assumes that Eastern Subarctic Algonkians have oral characters, which includes the necessity that those who desire to be cannibalistic "believe unconsciously that eating people is a means of magical efficacy for solving problems of interpersonal relations or for acquiring supernatural powers."[29] With regard to the problems of personal relations, cannibalism either stops the frustrations that another person imposes or preserves a threatened relationship by incorporating the other person. In both cases the cannibal is expressing in his actions the unconscious statement, "If you do not continue to offer me the gratifications on which I depend, I will gratify myself with you."

I would add here that one can push this sort of explanation further without much difficulty. For the Eastern Cree, at least, tradition holds that food-animals are in a loving relationship with humans unless there is a blunder by the hunter or interference by some other human.[30] If the hunter breaks down under the stress of deprivation of food-animals, then, in becoming Witiko, he can be said to use the psychodynamic mechanism of conversion reaction to develop a compulsive disorder that represses his love for his family and reinterprets them as his food. They must still love him, since they have made themselves available to be taken for food. This explanation is plausible, but of unknown validity.

Seymour Parker claims, and Hay repeats, that the desire to keep receiving dependency satisfactions may lead to aggression against a person who fails to provide the satisfactions.[31] My hypothetical interpretation above is only slightly more complex, involving a conversion from dependency on animals (and perhaps upon animal-masters) to those persons associated with other dependency emotions and frustration. These persons are involved in providing food but have not been the substance of the food. They are described by the Witiko as visually transformed into food-persons. But all of this rests upon the acceptance of both Witiko and these applications of psychodynamic theory as true to the Algonkian experience, which are two large assumptions.

Hay adds significant cultural factors: the importance of dreams and visions in defining the individual's world to him and the lack of alternative patterns for expressing cannibalistic desires. The social factors that are important to the tendency to psychosis have to do with whether the group around the person includes people with confidence in their ability to cope with him and who have the capability to nurture the person out of his obsessive state with social force or with love.

Psychodynamic theory, then, extends the Western notion of *incorporation* from the simple act of taking food into the body to the metaphor-in-action of internalizing an emotionally important other person, in which the act of eating resolves a traumatic conflict and gives irreversible possession of the emotional relationships associated with the person who is eaten.

INCORPORATION AS SOCIAL METAPHOR

The notion of incorporation is taken even further in a recent paper by David Turner, who finds the narrative tradition regarding Witiko to be a metaphor for the logic of Algonkian social structure.[32] Social incorporation refers to the recruitment of persons into specific production groups (at the domestic, brotherhood, and band levels) posited by Turner, and myth is the code that reveals a structural isomorphy to the structure of social groups. This use of the structural theory and the metaphorically extended notion of incorporation highlights, in my opinion, our tendency to overpower a very poorly known Witiko phenomenon with our own intellectual creations. The problem of translating the Algonkian idiom of experience into terms that are understandable and worthwhile within our own tradition of urbane intellectual inquiry is poorly served by psychodynamic and structuralist theories, unless the effort includes the judicious use of Algonkian phenomena. Both Hay and Turner, in my opinion, have created intellectual monstrosities in imposing elegant arguments upon dubious data.

BACKGROUND AND DATA FOR NEW INTERPRETATIONS

Looking at the general interest shown by people in the man-and-beast relationship, James Fernandez has suggested that human beings feel the press of their own domestication, and that this feeling tends to bring out the beast in every man, causing him to relate in symbolically significant ways to beasts "out there" in the world.[33] Perhaps Fernandez has penetrated to a subtle motive in Western minds, but what about *Algonkian* minds? The Witiko problem remains a frustration; we think and read, and reflect, and yet cannot get ahold of it. We are subjectively drawn to the problem and then we back off into method at a distance from the bush, the feelings, the culture, the phenomenal world of the Algonkians. What *is* back in the bush? What do we have in the way of positive knowledge?

1. Empirical knowledge:
   a. People do sometimes go out of control in the bush when solitary or lost and become hysterical or amnesiac. I have first-hand knowledge of three cases, all temporary, although one was terminated by the person's death. Flight hysteria, described by Cooper,[34] seems to fit these cases.
   b. Fearfulness of the mystery of some person being lost has psychological force for most Subarctic Indian people.
   c. Acts of cannibalism were less common than we assume, but a concern about the possibility of cannibalism was relatively common.
2. Expressive knowledge: "Mythic monsters" (our terms are awkward) were commonly believed to be potentially "out there." There is:
   a. complexity and variability in what is believed and by whom;
   b. comparison to parallels in other cultures' monster beliefs;
   c. a rich tradition of Witiko stories.

Interpretation of the evidence requires at least two approaches: we need sufficient self-awareness of our own symbolic system to be able to differentiate our subtle expectations from our appropriate interpretations of the Wild Man heritage, for which there is vast literature.[35] For example, Hayden White has argued that our notion of the beast within everyman is in all likelihood a transformation of the old notion of the Wild Man of the wilderness, more or less displaced, as the wilderness becomes known, to the interior of everyman. If White were correct, then Fernandez's idea of "the beast within" could be as much a Western historical artifact as the older Wild Man and must therefore be just as suspect as our basis for cross-cultural explanation. It is worth noting that this same notion of the beast within everyone of us as a powerful motive for our behaviour is the basis for Freudians, Jungians, and "other contemporary culture critics who, like Lévi-Strauss, lament the triumph of technology over civilised man and dream of the release of the lost child or the noble savage within us."[36]

The second approach is one that proceeds from a facility with the use of imagery in the expression of emotions. This ability is well developed in literary traditions. For instance, Blackwood's memorable account of "The Wendigo" is fictional, but it conveys our Western sense of the Witiko with astonishing accuracy, resonant emotion, and completeness. Blackwood's resources were his literate and imaginative mind and information given him by a friend who worked in the fur-trade in the Eastern Subarctic. One wonders what Blackwood might have been able to do if he had spent a longer period in the north as participant observer and had been familiar with the ethnological writings on the area. This suggests that literate skills and a poetic mind could actually save us from mentalistic distortions if combined with a critical, comprehensive, ethnographic grasp of the evidence to be interpreted.

If we are not likely to get first-hand evidence, there is still plenty of secondary evidence to be obtained. Many Algonkians are both knowledgeable and interested in the topic, and their words may inform the problem significantly. Beyond this we have a vast collection of oral tradition that is already written down, relating directly to the Witiko and also relating indirectly, depicting notions of hardships, crisis, loss of control, starvation, metamorphosis, and other components of the symbolic system that contains Witiko.

Edward Ahenakew, a Cree who became a teacher and missionary, records an explanation by an old man named Weipust in which the extraordinary aspects are deliberately omitted and dismissed as untrue reports. Weipust's stark and spare image deserves full detail, so I quote Ahenakew's manuscript.

THE WE-TI-KOO or He-who-is-alone

> Wetikoo (Windigo in Salteaux) is a being which is of nebulous character in the minds of most people. Short story writers have fantastic ideas about him. Some think it is a kind of Indian devil, one describes it as being of prodigious size.
>
> The white man, who has not grown up with the Indians, cannot be blamed for his mistaken ideas, for most Indians he can converse with, are not capable of giving an elaborate explanation in English. Besides this, the Indians who can speak English, are usually the younger people and they themselves have a very hazy idea of the creature.
>
> Wetikoo is not a devil not a demon; he is not a spirit disembodied, nor is he of prodigious size. At one time in his life he was a human being born of human beings and perhaps quite normal for some years of his life.
>
> The reasons for a human being turning into a cannibal, i.e., Wetikoo, as given by the saner and more intelligent Indian men are these. I can do not better than to quote Old Weipust (Dirty-skin) a fine mannerly old man despite his name. I had asked him how Wetikoos came to be.
>
> > There is no doubt that Wetikoos existed in the old days. Frequently, specially in the forest parts of the country there may be a family living in a teepee, the man hunting for fur and incidentally killing

> moose, deer and such for food. He might have an enemy somewhere. This man or woman—*mahokusu-mik*, i.e. curses him so that his luck leaves him, everything goes wrong, he can kill nothing, maybe the animals migrate to some other region.
>
> He goes out to hunt every day, trying to feed his starving family and himself. Their plight becomes desperate. They are hungry and yet there is not a track, even of a rabbit anywhere within reach. Pangs of hunger cry aloud for food—a person will do almost anything to secure food.
>
> As days of fasting go by; hope dies and despair takes its place. A time comes when one of the party begins to look longingly though slyly at another. This person is being sorely tempted to kill, so as to eat. It becomes an obsession with him or her. At last—chance offering, it happens. The person kills and soon he (or she) is eating. He has passed from being a human being to beastliness.
>
> The rest of the family realizes that they have a Wetikoo to cope with. All that they have heard about such monsters comes into their minds. A great dread overwhelms them, the marrow inside the bones seems to melt and they have no power to move or fight. While they might have met ordinary dangers bravely, they were as frightened children in the presence of a powerful inhuman monster. They give in and very soon share the fate of the first victim.
>
> Another reason why a person becomes a Wetikoo is due to his having in some way offended a spirit which may have befriended him in a dream and given him some powers. . . . This would bring a curse on him. This would not take away from him the gifts he had received but they would only be a curse to him and others instead of a blessing.
>
> Then again an evil spirit may come to him in his dream. Probably nothing about the spirit would appear in his looks and actions to show that he was another, but what he pretends to be is a benevolent spirit. The Indian accepts the gifts accorded him only to find later on, that he was living under a curse and that nothing good would come out of his life. Such an Indian may also turn into a Wetikoo.
>
> Such were the reasons why this monster appeared amongst people—fortunately, very rarely did the Wetikoo actually exist. I should say, that, in my opinion, the majority of the reports spread around that he had been seen were untrue—many such reports are brought about by some mischievous minded Indian trying to frighten someone else.

Such was the reply Weipust gave me. He had been a pagan till he

> attained midle-age, then he had adopted Christianity. He was learned in the things that pertained to old time Indian life. Knowledge handed down from the past was his. I accepted his words as of great value.
>
> To continue it is said that once a person has tasted human flesh he loses all human instincts he turns into a fierce carnivorous beast yearning to prey on his kind. He is gifted with supernatural powers and no one is able to withstand him except some person who is himself gifted with superior 'spirit help' and therefore more powerful. Such a person knows that he is so gifted and is willing to champion the cause of the band even at great personal risk.[37]

Weipust has described for us, in his example of starvation, the ordinary reality of Witiko from the point of view of one wise old man; many oral tradition and archival accounts confirm this pattern. Perhaps Weipust's skeptical attitude towards the more marvelous accounts is a result of his conversion to Christianity, but probably we should assume that he was also more critical than suggestible, aware of wrongness and wrong-headedness on the part of Indians as well as white men, when they are wondering about such terror-inspiring topics.

But for many people there must be more to Witiko than this, and it is from this point on that our problems gather momentum. In order to be brief, I will jump to an extreme case. In one narrative I collected a younger brother marries a beaver, and in the process of becoming transformed he is forced to begin to eat the meat of his killed and cooked wife. He becomes the "Great Beaver" and at the same time becomes *atoosh*, or Witiko, although there is no implication that he subsequently craved for the meat of beaver (or humans).[38] I have cited this case to show that when the gap is spanned between mundane cannibalism and mythic events and persons we are faced with a large and diffuse spread of evidence for beliefs, most of it encapsulated in the intuitions and actions of narratives.

I suggest that for many Algonkian Indians the notion of Witiko is very uncertain in both appearance and essence—that the possibility of Witiko's presence is accompanied by a wide variability in what Witiko may appear to be or the possibility that it is some other monster. Witiko is more certainly terrifying than he is a known figure with specifiable characteristics; in this regard he is roughly similar to our notion of the Christian Devil (a common English gloss for Witiko). As evidence for this hypothesis of ambiguity, I refer again to Ahenakew's paper, choosing a case where people are convinced they see Witiko, are terrified, and then discover that they were completely wrong.

Briefly, at about the turn of the century, one Christian Indian lived, and ran a small store, on the Sturgeon Lake reserve. Rumours of a Witiko in the area began to build, and people took precautions, barring their windows. The man who was chief was seen to carry a rifle on his back while plowing. Then the people gathered to sleep together on the floor of the store. One night, a man reported seeing the Witiko standing on a high manure pile not far from the store. An old man started to sing a power song to blow the Witiko away. With the light of approaching dawn, the Christian Indian went out and saw that the figure on the manure pile was one of his calves. He called the people out, and a general laugh was the result. The old man stopped singing, looking very embarrased. People returned to their homes. The Christian Indian offers the concluding comment: "I confess, however, that I, even with my Christian beliefs, was not altogether free from fear."

The people shared the fear of an imminent Witiko and gathered for security; the old man sang for a spirit person's help. But when their shared perception was transformed by the recognition of a calf, the fear dissipated quickly, and the song and spiritual assistance were absurdly out of place. I have elsewhere described Eastern Cree songs and spiritual power with reasonable precision,[39] but the threat of Witiko and of other monstrous persons has not yielded into clarity, remaining instead quite diffuse and difficult to grasp. One reason may be that this is a subject on which people are more likely to be fearful than contemplative, and different categories of people may be quite differently fearful. For example, the narratives are used in various contexts to: scare children into staying close to the camp or house; scare children into being quiet at night, to go to sleep; excite children when they go to play the game of Witiko; inform people about the contingent nature of the world; scare adults into deference to some sorcerers; account for the disappearance of lost individuals; assert the appearance of monstrous persons; or convey deliberately imaginative contributions.

I am persuaded that a satisfactory understanding of Witiko and related notions will depend upon taking into account distinctions such as the above. I have examples of each of these categories in my collection of Cree narratives, but here I will only cite excerpts that describe Witiko's appearance. The following description is paraphrased from a narrative I collected in the field:

> [He] may be a human being to begin with, but, from eating human flesh, he changes. If this person ever comes across somebody, he would always kill them and eat them. They live all alone, in the bush, and are not normal. For instance, they would prefer to sit in the snow rather than on pine boughs, and they become very strong, but are not clever. Long ago, when there was no place to keep crazy people, they just

> lost them in the bush. While alone in the bush in a crazed condition, he was getting worse and worse. They used to eat anything that they see. And somebody saw where this man who was crazy was digging up people to eat them. He didn't keep himself clean, and his face was not nice to see. His clothes were all worn out, and his skin was all black. He just wouldn't look after himself at all. As they grow worse and worse, they get bigger and bigger.

The transformation process from crazed human person into a monstrous person is indicated in this statement. How and by whom the monster is actually perceived is indicated in the following statement:

> In the morning after they ate they crossed over to the sandy part of the beach. The person who had killed the atoosh [Witiko] (Peter Trapper) was sitting at the bow. He got off the canoe and *saw footprints which were twice the length of a man's foot.* The atoosh had been *barefooted.* The Atoosh's face was all brown, the same all over.[41]

He is perceived, then, by the conjuror who struggles against him, with a mode of perception that is not simply empiricist:

> Those who claim to have seen the Wetikoo say that he is a terrible looking creature; his hair is long and matted. Living like a wild beast, ever exposed to the elements, never washing himself, he has a face which brings horror to those who see him. He has the look of ever grinning as his lips are eaten away by himself as far as his teeth can reach. He uses as hair oil the feces of human beings and that partly explains the terrible odour which is said to be most noticeable when he is near.[41]

The odour, size, footprints, and other aspects of appearance and action parallel descriptions of the Sasquatch. Whether this is due to the occurrence of the Sasquatch in the Eastern Subarctic, to parallels in the symbolic experience of people with conjuring-like vision experiences all across the continent, or to diffusion of oral traditions across the Subarctic is an open question. We are most certain of diffusion of narratives.

Beyond narratives, actual Witiko scares are a part of the experience of many Northern Algonkians of middle age or older. These are often related to the mystery and great concern over lost persons or may be a more complicated matter of group terror. But it is not only the Witiko that may be the threatening agency; it may be "white trappers" or other strangers or monsters. From one recorded version to another, some narratives replace Witiko with other creatures without altering many other aspects. Witiko is, when looked at in this synthetic fashion, more a matter of attitudes than he is a definable person.

The attitudes of the Indians would include the horror of being food for some monstrous person who has lost control of himself and become confused or transformed, irresponsibly powerful and damaging, sometimes as the result of the malign power of a sorcerer. People also have the attitude of confusion and paralytic fear of being beaten in this most horrible of life's contingencies. As Weipust describes it, some of Witiko's power is in the weakness of his victims.

Witiko's presumed attitude is one of low cunning in his desire to attack, kill, and eat those persons from whom he has become estranged, ostracized and solitary, exposed to the elements, and at once fearsome and fearful. He embodies the transformative power of despair, the awful confusion of family and society for food, and the consequent loss of humanity.

But these attitudes do not necessarily circumscribe a single, well-defined category of persons; there are other monstrous persons who share to some degree the motives and actions of Witiko and are regarded by people as being in some sense similar to him. Further, there are occasions when Witiko is not a transformed human, or not a cannibal, or not solitary, or not aggressive towards humans. There is more possibility and flexibility in the term than we have acknowledged.[42]

Yet many Algonkians and Algonkianists prefer to simplify this variance down to concrete kinds of person (monstrous, symbolic, or other) and condition. It is also manifestly clear that in either culture the experts do not agree. Apparently, while some Algonkians are prepared to accept the possibility of the monstrous, some Algonkianists prefer to tacitly assert the necessity of fantasy and then to exaggerate with false concreteness some aspects of symbolic implication that they have culled for this purpose from a variety of narratives.

In this context we have generalized a monster, not from a calf on a manure pile, but from similarly overwhelming our facts in a different manner. Evans-Pritchard, a judicious interpreter of such topics as belief and symbolism, reminds us that

> any event has the characters of uniqueness and generality, and . . . in an interpretation of it both have to be given consideration. If the speci-

> ficity of a fact is lost, the generalization about it becomes so general as to be valueless (this is what has happened to several of our categories, for example, 'tabu', 'totemism' and more recently 'lineage' . . .).[43]

I am arguing that the category of 'Witiko' has undergone such a devaluation.

To summarize, the Algonkian notion is a variable identification of separable attributes of attitude, appearance, and actions located on an event-specific basis in men, women, infants, cannibal monsters, solitary wild men, and a variety of less human-like creatures. We have over-generalized from some of these data a logically distinct category of persons or a distinct psychological condition. I concur with Honigmann and Ridington that, on the evidence, the case has not been made for Witiko belief and behaviour being diagnosed as a psychosis,[44] although particular aspects of Witiko may be components of some individuals' psychological dysfunction. Nor can he be realistically accepted as a category of persons, unless we can specify a category with boundaries allowing frequent realignment and with a content allowing great variance and transformative potential. Finally, from the Algonkian view there may be a category of madness that is identified as Witiko, a breakdown-transformation following despair, deprivation, and an enemy's curse. But the Witiko psychosis in the literature is not a very adequate approximation to the Algonkian emotional dynamics or to the great variability in Algonkian oral tradition on this topic.

Weipust's account suggests to me a human who, as the result of a curse by human or spiritual enemy, is blinded by deprivation and despair and may thereby be driven into the madness of Witiko. Since his competence proves continuously ineffective in relation to his environment, he cannot eat food-animal-persons to live as humans must. His mental competence weakens to the point of abandoning spiritual relationships and, in his internal experience, it weakens to the point of perceiving his family as food. He then loses control of social competence, attacks, kills, and eats his family. His attack and threatening behaviour are certainly definable as damaging, and the paralysis of fear that affects the survivors shows that some of his power is in the weakness of his victims. But this specific context of cannibalism does rather little to explain or understand the rest of Witiko belief, the differences between human persons and Witiko persons, or the consequences for social organization or human community. And since Witiko refers mostly to an imputed or imagined quality of mind, embodied in extraordinary action and only reflected in appearances, the concept of damaging madness becomes awkward for understanding not merely the empirical events but also the human significance of the events. I suggest that Witiko madness may be imagined by some Algonkians as possible to resolve by transformation into the domain of what we call mythic persons. In this domain, Witiko is beyond madness and is better understood in terms of his transformed competencies.

Since the data are diverse and imaginative, by most standards ephemeral a critical question is how we can make coherent sense out of the corpus of data that will make "mythic" Witiko understandable in non-exotic terms.

I will briefly describe the defining characteristics of Witiko competence, separated for convenience into the aspects of technical, social, and mental competence.[45]

In technical competence, Witiko has the ability to withstand unprotected exposure to the physical environment and is able to find food without the singular, distinguishing advantage of humans, to whom food-animals give themselves willingly. In this respect Witiko is directly comparable to other non-human carnivores whose food is unwilling. Most, perhaps all, large carnivores are sometimes cannibalistic. Also comparable are owls (for which some Algonkian languages use a root meaning cannibal),[46] dogs, and other creatures who occasionally fight, kill, and eat members of their own species.

With respect to social competence, Witiko has the ability to withstand isolation and ostracism and to be shunned, feared, and perhaps killed by humans. Witiko is also able to find and catch food without the necessity of sharing in time of hardship, again comparable to non-human carnivores.

Concerning mental competence, Witiko is responsive to the directing influence of some conjurors and is unwilling to eat the meat of non-humans. He perceives humans as food-persons, which is opposed to the fundamental and necessary human faith that they are not.

The competencies of a Witiko person are aspects of beastliness, clearly very different from the competence of a human person in an Indian community. But the difference is not defined by the madness relations that exist so much as it is defined by the recognition that Witiko, while powerful and threatening to humans, is fundamentally another kind of creature with correspondingly different characteristics of competence. Witiko is a human transformed into a beast not only because he has dominated and eaten his family, but also because he lives on—with the kinds of competencies that are characteristic of non-human carnivores.

Notes

1. See my *Cree Narrative: Expressing the Personal Meanings of Events*, National Museum of Man, Canadian Ethnology Service, Mercury Series no. 30 (Ottawa, 1975).

2. John H. Honigmann, *Culture and Personality* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 380.
3. Honigmann, *Personality in Culture* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 401.
4. In Algernon Blackwood, *The Lost Valley and Other Stories* (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1910).
5. J. Emile Saindon, "Mental Disorders among the James Bay Cree," *Primitive Man* 6 (1933): 1–12.
6. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
7. See Morton I. Teicher, "Windigo Psychosis," in *Proceedings of the 1960 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society*, ed. V.F. Ray [n. p.], 1960), pp. 93–103.
8. Joseph E. Guinard, "Witiko among the Tête-de-Boule," *Primitive Man* 3 (1930): 70.
9. John M. Cooper, "The Cree Witiko Psychosis," *Primitive Man* 6 (1933): 24.
10. Ruth Landes, "The Abnormal among the Ojibwa Indians," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 33 (1938): 14–33.
11. A. Irving Hallowell, "Psychic Stresses and Culture Patterns," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 42 (1936): 1291–1310.
12. Hallowell, "Cultural Factors in the Structuralization of Perception," in *Social Psychology at the Cross Roads* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 182.
13. Teicher, "Windigo Psychosis."
14. Charles A. Bishop, "Ojibwa Cannibalism," Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (Chicago: [n. p.] 1973).
15. Quoted in Teicher, "Windigo Psychosis," p. 80.
16. Raymond Fogelson, "Psychological Theories of Windigo 'Psychosis', and a Preliminary Application of a Models Approach," in *Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology*, ed. M.E. Spiro (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 77.
17. Ibid., p. 78.
18. Saindon, "Mental Disorders," p. 11.
19. Landes, "Abnormal among the Ojibwa," p. 25.
20. Paul Kane, *Wanderings of an Artist among the Indians of North America* (Longman, Brown, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859), pp. 60–61.
21. J.G. Kohl, *Kitchi-Gami: Wanderings around Lake Superior* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1860), p. 356.
22. Bishop, "Ojibwa Cannibalism."
23. Although Leo Waisberg, "Boreal Forest Subsistence and the Windigo: Fluctuations of Animal Populations," *Anthropologica*, n.s. 17 (1975): 169–85, provides a contrary argument.
24. For a definition of this concept, see Gregory Bateson, *Steps Towards Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972).
25. F.G. Speck, *Naskapi: the Savage Hunters of the Labrador Peninsula* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), p. 33.
26. See my "Cree Narrative," chapters 5 and 8.
27. Robert F. Murphy, *The Dialectics of Social Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 10.
28. Thomas H. Hay, "The Windigo Psychosis: Psychodynamic, Cultural, and Social Factors in Aberrant Behavior," *American Anthropologist* 73 (1971): 1–19.
29. Ibid., p. 3.
30. See my "Cree Narrative."
31. Seymour Parker, "The Witiko Psychosis in the Context of Ojibwa Personality and Culture," *American Anthropologist* 62 (1960): 603–23.
32. D.H. Turner, "Windigo Mythology and the Analysis of Cree Social Structure," *Anthropologica*, n.s. 19 (1977): 63–73.
33. James Fernandez, "Persuasions and Performances: Of the Beast in Everybody . . . and the Metaphors of Everyman," in *Myth, Symbol and Culture*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), pp. 39–60.
34. Cooper, "Cree Witiko Psychosis."
35. For a comprehensive survey of this tradition, see Edward Dudley and M.E. Novak,

eds., *The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972).

36. Hayden White, "The Forms of Wilderness: Archeology of an Idea," in ibid., pp. 3–88.
37. Edward Ahenakew, "The We-ti-koo, or He-who-is-alone," manuscript account dated April, 1949, in the archives of the American Philosophical Society, Franz Boas Collection of American Indian Linguistics, no. 67.
38. The word 'Atoosh' refers to the Witigo in the vocabulary of the Crees of the east coast of James Bay, Quebec. The 'Atoosh' quality of the Great Beaver was recorded at Rupert House, James Bay, by Brian Craik, from John Blackned (personal communication).
39. 'Cree Narrative."
40. Ibid. p. 114.
41. Ahenakew, "We-ti-koo."
42. The flexibility of meaning for the word Witiko bears comparison with the Old World category '*Eotenas*' (see D.L. Jeffrey's paper in this volume).
43. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Social Anthropology and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 175.
44. Honigman, *Culture and Personality*, pp. 279–82, *Personality in Culture*, pp. 399–403, and Robin Ridington, "Wechuge and Windigo: A Comparison of Cannibal Belief among Boreal Forest Athapaskans and Algonkians," *Anthropologica*, n.s. 18 (1976): 107–29.
45. The concept of competence is applied to Eastern Cree culture and discussed in terms of the ideals of technical, social, and mental culture of adult men, in my "Reticence and Self-Expression: A Study of Style in Social Relationships," in *Papers of the Seventh Algonquian Conference, 1975*, ed. William Cowan (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1976), pp. 450–94. A general survey of the concept in psychology is given in M. Brewster Smith, "Competence and Socialization," in *Socialization and Society*, ed. J. Clausen (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 270–320.
46. See, for example, Ives Goddard, "Owl and Cannibal," paper read at the 3rd Conference on Algonquian Studies, St. John's, Nfld., 1971.

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Raymond D. Fogelson

Windigo Goes South: Stoneclad among the Cherokees[1]

This article examines the tradition amongst several Woodland Indian tribes of a race of manlike stone giants, with an origin predating that of mankind, who embody qualities abhorrent to native society and who act aggressively to obstruct, mislead, or destroy humans. The Stoneclad are thought to possess magical, superhuman powers, and shamans or heroes who vanquish these monsters are thereafter endowed with their powers, which they can then use to benefit their own society. The author presents two possible interpretations: that the Stoneclad represent the existence of evil in nature and define by negation evil in man; and that the Stoneclad embody specifically the forces of winter and their severe impact upon a primitive society.

Stone-covered anthropomorphic beings are well represented in the mythology of the Iroquoian-speaking peoples; seemingly related beings appear in the myths and beliefs of their Algonkian neighbors in the Eastern Woodlands and Subarctic. Sporadic reports of stone beings also occur elsewhere in North America, although a systematic search of the wider literature has not been attempted. Other defining attributes of these beings, besides their stonecovered bodies, often include such features as gigantic stature, cannibalistic appetite, and a heart of ice or quartz crystal. Secondary features sometimes associated with these mythic figures are a capacity for metamorphosis into human form (frequently transformation into a child or an old hag), the presence of a spear-shaped finger by which the livers of victims are extracted, a detached finger that indicates the direction of human game, and a magical cane that can be used as a weapon, sensing device, or be transformed into other useful objects. Stone beings are usually thought to come from the north and to have some affinity for caves and mountains. They are believed by the Indians and by themselves to be an autochthonous race predating the advent of human beings and to be independent of, and in opposition to, the spiritual beings who created mankind and who maintain responsibility for man's welfare.

Any analysis of myths from the Eastern Woodlands poses difficult problems. Much material was collected only after these narratives had lost their sacred qualities and had passed into more public realms of folklore. There seem to be several strata of mythic themes and ideas represented. Some strata, doubtless, hark back to archaic times and perhaps ultimately to Asia. Other strata clearly relate to horticultural horizons and an evolved ceremonial cycle directed by sacred technicians. Dynamic processes of mythic formulation and reformulation continued and probably intensified with the European invasion of the New World that commenced in the sixteenth century. Besides the enormous time range with which we are dealing, we must also recognize that the Eastern Woodlands was a relatively open area. Migrations of people and ideas, both within and without the area, encountered few natural or cultural barriers. Such social factors as political alliances, trade relations, the adoption of captives, intermarriage, and even incorporation of alien tribal segments have greatly stimulated the diffusion of mythic motifs. I have reason to believe that the themes associated with Stoneclad reflect some of the deepest mythic strata in the Eastern Woodlands.[2] However, I see little hope of reconstructing a "pure" proto-myth, even if such a narrative ever existed. Yet I do feel that connections can be established between what now appear to be disparate myths, motifs, and beliefs and that through these connections the roots and meanings of Stoneclad can be approached.

I will first examine Stoneclad myths and associated beliefs among the Cherokees. Here I rely on published material as well as on data personally collected in the field. After this, the discussion will be expanded to encompass the linguistically related Huron-Wyandot and Northern Iroquois; this will be based on a fairly comprehensive but not exhaustive survey of the published literature referring to Stone Giants and related phenomena.[3] Next, specific features that seem to relate the Iroquoian material to certain Eastern and Northern Algonkian themes will be examined. Finally, some broader interpretative suggestions will be offered that may have implications for understanding the Sasquatch phenomena in the Northwest.

Brief variants of the Cherokee Stoneclad myth from Oklahoma and from North Carolina were published before the turn of the century by Herman ten Kate and James W. Terrell.[4] However, the first extended version of the myth was published in 1900 by James Mooney in his "Myths of the Cherokee."[5] Mooney collected this myth from his major informant, a medicine man named Swimmer, about 1888. I will present this version and use it as a basis for discussion of subsequent versions.

NÛÑ' YUNU' WĬ, THE STONE MAN

> This is what the old men told me when I was a boy. Once when all the people of the settlement were out in the mountains on a great hunt

one man who had gone on ahead climbed to the top of a high ridge and found a large river on the other side. While he was looking across he saw an old man walking about on the opposite ridge, with a cane that seemed to be made of some bright, shining rock. The hunter watched and saw that every little while the old man would point his cane in a certain direction, then draw it back and smell the end of it. At last he pointed it in the direction of the hunting camp on the other side of the mountain, and this time when he drew back the staff he sniffed it several times as if it smelled very good, and then started along the ridge straight for the camp. He moved very slowly, with the help of the cane, until he reached the end of the ridge, when he threw the cane out into the air and it became a bridge of shining rock stretching across the river. After he had crossed over upon the bridge it became a cane again, and the old man picked it up and started over the mountain toward the camp.

The hunter was frightened, and felt sure that it meant mischief, so he hurried on down the mountain and took the shortest trail back to the camp to get there before the old man. When he got there and told his story the medicine-man said the old man was a wicked cannibal monster called Nûñ' yunu' wǐ, "Dressed in Stone," who lived in that part of the country, and was always going about the mountains looking for some hunter to kill and eat. It was very hard to escape from him, because his stick guided him like a dog, and it was nearly as hard to kill him, because his whole body was covered with a skin of solid rock. If he came he would kill and eat them all, and there was only one way to save themselves. He could not bear to look upon a menstrual woman, and if they could find seven menstrual women to stand in the path as he came along the sight would kill him.

So they asked among all the women, and found seven who were sick in that way, and with one of them it had just begun. By the order of the medicine-man they stripped themselves and stood along the path where the old man would come. Soon they heard Nûñ' yunu' wǐ coming through the woods, feeling his way with his stone cane. He came along the trail to where the first woman was standing, and as soon as he saw her he started and cried out: "Yu! my grandchild; you are in a very bad state!" He hurred past her, but in a moment he met the next woman, and cried out again: "Yu! my child; you are in a terrible way," and hurried past her, but now he was vomiting blood. He hurried on and met the third and the fourth and the fifth woman, but with each one that he saw his step grew weaker until when he came to the last one, with whom the sickness had just begun, the blood poured from his mouth and he fell down on the trail.

> Then the medicine-man drove seven sourwood stakes through his body and pinned him to the ground, and when night came they piled great logs over him and set fire to them, and all the people gathered around to see. Nûñ′ yunu′ wĭ was a great ada′ wehĭ and knew many secrets, and now as the fire came close to him he began to talk, and told them the medicine for all kinds of sickness. At midnight he began to sing, and sang the hunting songs for calling up the bear and the deer and all the animals of the woods and mountains. As the blaze grew hotter his voice sank low and lower, until at last when daylight came, the logs were a heap of white ashes and the voice was still.
>
> Then the medicine-man told them to rake off the ashes, and where the body had lain they found only a large lump of red wâ′dĭ paint and a magic u′lûñsû′ti stone. He kept the stone for himself, and calling the people around him he painted them, on face and breast, with the red wâ′ di, and whatever each person prayed for while the painting was being done—whether for hunting success, for working skill, or for a long life—that gift was his.

Also in Mooney's collection is a myth about an *Utlûnta*, or Spear-Finger, an old hag who menaces the Cherokee community by spearing and devouring the livers of children.[6] This ogress is finally identified and captured in a pit trap. All the arrows of the hunters fail to penetrate her stone-covered body. Finally, a chickadee directs the bowmen to aim at her right hand, where her spear finger and palm conjoin and where her heart is located. The Utlûnta is then killed. Mooney implies in his notes[7] that the Utlûnta is the female form of Stoneclad; some of his informants believe that they are husband and wife, the former slaying hunters in the woods and the latter murdering young children near their homes. There does seem to be some significant difference between these two monsters: the location of the heart,[8] the failure to cremate the remains of the Utlûnta, and the absence of any ceremonial gifts from the dying Utlûnta.[9] Another valuable version of the Spear-Finger myth was collected in Oklahoma by John B. Davis.[10] Here Spear-Finger is a female witch with a stone body who derives her power from sleeping with the chief of the underwater monsters. When she is finally killed with an arrow to the hand, her corpse is burned for seven days, after which all that remains is a scale and tip of the horn of the water monster.

A second major rendering of the Stoneclad myth was collected in the late 1930's from Will West Long, an Eastern Cherokee traditionalist, and is recorded by Frank Speck and Leonard Broom in their *Cherokee Dance and Drama*[11]. This version conforms closely to the one collected by Mooney, although it is imbued with a more sacred and primordial quality. Here Stoneclad transforms himself into an orphan, is adopted into a family, and devours the livers of young children. These are the first deaths to occur in the world. Finally the monster is brought down by the seven menstruating women, and in his fiery death ordeal he sings different medicine and dance songs to offset the death and disease that he has let loose in the world. Stones from his body become specialized divining crystals. Speck and Broom remark that Stoneclad can transform himself into the old woman with the sharp forefinger, thereby suggesting that Stoneclad and Utlûnta are but different aspects of the same being.[12]

The Stoneclad myth still has some circulation among conservative Eastern Cherokees. Recent Cherokee informants of Jack and Anna Kilpatrick in Oklahoma knew about Stoneclad but could not, or would not, narrate the myth.[13] I had the good fortune to tape record a long version of the myth in 1960 from Elódi, a knowledgeable Eastern Cherokee medicine man. In this version Stoneclad resides in the mountains in a rock shelter and would kill deer hunters who ventured into his domain. He bludgeoned his victims to death with his stone cane, then used his awl finger to make an incision in the backs of their necks, and proceeded to suck out their blood. A medicine man sent three young men out to discover the fate of the missing hunters. Two of the boys were killed by Stoneclad, but the third managed to escape and inform the medicine man about their monstrous enemy. A plan of action utilizing women was formulated—but in this instance only four, instead of seven, young girls were employed.[14] Stoneclad grew sick when he encountered the exposed thighs of the young girls. He began vomiting the blood of the hunters he had slain, stumbled around drunkenly, and finally collapsed. He was tied to a pole, roasted to a slow night-long death,[15] meanwhile singing specialized medicine songs. All that remained in the morning ashes was his crystal heart. This was broken up and distributed to different medicine men to serve as powerful divining instruments. By scrying and interpreting revealed signs in the crystal, the future could be foretold and answers to critical questions obtained. My friend, Elódi, compared divining crystals to the telescopes and microscopes of the Western scientist.

Additional information was elicited concerning the *ulûnsû'ti,* or Stoneclad's heart. Faithful to its origin, the crystal required as a weekly sacrifice a drop of blood.[16] Preferably this would be human blood obtained by pricking the finger with a pin or sharp instrument; animal blood might be substituted in certain circumstances. If these regular blood offerings were neglected, the spirit of Stoneclad, which was still felt to inhere in the crystal, would become uneasy. It would travel around, bother people, and try other means to slake its thirst for blood. When not being consulted the crystal was carefully wrapped in deerskin and stored in a special stone niche within a dry rock shelter. One of the reasons for secreting the crystal was to protect it against the baleful influence of menstruating women. The rock shelter in which the crystal was stored could only be approached by laying down a path of seven rocks; these rocks were picked up on the return trip out of the hiding place. It seems as if human beings had to be properly insulated or "grounded" when coming near so powerful an object.

I was also told that the crystal was wrapped up with other ritual objects including the tusks, claws, or whiskers of seven or eight different animals, perhaps having totemic significance; also included were four divinatory beads coloured red, white, black, and blue, representing the four cardinal directions, and ceremonially treated old tobacco (*Nicotiana rustica*). The wrapping of these objects in deerskin is consistent with several Cherokee ideas. Deerskins were the prime trade commodity and became a standard of exchange during the Colonial period. Later, cloth was substituted for deerskin as the medium of exchange. On another level Cherokees feel that objects containing intrinsic power, including medicinal plants, must not be kept "naked" lest their powers become dissipated.

The preceding data clearly indicate the survival of medicine bundles among the Eastern Cherokees until quite recent times. The general existence of medicine bundles in the Southeast has been under-reported, although in recent years Louis Capron and William Sturtevant have independently discovered their use among the Florida Seminoles.[17]

According to oral testimony personally gathered in Oklahoma, late nineteenth-century Cherokee outlaws in the Indian Territory sometimes used small personal crystals to elude pursuing lawmen. The last divining crystal among the Eastern Cherokees reputedly was cared for by John Axe, a traditionalist who died about 1900. Statements in the Payne-Butrick manuscripts[18] indicate that it was customary for a medicine man or priest to bequeath his crystal and instructions for its use to a favorite disciple. In a very real sense the death of John Axe marked the end of a tradition, for he was unable to find a suitable successor. Before his death, he is said to have hid his crystal in a nearby mountain cave and placed seven rattlesnakes near the entry to discourage would-be fortune hunters.

Three other Cherokee myths recorded by Mooney, myself, and others invite brief discussion here because of their connections to the Stoneclad saga and to broader comparative issues that will be considered later. On first examination the Cherokee story of Flint and the Rabbit[19] seems an innocent folktale integrated into a larger cycle of Rabbit-trickster tales. These tales were told for amusement or moral instruction and lacked sacred qualities. In this folktale Rabbit is delegated by the other animals to visit

Flint, a being who lives in the mountains and has been killing animals in great numbers.[20] When Flint denies Rabbit the hospitality of his home, Rabbit invites Flint to his house for dinner. They eat picnic-style outside the Rabbit's dwelling. After dinner, Rabbit carves a wooden wedge and mallet. When Flint finally falls into a deep sleep, Rabbit drives the wedge into his flint-covered body and scurries away to his hole. There is a tremendous explosion of flint shrapnel. Rabbit is hit seven times in his anus, an event that some Cherokee narrators feel accounts for the Rabbit's peculiar pattern of pellet-like defecation; in turning around to see what hit him, Rabbit is struck in the face by a stray piece of flying flint, thus resulting in his split upper lip.

In his notes Mooney realizes that this tale involves more than an explanation of peculiarities of rabbit anatomy.[21] The Cherokee name for flint (and Flint), *tawiskala*, is directly cognate with the Iroquois term, *tawiskaron*. Tawiskaron refers to flint, ice, and to the devious mythical twin brother of the primal Iroquois culture hero, Tarachiawagon, also referred to as Sapling, Of Good Mind, Holder of the Heavens, and a host of other names. As is well known, the Algonkian culture hero/trickster, Nanabozho, often takes the form of a giant hare. Moreover, the same basic antithetical myth structure is found in many Algonkian cosmogonic myths wherein the good brother may be associated with east, sunrise, light, and life and his fraternal antagonist with west, sunset, darkness, and death. This, at least, was the early symbolic interpretation advanced by Daniel Garrison Brinton in 1868.[22] J. N. B. Hewitt sees a similar structural opposition but rotates the axis clockwise ninety degrees, so that the good brother represents south, warmth, sun, and summer, while the bad or contrary brother signifies north, cold, ice, and winter.[2] The Iroquois and many Algonkian groups personify Winter as an ice-covered or exposed skeletal figure. A slight Cherokee story involving Winter Man was collected by Mooney.[24] A Cherokee village was engaged in the annual fall burning of the brush, when the fire got out of control and began to burn an ever-widening hole in the ground that threatened to engulf the entire world. They summoned the Winter Man from his home in the north, and he responded with snow, hail storms, and heavy rain that finally extinguished the fire.

Thus the Cherokee tale of Flint and the Rabbit seems to be a vestigial remnant of a more deeply grounded and widely spread oscillating cosmogonic struggle between the forces of good and evil (or not good), creation and destruction, life and death, and summer and winter. But even in its attenuated form, the figure of Flint bears obvious similarities to Stoneclad. Both are primarily identified with a petrous material, both are man-killers, and both can bestow magico-medical and other practical boons upon mankind after they are overcome.

The Cherokees also have a profusion of myths about a monstrous, dragon-like, anthropophagous, aquatic serpent called the Uktena.[25] This type of creature has a widespread distribution in the belief systems of native North America. It is reported for the Iroquois, Creeks, the Shawnee (where interestingly the monster is vanquished with the aid of a menstruating woman), the Eastern Algonkians, Central Algonkians, the Yuroks, various Siouan-speaking groups, and elsewhere, including the Northwest Coast. Among the Dakota the underwater monster is called *Unkéhi*, probably ultimately cognate with the Cherokee Uktena, and this term can be extended by Dakota to refer to large extinct animals in general whose buried bones are sometimes uncovered on the Plains.[26] Obviously, the notion of underwater monsters is not restricted to native North America. Besides similarities to Chinese and European dragon-lore, and even the ripples of excitement generated by the possible existence of the Loch Ness monster, similar kinds of beings seem represented by the Melanesian *Marsalai* and the Australian Rainbow Serpent.

However, returning to Cherokee beliefs about the Uktena, several features of this mythic water monster show resemblances to Stoneclad. First, the scaley epidermis of the Uktena was also impervious to the spears and arrows of human hunters. Nevertheless, like Spear-Finger and Flint, there was a vulnerable locus on the seventh scale of the head or body. Like Stoneclad, the Uktena represents a primeval being, a survivor from the pre-human era of world creation. Finally and most importantly, the Uktena possessed a shining crystal jewel, an *ulûnsû'ti* or crystal, on the top of his head.

In several myths this carbuncle is liberated from the slain monster and serves as a major sacred tribal talisman. Its existence and mythic origin is attested to by Lieutenant Henry Timberlake and by James Adair in their descriptions of eighteenth-century Cherokee life.[27]

A great amount of information about the use of sacred crystals in Cherokee ritual is contained in the Payne-Butrick manuscripts. This material was collected from older informants in the 1830's by the celebrated playwright, actor, and adventurer John Howard Payne and by missionary Daniel S. Butrick. They describe five different-sized quartz crystals that were employed for different purposes. The largest crystals were used for war. These were sometimes carried into battle along with sacred war fire in a portable box, or "ark." These crystals might also be enclosed in a weasel-skin bag and worn on the breast of the war chief. There are indirect indications that the war crystal might have been associated with Stoneclad's heart, since it is addressed as "Man eater," and it was customary to rub blood from the scalp of a slain enemy on the stone. In divining the outcome of war or in determining the duration of peace, the crystal was placed on the fleshy side of a fresh deerskin that was laid on the west floor of the council house with the head oriented to the central fire and eastern door. A line of animal blood was brushed on the deerskin before the *ulûnsû'ti* was placed down, and various omens were interpreted.

Slightly smaller than the war crystals were the divining stones of the civic priests. These were primarily used to determine the future presence or absence of disease in the community. The ulûnsati could be placed on a deerskin-covered post, on a pile of seven folded deerskins, or in the crevice of a building to catch the light of the rising sun. These stones were also sometimes worn as a pendant around the neck of the priest.

The next smallest crystal was used to trace lost or stolen objects. The location of the missing object, often accompanied by the face of the thief, would appear in the stone. Still smaller crystals were consulted by hunters to predict if, and how much, game would be killed. The smallest crystals were used by individual conjurors to predict an individual's longevity and to answer questions involved with love magic. The three smallest crystals would be hidden on the body in no fixed place, somewhat analogous to the mobile or misplaced heart of Spear-finger.[28]

I have not dwelt on the highly elaborated usage of magical stones among the traditional Cherokee as a sterile exercise in ethnominerology, but rather to establish a parallelism between ritual usage and differentiated origin as revealed in surviving myths. Some divining crystals originated in whole or as fragments from the heart of Stoneclad. Other talismans seem to have come from Stoneclad's outer covering. Still other divining stones derive from the crown or scales of the serpentine Uktena.

Important for later consideration is the generic Cherokee name for quartz crystal, *ulûnsû'ti*. This same word in modern Cherokee is used for glass, as in drinking glass. Although its etymology cannot be traced, the term embraces connotations of transparency, translucence, a substance through which light can penetrate. As was mentioned previously, the term for flint or chert, both as a mineral and as a mythic being, is tawiskala. The Cherokee language also preserves a related and perhaps more fundamental term, *tawiska* or *tawiskaga*, meaning 'smooth' or 'slick'.[29]

We will now examine some related myths and beliefs from the Huron-Wyandots and Northern Iroquois. In his extensive volume on *Huron and Wyandot Mythology*, the Canadian anthropologist and folklorist, C. Marius Barbeau, provides several accounts of *strendu*, or Flinty Giants. Many of these narratives are virtually identical with recorded Seneca myths and doubtless reflect the long association of the Huron and Wyandot with the western Iroquois. In general, these Flinty Giants possessed a flint or stone exterior, were cannibalistic, utilized a detached finger to locate human victims, and were rather naive and easily tricked. A strendu could be temporarily tamed by human kindness and assistance. In one myth a bucket of lard is kept for the strendu to drink and thereby forget his hunger for human meat. It should be noted here that boiling lard or grease was frequently used by Algonkians as a remedy to melt the icy heart of a Windigo cannibal or human being suspected of being in the initial stages of undergoing such a transformation. The Flinty Giants had vulnerable places on their bodies, such as their eyes, mouths, armpits, or soles of the feet. They could also be beaten to death with blocks (or pillows) of basswood.

Barbeau cites interesting material on the origin of the Wyandot Stone Giants from a previously published work by W. F. Connelley.[30] According to this source, the Stone Giants, or *Hōōh-străh-dooh'*, were created by Tawiskaron, or Flint, to aid him in his battle for supremacy against his twin brother, Tarachiawagon, the culture hero. The stone coats of these giants were formed by smearing crude pine turpentine over their bodies and rolling around on dry beach sand. This process was repeated until the desired thickness was achieved. To offset this new menace, Tarachiawagon, with a fine instinct for structural complementarity, created a race of dwarfs, or Little People, who eventually succeeded in divesting the giants of their protective armor. The Stone Giants were so reduced in number that the few survivors fled to the woods where they live a solitary life, killing occasional travelers who stray into their domain.

The material on Stone Giants and related beings is quite rich amongst the Iroquois. However, the amount of material, along with its past and ongoing reinterpretation, makes the information difficult to disentangle. Besides the familiar attributes of gigantic size, stone covering, and cannibalism, the Iroquois believed these monsters to possess a detached direction-finding finger, an acute sense of hearing, powerful spittle, an ability to walk under water, and a northern origin. In many myths blundering Stone Giants are outwitted by their human adversaries. According to the early account of David Cusick,[31] the Stone Giants were once ordinary humans who wandered into the wilderness, became addicted to raw fish, and wallowed in the sand until their bodies grew to gigantic proportions and their skin became so encrusted that they became immune to arrows. Arthur Parker collected a Seneca text that accords well with Cusick's.[32] The children of a boney northern race of raw-meat-eating giants rub their skin with dry sand until it becomes so calloused with scabs and sand that it takes on the consistency of stone. Other native Iroquois mythologists claimed that Stone Men were born that way.[33] These northern giants began to tire of their diet of animal flesh and raw fish, and they began to move south in search of human game. They succeeded in devouring many Indians by attacking at night and hiding out in caves during daylight. With their success the Stone Giants grew arrogant and chided the creator god, Tarachiawagon, by claiming to be as great as he and to have created themselves. The terrorized Indians were helpless against the Stone Giants. They deserted their villages and prayed to Tarachiawagon, but the toll of human life continued to mount. At last, fearing that his creation, mankind, would be exterminated unless he intervened, Tarachiawagon sent an agent, sometimes identified as the West Wind, sometimes as Thunder, to destroy the Stone Giants. In one version of the myth the advancing army of Stone Giants is entrapped in a narrow defile and is crushed by boulders blown down upon them by the West Wind. In another version the Holder of Heaven causes such a mighty earthquake that the caves in which the Stone Giants are hiding collapse, and they are buried forever under the rubble,[34]

However, one of the Stone Giants, *Genonsgwa*, managed to survive the disaster and escaped to a cave in the Allegheny mountains. He continued his defiance of Tarachiawagon and the latter's allies, the Thunder spirits. In time, however, Genonsgwa became more human as his anger began to subside. Yet he was still powerful and merciless against those who trespassed against him.[35] A corner of his cave was filled with their bones.

One day a hunter was caught in a fearsome hailstorm and unknowingly sought refuge in Genonsgwa's cave. The terrifying monster confronted the hunter, but decided to spare him, since he realized the hunter intended no harm. Genonsgwa identified himself as the last of his race—a powerful race that had witnessed the creation of the world long before the coming of human beings. He claimed that the spirits of his brothers continued to live in the trees of the forest and that they had much wisdom which they wished to impart to mankind: "how disease is healed"; "how man and beast and plant have the same great kind of life"; and "how man and beast and plant may talk together and learn each other's mission." He urged the hunter to dream, and he would see the faces of these dead kinsmen. He was instructed to carve their images in the living basswood trees. The hunter did as he was instructed and spent a score of years in the forest, carving masks and gaining knowledge. Finally, his apprenticeship was over, and Genonsgwa ordered the hunter to return to his people in order to establish the False Face Society.[36]

There are, of course, many other Iroquois myths in which other beings are defeated in power contests with Tarachiawagon and become the founders of the False Face Society. However, this version bears some striking similarities with the Cherokee myth of Stoneclad. Both Genonsgwa and Stoneclad are associated with stone and caves, and both reverse their roles from devourers to benefactors of mankind. In his book on Handsome Lake, Anthony Wallace has constructed a credible synthesis of different versions of the origin of the False Face Society.[37] The giant World Rim Dweller, sometimes associated with the Whirlwind, and a whole host of other spiritual beings who undo the creative acts of Tarachiawagon are interpreted by Wallace to be but symbols or aspects of Tawiskaron, Flint, or the Devious One. It is Tawiskaron who creates bats, frogs, owls, worms, snakes, and monsters. When Tarachiawagon makes the rivers flow freely in opposite currents, Tawiskaron makes them flow in only one direction, and he also creates waterfalls, rapids, whirlpools, and underwater serpents. The good brother cultivates the corn bequeathed him by his dead mother, but his opposite twin introduces corn blight, hailstones, and ice. Tawiskaron, with help from his grandmother, manages to steal the sun for a brief time, before it is recaptured and returned to its present course. To Tawiskaron is attributed the invention of disease and death.

In the end, the power of Tawiskaron is neutralized by Tarachiawagon. However, to conceptualize Tawiskaron as simply an evil and entropic force is to miss his significance in Iroquois cosmology. Tawiskaron is a necessary complement in creating the world as we now know it. Without evil there can be no sense of good, life must be counterposed by death, happiness by sorrow, health by illness, light by darkness, summer by winter, and human beings by monstrous beings.

In contrast to the available Cherokee material, the Huron, Wyandot, and Iroquois mythic data reveal a close relationship between the Stone Giants and Tawiskaron. The Stone Giants appear as creations, transformations, or allies of Tawiskaron. This close relationship is documented even more convincingly by J. N. B. Hewitt's etymological analysis of the word Tawiskaron. The nominal stem *-wiskar-* occurs in the terms for 'ice', 'hail', and 'sleet'. These latter derive from the noun *owis ă*, which has the meaning of 'ice', 'hail', 'sleet', 'frozen snow', 'glare ice', and, in modern usage, 'glass goblet'. Combining the nominal stem with the prefix and suffixes, Hewitt renders the literal meaning of Tawiskaron as 'He is arrayed in ice in a double degree'. This expression connotes an anthropomorphic figure covered with ice, or more metaphorically, the power of winter transformed into a man-being. Hewitt goes on to derive the original meaning of the nominal stem *-wiskar-* as 'crystal', 'smooth', 'slippery', and 'slick'. Thus the original stem came to designate ice, on the one hand, and flint or chert on the other.

These linguistic connections seem to unite ice, flint, crystal, and glass as objects of a single class. Presumably the qualities linking these objects together would include smoothness, hardness, translucence, and, perhaps, similar patterns of fracturability. However, stone and flint, as exterior body coverings, seem an insufficient criterion to establish an equivalence between the Cherokee Stoneclad, the Iroquoian Flint and Stone Giants, Tawiskaron (or Tawiskala), or the postulated prototype of the Winter man-being covered with ice. Flint and stone seem like surface features in more ways than one. Another dimension based on interior features of these beings would make the equivalence more convincing

Once again J. N. B. Hewitt comes to our rescue by presenting a variant mythic encounter between Tawiskaron and Tarachiawagon. Tawiskaron desires some of the corn that was entrusted to Tarachiawagon. Quoting Hewitt:

> On hearing this request Tarachiawagon replied that he would consent on the condition that Tawiskaron surrender to him "the flint whereby thou livest." To this Flint replied, "What doest thou mean? Dost thou mean my arrow with the point of flint?" To which the reply came, "No; I mean, indeed, that flint which is *in* thy body." To this Flint answered, "So be it as thou dost wish it." Then opening his mouth, he thrust out the flint thing in question. His brother seized it and gently pulled it; he would not break it off, although Flint asked him to do so. "Verily," his brother answered, "thy life belongs to thee, so thou thyself must break it off and give it to me, for on no other condition can our compact be fulfilled." So, reluctantly, Flint performed his part of the agreement whereupon his brother gave him two grains of the corn, one for the grandmother and one for himself. By this act Tawiskaron lost his birthright of co-equal *orenda*, or magic power.[38]

Hewitt goes on to liken the extruded inner flint to an icicle and suggests an analogy with the inner essence of the Winter God. For purposes of the present argument, this vital internal flint substance can be considered to be the structural equivalent of Stoneclad's quartz crystal heart.

The mythology of the Algonkian-speaking peoples of the Eastern Woodlands and Subarctic is exceedingly complex and displays a high degree of internal differentiation. Nonetheless, some salient continuities can be traced with mythic themes already outlined for the Iroquoian-speaking peoples.

In the northeastern Algonkian area we find beliefs about such related cannibalistic giants as the Montagnais *Atcen*, the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot *Ki wa''kwe*, and the Micmac *Chenoo* or *Djenu*.[39] These beings can be of either sex and generally lack stone coverings, although the Penobscot giant is sometimes described as having a three-inch hard outer shell built up from layers of balsam pitch.[40] Rather than being considered as a separate primordial species, the existence of these monsters is usually explained in terms of human metamorphosis. This transformation is often symbolized by prolonged exposure to cold, which eventuates in a frozen heart or a piece of ice in the stomach; the effective cause of the transformation is frequently thought to be possession by an evil spirit or sorcerer and/or the eating of the heart or liver of one of these monsters. Such cannibal giants have an affinity for the north, to which direction they repair in summer. The principal means of conquering these monsters is to have special shamanistic powers to enable one to become equally monstrous. Battles between "good" and "bad" monsters were fought to the death with uprooted tree trunks or magical stakes (often of sumac)[41] and resembled shamanistic medicine fights of the Western Subarctic and Siberia. When the monster was killed, the body had to be thoroughly cremated and the inner ice melted to forestall regeneration. The victorious monster could be restored to "normal" human form and feeling by swallowing hot grease or tallow to melt his icy innards. Also, several myths in the northeastern area indicate that these monsters can sometimes be temporarily domesticated by human kindness and become valuable allies.

This general type of monster seems closely related to the Iroquoian Stone Giants and can, of course, be readily identified with the more anthropologically celebrated Windigo or Weetigo of the Central Algonkian Chippewa, Ojibwa, and Cree. However, since Windigo among the latter peoples most often refers to abnormal changes of state, in either a pathological or nonpathological sense, the hypothesized connections between these varieties of monstrosity will be supported by further examination of Central Algonkian mythology and religious beliefs.

The twin deities of the Iroquois find analogues in Central Algonkian cosmogony. Among the Peoria and related groups the original brothers were said to be quadruplets. Two of the brothers either perish, are banished, or are amalgamated with the two remaining brothers. We are left with the culture hero *cum* trickster, Nanabozho—or Glookap, Wisakedjah, Wenebojo, or any one of the other names he bears in different groups, contexts, and transformations—and with Chakekenapok (in some versions the younger, in others the older, brother) who is identified with stone, white flint, or ice.[42] In the Lac Du Flambeau Chippewa version of the Wenebojo origin myth, as recited by Tom Badger and collected by Victor Barnouw,[43] Wenebojo is the eldest of triplets, the second brother becomes the spiritual guide to the land of the dead, and the third brother, Stone (*Maskásaswabik*), instructs Wenebojo as to how to kill him: he is heated under an intense fire and doused with water. Barnouw here speculates that this form of fratricide may have some connection to the traditional sweat bath, but I think it may be related to the implicit association of stone with ice. Other variants of this myth from the Court Oreilles Chippewa bring out additional familiar elements. In one, Wenebojo's protagonist is clearly identified as Flint.[44] In another variant the opposing brother lives on an island of solid rock surrounded by pitch, which can only be neutralized by whale oil, and chops shells from his shins; he proves impervious to Wenebojo's arrows, until a chickadee indicates a braid of hair where the brother is mortally vulnerable.[45]

The Algonkian Nanabozho or Wenebojo clearly relates to the Iroquois culture hero, Tarachiawagon, although there are some interesting differences between the two. Tarachiawagon is beneficent, generative, and moral; in some sense his humanity edges toward such perfection that he becomes nonhuman, almost a "goody two-shoes." Nanabozho is more the amoral trickster, childish and impulsive, destructive as well as creative; he eventually assumes the form of the Great Hare. The previously discussed Cherokee folktale about Flint and the Rabbit probably has direct Algonkian ancestry, perhaps coming into the Southeast through the agency of the Shawnees.

The Algonkian Chakekenapok, 'Man of Flint' or 'Fire Stone', occupies a parallel position with Tawiskaron in Iroquois mythology, even down to the detail of matricide through unnatural birth. Again, however, differences can be noted. The Algonkian figure tends to be less destructive and more passive than his Iroquoian counterpart. When defeated by his brother, he assumes no particular role towards mankind. Nevertheless, the identification of the two figures is secure. In some Algonkian languages, such as Chippewa, the words for flint and ice are cognate. Finally, one of the cognomens of Chakekenapok is Windigo.[46]

Thus it seems as if the human condition or transformation labelled Windigo is deeply embedded in a widely ramifying folkloristic and mythic substratum. Whether the similarities between Iroquoian and Algonkian monsters are the results of recent diffusion or descent from a common prototypical ancestor, such as the personification of Winter, cannot be satisfactorily resolved on the basis of the available material. Indeed, such questions seem anachronistic in contemporary anthropology. However, I think the material presented here does make it possible to establish kinship between the southeastern Stoneclad, with his heart of quartz crystal, and the northern Windigo, with his heart of ice.

In conclusion, I will attempt to draw out some of the wider implications of the material discussed in this paper. At first glance the material presented would seem to lend itself to a structural analysis. Certainly the data abound in oppositions, mediations, and transformations. One could envision an interlocking nest of mediated paradigmatic oppositions in order to analyze structural relations obtaining between, for example, ordinary blood and menstrual blood, between blood and pitch, between pitch and stone, between stone and fire, between fire and ice, between ice and crystal, between crystal and blood, between blood and stone, and so forth, in ever-oscillating spirals. What is the significance of basswood, sumac, grease, and chickadees? Do the connecting myth cycles symbolize the alternation of summer and winter, or life and death? Can the gross constituent elements in the plot structures of the myths be broken down and rearranged to reveal hidden messages? Such an effort seems premature without firmer ethnographic control and historical anchoring. Like the exploded body of Tawiskala, the material seems too fragmented to reconstruct in any convincing fashion. Moreover, the results of such formal analysis might prove to be rather mechanical and probably would obscure what I take to be some of the evident meanings inherent in Stoneclad and related monsters. Rather than mine deep structural depths for buried riches, I prefer to pan for surface gold.

A useful beginning might be to rethink what we mean by the term monster. Monsters can be thought about from both semantic and pragmatic perspectives.

By semantics I mean those attributes that define what a monster is. Social scientists have of late rediscovered what perceptive humanistic scholars have long recognized—that monsters represent ambiguous or confabulated beings. The German art historian Heinz Mode has offered a nearly exhaustive typology for classifying monsters: "Animal-men"—essentially human forms with certain animal features or animal forms with human posture (such as angels, satyrs, or Lewis Caroll's March Hare); "Man-animals"—essentially animal forms with certain human features or an unmistakable animal posture (such as the sphinx, centaur); "Animal-monsters"—composite animal beings incorporating features from different animals (such as dragons, Uktenas, Pegasus); "Reduplicated or simplified shapes and combinations" (such as double-headed figures, cyclops)—also included here are expanded or reduced figures, such as dwarfs and giants; and man-made objects and natural phenomena in the shape of living beings (such as personified automobiles, Flint, the Winter Spirit).[47] As elegant as this schema appears, it doesn't easily accommodate many of the North American monsters considered here. Even Sasquatch experts would debate whether that being should be classified as a man-animal or animal-man.

The distinguishing physical aspects of the monsters discussed here are their enlarged size, frequent association with inanimate minerals (stone, crystal, flint), and displaced or transferred internal organs (moveable heart or heart of ice).

Other semantic dimensions that could be used to classify monsters might include moral and characterological attributes and origins. The monsters treated in this paper display exceptional power, lack of moral restraint, gluttony, egoism, and frequent stupidity. They originate either from a primordial being or group, or they can acquire their distinctive attributes through deliberate action or metamorphosis.

In attempting to define monsters pragmatically we focus on what they do, as manifested in behavior. All the monsters discussed here are anthropophagous and prey on human communities. They are also at odds with spiritual beings supportive of mankind. Monsters behave anti-culturally in trying to upset or invert the good works of the primary creative deities and culture heroes. They embody the realm of nature rather than culture.

All these semantic and pragmatic features that contribute to defining particular types of monsters must be viewed contrastively. On a more general level, it should be pointed out that monsters cannot exist classificatorily, except in opposition to others. Thus a universal function of monsters is to define what is human through contrast and opposition. This marking function shows up clearly in the types of monsters reviewed in this paper. They serve to mark off different "races," different eras, different creations, and different propensities.

However, the body of myths presented here transcends the simple boundary problem of separating man from monster. Once certain differences have been established, they are subsequently dissolved. Differences between the human race and the monster race become blurred; different eras are united through transmission of significant information; separate creations are shown to be continuous; monstrous propensities become more humanized. Monsters must have victims, but in this process of blurring and dissolution there is a role reversal and the victim vanquishes the victimizer. With Stoneclad, the devourer of men is finally consumed by man's culture, which the former monster then enriches by bequeathing medicine songs and his crystal heart. Genonsgwa becomes humanized and leaves as a legacy the mysteries of the False Face Society. Chippewa shamans must themselves attain the powers of the Windigo to overcome this dreaded adversary.

Perhaps something of this same general pattern can be discerned for Sasquatch. According to Wayne Suttles' presentation at this symposium, the native image of Sasquatch has undergone dramatic change over the years. In the native bestiary he was perceived as a fearsome monster who stole women and devoured children. Doubtless as a result of the white man's interest in Sasquatch as a possible hominid ancestor or cousin, plus the economic value of Sasquatch as a commercial totem, the frightful beast is now seen as benign, gentle, and timid. In brief, Sasquatch has become demonsterized: the hunter has become the hunted, and Sasquatch's skin has become a veritable Golden Fleece.

Finally, I think these related myths and monstrous beings concern universal human problems. They involve rationalizing the inevitable existence of evil in this world, particularly in the form of fear, suffering, disease, and death. These myths constitute a Native American theodicy adapted to a finite and transitory world. The Stone Giants are Titans living in the margins of an Olympian universe; Stoneclad singing the medicine songs from his funeral pyre is a Prometheus ever hopeful of easing man's misery and making mankind more human; and the ancient creators and diminishing number of narrators of these myths are still trying to establish contact and communicate their wisdom.

Notes

* In the spelling of the native words in this paper, accent marks (′) indicate stressed vowels. Other marks on vowels have the following values: â as in "all"; û as in "cut"; ûñ nasalizes the û. The ‘is a diacritic aspiration of the previous vowel, accented.

1. Grateful acknowledgement is hereby given to the Museum of Anthropology and the Centre for Continuing Education, University of British Columbia (with the assistance of the Canada Council and the University of British Columbia Press), plus the Litchstern Fund of the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, for travel expenses to the Conference on the Anthropology of the Unknown—Sasquatch and Similar Phenomena, for which this paper was written. I would also like to thank Jay Miller, Robert Brightman, Paul Friedrich, Thomas Buckley, Amelia Walker, and Susan Fogelson for useful comments and help, and Jennifer Rike for typing.
2. It has been suggested that the impenetrable stone bodies of these beings may be an indirect reference to European armour. I hope to show, however, that petrous symbolism is deeply imbedded in Eastern Woodland mythology.
3. The Huron and Iroquois sources consulted include: David Cusick, "Sketches of the Ancient History of the Six Nations," in *Information Respecting the History, Conditions, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, vol. 5, ed. H.R. Schoolcraft (1825; reprint ed., Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1855); Erminnie A. Smith, "Myths of the Iroquois," in Bureau of Ethnology, *Annual Report* 2 (1880–81) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), pp. 51–115; J.N.B. Hewitt, "Tawiskaron," in *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, pt. 2, ed. F.W. Hodge (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910) and *Seneca Fiction, Legends, and Myths; collected by Jeremiah Curtain and J.N.B. Hewitt*, ed. J.N.B. Hewitt, Bureau of American Ethnology, *Annual Report* 32 (1910–11) Washington, [1911]; C.M. Barbeau, *Huron and Wyandot Mythology*, Department of Mines, Geological Survey, Memoir 80, Anthropoligical series, no. 11 (Ottawa, 1915); Frederick Waugh, manuscript (1915–18), Waugh Collection of Iroquois Folktales, American Philosophical Society; Arthur C. Parker, *Seneca Myths and Folktales*, Buffalo Historical Society Publications, vol. 27 ([n.d.]); and Jesse Cornplanter, *Legends of the Longhouse* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1938).
4. Ten Kate, "Legends of the Cherokees," *Journal of American Folklore* 2 (1889): 53–55 and Terrell, "The Demon of Consumption," *Journal of American Folklore* 5 (1892): 125–26.
5. "Myths of the Cherokee," in Bureau of American Ethnology, *Nineteenth Annual Report, 1897–98*. pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 319–20.
6. Ibid., pp. 316–19.
7. Ibid., p. 467.
8. In the apparently derivative Creek version of the tale, the Big Rock Man proves vulnerable to an arrow shot in the ear (John R. Swanton, *Myths and Tales of the Southeastern Indians*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin no. 88. [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929], p. 38).
9. In the ten Kate version the Utlûnta's stone exterior breaks apart and individual stones are preserved as amulets; the male counterpart retreats to the north (ten Kate, "Legends of the Cherokees," p. 54).
10. "The Liver Eater: A Cherokee Story," in *Annals of Archeology and Anthropology*, vol. 2 (Liverpool: The University Press, 1909), pp. 134–38.
11. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951.)
12. Ibid., p. 16.
13. See their *Friends of Thunder: Folktales of the Oklahoma Cherokees* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1964), pp. 51–61.

14. Both seven and four are sacred numbers in Cherokee numerology.
15. According to the notes of Frans Olbrechts the fuel used to burn Stoneclad was basswood (*Tilia americana L.*) (quoted in Jack F. Kilpatrick and Anna G. Kilpatrick, Eastern Cherokee Folktales: Reconstructed from the Fieldnotes of Frans M. Olbrechts, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin no. 196 [Anthropological Papers, no. 80] [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966], p. 397).
16. The relationship between blood and crystal was probably strengthened by the fact that rutile quartz (crystal with a red mineral flaw) was common in the Southeast.
17. Capron, "The Medicine Bundles of the Florida Seminole and the Green Corn Dance," in Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 151 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 155–210 and Sturtevant, "The Medicine Bundles and Busks of the Florida Seminole," *Florida Anthropologist* 7 (1954): 31–72.
18. The John Howard Payne-Daniel Sabin Butrick manuscripts are on deposit in the Ayer Collection at the Newberry Library, Chicago.
19. Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokee," pp. 274–75.
20. The condensed symbolism here doubtless relates to the use of flint for spear points and arrowheads.
21. Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokee," p. 451.
22. *The Myths of the New World: A Treatise on the Symbolism and Mythology of the Red Race of America* (New York: Leypoldt and Holt, 1868), pp. 161–72.
23. Hewitt, "Tawiskaron," p. 708.
24. Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokee," pp. 322–23.
25. Charles Hudson has recently completed a richly textured analysis of the Uktena in a paper presented to the Cherokee-Iroquois Symposium held in Cherokee, North Carolina, in April, 1978, which is expected to appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal of Cherokee Studies.*
26. See Albert S. Gatschet, "Water Monsters of American Aborigines," *Journal of American Folklore* 12 (1899): 255–60.
27. Lieutenant Henry Timberlake, *Memoirs, 1756–1765*, ed. S.C. Williams (Johnson City, Tenn.: [n.p.], 1927), pp. 74–75; Adair, *History of the American Indians* (London: E. and C. Dilly, 1775), pp. 86–87, 237–38.
28. James Adair also mentions the use of a crystal to bring rain, which he sarcastically considers a neat feat given the heavy annual precipitation in the Cherokee area (Adair, *American Indian*, p. 86).
29. Hewitt, "Tawiskaron," p. 408.
30. Barbeau, *Huron and Wyandot Mythology*, pp. 314–15.
31. Cusick, "Sketches," p. 637.
32. Parker, *Seneca Myths*, p. 394.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 394–96.
35. Ibid., pp. 396–97.
36. Ibid., pp. 397–400.
37. Anthony F.C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of Seneca* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 89–93.
38. Hewitt, "Tawiskaron," p. 709.
39. The four terms are found in, respectively: Frank G. Speck, "Some Naskapi Myths from Little Whale River," *Journal of American Folklore* 28 (1915): 77; Speck, "Penobscot Tales and Religious Beliefs," *Journal of American Folklore* 48 (1935): 13–14; 81–82 Charles C. Leland, *The Algonquin Legends of New England* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1884), pp. 233–54; and Wilson D. Wallis and Ruth S. Wallis, *The Micmac Indians of Eastern Canada* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp. 343–45.
40. Speck, "Penobscot Tales," p. 81.
41. Robert L. Hall, cited in Victor Barnouw, *Wisconsin Chippewa Myths and Tales and Their Relation to Chippewa Life* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), pp. 122–33, suggests a symbolic association of fire with sumac, in that the germination of sumac is

aided by fire, a fact that may or may not have been recognized by the Indians. Thus sumac as a symbol of fire and heat might serve as a natural opposition to the ice associated with the cannibal giants.

42. See J.N.B. Hewitt, "Nanabozho," in *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, pt. 2, ed. F.W. Hodge (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 19–23.
43. Barnouw, *Wisconsin Chippewa Myths*, pp. 13–45.
44. Ibid., p. 74.
45. Ibid., pp. 73–74.
46. See Hewitt, "Tawiskaron," p. 709. Further earlier material tending to confirm the relation of Windigo (Vitico) to a primal being standing in opposition to or apposition to a benevolent deity can be found in the accounts of eighteenth-century traders, Drage, Ellis, and Umfreville, cited by Father John M. Cooper, "The Northern Algonkian Supreme Being," *Primitive Man* 7, nos. 3 and 4 (1933): 52, 56, 90–93.
47. Heinz Mode, *Fabulous Beasts and Demons* (London: Phaidon Press, 1975).

Thomas Buckley

Monsters and the Quest for Balance in Native Northwest California[1]

This article explores traditions of manlike monsters in the folklore of Algonquian groups in northwest California and draws comparisons with Sasquatch phenomena. The author tabulates significant features of the monsters and finds that they are thought to be destructive and frequently maneating, to possess magical wealth, skill, or spirit power, and to dwell at the margins of the physical world where the zones of earth, air, or water intersect. He sees myths of confrontation and domination of such creatures as representing the individual's attempt to master and integrate within himself those forces of man and nature which are in opposition or complementary to those values which society approves; through acceptance and incorporation of the negative, the individual achieves psychological balance and harmony with nature.

Bigfoot has stirred imaginations in mountainous, riverine northwestern California as elsewhere during the past few years. The town of Willow Creek, on the Trinity River near the Hupa Indian reservation, sports a large sign advertising the village as "The Gateway to Bigfoot Country." Indeed, the creature today called Bigfoot seems clearly to have been a figure of some concern in native northwestern California since aboriginal times. This paper will explore the beliefs of the Hupa, Karok, Tolowa, several smaller, largely Athapascan-speaking groups, and, most especially, the Yurok, as they relate to the Bigfoot and other monstrous beings.

A Karok myth published by Harrington[2] relates how an "upslope person" (*marukʔara'ᵃr*) kidnapped and devoured Long Billed Dowitcher Old Man's children. Dowitcher in turn killed the "upslope person" and restored his children to life by soaking their bones in a power-granting alpine lake near the monster's lair. Harrington notes that the "upslope persons" were "hairy, large, strong, stupid, crude, and were sometimes seen by Indians in the woods.[3] They lived in rocky dells far upslope. Some of the younger Indians call them 'gorillas'."

A Yurok myth collected by Kroeber is of interest here as well. It concerns a young woman who, after disappearing from a Karok village near present-day Bluff Creek (in Yurok territory), reappeared with a newborn child and five baskets made of dentalia shells, a much sought-after item of treasure.

She had married a "giant, one of four brothers who stepped from ridge to ridge and shouted loudly."[4] The myth is doubly interesting because, first, it has today been transformed into the "true story" of a young woman who "married Bigfoot" and, second, because some Yurok today say that Bigfoot fishes in Big Foot Creek at a point near where it joins Bluff Creek in the mountains to the north of the Klamath, near the location of the1967 shooting of a film by Roger Patterson which purports to show a Bigfoot in her customary habitat.

But the information we can gather about Bigfoot in this area presents major problems for the ethnographer who would understand it. For example, the Karok seem to make a distinction between the "upslope person" (marukʔ ara′ᵃr) and the "Indian devil," a sorcerer. However, for the neighbouring Tolowa, what appear to be similar "woods devils" are "wild hairy beings of human form" who whistle, annoy hunters, and put out campfires, but do no real harm, although human sorcerers can obtain fire-emitting magical tools from them.[5] Similarly, the Yurok have a "creek devil" (*ra·k ni ʔumaʔah*), or "brush devil" (*ka·p ni ʔumaʔah*), which some people today assert is Bigfoot. Others, however, claim that he is simply a human sorcerer who wears animal disguises and gives off flames and sparks as he runs, barking and whistling, in the woods, putting out travelers' fires and working mischief.

The issue is complex. The Yurok word *ʔumaʔah* is polysemic, variously meaning a human sorcerer, his kit of magical arrows, his 'power', and, possibly, a Bigfoot-like, non-human denizen of the deep woods. Yet "creek devil" (ra·k ni ʔumaʔah) can also refer to "wild Indians," semi-feral humans ostracized from conventional society. These "wild Indians" are said to have banded together in outlaw communities in inaccessible reaches of creek canyons from which they issue forth to harass the good hamlets along the coast and the Klamath River. Further, they are asserted to practice sorcery: to be ʔumaʔah. The Bigfoot, too, is said to live in hidden villages composed of family groups.

I have recently collected a Yurok myth specifically said to be about Bigfoot. The myth tells of a Yurok youth living at Fern Canyon (Osegon) on the coast who, after ten days of ascetic training, went up into the hills and captured a ra·k ni ʔumaʔah after wrestling with him all night. The ʔumaʔah paid the youth a good deal of money (dance regalia) to release him, and this payment served to establish the youth as a "rich man," ultimately to become the founder of a powerful lineage.

The problem is further complicated by the attribution to the ʔumaʔah of the ability to emit flames and sparks and Roman-candle-like aerial displays, since this stresses *human* possibilities, and no Yurok mistakes Bigfoot for a human being. All seem to accept him as an animal, and a rather dumb one.

The issue cannot be resolved here. However, the discussion does raise some interesting questions. In all of the material reviewed, the creature or creatures concerned are directly related to areas considered the loci of power acquisition: lakes, mountains, remote creeks. Secondly, encounters with these creatures all bring human beings wealth (or children, who are closely associated with wealth). In the mythologies of the peoples of northwestern California we find these habitats and wealth-granting powers attributed to a large range of different sorts of 'monsters', among which Bigfoot is but a single, perhaps not terribly important, figure. With cultural change, Bigfoot has emerged as the focal northwestern California monster. To understand the entire category of monsters will, I suggest, tell us a good deal about Bigfoot's meaning within the traditional native world view and, perhaps, something of its symbolic function today.

YUROK MONSTERS

Among the Yurok, monsters fall into several taxonomic classes. These classes and some of their members are sketched briefly here.

The wo·gey

I have shown elsewhere that the primary reference of the nominal form of the Yurok term *wo·gey* includes a wide variety of beings who shared directly in the enhanced spiritual powers held to have been prevalent in the pre-Yurok "beforetime."[6] The category thus includes many beings devoid of physical semblance to the humans who came after them, as well as many whose appearance was either quite human or anomalous. Power ultimately proving beneficial to humanity, not appearance, distinguishes the "before-people." The ultimate beneficence of the enhanced power of the wo·gey however, did not preclude a destructive aspect.

Great Money (*pelin ci·k*) is clearly among the wo·gey. He is a huge, winged *Dentalia indianorum* who lives in the "spirit world." In the beforetime pelin ci·k flew about the world acting as a scout for the hero Pulekukwerek and a companion of the sun; he also swam like other dentalia. His power is enormous, great enough to swallow the sky, and if caught by human beings he brings great wealth and luck.[7] Dentalia in general are held to be eaters of human flesh, and Great Money, although he is not mentioned as a man-eater, is clearly dangerous to humans.[8]

Like Great Money, Great Salmon (*sekoyeu*) lives in the "spirit world." He is inordinately large and a bringer of luck, but also of drowning.[9]

In the mountains lives *peʔpiʔr*, variously described as a "water panther," a "small bird with a long bill,"[10] and, more commonly, as a giant lizard. *Peʔpiʔr* is regarded as, at once, fearsome—killing unwary mountain travelers

—and, as the venerated guardian of the mountain esoteric precincts, accepting of those who have a right to be there.

The eleven Porpoise Brothers (*kaʔsumig*) lived at Kenek, the centre of the world. There, they trapped and ate people. Pulekukwerek, the hero, defeated them, and afterwards they helped him to create world order, saving him from various dangers.[11]

The Thunders (*łʔohkoł*) and Earthquake (*lewoł*) live in the underworld. They are rough and tough and destructive, but grant strength and bravery powers to young men who reach their home by diving into an alpine lake or into the surf from a seastack.[12]

Long One (*knewollek*) is a gigantic, horned, serpentine sea monster. He is a destroyer,[13] attacking people crossing the Klamath in boats. However, he has upon occasion been caught, in which case he brings hunting luck and wealth.[14] Some have raised him as a "pet" (*kaʔar*),[15] in which capacity he brings good fortune although, if kept too long and if the owner develops too great an attachment, misfortune surely follows.

Obsidian (*loʔogey ni·gem*) is, like Great Money, a personification of a Yurok wealth item, in this case the obsidian blades displayed in the Deerskin Dance.[16] His origins are disputed, some saying that he originated as *vagina dentata* in a woman destroyed by Pulekukwerek, these teeth also providing the original poison for rattlesnakes and sorcerers (*ʔumaʔah*), and others maintaining that he grew in a spring, Atɹpɹ, upstream along the Klamath.[17] He swims in the Klamath and may be caught, bringing wealth to his captor.

In regard to Obsidian, two points that seem to hold true of all of the wo·gey mentioned here should be emphasized. First, like all of these creatures (as well as Bigfoot), Obsidian has a clearly dual nature: he is, as poison, destructive, while at the same time being a bringer of wealth and of power. The second point grows from this first one: Obsidian may only be approached after very stringent ascetic training, meditation, and purification.[18] The same may be said of all of the beings mentioned above (including, as we have seen, Bigfoot). Without such training, always accomplished in the "sweathouse," or men's club (*ʔɹʔgɹ·k*), encounters with these beings can only be disastrous. In this, successful encounters with these monsters directly partake of the complex associated with less dramatic quests by historical Yurok men and women for luck, fighting and curing powers, as well as for wealth.

The Vicious Ones, łmeyur

The class *łmeyur* (from *łmey*, 'vicious', 'dangerous') comprises a variety of malevolent spirits and personifications: Adulterer, Sorcerer, Hired Murderer, the mysterious Ground Double One, Jerusalem Cricket (the bringer of death), Mole, the *ka·mes* (sea serpents much like knewollek), the *saʔał* (sprites that live in springs and bring disease), and others. Many of these were banished beneath ground by the wo·gey heroes, and all of the others seem to live in water, the ka·mes and the saʔał being the most often mentioned. All are extremely dangerous and destructive. However, like the creatures discussed above, properly approached they bring the supplicant unusual power.[19]

"Ghosts" (*soʔo.*), while not classified as among the łmeyur, might be mentioned here. The soʔo. are gigantic, humanoid skeletons which roam the forested hills at night. They are killers, yet, again, approached correctly by young men "in training," they grant powers of strength and bravery.[20] They seem, inferentially at least, related to both Jerusalem Cricket and to Mole who, together, are responsible for death in the world.

More directly related to the łmeyur Sorcerer (ʔumaʔah) and Hired Murderer are the human sorcerers and outlaws discussed in the beginning. These, too, are 'monstrous', and while renegades (who often acted, in the past, as paid assassins) were simply to be killed on sight, the ʔumaʔah were bound to grant boons of power and wealth if caught.[21] "Creek devils," at least those identified with Bigfoot rather than with outlawed sorcerers ("wild Indians"), paid handsomely in wealth objects when subdued, as we have seen.

"Reptiles," sok, and Dogs

While all of the above monsters share what we might identify as supernatural qualities, there are other categories of creatures which seem to partake of the Yurok monster complex, but which we would consider quite natural. These comprise the class *sok*, "reptiles," which includes all true reptiles (from our point of view) as well as human foetuses. Dogs (*čišah, megok*^{w}) may be considered at the same time, although they are not members of the sok class. Dogs, as well as all sok, are considered poisonous, dangerous psychically as well as physically. Nevertheless, these creatures are not simply dangerous: like other monsters discussed above, both the sok and dogs are of dual natures. While highly destructive, many of them are also beneficial to man. Rattlesnakes, for example, while obviously dangerous and to be destroyed, can also serve as spirit-helpers, bringing the supplicant wealth and power.[22] Again, dogs, while polluting and psychically dangerous,[23] are highly useful in hunting and, occasionally, are bringers of good portent; wo·gey dogs heard barking in the mountains bring luck. In one myth, an ascetic young man receives misfortune through becoming overly attached to his old dog but, ultimately, the dog brings him great good luck.[24]

Rattlesnakes, too, are found as pets, although only among the most powerful of families. A Yurok friend says that the last salmon priest at Welk^{w}ew had a pet rattlesnake that served as his house guard, and Lucy Thompson, a Yurok woman writing in the early years of this century, relates that her (very aristocratic) natal house swarmed with rattlesnakes which, however, were tame and never bit the inhabitants.[25] Untamed rattlesnakes were held to act as protectors of ritual purity, destroying those who broke the stringent rules of the great ceremonies.[26]

FEATURES OF YUROK MONSTERS

Arranging all of the Yurok monsters discussed above in a table, together with four significant features, we are struck by a certain degree of uniformity expressed across the entire spectrum of creatures.

Three consistent features of Yurok monsterhood are immediately apparent in this tabulation, and a fourth will emerge shortly:

1. Yurok monsters are polyvalent (specifically, ambi-valent[27]), both destructive and beneficial.
2. Although essentially wild and antisocial, many of these creatures may either be cultivated as personal guardians or tamed as pets.
3. All monsters are associated with areas which mediate between cosmographic levels.
4. Monsters are all, in a strict sense, anomalies.

The first two features have been clearly suggested by the ethnographic data already presented; the others demand further ethnographic detail.

YUROK COSMOLOGY

As are those of many Californian peoples, the cosmographic scheme of the Yurok is essentially threefold: earth, underworld, upperworld.[28] In the Yurok case, upperworld would seem to include both an "Across-the-ocean-land," beyond the rim of the sky-dome, and a "Skyworld" above the sky-dome. This complex upperworld is sometimes referred to in English, by contemporary Yurok, as the "spirit world." While the three concepts, Across-the-ocean-land, Skyworld, and spirit world are, in fact, subtly discrete, "spirit world" will be used in the following account to refer to the entire upperworld complex, the context being general enough to allow such broad usage. The earth, then, is connected to the spirit world at the periphery described by the rim of the sky-dome.

By the same token, the underworld, the chthonic realm of the dead, seems connected to the earth/sea plane at the periphery, this plane comprising a sort of membrane separating bowllike upper and underworlds.[29] The spirit

TABLE 1: FEATURES OF YUROK MONSTERS

CREATURE	HABITAT	BENEFIT	DANGER	GUARDIAN OR PET
Great Money	sea, river, air	wealth	man-eater	+
Great Salmon	sea, river	food	drowning	+
Porpoises	sea, river, land	world order	man-eaters	+
Knewollek	sea, river	wealth, hunting luck	killer	+
Obsidian	river, spring	wealth	poison	+
Peʔpiʔr	water, air, mountains	spirit power	man-eater	–
łmeyur	underground	power	death	+
Ka·mes	sea, river	wealth	killers	–
Saʔał	springs, sea, caves	strength	disease	+
sok	water	power	poison	+
rattlesnakes	water, mountains, caves	wealth, protection	poison	+
dogs	river, mountains	hunting luck	poison	+
Thunders	underworld, ridges, water	strength, bravery	destruction	+
Earthquake	underworld	?	destruction	–
soʔo·	mountains	strength, bravery	killers	–
ʔumaʔah	mountains	power, wealth	killers	–
Bigfoot	mountains, water	wealth	man-eater	?

world may be reached either by ascending into the sky by way of the inland mountains or by going far enough out into the sea. Again, the underworld is invariably reached by descending through water—either the sea, or the river, or small alpine lakes. The dead, it should be noted, first enter a hole in the side of a hill above the village of Turip, and then descend through an underground lake. In parallel, living esotericists often make contact with underworld beings after first entering a cave, a cleft in the rocks, or other rupture in the earth-membrane.

As Bean suggests,[30] "power" comes from "outside." That is, the Yurok seeker obtains strength and bravery, generally speaking, in the underworld. Hunting and fishing luck is usually obtained on the earth-disc itself, although the beings which bring such luck to men invariably come from "outside," generally from the spirit world. Wealth, in the form of dance regalia, is obtained from the spirit world where its home is.[31] In myth, such wealth is often obtained through direct visits to the spirit world, always with the help of a spirit-being, often a monster.[32] We also find, in narratives, wealth acquisition through contact with monsters in caves and rock clefts.[33] However, in practice, as far as I have determined, wealth is normally sought through ritual ascension into the hills and mountains. Such ascensions are undertaken in both routine fashion—through the gathering of special sweathouse firewood—and through more intense questing in the high mountains. While both sorts of ascensions are bracketed within periods of ascetic training and concentration, and while both depend on the sincere prayers of supplicants to "protectors" (*ekonor*), the latter type is far more momentous and intense than the routine gathering of sweathouse wood which, however, usually serves as preparation for the high mountain power and wealth quests.[34]

While sweathouse wood gathering is considered an efficacious means of winning the approval and pity of spirit beings, its effects are gradual and generalized: wealth and power come, eventually, to the supplicant. The "high medicine" made in the mountains is, however, more direct, seekers either encountering helpful beings in their power places[35] or going themselves, in trance, beyond the sky-dome to the spirit world.[36]

We may note that, in many of the accounts of medicine making in mountain caves and the like, water figures prominently: wealth accrues to a man upon whom water drips from the roof of a cave; a man finds his wealth-bringing talisman in a water-filled hole; men dive for power in alpine lakes, and so on.

Finally, then, water as a means of access to or communication with the "outside" realms of power must be emphasized: "[Sraʔmaʔu] was a weskwilai [*weskʷeloy*] or brave man. He was not afraid of any lake or bad place in the river, but would jump right into it to acquire power."[37] We have seen above that such power quests are linked with the Thunders. However, many other beings are often involved as well. A myth relates how a man is carried across the ocean to the spirit world by one of the wo·gey, gaining wealth there; another similar journey is undertaken on the back of a saʔal, this one bringing the man fighting powers; others tell of catching various monsters in river or ocean, such encounters bringing wealth.[38]

There are, then, three means available to the living for reaching the upper and lower realms: through water, through ascent into the mountains, or through various ruptures in the earth's surface. Returning to the table, we see that all monsters are associated directly with one or more of these three approaches, predominantly with water and mountains.

Yurok monsters tend to inhabit or travel in the liminal regions of the Yurok cosmos: those areas which at once separate the levels of the tripartite universe and serve as means of passage between them. In a sense, then, the points of contact between man and these creatures may be viewed as cosmographically anomalous: neither clearly in one realm nor another.

Throughout, I have used the terms "monster," "monstrous," and so forth, in a most general sense which includes members of several taxonomic classes. The parameters of my usage have been defined by two underlying components, anomaly and danger-to-humans.

By anomaly I simply mean that monsters are sentient beings which in some way defy inclusion in ordinary classes of beings through characteristics such as size, temperament, colour, shape, or habitat which separate them from their nearest parallels in the natural world. "Monster," then, is a relative term. For example, Bigfoot is a monster insofar as, while generally humanoid, it is bigger, stronger, hairier, and meaner (in the Karok view at least) than an ordinary human being and lives in areas considered uninhabitable by humans. Bigfoot is a monster insofar as it is not a human being, yet is too humanoid to be fully an animal.

Such anomaly is clear in most of the beings considered above: huge aquatic beasts with horns, swimming, talking rocks, flying shells, and so forth. The anomaly of "reptiles" (sok) may not be immediately obvious. Yet, consider the rattlesnake: a cold blooded, egg-laying, non-flying land creature which often swims. Or, again, the redwood salamander: a four-legged water creature with vestigial gills which is often found on land. The human foetus, while apparently warm-blooded, seems aquatic.[39] While as members of a taxonomic class, sok, these "reptiles" are, by definition, not anomalous, the entire class may be understood as a collectivity of anomalies.

Dogs are anomalous in that they, unlike wolves, foxes, coyotes, and other canines, are domesticated, understand human speech, and are thought capable of speaking *back* to humans. Moreover, the dog is the only animal to which mankind is directly related, a dog having been man's first female ancestor.[40] That man has a part-animal and part-monster nature is, as we



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Plate 16. On the afternoon of 20 October 1967, Roger Patterson and Bob Gimlin were riding on horseback along the banks of Bluff Creek in northern California, when they sighted this creature.



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Plate 17. Patterson was thrown from his horse, but he managed to film the creature from a distance of, at the nearest, about 24 metres.



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Plate 18. As the creature turned toward them, its heavy, sagging breasts and deepset eyes became evident.



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Plate 19. The creature left footprints which measured 35 cm in length by 13.75 cm in width and left an impression 2.5 cm deep in the firm sandbar.

Plate 20. The outline of the foot, with its five toes, is clearly visible as the creature disappears into the forest.

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

will see, of profound import in Yurok metaphysics, as it is symbolic of a balance between what is thought of, anthropologically, as 'nature' and 'culture' in mankind.

"Reptiles" are both poisonous and power-granting, and thus comprise highly ambi-valent symbols. In this they are similar to other, more easily recognized, monsters. All Yurok monsters are, like these "reptiles," dangerous to humans yet beneficial as well—when correctly approached.

The same ambi-valence, an admixture of danger and benefit, is to be found in the symbolic components of the liminal regions favoured for monster travel and communication with monsters. Thus, water is highly beneficial as the medium of subsistence, of communication and travel, and of purification. At the same time it is very dangerous, both in an ordinary sense (high surf, rapids, floods, tidal waves) and in an extraordinary sense as the source of disease, the habitation of monsters, the carrier of poisons. Mountains, too, are the source of great good, the location of the highest spiritual exercises. Yet they hold extreme dangers as well, such as enemy peoples or monsters. Caves and rock clefts likewise provide avenues of contact with beneficial forces yet pose the dangers of the underworld: one may all too easily become trapped.[41]

I suggest that the polyvalent symbolism of these liminal regions between the earth and the underworld and spirit world expresses the multiple *potentialities* of the liminal cosmic zones. Such potentiality, particularly in the case of water, is, of course, a common symbolic attribute of such cosmographic zones. As Eliade writes, "The Waters symbolize the entire universe of the virtual; they are the *fons et origo*, the reservoir of all of the potentialities of existence."[42]

Among the Yurok the water's potentiality is most clearly expressed through the theme of transformation. For example, in the myth of the Thunders a young man dives through the water to their house, from which he emerges a new man, more powerful and complete. Other, more ordinary reflections of the theme are found in daily life in bathing following the use of the sudatory; intensive bathing and sweating are primary means of purificatory transformation both as an end in itself and as preparation for further ritual activities and duties. That is, the sweathouse and the associated bathing in creeks and rivers serve as means of transforming the practitioner from ordinary to ritual states. Such transformation represents the maximization of inherent potentialities in a given direction with the accompanying denial of other potentialities.

Here, anomaly and polyvalence seem to coincide. That is, the ambi-valent nature of both monsters and the regions which they inhabit are symbolically indexed by anomalous features. Monsters slip between ordinary taxa because they combine attributes of two or more such taxa; they are taxonomically liminal and hence must be classified in liminal, extraordinary taxa (such as wo·gey, łmeyur, or sok). By the same token, water, mountains, and caves all comprise links between, or combinations of, specified and discrete cosmic zones. The ambi-valence of both monsters and their habitats, then, is realized at a surface level in anomaly. What is perhaps most important here is not so much the anomaly of categorization as the categorical polyvalence—the deeper, underlying level of the structure.

Monsters and liminal zones, as anomalies, constitute ruptures in the fabric of ordinary classification. Both allow heightened access to power and to wealth by human beings ordinarily bound to a less highly charged theatre of experience. It has long been accepted that such classificatory ruptures signify the intrusion of the "sacred" into the "profane."[43] Dispensing with this misleading dichotomy *vis à vis* the Yurok, I hypothesize here that in the symbolic systems of northwestern California such ruptures allow the emergence of the powerful into the realm of the ordinary; thus, the polyvalence of monsters is metonymous with the polyvalence of power itself.

As Bean points out, in native California power is "neutral." Like electricity, power is simultaneously a positive force and a destructive one, its manifestation being entirely determined by the ability of the acquiring individual to understand and control it.[44] As a Yurok friend says, "Power is just power. It's not good or bad, It's all a matter of control, of will." The danger of personal power, then, lies in its very neutrality. Uncontrolled, or controlled towards a negative end, it is harmful to human beings; controlled towards ends culturally specified as positive, it is beneficial. Here, then, neutrality equates with the more cumbersome notion of polyvalent potentiality, a notion which is in no way exclusive of actuality. That is, what is potential in power does not simply remain so, but is actualized in specific events.

I suggest that both monsters and the regions which they frequent, and in which humans make contact with them, are ambi-valent symbols of *both* good and evil. Secondly, I suggest that the polyvalence of both monsters and their habitats, represented through anomaly, in turn represents their nature as foci of potentiality and, hence, as avenues or means of human transformation. Such abstractions remain to be solidly related to ethnographic data.

INTERPRETATION

Yurok monster myths do not comprise an entertainment genre, and, as a group, they are comparable neither to the entertaining genre of animal tales usually told to "children and strangers,"[45] nor to Euro-American "horror stories."[46] Rather, they are a part of a specific corpus of myths and narratives, essentially educational in nature, which deal with the acquisition of power in its several forms and of the emblems of personal and communal power, wealth objects.[47]

As such, their place would seem to have been, predominantly, in the "sweathouse," the locus of the education of young men towards "making man medicine," which is the culmination of a lengthy preparatory process directed towards becoming a "real man" (*pegerk*). Native experts stress that, in the training process, "to make man medicine you have to completely root out all of your fear. You can't have a trace left, because if you do you won't make it. That's what training is for, for overcoming fear."[48] The process of "overcoming fear" is a revealing one: "To be a real man is to know exactly who you are; to grow up and stop being a child." Finally, to be a real man is to be, simply, 'manly' ("independent", "rooted"). Pegerk does, after all, specifically mean "man," not "person" (*ʔo·ł*). To be a real man is to have separated yourself from the culturally specified negative aspects of feminity. Wealth, it would seem, comes quite naturally to such an individual: pegerk means "rich man" as well as "real man".

There are three avenues to be followed in order to, after full preparation, "make man medicine": running at night in the mountains; swimming at night in the ocean; diving into a river whirlpool. All of these avenues, as we have seen, are customary monster habitats. Monsters may, then, be explained as infantile oral-aggressive fears projected outwards, and medicine making as the overcoming of such neurotic symptoms.[49] Yet, such explanations must not be mistaken for real comprehension.[50]

BALANCE

To comprehend, rather than simply explain, Yurok medicine making, we must attend more closely to native philosophical and metaphysical concepts than to those of non-Indian psychiatry. While recent analyses stemming from the latter body of theory have stressed the "sacred" in regards to power questing and wealth acquisition among the Yurok,[51] the sacred/profane dichotomy does not correspond precisely to any Yurok mode of classification. Rather than speaking in these terms, Yurok experts today speak of "balance."

Thus, in telling me about the characteristics of a "real," or "complete," man (pegerk), a highly Yurok-trained friend told me

> There are two sides to everything; everything has two sides, like a coin. you can't have one without the other. A real man knows this, and he sees both sides of everything; he has to. When he has defined the two sides, then he can keep them in balance. That's what a real man does, he keeps everything in balance. You have two sides too, of course, and being a real man means keeping yourself in balance, too. An ordinary person is lopsided, so he doesn't amount to much; he doesn't have much will power, and he can't see both sides of things. He lives by accident [synthetic paraphrase].[52]

Thus, training leading towards becoming a real man rests on the discovery of the principle of balance, and, I have been told, the initial training of a pubescent boy thought capable of "cutting the mustard" by his elders is directed towards his discovery of the principle of complementarity, this being accomplished largely through the solitary contemplation of the natural world ("learning to see," literally, "perceive" [*sɹnɹyɹh*]). Such perceptual training is accompanied by training in the technologies which are, among "ordinary" or "low" people, sex-specific. That is, a young novice pegerk learns enough of women's technology to be entirely self-sufficient, and a novice shaman (*kegey*), among the Yurok almost invariably a female, learns many "men's things," usually in the sweathouse along with the young men.[53]

The emphasis on balance extends both to the actual conduct of training, for both male and female initiates, and to the ordering of personal conduct. Thus, my expert friend stresses the importance of alternating intense mental concentration (*kocpoks*) with equally intense physical exercise, or "training" (*hohkep*) while in preparation for "making medicine." Again, he tells of his mentor's conduct.

> Sure, R. would train hard for a long time. But enough is enough—you got to keep it in balance. So when he'd gotten as far as he could, he'd knock it off. You can't keep that up because you'd exhaust yourself. So he'd kick back for awhile, maybe get stinking drunk. People'd come, find him drunk, laid up in his bed with a woman. They'd say he wasn't a real high man. But they didn't know. Ordinary people have lots of expectations, but they don't know what it really takes [synthetic paraphrase].

This sort of balance in the conduct of one's personal life is clearly reflected in another consultant's gloss of the term *mɹwɹksɹgɹ*, "beauty" or "purity," the essential quality of the real "high" man:

> That's a fella who's a pure man, a good man. He could go up into the [highest] places and talk with the Creator, and yet he could come down and talk with anybody, be just an ordinary person and not put himself above anybody.

The concept of balance is most clearly illuminated by the Yurok concept of "the middle" (*wogi, wogwu*). As Dundes points out, the importance of the middle position is consistently emphasized throughout the corpus of Yurok myths.[54] The middle (of a prairie, a river, a row of houses, a single house, a line of dancers, and so on) is the best, the most dangerous, the most valuable, the most powerful position. The house of the village's wealthiest man is in the middle of the row of houses. The monsters are in the middle of the river. The best wealth objects are in the middle of the danceline and are carried by the most powerful dancers.

Finally, we should note that the attributes of the middle are also those of the real men, the pegerk. They, too, represent the best, the most powerful, the purest, and the most dangerous, through sorcery powers.[55]

What emerges from an investigation of the Yurok concept of balance, then, is an understanding of the spiritual or the sacred as that which manifests balance, the quality of the middle. This interpretation is justified by a further consideration of the concept of beauty. A trained expert says, regarding one who "walks in beauty" (is *mɹwɹksɹgɹ*)

> He is in a state where all things are *known*, deep, deep down, as portions of "Creation." "Creation" has no name—no dimensions, no substance. It is *every*thing. When one walks in beauty one touches the ground with reverence each time he puts his foot down, each mouthful of food, each time you touch something. You can tell a person who walks in beauty by the way he looks at things, touches with sight.

This expert says that he learned to "walk in beauty" when he made his final, "high medicine" in the inland mountains; that after this occasion he no longer saw "things," but only "creations." The ability to see all things as "beautiful," as "creations," results in the full experience of complementarity, of the absolute balance of reality.

THE INCORPORATION OF MONSTERS

Monsters, like both the regions which they inhabit and the real men who conquer them or manage to use them for their own ends (such as power acquisition), are, we have seen, polyvalent and anomalous, symbolic congeries of both the best and the worst, categorically liminal. In this, monsters partake of the essential quality of the middle, of balance. They comprise unities of opposites (or, in Yurok terms, complements) which transcend polarity, and by extension, clear categorization.

In her seminal work on ritual categories and pollution, Mary Douglas views the incorporation of the anomalous and the abominable in mythic and ritual productions as a form of 'composting'.[56] She goes on to speak of such productions as achieving "a union of opposites which is a source of power for good," growing out of "men's common urge to make a unity of all their experience and to overcome distinctions and separations in acts of at-one-ment," concluding that "any ritual which expresses the happy union of opposites is also an apt vehicle for essentially religious themes."[57]

What Douglas suggests here seems highly pertinent to the Yurok case. While I have emphasized the benign qualities of Yurok monsters—as helping spirit beings—their true ambi-valence must not be lost sight of. That is, they are considered, above all, dangerous, destructive, and highly negative: objects of fear to be destroyed. Yet, at the same time, they make good pets and bring those who master them many sorts of benefits, primarily power and its emblems. They are both "abominations," in Douglas' strong words, and symbols of completion, of the middle, of balance. The two are not, in Yurok metaphysics, mutually incompatible: an abomination is a "creation," too.

These various threads are neatly tied together in the single person of Pulekukwerek, who is, along with the trickster Wohpekumew, one of the two great world-ordering culture heroes of the "beforetime."

Pulekukwerek is the epitome of the ascetic Yurok man of power. He is the "never eating one" who subsists on tobacco. Unlike Wohpekumew, he is entirely disinterested in women. He is the master of both rivers and oceans, making them safe for travel by canoe, and he is the slayer of the monsters who plagued the world incessantly in the beginning. Along with his erstwhile friend, he institutes the wealth quest and the display of wealth in the great dances. His power is absolute, his strength untiring, and his bravery beyond reproach (all in contrast to Wohpekumew). He institutes the sweathouse for the training of men, and himself trains his "nephews," Wohpekumew's son and grandson. He is the model of the real, complete man.

However, in contrast to Wohpekumew who, although capable of many transformations, is essentially human in appearance, Pulekukwerek is monster-like. He is the "sharp pointed one behind," a reference to the sharp horn which grows from his buttocks. This horn, of course, immediately brings to mind the horns of Knewollek and the ka·mes, the elongated snouts of the saʔał, the fangs of rattlesnakes, and, finally, the shape of Great Money and all (man-eating) dentalia shells. Among the humanoid wo·gey, only Kewomer, Wohpekumew's grandson and Pulekukwerek's best student, is similarly deformed, being, in fact, described on occasion as a horned sea-serpent.[58]

Pulekukwerek seldom makes use of his monstrous horn: it is simply there. On two illuminating occasions, however, it figures prominently. In one myth he uses his horn to prevent himself from sliding down the ladder of a house pit and into the fire which has been laid by monsters to destroy him.[59] Fire is the weapon which Pulekukwerek himself uses to destroy most monsters, hence it may be understood, in this context, as the primary symbol of his power (while transformation and trickery are Wohpekumew's). A literal reading of the coded message in the incident, then, is that Pulekukwerek is saved from being destroyed by his own power through his monstrous appendage.

The only other use the hero makes of his horn is in gouging a slash down the face of a great boulder near the village of Kenek. The dust created by his mighty slide was given to the post-wo·gey humans as medicine against blindness.[60] Pulekukwerek himself has, in myth, the ability to cure blindness. "Seeing" (*sɹnɹyɹh*), a consultant says, means "to see what is really there; in your mind, in the world—it's all seeing." As outlined above, the aim of perfecting "seeing" is the development of the ability to "see beauty," the presence of Creation in all things. "Seeing," then, is the key to the discovery of the complementarity and balance in reality. It is the means of recognizing the middle, and, as such, is the true mark of real manhood. Pulekukwerek, part man and part monster, provides the means to "see." The nature of the model of the real man which he provides becomes clearer.

Pulekukwerek destroys monsters. That is, as Posinsky suggested, he successfully struggles with his own instincts towards undisciplined self-satisfaction.[61] By the same token, the Yurok novice in training to make man medicine must overcome his oral cravings through fasting and thirsting, his sexual desire through continence, his greed through humble restraint in the wealth quest.[62] Yet, the real man must keep himself in balance least he be exhausted and defeated by his own power. Thus, he must marry and share his life with a woman and with children who alone can, according to a Yurok friend, make a man complete.

The real man (who is also a "rich" man) is not, then, committed to a simple form of self-denial and world-rejection: he is, rather, committed to balance, to keeping in the middle. The monsters must be acknowledged as a significant part of balanced, total reality. They must be incorporated as well as being subdued. The latter, I suspect, gives the essential energy for accomplishing the former. Thus, in myth, successful encounters with monsters leading to enhanced wealth and power are most usually preceded by periods of intense, ascetic training. All of this is to say that it is the control of monsters, not their absolute destruction, which is the earmark of the real man.

A Yurok friend has often spoken of "control" as well:

> We cannot speak of power, only of control. A real man lives a life of control, of will. He makes his definitions, figures the price of what he wants, and then he acts. Nothing can stop him then—you'd have to kill him to stop him. Because he is completely in control, he does everything on purpose, we can say he has power. But we'd just say he has control, because if you have power but can't use it on purpose, every time, anytime you want to, what good is it? Control is real power, and without it there's nothing [synthetic paraphrase].

In this context it is to be noted that the Yurok "world renewal" dances (*helomey*) were held in order to "balance the earth," to make it stable through correcting the uncontrolled actions of human beings which threatened to tilt the earth-disc, causing floods, tidal waves, and other natural disasters. Among the effects of the great dances were the prevention of rattlesnake bites and of diseases (caused by the saʔal). That is, the prayers of the officiants (always pegerk) and, most importantly, the display of the wealth objects belonging to the pegerk of the group—a public manifestation of power—maintained the earth's balance and kept the monsters under control.[63]

CONCLUSION

The role of monsters in Yurok culture can only be understood as multileveled and cumulative. That is, monsters are best understood as representing different things to different people at different levels of training and development.

For women, children, and strangers, if indeed they heard them at all, the myths which have been partially investigated here in all likelihood traditionally comprised "horror stories."[64] Yurok monsters, I suspect, served the same functions as bogey men everywhere do. Yet, to restrict analyses to those growing out of an explanation of monsters as simply objects of fear is to neglect far more complex, interesting, and important possibilities.

For, if monsters inspire fear, they also provide means for overcoming it and, through this act, attaining a higher level of individuation and self-actualization. It is this sort of development, into real manhood, which is indexed by the attainment of bravery and by the possession of wealth. That is, wealth, attainable through confrontations with monsters, is an emblem of spiritual (or psychological, if you prefer) maturity—of power.

Still, however, this level of attainment is incomplete, as is an analysis hinging on the supposition that monsters, like fear and immaturity, or femininity, are merely to be overcome. Why, we must ask, if monsters are simply projections of non-objective, generalized fears, infantile cravings, and the like, onto objective, supernatural embodiments, do these embodiments themselves represent, variously, wealth objects, models of manhood, and direct means to the acquisition of power? This question is relevant in view of the fact that wealth, manhood, and power are all the earmarks of precisely those who have overcome fear, infantile drives, and femininity. Here, it would seem, we must recognize the efforts of archaic philosophers to resolve the apparently paradoxical nature of reality, revealing its underlying unity, its balance. The real man does not reject femininity, he incorporates it, as the *kegey* (also a "real man") incorporates masculinity. Pulekukwerek not only destroys monsters through his ascetic, powerful life; he incorporates them into his very being. Great Money and Obsidian not only travel about eating men and poisoning them, they represent the quintessential power objects as well.

Finally, for the real man monsters are simply another creation, a resolved balance of complementary forces. Like the middle which they personify, they are ambi-valent: pure potential. They are both the absolute danger of mortality and Creation itself, the source of all power. As "seeing beauty" is, in effect, the destruction of all categories (*everything* becomes a "creation"). so monsters, categorically anomalous, may be understood as including in potential all categories, as do the liminal regions which they inhabit. They are, then, in the highest, or "beautiful," sense, nothing special once you know what they are.

Notes

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2. J.P. Harrington, *Tobacco Use among the Karok Indians,* Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin no. 94 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 257–60.
3. Ibid., p. 259n.
4. A.L. Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* folkloristic commentary by Alan Dundes (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), A10.
5. See P. Drucker, "The Tolowa and Their Southwest Oregon Kin," *University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology* 36, no. 4 (1937): 268.
6. In my "Structure and Meaning in Yurok World View," manuscript, 1977.
7. See Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* Y1, T1.
8. Ibid., T1, T3.
9. Ibid., C21, Q2.
10. Ibid., p. 461n.
11. Ibid., A151, C1.
12. See R. Spott and A.L. Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," *University of California Publications in American Archaelogy and Ethnology* 35, no. 9 (1942): 227–32 and Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* N1.
13. Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* A15.
14. Ibid., A11.
15. Ibid., B2, B6.
16. See A.L. Kroeber and E.W. Gifford, "World Renewal: A Cult System of Native Northwest California," *Anthropological Records* 13, no. 1 (1949) and H.N. Rust, "The Obsidian Blades of California," *American Anthropologist,* n.s. 7(1905): 688–95.
17. Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* Flp.
18. Ibid.
19. See Koreber, *Yurok Myths.*
20. Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," p. 217.
21. See D.K. Valory, "Yurok Doctors and Devils" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1970) for the most complete discussion of "devils."
22. Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," p. 229.
23. Ibid., p. 233–38.
24. Ibid.
25. Lucy Thompson, *To the American Indian* (Eureka, Ca.: Cummins Print Shop, 1916).
26. See B.H. Cantanish, "Did Ancient Mysteries Rule along the Trail?" (1904), reprinted in *Redwood Cavalcade* (1968). While the Yurok, unlike many of their southern neighbors, have neither rattlesnake shamans nor public displays involving manipulation of rattlesnakes by cult members (see A.L. Kroeber, *Handbook of the Indians of California,* Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin no. 78 [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925], p. 854), there is an esoteric complex centred around these reptiles. A consultant has described the use of rattlesnake heads in making an arrow poison, as well as "making rattlesnake medicine" on a large rock in the Klamath River. This was, I was told, "earth medicine, to keep me walking firmly on the ground"—and, presumably, safe from rattlesnake bites.
27. "Ambi-valence" is used as a term suitable to the analysis of symbolic and cognitive

phenomena in which two possible and apparently contradicting meanings or values are equally present. It is preferred here to "ambivalence," a term understood as related to an unconscious, psychic phenomenon.

28. See L.J. Bean, "Power and Its Applications in Native California," in *The Anthropology of Power,* eds. R.D. Fogelson and J.N. Adams (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 117–29.
29. See Buckley, "Structure and Meaning in Yurok World View."
30. Bean, "Power and Its Applications."
31. See Kroeber, *Yurok Myths.*
32. Ibid., T5.
33. Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," pp. 167–71.
34. See, amongst others: ibid., p.227; Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* p. 20; Harrington, *Tobacco Use,* pp.200–207.
35. For example, Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," pp. 167–71.
36. See Valory, "Yurok Doctors and Devils."
37. Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," p. 167.
38. See Kroeber, *Yurok Myths.*
39. For further discussion see Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).
40. Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," pp. 233–38.
41. For example, Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* T3.
42. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols,* trans. P. Mairet (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p.151.
43. See A. Van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage,* trans. M.B. Vizedom and G.L. Caffee (1909; reprinted., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
44. Bean, "Power and Its Applications," pp. 118–20.
45. Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* p. 316.
46. In this I disagree with D.E. Marrant, "Variations on a Theme: Some Northern California Horror Stories," *Western Folklore* 29, no. 4 (1970): 257–67.
47. See J. Bushnell and D. Bushnell, "Wealth, Work and World View in Native Northwest California," in *Flowers of the Wind,* ed. T.C. Blackburn (Soccoro, N.M.: Ballena Press, 1977).
48. See Spott and Kroeber, "Yurok Narratives," p. 217.
49. See Bushnell and Bushnell, "Wealth, Work and World View" and others.
50. See P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976).
51. See Bushnell and Bushnell, "Wealth, Work and World View."
52. I have known this consultant since 1970, and we have done a great deal of talking since then, often going over the same topics several times through the years. Quotations cited as "synthetic paraphrases" are not direct quotations but synthesized ones which incorporate statements made on a single topic at different times, as these are reflected in my mnemonic notes.
53. See Valory, "Yurok Doctors and Devils."
54. In Kroeber, *Yurok Myths,* pp. xxxv–vi.
55. See Bean, "Power and Its Applications."
56. Douglas, *Purity and Danger,* p. 163.
57. Ibid., p. 169.
58. For all of the above discussion of Pulekukwerek see Kroeber, *Yurok Myths.*
59. Ibid., A15–A20.
60. Ibid., C1.
61. S.H. Posinsky, "The Problem of Yurok Anality," *The American Image* 14, no.1 (1957).
62. See E.H. Erikson, "Observations on the Yurok: Childhood and World Image," *University of California Publications in Archaeology and Ethnology* 35, no. 8 (1943): 257–301.
63. See Kroeber and Gifford, "World Renewal."
64. See Marrant, "Variations on a Theme."

Robin Ridington

Monsters and the Anthropologist's Reality[1]

This article explores the psychological reality of the Wechuge phenomenon, in which a person is believed to be transformed into a cannibalistic monster, among the Dunne-za culture of northern British Columbia. The author links the relationship between the Dunne-za and the Wechuge to myths of giant spirit animals endowed with human capabilities, and he suggests that the symbolic mastery by the individual of his private spirit animal in the portrayal and imitation of these myths endows that individual with the "medicine power" to master his environment. If a person violates the taboos of his personal relationship with his spirit animal, he is in danger of becoming "Wechuge," and the fear of the crazed, antisocial behaviour associated with this state serves as a sanction against intentional violation of social conformity.

Organized anthropology has been systematically collecting information from the world's cultures for more than a century. During this time the attributes and appearances of thousands of "supernatural" beings and happenings have been described. In most cases these phenomena are accepted as real by members of the culture in which they are found but are not accepted as real by the anthropologist personally. Implicit in the anthropological understanding is a sense of the relativity of the information that constitutes a culture's reality. Professionally, the anthropologist interprets phenomena which he cannot personally experience as real as ethnographic data relevant to the subject culture's system of belief, but he seldom includes an examination of his own culture's system of belief as integral to the process of ethnographic description. Anthropology, of course, has examined closely the terms of its scientific epistemology, but it has paid less attention to the world view of its practitioners as personal participants in their own culture's system of belief than it has to the beliefs and practices of the people it studies. This paper will compare a traditional North American native system of belief, as represented by its image of monstrous beings, with the belief system of the anthropologist, as represented by the historical and evolutionary images of his own personal culture.

The anthropologist's own culture generally distinguishes between supernatural and natural phenomena. Yet as Suttles has pointed out, this dichotomy does not accurately represent native conceptualizations of reality.[2] Whereas Western thought distinguishes between mythical and natural animals as being respectively symbolic and concrete, the native conceptualization of a natural species may contain attributes that belong in the Westerner's category of supernatural, and an animal that is purely supernatural to the Westerner may be classed with natural species in native thought. Sasquatch-like beings are an example of the latter category. The former category, monstrous forms of "natural" species, will be the subject of this paper. I will present and analyze the meaning of monsters in general among the Athapaskan Dunne-za of the Peace River area and, in particular, discuss the meaning of monster stories about Giant Wolverine.

In Dunne-za tradition, as in the traditions of many other North American native cultures, there was a time when the relations between people and animals were reversed. Giant animals that spoke and had culture hunted humans, who were their game. In the stories about this time, terms normally used to describe animals were applied to people, and human terms were used for the giant animals. For each animal species known today there was a giant form capable of exerting a controlling influence over humans. These animal people were overcome by a culture hero/transformer, Saya, who drove them beneath the surface of the earth and changed them into the forms that are known today.[3] The contours of the physical terrain inhabited by the Dunne-za are believed to reveal the shapes of the giant animals lurking beneath the earth's surface.

A Dunne-za child experiences animals first as food and clothing; growing up involves a redefinition of a person's individual relationship to them. When Dunne-za children are sent out into the bush to obtain "supernatural power," literally *mə yine,* or "its song," they experience directly the power of the giant animals. It is from these giant animals of mythic times that the Dunne-za acquire the powers that enable them to perform competently as adult members of their society. The giant animals are encountered directly by every normal person at the time of the childhood vision quest experience and they remain a constant presence behind the appearance of everyday reality. Through the vision quest people learn to exert a controlling influence over the animals of the real world.

The giant animals of mythic times are real to the Dunne-za because they represent the realities of Dunne-za adaptive experience. In a vision quest and in the training associated with it, the child comes to know the animals as they are in the bush and to develop his or her own personal relationship to the process of transformation that is central to Dunne-za adaptive strategy. The supernatural animals of mythic times are intelligible transformations of the natural animals upon which the people's lives depend, just as the people's cultural competence is based upon an understanding of the transformation of natural animals into cultural resources. The giant animals quite literally represent the relationship of the Dunne-za to their environment.

The events of a Dunne-za person's life relate to the events of their mythology in that both describe an articulation between the lives of people and animals. Human beings live by making contact with animals in the bush and transforming them into cultural resources, such as food and clothing. In myth, human-like animals overcome animal-like humans. The mythic giant animals are metaphoric transformations of everyday events, not a separate, occult reality. The metaphoric relationships stated in Dunne-za myths serve as instructions for the integration of knowledge and experience; the Dunne-za say that a person with mə yine "knows something." In the vision quest, cultural information relevant to the Dunne-za system of meaning becomes internalized as a point of reference for the instruction of subsequent experience; the power and knowledge represented by the myths of the giant animals become a person's own power and knowledge.

The giant animals of mythic times are real to those who know them. At all times the space around a person with recognized mə yine actively represents the quality of his or her knowledge. Within this space the power of the giant animals is contained and controlled just as beneath the contours of the land's appearance the form of their bodies may still be seen. Only in time of need will a person give direct voice to his or her medicine power. At other times it remains an unspoken presence beneath the appearance of everyday reality. Only in his or her dream life does the power holder communicate directly with the symbols of empowerment.

For each power there are certain foods and activities, symbolic of the giant animals' behaviour in the relevant myth, that must not be brought into contact with the power holder. For instance, in one myth a giant spider man lures people to his mountain top web with a giant bullroarer, kills them, and sucks the juices from their bodies until he is overcome by Saya, who turns the monster's own weapon back upon him. I learned that a person whose personal spirit animal is this spider may not hear the sound made by any stretched string because it is evocative of the destructive power of the giant animal of the myth. To violate this taboo and knowingly make such a noise in the power holder's personal space would compel him by the logic of the metaphor on which his life experience is organized, to become "too strong." A person whose power is thus violated must undergo a further transformation, into a representation of the giant animal in the reality of here and now.

A person who has undergone this transformation because of a violation of his personal relationship to the power of his medicine becomes Wechuge, a cannibal monster, who in human form recreates the giant person-eating animals of mythic times. Elsewhere I have described the Wechuge phenomenon in detail and compared it to the Algonkian Windigo.[4] In the Dunne-za context the figure of a person transformed into a cannibal monster represents the authority and reality of mə yine power rather than a form of cultural psychosis. The person who has been compelled to become Wechuge systematically and ritualistically acts out the powers of the giant animal as they are stated in the relevant myth. For instance, in a recent case reported to me in which the power of a person with wolf medicine had been violated, the person meticulously filed a large nail into a sharp point, representative of the "silver teeth like knives" given to the giant wolf in the relevant myth. In another case a person with frog power jumped up and down in representation of the behaviour of the mythic frog people. The ritualistic Wechuge performance simply activates dramatically the symbols of those powers that are a constant condition of an individual's identity. As a dramatization of powers, instructed by myth and acquired through a solitary visionary experience, the Wechuge performance seems more like the Kwakiutl Hamatsa than the Algonkian Windigo with which it shares some formal elements. Both Wechuge and Hamatsa dramatize a relationship between mythically represented knowledge and personal experience. In both cases, the metaphor associates the experience of personal transformation with the physical transformation of living sentient animals into food.

Mythic information and its dramatic representation in ritual articulate the place of personal experience within a system of meaning. "Supernatural" phenomena in both contexts are real because they represent a system of relationship. Their reality within the Dunne-za context does not translate simply into our own culture's system of classifying information. Because the two cultures are adaptively and organizationally very different, it is safe to assume that the intelligence of one culture's system of information will differ systematically from the intelligence of the other's. In particular, the traditional mythic intelligence of Dunne-za metaphor represents a meaningful relationship between knowledge about the world and experience of it, while our own culture's scientific intelligence removes knowledge about the world from the direct experience and control of most people. To "know something" in the Dunne-za context is different from knowing something in modern Western society. Among the Dunne-za, the acquisition of mə yine through a vision quest encounter with a giant animal contributes to a person's feeling of control over the significant relationships of Dunne-za life; the experience of personal transformation in modern Western society is relatively removed from the culture's general intelligence.

The anthropologist's personal reality is instructed by his or her participation in a diverse, modern, and historically particular system of information. It is strongly influenced by a sense of the relativity of experience to the particulars of time and place, whereas the context within which traditional

Dunne-za experience is meaningful is specified by their mythic tradition. The fundamental paradigm of modern experience is progressive and historical, while the Dunne-za mythic paradigm is cyclical and experiential. For the Dunne-za, giant animals from the mythic past freely enter the realm of personal experience during the points of transformation in a person's life cycle. In the vision quest, in dreaming, in the Wechuge performance, and in the use of mə yine for curing, the power of the mythic animals becomes operational.

The Dunne-za explain that white men power their machines with the energy of the giant animals by drilling beneath the earth's surface to get their grease, while to the white men this energy comes from oceanic photosynthesis of the long past mesozoic era in the life history of the planet. The life of the mesozoic is forever removed from the direct experience of modern people just as the life of any past age is inaccessible to our experience; the power of the giant animals of mythic times is a constant presence beneath the surface of everyday Dunne-za experience. Their power is linked to a person's own sense of identity. By means of the behavioural taboos instructed by myth, an individual's personal experience is systematically related to their mythic reality. Monsters of mythic times are real to the Dunne-za insofar as they are an inherent property of culturally instructed experience. They cannot be real in the same way within the experience of an anthropologist or any other member of a modern historical culture. They are real within the context of Dunne-za experience, but lose their meaning when removed from that context.

The anthropologist must construct a context within which elements of another culture's belief become intelligible, just as the historian reconstructs the context within which events of the recorded past have meaning. The reality of symbolically mediated experience in another culture known to us through anthropology is much like the experience of life in our own historical past. Both historical and ethnographic facts are meaningful to us only as they can be shown to be part of a system. Information available to people in our modern culture far exceeds the capacity of any one individual to internalize it. Thus, knowledge is acquired through the creative construction of a context articulating a set of facts in a coherent relationship; it is organized into classes of information relevant to specialized interests. Anthropological enquiry is simply one example of the Western practice of creating meaning through the contextualization of information.

Anthropological translation of meanings from another culture requires the construction of a symbolic context representative of the context in the original culture. Most anthropological models do not refer to the *quality* of phenomenological reality with which another culture's symbols are experienced by its members. Our structural representations translate relationships between formal elements in a cultural system, but do not deal with the problem of the phenomenological or experiential. In failing to take into account his or her own phenomenological assumptions, the anthropologist risks misinterpreting the metaphoric relationships of another culture's system of meaning. For example, to the Dunne-za, sun and moon are a person travelling through the sky bringing into being the days, months, and seasons; to our own culture they are separate astronomical bodies. The difference between the two conceptualizations is phenomenological, not astronomical. To the Dunne-za, sun and moon represent transformative phases of personal experience. Their relationship to one another represents to the Dunne-za their experience of the relationship between ordinary waking, dreaming, and visionary states. Together, sun and moon in the sky are seen as Saya, the culture hero transformer, whose own vision quest transformation from a child named Swan into a world-circling transformer is a prototype for all vision quest empowerment. The Dunne-za represented the sun and moon as a person, not because they misunderstood their physical nature, but because they recognized in the systematic relationships of celestial motion a metaphor for transformations of human phenomenology. In order to understand their metaphor we must translate between their phenomenology and ours, not simply between two conceptions of astronomical reality. Their knowledge of celestial mechanics was accurate and pragmatic rather than fanciful and uninformed. In negotiating undifferentiated terrain they took direction from close observation of the sun's path across the sky. They were aware of the sun's change of direction at the solstices, and they were closely attentive to the phases of the lunar cycle. Indeed, practical astronomical knowledge was far more deeply integrated into the experience and understanding of all members of their society than it is for most people in modern society for whom this information has become the privileged expertise of astronomers. The anthropologist cannot recreate directly the experiential basis of their knowledge, but in coming to recognize it, he can make that recognition a part of his or her understanding of their symbolic referents.

In thinking about the following two Dunne-za stories the reader is asked to remember the experiential basis of Dunne-za knowledge and in particular to recognize the significance they place in dreaming, the vision quest, and mə yine power. The story told by Jumbie presupposes a knowledge of the more general story of Saya and Wolverine Man. It also presupposes, in a Dunne-za listener, a knowledge of Jumbie's own personal medicines. A person's medicines among the Dunne-za are known to those around him or her through symbolic reference in everyday life to the medicine stories. For them, the events of everyday experience are meaningful in relation to the symbolic context of the stories. Information about both Jumbie's life and the life of Saya is implicit in the telling of Jumbie's story. The anthropologist must know that at least this information, although unstated in the text itself, is integral to the context of Dunne-za reality. In coming to an understanding of Dunne-za meaning, he or she must approach a given text as merely one point of entry into a contextual mosaic.

The medicine man in Jumbie's story is a person whose own vision quest encounter with the giant wolverine-person gives him the wolverine's power over traps. When the people feel themselves trapped by circumstances beyond their control they turn to him for guidance. The story presumes a knowledge of the relationship between vision quest encounters with an animal-person and that animal's powers, as represented in both myth and in observation of animal behaviour. In this case it is known that wolverine is the "boss of furs" and that the culture hero Saya overcame a giant wolverine-person, who lived from trapping people as his game, by tricking him with his own trap. This story is the charter for the power described in Jumbie's story. It is known that wolverines have the ability to steal bait out of traps and to raid caches. When a wolverine comes into contact with a snare he is said to have the ability to go back on his own tracks and lift the snare over his head, rather than blindly struggling forward into the snare. The story of Saya and Wolverine Man tells how the transformer overcomes the giant animal through an understanding of this power. Saya baits Wolverine Man's person trap with his own body; so, in understanding the situation at a higher level than the trapper himself, he is able to set a trap for Wolverine Man. The transformer gains power over wolverine medicine by transforming himself from the victim of Wolverine Man's trap into the bait of his own trap for Wolverine Man, just as wolverines are said to transform the bait of human traps for fur bearing animals into their own food. Wolverine is "boss of furs" because he alone of the fur bearing animals is above the situation that overcomes them. People who know wolverine are expected to be similarly above the situation that overcomes ordinary people. In their dreaming and through their vision quest empowerment these people have access to the cultural strategies represented by wolverine, just as in the vision quest and dreaming of other powers people have access to other kinds of knowledge.

In Jumbie's story the dreamer knows wolverine because of his childhood vision quest experience, instructed by the myth of Saya and Wolverine Man. Thus, the message of Jumbie's story presupposes a knowledge of this story and the cycle of stories about the transformer and giant animals, just as it presupposes the dreamer's vision quest experience of the power represented in the Wolverine Man story. Both stories simultaneously reflect and instruct Dunne-za knowledge and experience.

SAYA AND THE WOLVERINE MAN

One time Saya was walking in the bush. He didn't feel easy. Something was strange, something was not right. He took a big spruce bough and he swept the ground in front of him as he walked through the bush.

Pretty soon he came to a place where all the leaves fell down when he swept the path. He saw a big square hole in the ground, twelve feet deep. At the bottom of the hole were spikes all covered with dried blood. This was the pit of the Wolverine Man who lived on people.

Saya caught some grouse and put their blood all over the spikes. Then he lay down as if he were dead. The Wolverine Man came back to the pit and saw the leaves gone. He said to himself, "Good. Pretty soon there's going to be grease around my mouth. I wonder if it's a man or a woman. Hope there's lots of fat. I haven't eaten good for a long time."

Wolverine Man looked in the pit. The wolverine had a big bag on his back. He always wore it and he put the people he killed in it. "This must be the main game trail," he said. "Every time I come I get game." He reached in and pulled out Saya and put him in the bag. Wolverine Man always wore a big bag on his back. He put the dead people in it. Then he fixed the pit again, putting sticks and leaves over it. "Good," he said, "My old lady is going to love me tonight!" And he set out for his camp.

The Wolverine Man had a bunch of children and a big, big, fat woman. One of his boys was named *Tsimaka,* Whiteface. When the Wolverine Man came into camp, Tsimaka called out, "Daddy's got a big, big bag." Around the camp were people arms, legs, all different parts of people, hanging up drying. "Old man, what do you have? Woman or man?", the old lady said.

"I've got a man inside," he said. "Lot's of fat on his bottom."

"I want that part," said the old lady.

Saya just sat inside listening.

The old lady cut new spruce boughs and laid them out just like people do when they skin a moose. She laid Saya down on the spruce. Saya lay there like he was dead.

"This is the heaviest game I have ever killed," the Wolverine Man said. "He must be very fat. But I'm tired now, I'll skin him later," and he went and lay down and slept.

His children, the wolverine pups, sneaked up closer and looked at Saya. They reached out and felt him. "Really fat," they purred. Saya opened one eye to look around. Tsimaka saw him and called to his father, "Daddy, that man's not dead. He opened one eye."

Wolverine Man was mad. He said, "You fool, you go to the pit and look at those spikes. They're covered with blood up to here," and he held out three fingers. "Go away, he can't be alive."

Saya had seen a big stick. He reached out and picked it up and stood up. The wolverine lady and all the pups were so scared they jumped on top of the Wolverine Man to hide. But he couldn't move, with his wife and all his pups on him. Saya went *whack, whack* with his stick and they all fell dead. Then he cut them up into little pieces and threw them in the winds. It's a good thing too, because those big wolverines lived on men. They killed many people before Saya stopped them.

But still today wolverines have a ring of white on their fur where that wolverine man used to carry his pack.

STORY TOLD BY JUMBIE

Once upon a time in April, in late winter, when there were monsters, one old medicine man felt *nagata,* the feeling that something bad was going to happen. He felt like that all the time until the time came when the bull moose were getting really fat. Then he and his people moved up the river that comes out of the mountains. They camped three places along the river, past where it turned into the mountains, and they killed a really fat bull moose. Before that they hadn't got anything and they were hungry.

The people who were camped with the Old Man laughed at him when he said he felt strange. But for six days he felt that way. He couldn't eat because he was afraid. The people just laughed at him. "You won't see any monster," they said but on the sixth day he said, "Tomorrow the monster will come." The next day he told the people to move up on top of the high mountain with a flat top. The people moved up there, women and children and the rest. The Old Man stayed down but then he got really scared and he went up on top of the mountain with the rest of the people, for he had seen something really big where the river turned, where they had camped three days before. That was about thirty miles away. If that thing he saw was little like a moose or horse he wouldn't have been able to see it from that far away. It was a really big monster and it was following their tracks towards them.

The Old Man went up on top of the mountain and he told the people, "See, you didn't believe me. Look there and see what is coming." The men went with him and they saw that animal. It had already passed the second place where they had camped. It went fast like a wolverine, and it was huge. It had a white back with two great humps on it. It was *Nowe nachĩ*, a giant wolverine. When they saw that, the women all started to cry for their babies because they knew that the animal was going to eat them all.

They saw the animal get to their third camp. When they had run away they had left the fire burning, they were in such a hurry. The animal went into their camp. He went to that fire but there was nobody there and he kept on going, right up that mountain after the people, right straight up. The people's tracks went either side but he came on up the steep part.

The Old Man took off his clothes and wrapped himself in a pure white moosehide and he went down the mountain to that giant animal. When the Old Man was pretty close he called out to the animal, "Where the hell do you think you are going?" The animal didn't see him. He looked back to where he was coming from. The Old Man met the animal and he put his hand on the animal's chest and he said, "Stop!" The animal looked at him and said, "You're the one I am looking for." That old man knew that animal from when he was a little boy. "Follow me down the river," he said, and the giant animal went back where he came from.

The people moved back to their camps. The Old Man was still wearing his moosehide and he told them he was going out to meet the monster. He said he wouldn't be gone very long and he went out. Not too far away he met that big animal. He was gone four days and the people began to worry about him. They thought something had happened to him.

The Old Man went back to the camp. His old, old father was named Tsuketa. He knew that animal too; he knew it better. The Old Man, his son, didn't want to follow that animal, but his father told him he should go. "You should go. He will make you a strong medicine man. It's good medicine." So his son went after the monster.

The Old Man went out to meet that animal. He stayed with him seven days and the animal showed him every kind of trick. The monster slept on top of him. On the seventh day the monster told him to go back. He knew that Tsuketa was worrying about his son. He told him, "If you go a little way from here you will meet your father." The monster told Tsuke, for that was the old man's name, "I am going to meet your *saze* [sister's child]." Tsuke's saze knew the monster too. He was an old man but he had known him when he was young. The monster said, "His mouth stinks too much. He doesn't have much power now." He said that the relative would go out hunting but he wouldn't see him, even

> when he was close. Then Tsuke went back a little way and met his father. "You're still alive," his father said, and Tsuke said, "Yes." They went back to camp together.
>
> Tsuke's saze went out hunting the next day. He saw the tracks of the great big monster and he started following them. All day he followed those tracks. He saw that they were coming from where his relatives were camped and he thought that the monster must have eaten all of them. But it soon got dark and still he hadn't seen the monster so he went back to his camp. He told the people, "All day I followed the tracks of *Onli nachĩ*, but I couldn't catch up with him. Maybe he didn't want me to see him. His tracks were coming from where my relatives were camped. Maybe he ate them all." That's how the story goes. That is the end of the story.

For the Dunne-za, to "know something" is to control the experience of its power. The story of Saya and Wolverine Man tells how the transformer overcomes the giant animal through an understanding of its power. In Jumbie's story the medicine man turns back upon his own trail to confront the image of his own childhood encounter with the power of the giant wolverine. With knowledge gained through this experience, the old man took off his clothes, wrapped himself in a pure white moosehide, and went down the mountain to confront the giant animal, in much the same way that the natural wolverine, when it comes into contact with a snare, is said to have the ability to go back on its tracks and lift the snare over its head, rather than blindly struggling forward into its extinguishing enclosure. Jumbie's story and the story of Saya and Wolverine Man both begin with a feeling of premonition, of *nagata*. It is the feeling that comes to a person in possession of mə yine. Every person comes to know a part of Saya's power through the experience of vision quest encounters with a giant animal. Dreaming or the feeling of nagata bring about an emergence of the powers themselves into the world of everyday experience. Where only three days before the people in Jumbie's story had known the security of life in camp, they now recognized a monster on the trail behind them. Like animals caught by their own nature in a situation they do not understand, they flee into the tightening snare of circumstance. But because of his vision quest experience the medicine man has the power to prevent the transformation of their reality into a pit of stakes. Only this knowledge of Wolverine Man's medicine could instruct the people to turn back upon their own tracks to confront the force that is tightening around them. Only with the understanding of wolverine medicine could they know that the force of their terror must be coming from within themselves.

The story of a person's life is predicated upon the story of his or her own medicine powers. It was from Jumbie that I came to learn the story of the Old Man who knew Wolverine and from Johnny Chipesia that I learned the story of Saya and the Giant Wolverine. From Johnny I also heard a story about Jumbie. According to Johnny's story, both men had once been out trapping together. They had been favoured by Wolverine, the fur boss, and were making their way back to camp, toboggans heavily laden with furs. Trapping had been so good that they had gambled on starting the long trek back to camp only when their supply of grub was entirely gone, but the journey proved to take far longer than expected because of heavy snows. In their eagerness to stay in contact with the trap boss's medicine they had become themselves the victim of a snare of circumstances. Because of the deeply drifted snow they had to break trail step by step with their snowshoes and then go back to drag the laden toboggans after them. What might have been a hard but fast return to the comfort of camp became a terrible ordeal as the trail took its toll of their energies. One night it snowed heavily, and in the morning Johnny could not summon the energy from within himself to crawl from his sleeping robe into such a cold and hungry world. As he lay in shivering despair, all but painted into the frozen landscape by thick new snow, he saw that Jumbie, the older man, was already up and moving about. Then he looked again in amazement. Jumbie was walking barefoot through the snow, gathering Labrador tea to make a hot drink. He made a fire, melted snow, and threw in the leaves for tea. This gave Johnny the energy to overcome his despair and begin another day. When they had both been restored by the hot drink, Johnny asked Jumbie how he had been able to walk through the snow as he did. Jumbie replied, "Wolverine gave me his feet." With Jumbie's knowledge of Wolverine the two trappers lifted the snare of circumstance from their heads and walked away from the trap. Perhaps Jumbie told me the story about the Old Man who knew wolverine because he wanted me to know about the trap medicine that was so much a part of his life.

DISCUSSION

The phenomenology of the anthropologist's culture which distinguishes between myth and reality is an inappropriate instrument for the examination of Dunne-za culture in which myth, dream, and vision articulate a mosaic of meaning underlying the reality of ordinary waking phenomenology. The reality of information coded in myth and processed in dream and vision underlies the relationship of Dunne-za people to their substantive environment just as the bodies of the giant animals are real to them just beneath the surface appearance of their physical terrain. The anthropologist's phenomenology is different from that of the Dunne-za, because of his or her primarily institutional, rather than experiential, relationship to the physical environment.

When a Dunne-za band finds itself faced with the trap of a circumstance the people do not understand, symbolized by a giant wolverine, they turn to the person in possession of that animal's medicine and he turns back to confront the monster for them. He is warned of the danger by a feeling of nagata. His experience of the monster as a child gives him knowledge and therefore power over it and the situation it represents. His medicine power internalizing the power of the monster as stated in the myth of Saya articulates the power the Dunne-za recognize in their relationship as humans to the world of animals. It is their superior understanding of their situation that gives them power over it. Their cultural competence is internalized as a programmatic set of instructions that guide individual experience. Through the symbols and experience of personal transformation their culture's adaptive strategy becomes the strategy of individual actors. Their monsters have power over them only to the extent that they symbolize a reflection of their own human powers. They are real as metaphoric transformations of the human power in reflection. Wolverine Man is a statement of the real human adaptive control over situational manipulation that is the essence of hunting and trapping. The animal mistakes the hunter's artifice for a safe trail, but the hunter must make no mistake in his conceptual control of the situation that binds the two together lest their roles revert to the mythic time in which humans were hunted by the giant animals.

In the story of Saya and Wolverine Man, control of the situation turns upon the control of information. Saya asserts his humanity by transforming himself from Wolverine Man's game into his hunter. The roles of hunter and hunted depend upon a conceptual hierarchy. Wolverine Man believes himself to be hunter in his construction of an attractive illusion on the trails of people, but he becomes the hunted when his understanding of the situation is falsified by Saya's categorical transformation of himself from victim of the trap into its bait. In Dunne-za adaptive reality the person who understands his situation has control over it, while, in contrast, in our own adaptive reality understanding and control are removed from one another.

The events of mythic time and space are abstract representations of reality as it is experienced rather than literal realities of a separate order. The metaphoric relationships stated in Dunne-za myth serve as instructions for the integration of knowledge and experience. The transformative experience of the vision quest imparts knowledge that allows a person to control his or her relationship to the physical and social environment. Through the vision quest, mythic metaphor is experienced as reality. A Dunne-za person's medicine power becomes a constant condition of his or her identity. The anthropologist's reality presupposes knowledge of a naturalistic conception of time and space. In this perspective human experience becomes merely the instrument of knowledge, not its primary focus. The anthropologist knows of an evolutionary past in which the human adaptive pattern had not yet emerged. He or she is equally able to conceptualize a future bereft of human intelligence. From the perspective of our knowledge of an expanding universe of galaxies twenty thousand million years away from the big bang, the events of terrestrial existence shrink to inconsequentiality. The anthropologist must come to terms with the relativity of his or her reality and devise a system of symbolic mediation through which the meaning of another culture's reality can have meaning. The translation of meanings from one culture to another requires a transposition of contexts rather than an importation of a single element from one culture to the other.

Dunne-za medicine powers and the giant animals that represent them are meaningful within the context of a nomadic hunting adaptation. Our own powers as well as the monsters that pursue us are meaningful within the context of a progressive, global, industrial adaptation. Through our understanding of how meaning is constructed for the Dunne-za we may come to know more clearly how our own meaning reflects the processes of historical transformation that carry us forward with their tide. Perhaps the glory of our understanding lies ironically in its impersonality. To know that our personal reality is relative to its time and place in an immense and indifferent universe places a premium on the accuracy of our information about the context within which our meaning is created. In the anthropologist's personal life as well as in his professional life he must be aware of anthropology's reflexive relationship to the lives of the people it studies. In coming to understand the reality of other peoples' lives we can only come to enrich our own.

Notes

1. The fieldwork upon which this article was based and during which the two stories were collected was conducted amongst the Dunne-za people of the Peace River region of British Columbia from 1964 to 1971.
2. Wayne Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 1 (1972): 65–90.
3. Saya is also associated with the daily, monthly, and seasonal transformations of the sun and moon in the sky.

4. "Wechuge and Windigo: A Comparison of Cannibal Belief among Boreal Forest Athapaskans and Algonkians," *Anthropologica* 18, no. 2 (1977): 107–29. For further discussion of the ideas expressed in this article see my "Eye on the Wheel," *IO* 22 (1976): 69–82, and *Swan People, The Prophet Dance among the Dunne-za* (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, Mercury series no. 38, 1978).

IN ART

Julius Stephen Kassovic

The Familiar and the Grotesque: The Roots of Monster-Making in a Mexican Indian Village

This article describes how the growth in manufacture of grotesque ceramic devil and monster figures to satisfy a burgeoning tourist trade has disturbed local folk beliefs. According to popular religious superstition, devilish creatures are thought to inhabit the village, and some villagers fear that increased production of the ceramic figures might increase the influence of evil forces in the village. The conflict is seen in the context of the effect one culture can have on the folk crafts, and hence on the folk beliefs, of another.

Within the past ten years the little village of Ocumicho, Michoacán, Mexico, has become famous outside its Tarascan Indian area, but rather infamous within it, because of a change in the folk art produced there.[1] For several generations past, Ocumicho was well known only within its marketing area for the small ceramic toys and whistles which its women made on a part-time basis. Recently, however, the small-scale production of toys for Tarascan children has been overshadowed by the making of grotesque ceramic devil and monster figures, which were instantly popular with folk art collectors and tourists and have appeared at exclusive galleries in San Francisco, Paris, and Tokyo and even in the pages of the *National Geographic*.[2] This enthusiasm for the new figures is not shared by the Tarascans who comprise the traditional market. They find the new figures disgusting and repulsive, not because they are grotesque, but because they are frighteningly real. In this paper I will explain the cultural context within which the people of Ocumicho find inspiration for devil and monster figures and why in cultural context they are both familiar and grotesque, at once less odd and more terrifying to their creators than to the tourists who buy them.

THE FAMILIAR

Devils and monsters walk the streets of Ocumicho. They live in the *malpaís* ("the bad land") on the edge of the village, in hollow trees, in caves in the mountains, and in the nearby volcano Parícutin. The villagers live uneasily with this presence. They believe that the close of the millenium will bring the end of the world; Satan has been bound in chains by Christ for the last thousand years, but with the end of the century he will break free to join his minions, the vast array of minor devils now walking the earth who bring destruction to man and drag his soul off to hell. Living uncertainly in this fear, the villagers avoid even the mention of the Devil's name least he be unwittingly called up.

As noted by Carrasco, Tarascan folklore and religious concepts are dominated by the ideas of good and evil.[3] God and the saints are good, the Devil and his demons evil, and everything is identified with one or the other. God lives in heaven with the saints, but the Devil and his demons live in hell, under the earth, and in "ugly" places like caves, hollow trees, ravines, and volcanoes. Harmful and violent forces of nature are considered bad and so are related to the Devil:

> They are either caused by him or are special representations of him. Thus the tornado is a water snake, a devilish creature in itself. When the devil wants to take someone away, he does so in this form. Similarly a whirlwind is a lame devil. . . . The volcano was made by the devil, as something bad which only he can do, even if following orders from God. When the volcano is personified it is the same as the devil.[4]

In Ocumicho, people believe that the nearby volcano Parícutin which grew out of a peasant's field in 1943 was a sign from God that hell really exists, and that if you go up to the crater you can actually see devils down below working and throwing rocks around. The denizens of "ugly" places are also identified with the demonic, especially snakes and lizards, for as one villager said, "Devils dominate snakes as men dominate cattle."

Because the souls of the wicked go to the Devil, his demons walk the earth provoking the bad behaviour needed to win more souls. They are always found among drunks, for example, persuading them to drink more and causing them to fight so they will lose their souls. Devils appear in many forms, often disguised as humans or animals, but with incongruous features. One may notice that a drinking man has goat's feet or a seducing woman has hairy hands. One of the villagers told me that the morning after a drunk was murdered, a dog was found eating his body.

> He ate all of the side of his face. We were looking at the dog and

> finally when we saw his feet, they were like the feet of a chicken. . . . We were just looking at the shape, which was of a dog, but below he had the feet of a chicken! Well, clearly he was no dog! He was a devil! He left when we saw the feet. . . he just disappeared. . . there are devils everywhere. I believe there are devils everywhere.

In Ocumicho, to talk of devils and monsters is to use two terms for the same thing. The Devil may appear in human form with horns and a tail, but any creature or natural phenomenon which deviates from the ordinary is of the Devil; there are no monsters apart from the idea of evil, symbolized by the Devil.

For the people of Ocumicho, seeing a devil, while not a common or mundane experience, is not the singular event that spotting a Sasquatch has become in Canada and the United States, where believing in Sasquatches is confined to a minority. The overwhelming majority of the villagers actively believe in the existence of devils and monsters; spotting them is not an extraordinary event, but it is a vision of evil and danger and is consequently a powerful experience.

Images of the Devil are constantly before the villagers. The *santos* ("religious pictures") in the shrines of their homes and churches portray the devil in his various aspects, from an allegorical monster representing the fiery jaws of hell to anthropomorphic devils with horns and pointed tails. His image is also frequently conjured up in the Bible as read in church and the Bible stories transmitted informally, as well as in the religious legendry of four hundred and fifty years of folk Catholicism. Costumed devil figures appear in the *pastorelas* ("nativity plays") presented at Christmas and the New Year, where the devil, brought to life by adolescent performers, is transformed into a comic trickster figure.

All reference to and portrayal of the Devil was done in a proper religious context; it was in this familiar context that the Devil, when made, was included among the figures of the toys and whistles which sold in local markets. The stock of figures produced was a fairly well-defined set of traditional forms, such as figures of horsemen, common animals, human figures from daily life and in costume from various festivals, and figures from folklore and folk religion. Devils made up only a minority of the figures produced.

THE GROTESQUE

In a recent radical departure from this tradition came a new production of grotesque devil and monster figures, far more varied and horribly explicit than any previously produced in the village, which were intended for sale not in the local market but in the tourist trade. This development was essentially the product of one man, Marcelino Vicente Mulato, who died shortly after establishing it. He was, according to those who knew him, an extremely creative artist whose homosexual orientation steered him away from traditional "men's work" towards the "women's work" with clay. As opposed to the women's part-time involvement, he worked full time. Very shortly thereafter he began to depart from the confines of the traditional figures and create new ones drawn from his cultural stock and enriched with ideas from his imagination and dreams, dreams in which he actually saw devils who told him to stop fooling around and make figures of them as they actually were!

As his new style developed, the market changed, and for the first time large numbers of outsiders, folk art shops, museums, and tourists began to buy Ocumicho figures. In short order Marcelino found he could not keep up with the demand for his devils and had to enlist the help of the other figure makers. They were at first reluctant to join him because they were afraid to set loose those aspects of their culture which were controlled in their religious context. Miserable economic conditions, however, eventually overcame reluctance; soon the market was asking for not only more, but more grotesque figures. "Put on more snakes," they were told by the buyers, "the tourists like them with more snakes."

As it evolved, the new style of figure-making emphasized the break with the traditional style by its stress on a freer use of *memoria* ("imagination") on the part of the artisan to attract the attention of adults who comprise the new market. The figures also have to possess a certain quality defined as *chiste* ("to be striking or imaginative"). In producing them, sometimes a specific idea from a specific source may guide the artisans, but often, as they have told me, "I don't always know what I'm going to make. I just sit down and, little by little, there it is." The resultant figures, drawn from every demonic representation and situation from orthodox and folk Catholicism, legendry, the artisans' own personal encounters with the devil, their dreams, and their unconscious, reflect in symbolic terms the artisans' social and psychological states. While they are continuing many of the grotesque themes established by the innovator, they are also, because of the importance placed upon memoria and chiste, expanding the scope of the sins of their world as they see them, expressed figuratively as devils.

Revelations, perhaps the most popular section of the Bible in Ocumicho, provides a number of vivid devil and monster images which have been portrayed. Figures of seven-headed dragons which in folk belief represent the seven vices on earth were inspired by the beast ridden by the whore of Babylon.[5] Figures of Satan in chains stem from their belief in the imminent end of the world.[6] Figures from the "ugly" places and of the "ugly" animals also loom large in the array of devil figures. Great lizards and monsters carry the souls of sinners, particularly drunks and *malcasados* ("adulterers and fornicators"), off to hell on their backs. Whirling cyclones ensnare sinners, now portrayed as devils themselves, and spirit them away. Snakes, special to devils and tourists, abound. Since most of these figures are made by women who do not work in the fields, harmful, and therefore demonic, creatures they have only heard about from men are transformed by their imaginations into terrible monster figures. A hog-faced snake feared for its bite, for example, was transformed into a dragon-like creature with teeth so large it could not possibly close its mouth. Violent crime provides further avenues for exploration. The murder of a drunk by his two drunken companions, transformed by an artisan into a grisly scene of monsters killing a devil, reflects the belief in the presence of devils among the drunks, dooming both the killers and the victim.

Creating devils and monsters for tourists is not done without taking a certain toll on the artisans involved. These creatures, although made for sale to tourists, are part of a real, vivid, and immediate reality for the villagers. The new style is sold only to outsiders because the local market of Tarascan Indians finds it repulsive; the concentration on demons is for them unnatural; their very explicitness, variation, and quantity is considered dangerous. Traditional reference to the Devil has always been indirect—"the evil one" (*noambákiti* in Tarascan) or "monkey" (*chango* in Spanish)—in order to avoid calling him up unwittingly; producing his image only invites trouble. Many people in villages surrounding Ocumicho fear it for its devil production; within Ocumicho those who do not make devil figures fear those who do, and many of the figure-makers themselves fear their own creations. They cover them up at night so they can walk by them without being frightened, and they dilute their production of demons with figures from folktales or their imagination. As one person told me, "They say here that the Devil will carry off to hell those who make devil figures. I too have a fear of making so many devils, but, well, it is necessary, so I mostly make moon and animal figures—only some, two or three, devils." The one mitigating factor in the production of demon figures is that they are quickly taken away and sold to tourists who do not know what they are, but are amused by them. In this way they are dispersed and their power diluted.

The ceramic figure production in Ocumicho, being a product of the artisans' memoria, can be seen as a mirror of their culture. The influence of the tourist market has made this a fun-house mirror, distorting the proportions of the villager's reality until evil, in the guise of the Devil and his monstrous minions, looms so large that it dominates the frame.

The new figures are at once familiar and grotesque, removed from the cultural structure that carefully maintained the proportions of good and evil.

The artisans who have been producing these figures have dealt with them in several ways. Some have become used to making them and have, to a certain extent, overcome their fears. In dealing with large quantities of them over the years they have come to regard the figures themselves as simply harmless toys, comic figures like the trickster-devils portrayed in the above-mentioned pastorelas. Much of the fear, however, has been merely repressed, and the majority of the artisans are living with a certain level of it. For their suspicious neighbors and their own consciences, they quote the following counsel of a sympathetic village priest: "We make only figures; nobody adores them as real devils. And it is much better to maintain oneself and one's family by making these figures than by stealing someone else's burro!"

Notes

1. Fieldwork in Ocumicho was conducted in 1974 and supported in part by a grant from the Center for Latin American Studies.
2. Vol. 153, no. 5 (May 1978): 648–50.
3. Pedro Carrasco, "Tarascan Folk Religion," in *Synoptic Studies of Mexican Culture*, ed. Robert Wauchope (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1957), pp. 36–48.
4. Ibid., p. 46.
5. Rev. 17: 1–6.
6. Rev. 20: 1–10.



Plate 21-23. In the past few years, ceramic figures made by Tarascan Indians of Ocumicho, Mexico, have undergone a transformation. They have become more grotesque and more frightening to satisfy the tastes of foreign tourists. Local residents fear that the demonic figures risk attracting real demons.
Julius Stephen Kassovic discusses this confrontation between art and belief on pages 187-92.











Plate 24 (top left). "Spirit-faces (inua) showing on the knees and shoulder of imaginative figure," by Eli Sallualuk of Povungnituk, Quebec (1967, 10 cm.) Property of the Povungnituk Cooperative.

Plate 25 (top right). "Tunnituaqruk," by Davidialuk Ammituk, Povingnituk (1968, 7 cm) is a small female humanoid with facial tatoos and large breasts on its cheeks.

Plate 26 (at left). "Hammer-head person (kajjutajuk) holding severed head," by Paulasi Irqiku, Povungnituk (1967, 21 cm), is a small, destructive humanoid.
These Inuit spirit-figures are discussed by Nelson Graburn on pages 193-210.



Plate 27. "The giant (inukpak) of Kovik, being killed by an Eskimo," by Charlie Sivuarapik, Povungnituk (1958, 26 cm). Property of Father A.P. Steinmann, O.M.I., who encouraged the Inuit to express their traditional beliefs in sculpture.



Plate 28. "The soul (tangnirk) of a deceased man appears in the Northern Lights to his living friend below," by Davidialuk Ammituk (1968, 45 cm). Property of the Povungnituk Cooperative.



Plate 29. "Woman eating child, transforming into seagull," by Davidialuk Ammituk (1967, 28 cm), is an example of the transformation of human to beast common to Inuit stories. Property of the Povungnituk Cooperative.



Plate 30. "Mermaid (iqala nappa)," by Aisa Aviliajuk, Povungnituk, is typical of creatures which have both human and animal attributes. Property of the Povungnituk Cooperative.

Nelson H.H. Graburn

Man, Beast, and Transformation in Canadian Inuit Art and Culture[1]

This article describes the major features and classes of manlike and non-human creatures of Inuit mythology and examines their expression in oral tradition and in the new commercial arts of carving and printmaking. The author demonstrates how the Inuit belief systems have changed gradually with the impact of literacy and the influence of Christianity. He suggests that the transition from oral to pictorial representation of mythological beings has fixed, and thus limited, the Inuit's conception of these creatures.

Traditional Inuit culture populated the physical and spiritual world with a plethora of humanoid and non-human beings of many different types. Most were superhuman in their characteristics and were inexplicable or uncontrollable, except by shamans. Significantly none were animals, with the exception of a few origin myths which account for certain species having transformed from humans. The major characteristic of all these beings is that they are not subject to very close description nor to systematization in a way satisfactory to our literate culture.

This paper describes the major features and classes of these beings and examines their expression in oral tradition and in the new commercial arts of carving and print-making. Although my own field data provide the basis, other major sources have been examined for correspondences and elaboration.[2]

The major conclusions are: that Inuit experience and belief cannot and should not be analyzed in the same ways as we attempt to do with the Sasquatch, for Inuit reality was based on a different, oral mode of communication, and our academic understanding is based in the literate, two-dimensional externalizing modes; that the Inuit belief systems have changed gradually with the impact of literacy and that the commercial arts express a half-way stage in the materializing of beliefs; and that the reality of the Inuit beings and experience is a question which is best answered from an existential or inter-subjective point of view.

MAN IS THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INUIT HUMANOIDS

The many varieties of humans, humanoids, spirits, and transformations that appear in Inuit mythology and experience are not easily systematized. Any attempt at definitive classification or analysis contains the possibility of violating the data, for the Inuit did not traditionally feel the need for neatness or logical closure in their many tales, nor did the multiplicity of individual experiences exclude considerable variation. As Rasmussen found out in his excellent enquiries into Central Eskimo cosmology

> In our ordinary everyday life we do not think much about these things and it is only now that you ask that so many thoughts arise in my head of long known things; old thoughts, but as it were becoming altogether new when one has to put them into words.[3]

This essay does not contain the all-embracing tree-diagrams or componential paradigms that the ethnoscientist might desire. Furthermore, the analysis should be seen as imposing more than is usual with structural analyses a framework which is only partly implicit in the data and cannot be expected to represent the intellectual reality of one *inuk* or group of *inuit*.

Following Eskimo verbal categories the beings under consideration fall for the most part into two non-oppositional categories. Living things—in which the Inuit do not include plants—are implicitly subdivided into two divisions: those which *inu*juk, that is, are alive in the human sense; and *Uma*juk, those which live in the sense of animals. It is the former kind of living, related to the world inuk, "human (Eskimo) being," which is imputed to the array of beings considered here. Another, non-opposite category is that of *turngak*, "evil spirit," which is a cover term for a large number of "beings" comparable to our words "spirits" or "ghosts." These resemble the Inuit only at times and in less tangible ways: they do not love and breathe and eat and die, and they are capable of feats usually uncharacteristic of both *inujuk* ("humans") and *umajuk* ("animals"). Perhaps the most important categories of *turngait*, the plural of turngak, include the familiar spirits of shamans, which may take many forms, human, animal, and non-living. There are in addition numerous beings which most inuit are unwilling or unable to label as either inujuk or turngak, but which are named, known, seen, and share some characteristics of both.

The key concept behind this classicatfiion is the root-morpheme *inu*-which as we have seen occurs in the prototypical unmarked nominal form inuk ("Eskimo human being") and in the verbal form inujuk ("that which lives" in the human sense). The contrasting umajuk refers to the physical animal aspects of being alive, active, moving, related to *umati* (the "physical heart"). Inuk refers to Eskimo, non-Indian, non-white, people, though the latter two also *inujut* ("live," in a human sense); traditionally the contrast was strengthened by the modifier *inu-tuinak*, an "ordinary Eskimo," though recently this has changed, perhaps due to the influence of whites and ethnic self-consciousness, to *inu-marik*, which means a *real* Eskimo, in the sense of an adult, fully competent Eskimo.[4] Beings that look like an Eskimo may be *inujak*, a kind of human being (non-Eskimo) who "looks like an Eskimo," *inunguak*, a "doll or figurine," and *inuksuk*, a cairn made to look like a person. Of the many other derivatives, the following are important: *inuulirkpuk* ("is born"), which is also used of animals, and *inugait* ("the fingers and toes"), so named because the bones of these digits resemble little people and are used in games as "people" of various kinds.

The concept behind this paradigmatic set is inuk in the sense of spiritual, alive, sentient person, a kind of "soul" often translated as "owner" or "inhabitant" even of inanimate objects. Traditional Eskimo animism endowed everything in the physical and animate world with one or a number of *inua*, which is a contraction or alternate of *inunga* ("its person"), the possessive form of inuk. Such little spirit animators were believed to inhabit everything, and sometimes could be seen as a homunculus, an inch or two long: in living beings these are said to inhabit the joints—and are sometimes shown extant in Inuit art works (see Plate 24)—and in humans, the groin. These inua were the life essences of the world of shamans and spirits and, naturally, the turngait did not have inua for they were not something to be inhabited, they were of the same nature as inua. Human beings, prototypically inuit, were said to have three souls: (1) *anirngnirk*, or "breath-soul," which was "life" and was lost irretrievably at death; (2) *atirk*, or "name soul," the "personality" and name of the individual which was passed from the recently dead to the newborn at the time of birth—such that there is a spiritual identity between the two and between all people of the same name;[5] and (3) *tangnirk*, which in the case of a human being could be confused or identified with the principle inua, whose loss meant illness and shamanistic search or death, and which went to one of the "heavens" after death (see Plate 28).

INUJUT

Inujut are a number of beings in the Eskimo cosmology and experience which resemble inuit in most ways (they "are alive," in the human sense) but whose definition and behavioural characteristics differ along important dimensions from inuit. Some of them, such as *allait* ("Indians," prototypically Alkongkians, in the Eastern Arctic dialect), *qallunat* ("white people," French and English speaking caucasians, typically), and *inuragullit* ("strong little dwarves," associated with foxes), are still around and experienced. Others, such as *tunit* ("ancestral," Dorset or Thule, Eskimos), *inukpak* ("giants" of various kinds—see Plate 27) and *ikutajut* ("the drillers"), who killed a number of inuit and tunit, are no longer extant, and are said to have lived in prehistory or early history.

Briefly we may tabulate the characteristics of these beings according to whether they exhibit more or less of certain dimensions for which the *inutuinat* (ordinary Eskimos) are the norm:

Name	Size	Strength	Skin Colour	Danger	Intelligence	Dress
inuk (Eskimo)	0	0	0	0	0	0
allak (Indian)	0	+	+	+	0	–(or hairy)[1]
qallunak (White man)	+	–	–	+	0	+
tunit (Strong people)	–	++	+	–	–	–
ikutajuk (Drillers)	0	+	0	+	0	0
inukpak (Giant)	++	+	0	+	–	0
inuragullik (Dwarf)	– –	+	0	+	+	+(or hairy)[2]

+ = more than ordinary Inuit.
– = less than ordinary Inuit.
0 = approximately the same as ordinary Inuit.

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1. Although Indians are known not to be hairy these days, some Inuit have noted that they wear flimsy clothes and seem almost immune to the cold, just like dogs, and speculate that some time ago they did not wear clothes at all and were hairy and rolled around in the snow like dogs.
2. Inuragullik are usually spoken of as finely dressed in furs of fox skin, for they are "fox-people," but one model inuragullik, which many Inuit said was realistic, showed him as having skin all over like a fox.

We can note from the above table of minimal characteristics a number of points: (1) there is no clear cut set of organized oppositions which account for these beings; (2) hairiness beyond the human norm seems to be a secondary characteristic except in the case of white people where the hairiness is in the human, not animal, range; and (3) dangerousness, a salient characteristic of most Eskimo stories, is dependent neither on great strength alone nor on superior intelligence, but on irrational, antisocial, or particularly unpredictable behavior: generally, the larger beings are considered less intelligent and the smaller more intelligent, reflecting other Inuit beliefs about the nature of normality and intelligence. We shall return to these and other features later in the analysis.

THOSE IN BETWEEN: HUMAN/SPIRITS

Humanoid beings who are neither inhabited by *inua* nor are they proper, detached turngait are few, but *kapiasuktuk* ("fear-inducing") in the Inuit experience and belief system. There are two major categories; both are rarely seen and are spoken of in awe or disdain.

Ijirak (dialectal variant *ijuruk*) are close to what we call ghosts, that is, the spiritual presences of deceased people, often known and recognized people. These are sometimes called *angirngranirk*, beings which "come home again," referring to the belief that the tangnirk soul may stay around after death, especially near the place of death, and not go off to its permanent heavenly abode. Such apparitions cause great fright for they are fast moving, can play "ghostly" tricks on people, and may indicate that either the living or the dead had broken some serious taboos and were being punished.

Uiirksak and its pair *nuliarksak* are respectively the incubus and succubus said to have marriage-like arrangements with women and men. These beings are greatly feared and it is not known except to the "spouses" whether they are normal human being or spirits. Men and women who do not get married or do not want to get married are said to have these spirit-spouses who visit them and satisfy them at night, usually in small igloos or tents where others do not sleep. Some women even claim to have babies by the uiirksak ("spirit husband") though the babies generally look quite normal. And men sometimes tell of events, such as pregnancies of their spirit-wives, though their offspring are never seen.

We may represent these beings—for which there is no Eskimo cover term—in the following paradigm.

	Male	Female
Living spouse who is a spirit	*uiirksak*	*nuliarksak*
Dead person come back to the living	*ijirak*	

THEY'RE NOT ALL THERE: HUMANOIDS WHO ARE LACKING

Eskimo stories contain accounts of strange humanoids who used to inhabit other parts of the world or who existed at other times: these humanoids often lack something essential to *inutuinak* ("ordinary Eskimos"), and the point or humour of the story usually revolves around the attempts of the creatures to "make themselves whole." Typical of these are the *itiqangitut* ("the people who have no arseholes"), who lived fairly happily by vomiting up their excrement in the way that owls do. However, one of the women married an Eskimo and had a baby. Very soon she discovered that it had a convenient hole through which it defecated and she was jealous. So she set up a sharp stick on the floor and went "One, two, three" and sat down hard on it; however, all her guts spilled out and she died.

Other stories of the long ago and far away include the island of women who lived without men, the people who only had one eye, and so on, and I leave it to the readers to make up their own endings to these tales; all these beings were otherwise human and not combinations of features as are the monsters and spirits which form the focus of this paper. Furthermore these stories are always told in the spirit of fables rather than as experiences which one might believe anyone to have had. While it is presumed that these beings had inua, no one knew for sure.

The following beings, too, were definitely not turngait; on the other hand, informants did not know if they had the full complement of souls. An obvious pair consists of small humanoids who have nothing but heads on legs, with no arms and no bodies. Usually the first, *kajjutajuk* "the one who hammers" is said to be male. He has a big head, perhaps bigger than humans, and wanders about in a brazen manner bashing into things, even through igloo walls: knocking sounds at night, and broken walls and implements are said to be evidence of the frightening presence of the inexplicable kajjutajuk (see Plate 26). The other similar creature is *tunnituaqruk* ("has many *tunnit*," facial tatoos), and is often said to be female, with large breasts on the cheeks and its *nalikka* ("in-between-the-legs," genital parts) just under its chin. This small creature, perhaps as high as a hand, or pairs of them in other stories, is found searching for scraps to eat or making a home in the bedding of tents and igloos. They too are thought responsible for inexplicable noises around the houses, but are not considered frightening.

A category of beings that are less humanoid and perhaps more like ordinary turngak are those which are incomplete as humans but which have their missing parts replaced by animal parts. Though there are many turngaks (see below) which transform into humans and stories of humans who transform into animals, the beings described here are permanently half and half. Among these are a series of sea creatures that resemble what we call mermaids. *Iqalu-nappa* ("fish-half") (see Plate 30) and *qilaluga-nappa* ("half white whale") are beings, slightly larger than normal humans, whose bodies end at the waist with the tail part of fish or whale. They are potentially dangerous creatures, for you may die if you touch one; on the other hand, they can be benevolent if you help them. A typical story is about a man who finds one cast up on a beach and unable to get back into the water. The man is told that he will receive some riches if he pushes the creature into the water, using a stick of course. Though most of these beings are female that is not always so. A similar creature called *talilajuk* ("the one who waves arms") inhabits the open waters, waving his arms, beckoning to those in boats; it is presumed that something dangerous will happen if one heeds the call. However, these can be of varying size; tiny ones have been picked up on the beach and are not dangerous. It has been suggested that these creatures are not truly indigenous Inuit beliefs but are derivatives from the mermaid figureheads of the old sailing vessels, with stories woven around them by Inuit.[6] This supposition is perhaps strengthened by the fact that the wealth gained by iqalu-nappa's helpers is usually in the form of manufactured goods.[7]

Disappointingly, perhaps, from the point of view of Sasquatch hunters, there are no significant Inuit accounts of humanoid land creatures that have particularly animal-like appendages or characteristics. Though there are such creatures which are reckoned as turngait, that is, spiritual, not really living creatures, and there are other stories of the transformation back and forth of humans and animals, the only half-and-half creatures are the sea-beings mentioned above, and they are of doubtful traditional origin.

THOSE WE FEAR: THE TURNGAIT

Apart from the above beings—and sometimes including some of them—are all the other myriad creatures which inhabit the earth and which are inexplicable. These are generally called turngak, a word that cannot be analyzed to more basic meanings. These beings are unpredictable, have superhuman abilities, and are only under the command of humans with supernatural powers, *angakuk* ("shaman") or other powerful spirits. The very word turngak, or a description or story about them, engenders fear deriving from their malevolent nature and the Inuit pervasive fear of the unknown.[8] Thus "things we don't understand must be turngait; and they are therefore dangerous; thus all turngait and things we fear are malevolent." Perhaps the explanation is better sought in the logic that "Bad luck that happens to us comes from the spirits [though we might have caused it because we have infringed a taboo]; whereas good luck comes from our own skill and foresight." One may impose on the data three major overlapping classes of turngait, all of which share the characteristics that they are superhuman, spiritual entities which do not have inua (owner-souls): (1) shaman's helpers —which may be members of the next class that have been "captured" by the shaman for an indefinite length of time; (2) free-roaming, unnamed, inexplicable, and unpredictable spirits who are not known to regularly inhabit one area; and (3) known, named, and often greatly feared spirits which are said to inhabit a certain area and behave in a familiar way.

The prototypical turngak is the shaman's familiar spirit, which can appear in any form, human, animal, mineral, or whatever. They do the shaman's bidding, whether it be a visit to the spirit world to ward off ill luck that had befallen the population, or whether it be to roam around and attack some living person either through a dream or through direct means such as illness or fire. As shamans are people who are inherently feared for their powers, though they may be helpful if they are on your side, so the majority of turngait are feared unless they are under one's own control. A few short cases will illustrate the range and nature of shaman's turngait. One woman dreamed that she saw a large *qungasikutalik* ("the one with the long neck," an unknown and frightening animal; the name is nowadays applied to giraffes by those who have seen movies) which made her very ill, so ill that she had to give up her newborn baby in adoption. Later the shaman admitted sending (*ilisituk*) the spirit to frighten her, but he had not intended that it do her so much harm. In another area a wooden house containing a family started to burn down; nearby men ran to put the fire out, but as they approached the house they were suddenly stopped in their tracks by a weasel with some supernatural power which ran round the house until the house was burned down and the people dead. This was the familiar of a female shaman who lived in the area and had a grudge against the family. Earlier that year the small daughter of the household had been bitten to death and eaten by a pack of dogs which acted very strangely. In this case the shaman's turngak was said to have entered into the dogs, for the dogs were all right before and after the event. Shamans' spirits are not usually so visible, for they may only be known by the strange or animal-like noises that are heard when witnessing a shamanistic performance, which usually occurs in the dark— thus the exact form of the spirit is left up to the imagination of the audience.

The second and by far the most common form of turngait is the unknown and inexplicable sighting. Strange noises, sights, and events are usually described as the work of unnamed spirits which are free roaming and inhabit everywhere. These are often in the form of animals or even humanoids which are seen in the distance but which suddenly disappear when approached—very often the tracks of the being are found in the snow but completely end at the point where it disappeared. Such events are explained that the being was not the ordinary, real *-tuinak* version but a "turngak in the form of ———," as in the case of the weasel described above. Others appear in the house or tent when someone wakes up at night (though sometimes these are returned deceased humans, ijirat). Others may be rocks that move, skulls or bones that have volition, or even strange planes or skidoos nowadays (somewhat akin to U.F.O.'s in Western culture). All these beings are feared for their potentially dangerous behaviour or as portents of disasters, illness, accidents, or bad weather—or as the spirits of shamans that are up to no good. Traditionally the world was full of them, and Inuit best avoided them and sought human company as soon as possible. Occasionally the spirit might ask for something which would lead to a reward if given and disaster if not granted, as in the case of the iqalu-nappa (half-fish) and inuragullit (dwarf) above.

A few turngait were well known for their stable characteristics and their consistent behaviour and locality. These were named and talked about whether they were sighted or not. One with wide distribution is *amautilik*, an enormous man-figure who wears a woman's parka, *amauti*. This turngak, believed by some to have a "house" near Diana Bay, roams around the countryside at immense speeds and steals children which it puts in the pouch of its *amauti* then takes them home to eat.[9]

Another more localized character is *arngnasiutik*[10] ("the woman chaser") only known in areas close to the southern boundary of Inuit territory, near where *allait* frequent. These individuals—for there are more than one of them—are said to arrive in Inuit areas from the wooded Indian land to the south, often in huge unfamiliar non-Inuit canoes. These human-sized beings differ from Inuit in that they wear "fancy" skin clothes, sometimes being described as Indian-like or even like whitemen, their facial skin is very dark, as is sometimes attributed to Indians, and they are often said to have strange eyes which are slit vertically, and open from side to side, not up and down. In addition, they do not speak but have the power of command over Inuit women by look and gesture. Their favorite mode of operation is to enter an Inuit tent (or igloo, but this is rarer) at night, to awaken a sleeping woman just by looking, and to beckon her irresistably outside where she is subjected to sexual intercourse (not rape). The arngnasiutik never wakes the husband or anyone else and the woman is unable to cry out or wake anyone. One widely recounted story tells that the men of the camp saw the arngnasiutik coming down the river in their fast canoe late one evening, so they went to bed and pretended to sleep: When the arngnasiutik entered the camp and went to the tents, the men all rose as one with their knives and attacked them, killing one and causing the other to flee back to the river. It is perhaps significant that a very similar belief about such beings is widely held amongst the neighbouring Naskapi Indians where it is called *katcimeiJ̌ashu* ("hides behind trees") or other names: However, the Indians fear not seduction, but the stealing and eating of children and others.[11] The major literature sources show the occurrence of many other named, feared spirit humanoids in other areas, but for present purposes these examples from the Ungava area suffice.

TRANSFORMATIONS

The idea of beings transforming from beast to man and back or even between the human sexes is common in Eskimo *unikkatuat* ("traditional stories") though instances of such have not been related by my informants, except in the cases of the shamans' turngait, where there is a thin line between transformation of spirit into animal and the spirit inhabiting the animal temporarily, just as inua inhabit humans and other beings. Some of these stories refer to long ago and account for the origin and nature of certain species, while others are "historical" tales, but, again, it may be imposing too much on the data to separate them into separate categories.

Typical of the first kind are the origins of seagulls and of narwhals. The men were coming back from hunting and found their camp empty of women and children. They spotted them further down the shore and, when closer, the men saw that the women were eating their children (Plate 29) and turning into seagulls which then flew away—which tells us why the Inuit do not eat seagulls and something of what they believe about women. In another story a woman left her husband because of his brutality. After sexual intercourse with someone else, she was washing herself of the sexual smell and braiding her hair in one long pigtail near the top of the cliff when her ex-husband approached angrily. She refused his advances and jumped over the cliff shouting at him, "Tigak, Tigak, Tigak!" ("[you] bull-seal"), and when she hit the water she turned into a narwhal and swam away, and her braided hair turned into the narwhal's horn or tusk—which tells us something about the narwhal and about Inuit beliefs about men. Although we have contemporary Inuit art showing these and other beings in the state of transformation, none of them are believed to have stayed in the half-and-half stage.

Other, non-origin tales tell of the man who marries the fox wife. She used to turn into a fox and leave the igloo every day to hunt and return before him, but he became suspicious because of her smell and spied on her and caught her. Another widespread tale concerns Kautcajuk, an orphan boy who was mistreated and had to sleep with the dogs and eat scraps. One day he was empowered to grow larger and larger, and he came back to his camp in the form of a polar bear, killed all the people who had been cruel to him, and married the beautiful daughter of his foster parents. Another tale tells of the old woman Qisaruatsiak who used to live alone; she was a poor fisherwoman and used to steal for food. Finally she stopped these practices and gradually turned into a wolf and hunted caribou. It can be seen that these and other stories always relate the transformation to some kind of interpersonal crisis: eating children, quarrelling with husband, an orphan mistreated, living by stealing, and so on. In a sense all these stories are about Inuit who are "ordinary" in appearance and in other ways who resolve the crisis by turning into "ordinary" animals; thus they differentiate themselves from the above classes of beliefs about non-ordinary inujut (living people) and about turngait, who are not ordinary in any sense.

It is particularly interesting that most of these transformations from man to beast are irreversible, with exceptions like Kautcajuk, and do not involve permanent "mixtures." I would suggest that this mythological method of resolving interpersonal crises exactly parallels the customary legal mechanism of *qivituk*, or "fleeing the group," which is a common, perhaps the commonest, method of resolving social crises in everyday life.[12] In traditional Eskimo communities which were without effective legal mechanisms for resolving social problems without resort to violence, self-detachment from the group was common. Though the qivituk person might eventually join another living-group, from the point of view of their community of origin they disappeared—indeed in many recorded cases they were never seen again by other humans; thus, their transformation into an animal species would be a reasonable explanation of their disappearance. Conversely, we might look for other cases where mythological transformations which are incomplete or reversible might parallel other mechanisms of social action in times of crises.

CONTEMPORARY INUIT ARTS

Since 1948 the Inuit of the Eastern and Central Canadian Arctic have been producing art for sale, in the form of soapstone carvings, lithographic prints, and other media.[13] At first these figurines and portrayals were of Inuit life as it was known at that date and did not contain reference to any non-ordinary aspects of the belief system. This may have been due to the fact that the Inuit, though nominally Christian, were still too much in awe of these frightening beings to represent them materially and that the Inuit knew that these arts were produced for white people who, particularly missionaries, traders, and police, looked down on traditional Eskimo beliefs and even called them symbols of belief in the Devil, *Satanasi*. However, during the late 1950's they began to produce representations of their traditional beliefs about dwarves, giants, spirits, and so on. In some areas this was specifically encouraged by missionaries and others, and in other places it was probable that fears of the immediacy of these beings began to lessen. In a few cases some Inuit were specifically paid by anthropologists and others to represent their unikkatuat in their arts, as a kind of recording of dying beliefs. One of these projects, initiated by Asen Balikci at the National Museum of Canada, resulted in the book by Nungak and Arima which illustrates transcriptions of traditional stories with photos of carvings made to accompany them and which forms an important reference for this paper.[14] In Cape Dorset and other areas where commercial drawings and prints are produced a large proportion of them illustrate aspects of traditional beliefs or contain portrayals of "spirits" which are creations along the same lines as the traditional turngait. So far the content of Inuit arts is restricted to imaginative creations based on traditional beliefs and principles and the portrayal of traditional Inuit life of the past, *not* portrayals of Inuit life as it is today, in contradistinction to the souvenir arts of the first half of this century.

One might on one level see the contemporary arts as forms of expressive culture paralleling the traditional unikkatuat storytelling in fun and fear and episodic nature: that individuals should create realities out of generally held beliefs, with significant individual variation and "skill" in the aesthetic sense, is reasonable. However, this parallel cannot be pushed very far. The creations of visible, lasting, tangible expressions of beliefs differ from storytelling in the same way that literature differs from mythology. Although the content of the stories and the arts bear similarities they differ in the following ways:

1) The artistic representation "freezes" one point of the belief or story, neglecting all the others, in contrast to the essentially fluid, processual belief and the oral mode.
2) The representation makes visible and tangible what used to be imagined by audiences or at best partially glimpsed in the case of turngait, reducing them to "reality."
3) The representations can only show *form* or by metaphor and symbol suggest movement, action, or emotional characteristics.[15]
4) Traditional storytelling was a social, shared expression in which a raconteur of myths or experiences built upon previous beliefs and shared principles and in which the creativity was in the telling; in the new art works the creativity is indeed in the carving or drawing, and the principles are, usually, shared beliefs, but the activity is antisocial in the sense that the expressions are not made to be shared, passed on, embroidered by mem-

bers of one's own culture, but to be finished and passed on to members of another culture. Indeed, after a very few months in any Inuit community I found I was able to identify and comment on the productions of nearly all the artists whereas no one Inuk knew more than a few of his closest friends. Thus the new art form allows for an ever-expanding individual set of creations and the humanoid and mythological beings created are not subject to the checks of a shared audience—only to acceptance by a foreign audience, many of which value exoticism and originality.

5) Above all, perhaps, the new two- and three-dimensional art forms force organization and intellectual closure on the creations. Myths and stories can be open-ended, subject to change, embroidery, interaction with an audience—one which does not demand a logical totality, whereas a material art form requires organization of all the parts—they have to be "put somewhere," "fitted in." Inuit attempts to reproduce the unknowable and the inexplicable to material form have not been successful from their point of view, though they have succeeded very well from our, the audience's, point of view. Indeed, one might say that if they had been able to transform their beliefs into material form in traditional times they would have done so, whereas in fact they were overwhelmingly expressed verbally, in ritual and song, and through a few material symbols such as talismans (*ujamik*).

DISCUSSION: MODES OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

The reader may be wondering by now what the connection is between the range of traditional Inuit beliefs and experiences, the representations of contemporary Inuit art forms, and our enquiry into the nature of the "Sasquatch and other monsters." The point that I wish to stress is that the realities and knowledge of any culture stem from the nature of that culture and its modes of communication, most specifically from the modes and media of communication.

In traditional Inuit culture we have not found much evidence of particular though elusive humanoid Sasquatch-like species. Perhaps the little inuragullit ("dwarves"), the kajjutajuk ("hammer-head"), the tunnituaqruk ("tatooed ones"), the larger arngnasiutik ("woman-chaser"), and the iqalu-nappa ("half-fish") come closest in their various ways: they all differ from humanity in specific ways, such as their size, completeness, strange clothing and faces, and "beastly" appendages. However, they interact with humans and are endowed with at least parts of human motivations and behaviour. More important than these facts is the agreement that none of them are animals, *umajuit*. Most important of all are the characteristics of this range of knowledge: there is a continuum of beliefs about these beings which overlaps hundreds of others on many dimensions. Furthermore, these humanoid beings do not, in Inuit terms, belong to any one category of being. Far from being thought of as species of animals, some are inujut, some are turngait, and some the Inuit find difficult to place at all—they are just what they are.

The basic difference between the Inuit belief system and that of Western society is that the Inuit do not look for closure and system. As Rasmussen and others have found, they feel that any attempt to "explain" or "pin down" their beliefs violates the nature of the beliefs. Though the basic principle behind the beliefs is overwhelmingly "the fear of the unknown,"[16] the fears are not reduced by systematization or examination, but by avoidance and compliant interaction where forced. This very much parallels "Eskimo law"[17] which is neither codified nor enforced and in which trouble cases are fled or met with situational and personal strategies; other parallels could be drawn with many aspects of Inuit culture. The different attitudes towards knowledge and reality stem from the possibilities of the modes of communication,[18] and I am particularly attracted to the points of view recently expressed by Goody.[19] The oral mode of communication is inherently not cumulative, but it allows for continuous creativity. Above all, it is not inherently self-reflective, for the "stuff" of belief is contextual and not exteriorized outside of the context of time and experience. The literary mode is inherently cumulative and increasingly linear: it allows for the abstraction of belief out of the context of time and hence for re-examination and reflectiveness. Thus we Westerners are able to ask the question "Is there or is there not a species of Bigfoot?", "What evidence do we need to prove it?", and "Where in our classifactory system would it fit?"

Goody goes further than the separation of modes of thought stemming from means of communication. He avers, as I have already suggested, that our penchant for systematizing and charting of other peoples' belief systems distorts them and even reduces them to the two-dimensional and the static. He contends that

> since the table [plan, classificatory system, chart of oppositions] is essentially a graphic (and frequently a literate) device, its fixed two-dimensional character may well simplify the reality of oral communication beyond reasonable recognition, and hence decrease rather than increase understanding.[20]

Thus one could agree that the attempt to scale the characteristics of the inujut humanoids, rather than being very illuminating, tells us less than a mere summary recounting of the beliefs as set out for other humanoids on succeeding pages. What it does tell us is that if we are honest with the totality of our data, we cannot construct neat rules of deep structure unless we do it many times in different ways.

The recent Canadian Inuit artistic representations may be thought of as a kind of language of belief expressed in material form, but, if one were to push the analogy with literacy, it would parallel ideographic rather than syllabic or alphabetic literacy. And, as Goody has shown, ideographic systems are a kind of "halfway house" between oral and literate traditions, for although they can fix and store information, they are not subject to the same kinds of abstract manipulations as phonetic systems.[21] In the period of the emergence and florescence of these representational arts in the 1950's and 1960's, most of the Canadian Inuit were already literate in a syllabic orthography which was used primarily for Christian religious purposes; however, this literacy was hardly ever used outside of these contexts except for names and some commercial transaction (with the exception of unique individuals such as Peter Pitsiulak[22]) and, for those of us who have read many Inuit letters from that period, we know that they were mainly phatic and had very little discursive content. Since the late 1960's the missions, the government, the schools, and the various political organs, e.g., *Inuit Ullumi*, have made increasingly greater use of syllabic communication to the point where most Inuit might be said to have moved from the "halfway house" of literacy to full literacy, and many have learned English during this period, too. This phenomenon bears examination as a partial cause of the change in nature, or even the decline as some would put it, of the commercial arts.

In the pre-literate, pre-commercial art period, the small Inuit representational arts—toys, amulets, *pinguat*—showed variety but little originality and did not stray far from themes of common species or widely held beliefs. They were guided by the principle of what Carpenter has called "acoustic space"[23]; they did not have a favoured point of view, or a base to stand up on, they were only minimally representational, showing the intellectual rather than the visual essentials, and contained many "visual puns." While the work of some of the oldest Inuit artists shows characteristics of this domination by the aural/oral tradition, that of most of the younger ones does not. Furthermore, most of the younger men and women do not "like" (understand) those kinds of representations; they think they can do much "better" now. The past hundred years, then, has shown a gradual change in the Inuit communication systems from oral to literate and in their arts from open-ended suggestive to pictorial with closure. The beliefs in a plethora of more or less humanoid beings populating both the physical and spiritual worlds, whose distinctive features did not classify them in a closed systematic way, has gradually given way to fewer beliefs of more specifiable phenomena and, recently, to a world view approximating that of the Canadians with whom they are in contact.

One may pose ontological questions about the nature of beings in the cultural systems of the Inuit and the Canadians. The phenomenological answer is that if things are believed to exist, they do exist, for there is no other kind of existence. However, this is only satisfactory within a culture of shared premises, and such did not obtain between the Inuit and the Euro-Canadians, at least until recently. Cross-culturally, anthropologists have long faced these problems, but mainly on the intellectual, analytical level, for instance in the Durkheimian tradition of social projections or the Freudian concept of psychological projections. In one way, we may say the question is unanswerable without the experiential, and that experience is a subjective or intersubjective phenomenon.[24] While travelling with the Inuit by dog-sled I became as frightened as the Inuit of the possibility that a particular shaman would send his spirit to harm us because he had a quarrel with one of us—but I am not in the Arctic now: what was that experience?

The dictum that "the medium is the message" may, for our purposes, be rephrased "the instrument of the search will determine the nature of what is found." And the instrument is the human mind, in its particular cultural milieu, with all the technical equipment that the culture puts at its command.

Notes

1. The data for this paper were gathered during field trips to the Canadian North in 1959, 1960, 1963–64, 1967–68, 1972, and 1976. For the most part the data are limited to the Inuit culture of the Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait areas. The phonemic orthography is derived from G. Lefebvre, "A Draft Orthography for Canadian Eskimo" (Ottawa: N.C.R.C., 1958), and has been used in most of my previous works as it is more suitable for use by English-speakers than the newer Gagné-based orthographies being introduced for inter-Inuit purposes.
2. See especially Franz Boas, *The Central Eskimo* (Washington, C.D.: Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, 6th Annual Report, 1888), and *The Eskimo of Baffin Island and Hudson Bay,* Bulletin no. 15 (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1906); Z. Nungak and E. Arima, *Eskimo Stories—Unikkatuat,* Bulletin no. 235 (Ottawa: National Museum, 1969); K. Rasmussen, *The Intellectual Culture of the Igluulik Eskimos,* Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition (Copenhagen: Gyldenal, 1929), *Observations of the Intellectual Culture of the Caribou Eskimos,* Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition (Copenhagen: Gyldenal, 1930). and *The Netsilik Eskimos, Social*

Life and Spiritual Culture (Copenhagen: Glydenal, 1931); and E. Weyer, *The Eskimos* (New Haven: Yale Univesity Press, 1932).
3. Rasmussen, *Netsilik Eskimos*, p. 61.
4. See H. Brody, *The People's Land: Eskimos and Whites in the Eastern Arctic* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
5. See B. Saladin d'Anglure, "Iqallijuq, ou les reminiscences d'une âme-nom Inuit," *Etudes Inuit Studies* 1, no.1 (1977): 33-64.
6. By C. Gimpel, personal communication, 1968.
7. It is doubly ironic that the soapstone carvings and prints showing these creatures are almost always misidentified as "Sedna—the supreme Inuit sea goddess" in artistic publications of the last two decades. Firstly, the dominant sea goddess, the terrible woman who lives at the bottom of the sea and is visited by the shaman, is not a half-woman, but an ordinary, if ugly and old, woman who has lost nothing but her fingers which were cut off (and became the sea mammals). Secondly, the woman should be called *arngnaluk, takanaluk, niqivvilik*, or by a large number of other names (see Weyer, *Eskimos*, and Nungak and Arima, *Eskimo Stories*), but not Sedna, for the very word could not exist in the Inuit phonetic system: it was introduced by Boas (*Central Eskimo* and *Eskimo of Baffin Island*) perhaps as a corruption of the Inuit word *sana* ("[down] there") or of the English word Satan, which the Inuit had been taught was their major deity. Thus we have a white-derived physical form described by a white-derived word-concept. Another general word for the sea goddess is *tariup inua* ("the spirit/person of the sea").
8. Rasmussen, *Igluulik Eskimos*, p. 123.
9. Known as *kalokpalik* in Baffin Island, Boas, *Central Eskimo*, p. 212.
10. Although most informants stated these were *turngait*, they have some *inujuk* features.
11. See Nelson H.H. Graburn and B. Stephen Strong, *Circumpolar Peoples: An Anthropological Perspective* (Pacific Palisades, Ca.: Goodyear, 1973), pp. 114, 120.
12. See my "Eskimo Law in the Light of Self- and Group-Interest," *Law and Society Review* 4. no.1 (1969): 48.
13. See my "The Eskimos and 'Airport Art'," *Trans-Action* 4, no. 10 (1967): 28–33, "A Preliminary Analysis of Symbolism in Inuit Art and Culture," in *Proceedings of the XXXX International Congress of Americanists* (Rome, 1972) ([n.p], 1974), 2:165–70, "Eskimo Art: The Eastern Canadian Arctic," in *Ethnic and Tourist Arts: Cultural Expressions from the Fourth World*, ed. Nelson H.H. Graburn (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), chapter 1, and *Hunters and Artists: The Commercial Arts of the Canadian Inuit* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, forthcoming); as well as J.A. Houston, "Eskimo Sculptors," *Beaver*, Outfit 282 (1951): 34–39 and *Eskimo Prints* (Barre, Mass.: Barre Publishers, 1967); C.A. Martijn, "Canadian Eskimo Carving in Historical Perspective," *Anthropos* 59 (1964): 546–96; and G. Swinton, *Eskimo Sculpture* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965) and *Sculpture of the Inuit* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972).
14. *Eskimo Stories.*
15. See my "*Nalunaikutanga*: Signs and Symbols in Canadian Inuit Art and Culture," *Polarforschung* 46, no. 1 (1977): 1–11.
16. Rasmussen, *Igluulik Eskimos*, p. 125.
17. Graburn, "Eskimo Law."
18. See Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) and Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
19. J. Goody, *The Taming of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
20. Ibid., p. 54.
21. Chinese and Japanese uses of ideographs have been modified or supplemented by phonetic reduction and two additional syllabaries, respectively.
22. See his *The People from Our Side* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1975).

23. E. Carpenter, "Space Concepts of the Aivilik Eskimos," *Explorations* 5 (1955).
24. Graburn and Strong, *Circumpolar Peoples,* p. 52.

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Marjorie M. Halpin

The Tsimshian Monkey Mask and Sasquatch

This article examines the central importance of masks in the ritual dramatization of the personifications of power in Tsimshian mythology. The author suggests that the particular spiritual abstraction represented by the mask is activated by the wearer in the ritual. Masks which portray manlike monster figures confuse the distinction for the observer between mask and wearer in ritual and, consequently, between the spiritual and the human realms.

This paper was inspired by a mask collected about 1914 from the Niska Indians in the Nass River area of northern British Columbia by Lt. G. T. Emmons, which is now in the Peabody Museum, Harvard University (Plates 31 and 32). In documentation accompanying the mask Emmons wrote that it represented "a mythical being found in the woods and called today a monkey." Whether or not this mask is a portrait of a creature actually seen, it suggests to those who see it that it has some relevance to the Sasquatch, a zoologically unverified ape-like animal believed by both whites and Indians to inhabit forested regions of British Columbia. This paper is an excursion into the meanings behind the mask and an attempt to construct a symbolic framework within which we can apprehend Tsimshian thought on Sasquatch-like animals and compare it with our own.

Sasquatch "makes sense" in Tsimshian. We are looking for some way it can make sense, or be made sense of, for us. In anthropology we investigate those things which are problematic to us by looking for them elsewhere. From the perspective granted to us by others, we can sometimes see ourselves more clearly. Questions of religious symbolism and their relationship to hallucinatory experiences (that is, experiences accepted as real by the experiencer but not shared by others), most commonly found in drug-induced states, are becoming increasingly current in anthropological research. As long as Sasquatch is a personal rather than a collectively sanctioned experience it will remain hallucinatory as officially defined by Western culture. Since to behave as if one's hallucinations are real is one of the principal criteria by which medical scientists diagnose insanity, research into hallucinatory experiences reflects a pervasive concern of our time and our culture with the problem of insanity. If Sasquatch were not of considerable interest to us, we would not be at this conference talking about it. If it were not of considerable interest to a great many other people as well, the press would not be here with us in order to report to them what we are saying. It might sometimes be treated as a joke, but as Keyes says, we do not often "stop to consider that a joke is never the least bit funny unless it is true."[3]

A good way to begin is by attempting a zoological classification of the creature represented by the Peabody mask. According to physical anthropologist R. D. E. MacPhee it does not resemble any known species of primate closely enough to be identified as a zoologically verifiable animal.[4] It does have primate attributes, four of which are especially noteworthy: the brow ridges, the shape of the nose, the distance between the base of the nose and the upper lip, and the prognathic, chinless lower face. The brow ridges appear from the photographs to be bow-shaped and sharply delineated from the forehead, a form replicated in many monkey species and quite unlike those of man, fossil or recent. The dished-out nose with its rounded, somewhat laterally directed nares is striking and is perhaps the best single monkey-like feature of the mask. While the large, mobile upper lip is prominent in apes, it is also characteristic of numerous monkeys. The prognathism of the lower face and its lack of a chin also strongly evoke the non-human primates. Such an identification is, however, counteracted by the lack of large canines, which are characteristic of every other primate except man. Comparing these and other attributes with those of both old and New World primates, MacPhee concludes that, except for the absence of prominent canines, "if the mask represents a monkey, the most likely model would be found among the short-faced monkeys of the Old World."

From a zoological perspective, then, the creature represented by the mask is an invented or anomalous form based upon an Old World monkey, but having human-like teeth. Since neither monkeys nor apes are native to British Columbia, the creature of the mask is likely to be a recent or post-contact invention.

Another mask collected from the Niska of Gitlaxdamiks in 1927 by C. M. Barbeau was also said to represent a "monkey". While its somewhat prognathic lower face and lack of a chin are suggestive of non-human primates, this mask does not have monkey attributes. Its facial proportions, nose, orbital area, lips, and forehead are quite well formed human features. Barbeau recorded a native name, *pi'kis*, as well as the following information about the performance of this mask:

> The performance of this naxnoq, when the name was assumed began in

> another house. The performer does not wear the mask at first. But when he comes into the feast house, he begins to act as a monkey, irresponsibly. He throws the headdress of some chiefs into the fire, and it does not matter how costly the misdeed may be to him, as he will have to compensate the owners. The next day, he calls the people to his house, wears the mask, with long hair on, and pays for the damage caused on the first day.[5]

This description identifies the "monkey" as a *naxnox* (power) name, customarily dramatized in masked performances, of which more below.

That *pi'kis* which was thought of as a monkey, but was also the so-called wealth or property woman who carried a crying baby, is attested in a Gitksan story recorded by Lt. Emmons at Hazelton:

> Pighish . . . was an animal closely associated with the land otter, although very human in appearance, and spoken of to-day as a monkey woman. The presence of Pighish was indicated by the cry of a child, for she always carried on her back a small being much like herself.
>
> Only one without fault could see this miraculous creature, and when the voice called, he was obliged to follow as the sun goes around four times, then he would come to Pighish. He then must take the child, which immediately appeared to be human. The mother pleaded for her infant and it was returned to her, whereupon she agreed to grant any wish asked. In returning the child, the face of the person had to be turned away as he stepped back, lest Pighish kill him with her long claws.[6]

In this story the *pi'kis* is an animal, but one which resembles humans. She is also said to be closely associated with the land otter.

In a Coast Tsimshian myth recorded by Henry Tate and published by Franz Boas, wealth woman is originally a lake woman who has a child with a human father.[7] She carries the child on her back and later goes into the ocean to become the sea monster *hagwelox*, described in this myth as "a being part fish, part woman." Before she leaves for the ocean she gives her wealth-bestowing power to her husband's sister, putting the sister's baby on her back and saying, "Whoever meets you, or whoever hears your child cry, shall be richer than anyone else." This myth thus divides wealth woman into two manifestations—a human and a sea monster. (The myth is examined in more detail below.) In another myth, also recorded by Tate, the female hagwelox is a dangerous sea monster whose "beautiful child" floats on the water between two islands and functions as a lure to sea otter hunters.[9] The myth suggests a strong association between the otters and the floating child.

In unpublished field notes Barbeau recorded the Niska naxnox name *pa'gwus*, a variant of pi'kis, which he again glossed as "monkey," and of which he said: "they had a story that this monkey would confuse their minds and turn them crazy if they met it in the woods. The man using it imitated a regular monkey."[10] This strengthens the monkey/land otter association since meeting a transformed land otter person in the woods is the traditional Tsimshian cause of insanity.

Today the monkey is classified with the Sasquatch by the Coast Tsimshian who alternately gloss the word *ba'wis* (another variant of pa'gwus, pi'kis) as "monkey," "ape," "Sasquatch," and "Bigfoot."[11] It is significant for the argument to be developed here that the linguist John Dunn has discovered that the semantic range of the word ba'wis is extended to mean "any animal that can imitate human behaviour with great alacrity and deftness."[12] The word is borrowed from the Kwakiutl *bukwus*, usually glossed "man of the woods" or "wild man" by the Kwakiutl.[13]

The Gitksan identify another manifestation of wealth woman, a tiny bird named *wadaml* which has a loud voice that sounds like the cry of a newborn baby. In the "early days" it was necessary to take the child of wadaml away from her in order to obtain good fortune or luck, but today it is only necessary to hear the bird's voice. While the Gitksan now make a distinction between the bird wadaml and the woman wadaml with her crying baby, they suggest that "in early times" no such distinction was made. The perceptual similarity of the bird's voice to a baby's cry, in other words, the ability of the bird to imitate a human, was evidence of an anomalous creature, another existant which mediated the animal and human categories of being. The existence of a human attribute in nature, already a perceptual bridge uniting man and animal, was conceptualized as an anomalous being containing that unity, a concrete being which could be encountered by man himself in the woods or on the ocean when away from human settlement. It was a dangerous encounter since it was an encounter with power, but if a man conducted himself properly he could acquire some of that power and thereby acquire wealth.

By examining the nature of wealth woman in more detail, we can increase our knowledge of the ba'wis category and begin to understand why both the monkey and the Sasquatch have been lexically classified with her, thereby being "put in place" in the Tsimshian order of things. She is no simple or easily comprehended being, as we have already glimpsed, and in her animal dimension is alternately bird, otter, monkey, and whale. Her enduring attributes throughout her transformations are her fierce and possessive motherhood, her crying baby, and her resemblance to a human. Her enduring function is to exchange the power to acquire wealth for the return of her child. She seems to exchange for her child only with men, except in one myth in which she shares her wealth-bestowing power itself with a human woman who has a newborn child.

In the two Coast Tsimshian myths mentioned above, either wealth woman or her child kills the people in a village where proper marriages are not taking place—in one instance where a prince refuses to marry and in another where brother-sister incest explicitly occurs.[14] Brother-sister incest seems implicit in the first myth as well. In this myth wealth woman is a beautiful woman of a lake and is herself the cause of a prince's refusal to marry one of his father's relatives, since he prefers his secret marriage with her. She makes him promise neither to take another wife nor to reveal their relationship "lest you die." When a friend who has spied on the prince discovers her and their child at the bottom of the lake, he takes the child back to its father's house, and it kills everyone in the village during the night by plucking out their eyes. Only the prince, his sister, and her newborn baby are spared. The prince then returns the child to its mother in the lake, saying in anger and sorrow, "Why didn't you take notice to whom you gave your child? This child has killed everybody in my village."[15]

What is it that the people of the village might see, to prevent which they are killed by having their eyes plucked out? If we consider that the following morning would present to the villagers the *apparent* relationships of the prince as a father to a child who has no mother and his sister as the mother of a child who has no father (she has no husband in the myth), the implication of brother-sister incest seems fairly obvious. Two children have been born to a man and his sister, apparently neither of whom have spouses. This implication is strengthened by the ending of the myth. After being rebuked by her husband, wealth woman gives him some magic gambling sticks and sends him away to the south. She then gives her own gift of wealth-bestowing power to his sister, puts the sister's newborn baby on the sister's back, and sends her away to the north. Having separated the prince and his sister, leaving the village entirely unpopulated, she enters a period of mourning in the lake, after which she comes up with her own baby on her back and goes into the ocean to become the monster hagwelox. The possibility that wealth woman and the man's sister are the same, or are different aspects of the same woman, strengthens the theme of incest already suggested by the two births.

In the second myth, wealth woman as hagwelox has been killing the sea otter hunters (the young men) of a village for "generation after generation." Her "beautiful child" floats on the water between two islands, one of which is the home of the sea otters, and functions as a lure to the sea otter hunters. When they rescue him, they are killed by his monster mother. In the final sequence of the myth the only people remaining in the village are "one young chief. . . with his two nephews and his niece and the mother of these two [sic] young people."[16] Then two other nephews join them. "Now there were four young men, two women, and the chief."[17] They decide to kill the monster and set out in a magical canoe made of yew wood. The chief captures the child in the water and refuses to return it, saving himself and his family from the destructive wrath of the hagwelox by floating in the air in a magic canoe. The child dies while the party is on an island from which "there was no way to escape." The hagwelox then stops asking for her child while the chief "counted the days of his work" (in other words, he observed a hunter's taboos of sexual continence, fasting, and bathing).[18] Then one of the nephews "compelled his sister to have intercourse with him,"[19] after which she sends him away as a sawbill duck. The chief then kills the hagwelox and they go to a village where the men make proper marriages and bring their wives home: "thus the empty village was peopled again. . . and the island was free to those who wanted to hunt sea otters."[20]

In this myth, too, there is brother-sister incest within an isolated matriline unit which results in the depopulation of a village. This time, however, wealth woman and her child are killed by the head of the matriline. The men then contract proper marriage alliances with another group, and their village is repopulated. Also, in this second myth it is a murderous wealth woman who keeps the villagers away from wealth in the form of sea otters (with which her child is identified), access to which is restored after her death. The incest in this myth is explicit, and the chief who is able to kill the hagwelox does so after proper observance of a hunter's taboos.

My reading of these myths, and of the wealth woman aspect of ba'wis, is that they do in fact explore the dangers inhering in the close brother-sister relationship in a matrilineal, avunculocal system in which a man's sister's son is his successor. In such systems, the sister's son is temporarily "taken away" by another man, its father, and returned as a youth to its uncle and the matriline. Were a man to enter into a direct, incestuous relationship with his sister in order to father his own heir, death would result to the village as well as to his sister and her son (as in the second myth). Obversely, if a father were to attempt to keep his own son as his heir, thus *appearing* to be in an incestuous relationship with his sister, who is properly his heir's mother, death would again result to the village (as in the first myth). The danger is removed in both instances by the exchange of a man's sister in marriage with another man, creating the alliance along which her progeny move, temporarily, in one direction and other forms of wealth equivalent to her children move in the other. Wealth woman is the sister through which a man acquires both wealth and an heir if he gives both her and her child away to another man in a proper marriage alliance. She and her child are also the beautiful and dangerous monsters who symbolize a brother's temptation to keep his sister for himself, thus fathering his own heir directly, or a father's temptation to keep his own son as his heir, thus perpetuating himself directly.[21] In both cases the myths explore the elemental tensions of matrilineal systems and show the dire consequence, death to the community, which would result from breaking the marriage rules.

Emmons was told that "monkey woman" was "closely associated" with the land otter, the animal most feared by the Tsimshian in traditional times and still considered dangerous today. While the myth just considered suggests an association with sea otters, the animal most often mentioned in myths and stories is the land otter. The sea otter has, of course, been virtually extinct since the early nineteenth century, which might account for its disappearance from the belief system. Prior to the European introduction of the monkey, the land otter was probably perceived as the most human-like animal in the Tsimshian environment. It is also anthropomorphized by non-Indians, who consistently describe it in terms of human qualities. A naturalist, for example, writes as follows:

> If an otter can't have fun doing something, it just simply won't do it. This might be an exaggeration, but only a slight one, for the otter seems to make light of nearly everything it does and is without doubt the most fun-loving of all of native wildlife. Whether traveling, feeding, or merely enjoying the family group, it finds time for fun and games. The otter seems to feel that life is just too wonderful to be overly concerned about anything, even things that most wildlife consider extremely serious business—such as eating.[22]

A zoologist writes that they "play like monkeys."[23] He also notes that they have an extensive sound repertory, of which the most characteristic sound "is a curious low grunting noise, in a very deep register, which certainly gives the appearance of being a form of conversation. . . . The effects of two otters thus conversing underwater is a very unusual one."[24] They also give raucous screams and make bird-like chirps and twitterings.[25] They show great affection for their young and will defend them at the risk of danger to themselves.

Sea otters sleep with their young folded in their arms, kiss them, and call them with "a voice like the wailing of an infant; and when the young ones heard their mother's voice, they wailed too."[26] They seem to have a rudimentary social organization and to be depressed by isolation. They play dead to escape killer whales.[27] They are one of the few tool-using animals, smashing mussels and sea urchins on stones held on their chests.[28]

Thus, whether we consider the combined attributes of both land and sea otters, or land otters alone, we are certainly dealing with an animal having the ba'wis ability to create a perceptual bridge uniting man and animal. In Tsimshian belief land otters have the power to transform themselves into simulacra of humans and to possess or "take away" the minds of those who encounter them and yield to their dangerous enticements. Whereas "only one without fault" could see wealth woman and her child, it seems that it was expressly those with "faults" who were most likely to see the land otter people.

Ordinary humans are vulnerable to land otter possession on the sea when they have capsized and are in danger of drowning and on land when they are in the forest thinking of a sexual partner. Possession is manifested by insanity which, if not cured by a shaman, leads to death. Shamans can survive land otter possession, after which they call upon the power of the animal, either by song or by returning into a possessed state, in order to cure illness and perform other shamanic feats, such as fire walking.[29]

The belief in the vulnerability of those who are drowning to land otter possession might derive from the condition of hypothermia, caused by the rapid loss of body heat in cold water. According to medical specialists, "hypothermia permits expansion of the short and unstable state observed just before death."[30] Its symptoms include "confusion and defective thinking"[31] which can manifest in behaviour considered insane in other contexts. For example, an acquaintance of mine who suffered from hypothermia while skiing took off her clothes and began running barefoot through the snow, experiencing subjective feelings of heat and great energy. It seems likely that someone in such a confused state might also readily confuse a human-seeming otter with a real human or, more generally, that hypothermic confusion due to cold water exposure was equated with the other confusions of "insane" behaviour resulting from other causes.

The danger of thinking of a sexually desired person while alone in the woods is that it gives the land otter an opportunity to take that person's place in one's mind, thereby manifesting in a human form. The sexual lure of the land otter people is mentioned as an explicit danger. When Chief Mountain of the Niska was becoming a shaman, he was approached by a beautiful girl who wanted to have intercourse with him. She gave him a power song and taught him how to control fire. When she left, he saw that she had a land otter tail. He later danced in her mask.[32] Someone from Kitkatla told John Dunn that once an otter who appears as a sexually enticing person embraces a human "they go into you and straight to your brain and gnaw away at it so that you become mindless and a were-otter too. You don't live too long after that happens to you. You start acting crazy; then you get sick and die."[33] A Gitksan woman said that intercourse with an otter woman "will make a man really wild until he dies, if the medicine man cannot do anything."

She then told the story of a girl who was "taken" by the otter of a lake. She had to be tied up by her family else she would run away to the woods in order to return to him. A shaman instructed her family to go to the lake and use the girl as bait to entice the otter so that they could kill him with a bow and arrow. He then instructed them to "cut the urine of the otter out" and squeeze it into the girl's mouth as she lay tied on the ground. After being forced to drink the otter urine, she could be cured by the shaman. People in myths use human "urine and poison and everything that is nasty" as protection against ghosts and malevolent beings such as land otters.[34] In both instances, that is, whether the urine is that of the human or the otter, it seems to function to maintain the distinction between the human and the non-human.

In a Coast Tsimshian myth about a man who vowed he would never succumb to the land otters, their lure is said to be food rather than sex.[35] When a canoe in which the man is travelling with his sister capsizes, she drowns and he swims ashore. The land otters transform themselves into people and approach in another canoe, but when the man throws their paddles into his fire, thereby turning the paddles into minks, the land otter people disappear and their canoe transforms into a driftwood log. He also refuses to yield to the blandishments of a land otter woman who offers him food, which would accomplish his transformation into one of them should he eat it. Then he recognizes the voice of his dead sister's ghost. "I ought not to be afraid of my own sister," he says to himself, and he accepts the harmless food she offers. After a month he is rescued.

This myth explicitly disavows that it is about brother-sister incest although the situation leads us to expect this to be its theme. Unlike "monkey woman," land otter woman is not a manifestation of one's sister. Her ghost, like anyone else's, will be taken by the otters if she drowns. The malevolence of the land otters is not a consequence of brother-sister incest then, but represents something even more dangerous. The interchangeability of offerings of food and of sex suggests that the category of this danger includes but is even more basic than misplaced or inappropriate sexual relationships. Since the two basic requirements of life are food and procreation, illusory substitutions of which are offered by the death-bringing otters, this danger appears to be one of an absolutely fundamental challenge to human existence.

Land otters have the ba'wis ability to so successfully create the illusion that they are human beings that they can entice real humans into sexual and commensal relationships.[36] Once humans have accepted the illusion, have surrendered to this elemental confusion between humans and animals, their human consciousness dissolves into madness and eventually death. As the human's identity disappears, his or her body transforms into the body of an otter. The non-human overwhelms and possesses the human. The transformed person, however, retains awareness of its human relatives and will even help them, as when the drowned ghost of a man's sister appears in a myth and offers him harmless food.[37] Thus a biological link between the human and the animal is retained. The malevolent land otters even use the kinship link between humans as a lure, appearing to them not only as sexual partners but also as relatives. Among the Tlingit, children are especially vulnerable to land otters who appear as their parents.[38]

Other animals, and non-humans generally, are offended by human biology—sex, excrement, and menstruation—and will only approach humans who are in a condition of purity. Thus hunters, shamans, and initiates are required to bathe, fast, and practice sexual continence before a non-human encounter will occur—in opposition to the pollution which attracts land otters. A hunter's wife can pollute him by not observing menstrual taboos or by having sex with another man while he is away. According to Garfield "the contamination of sexual intercourse was abhorrent to supernaturals . . . [and] the continence of hunters was particularly stressed."[39] Boas writes that "without any doubt, the general injunction of sexual restraint was binding upon all hunters."[40] Gitksan shamans today admit that their lack of power stems, at least in part, from over-eating.

Since successful gambling is also evidence of supernatural favour, the following Gitksan story heard in 1976 illustrates the contaminating nature of human biology to those who grant power. An unlucky man lost everything he possessed in the gambling game *laal* (the bone game). He left his family and went into the woods in a state of anger to die. At night he came to a shack where he heard a woman singing a baby a lullaby (perhaps a wealth woman). Without looking around at him, she called him into the house and bathed him. She used wood chips to scrape dirt off his body. Then she scraped off moss, such as is used in diapers. His wife, she said, had not washed her hands after changing the baby before fixing him food. Then she scraped off dirt mixed with blood. His wife, she said, had not washed her hands during her menstrual period before feeding him. For these reasons he was unlucky at gambling. The woman in the hut was a naxnox. She taught him about the taboos so that he would thenceforth know what to do, stating "This is the reason for menstrual taboos."

The breaking of her menstrual taboos will not only contaminate a woman's husband, it apparently can also cause her to become insane through land otter possession. The word *mu'watsa* (literally, "like a land otter")[41] is glossed in English as "crazy" or "insane" and is applied to persons whose minds have been "taken by" land otters, that is, who are possessed. The symptoms of insanity include talking to people who cannot be seen by others (hallucinating). Insane persons are also said to be "wild." They can be cured by shamans, at least in some instances. Barbeau recorded the following song on the lower Nass River. It is called "mu'watsay" and was sung over a woman patient:

> I am possessed. No one can cure me.
> The salmon is in the same creek as the tabooed woman.
> I do not recognize the small spirit (*narhnoq*).
> I do not recognize the small spirit (*narhnoq*).
> I am possessed.
> It touches my ribs, where my body grows weak.[42]

It was added as an explanation by the singer, "I don't know the name of the spirit that touches my body; I don't even see it. I am crazy!" The song was explained as follows:

> The patient here is supposed to be a woman.
> To recover from her sickness she must abstain
> from things forbidden to a woman under taboo.
> Otherwise she would die. The term *ha'wak*
> [taboo] means to abstain or refrain from anything.
> The woman who infringes the taboos (while in her
> period) will die and be with the salmon in the
> creek, where she will really get lost.[43]

The shaman who owned this song had as a helper the salmon and he had a very small carving to represent it, which is probably the "small spirit (*narhnoq*)" referred to in the song. Such carvings were placed on the patient's body ("it touches my ribs, where my body grows weak"). At their first menstruation, women are forbidden to eat fresh salmon.[44] Although we do not know the conditions under which this song became an appropriate cure, it specifically relates land otter possession to the breaking of menstrual taboos and the curing of insanity to restoring proper observance of them.

One of the principal symbolic functions of these beliefs seems clear enough for the purposes of this paper. They serve to maintain the boundary between the human and animal realms at dangerous points of intersection. These can be defined as those points where similarities between beings in the two realms diminish critical differences between them. When ba'wis animals imitate humans, they transgress the boundary onto the human side. Here they have the power to bestow wealth or death and insanity, depending upon how they are encountered by humans. If wealth woman is approached by one who is "without fault" and who knows who she is, she gives wealth. If, however, the illusory enticements of the land otters are accepted, they pull humans over to the animal side, where their humanity dissolves. Persons who have already diminished their humanity or not yet achieved it—children, the drowning, men and women who break sexual taboos—are subject to the dangerous contagion of their resemblance to animals. Similarities between humans and animals create openings in the separation of their realms through which the superior powers of the non-human can erupt into the precariously structured human order and overwhelm those who have released them. Separation between the realms is maintained by cultural control of human biological functions: eating and defecating, sex and menstruation. Safe encounter with the non-human realm depends upon the supression of these functions by men through purification of the body and by women through observance of menstrual taboos. Since possession by animals, or one's animal nature, is a transformation tantamount to death, control over human biology is an attempt to control human mortality. The most common form of death to a fishing and sea mammal hunting people—drowning—is classified as an unregulated biological function also resulting in land otter possession, just as does unregulated sexual conduct. He or she who would encounter death and survive—hunters, shamans, initiates, and menstruating woman—must scrupulously attend to the purity of the body. When out of control, the powers of nature can kill.

This interpretation can also be applied to power encounters in masked rituals, where humans themselves take on the forms of cosmic forces. While space precludes a detailed exposition of the rituals, they are such highly condensed symbolic statements that their relevance to the argument of this paper can be readily presented.

Masks are worn in the dramatization of naxnox or "power" names, in which the personifications of power are impersonated by humans. In the impersonation, the human merges his or her identity with the power being itself. As Goldman says of the Kwakiutl: "to receive the attribute [power] one must also become in some measure the source being."[45] He adds that the transformation is not, however, a "total transformation, but a masking transformation; it is always known that another human being is beneath the mask."[46] With the Tsimshian, where the relationship between the human and the power being is even more explicitly one of identification through both mask and name, we can be more precise as to what a masking transformation is. Although we have already seen that the Tsimshian wore masks of ba'wis (including wealth woman and monkey; also land otter woman

Plates 31 and 32), the key to understanding their masking lies in the fact that the majority of Tsimshian masks, and the names they embody, are human. The masks typically have even a portrait-like quality, although they are not representations of particular persons. They are the faces of naxnox, the faces of power. Fortunately, we know the names of over six hundred of them, which permits us to construct a composite picture of the qualities of power.[47]

Most of the names are of some human attribute, action, or category of person, such as Crippled, Deaf, Laughing Continuously, Choking While Eating, Always Having Intercourse, Corpse, Stranger, Slave Woman, all of which are negative aspects of the ideal or positive Tsimshian person. In performance they are often humorous, although audiences are also reported to cry in a state of fear and terror. The names are owned by lineages and dramatized by their members when they are assumed, after which they are often (especially among the Gitksan) used as secular names in everyday life. The dramatizations are performed for the guests before a potlatch as a demonstration of the power of the lineage, as well as for entertainment. Most performances consist of a simple acting out of the quality of the name (for example, Deaf cannot hear; Laughing Continuously keeps laughing), although more elaborate performances are reported for earlier times.[48] It is common for the performer to attack or insult visiting chiefs and to otherwise act out the quality of the name upon the audience; for example, in the performance of Sleep, the power of sleep is thrown upon the audience who all close their eyes. The masks themselves are believed to be dangerous. Henry Tate wrote of a mask named Boiling Words that "it was a very terror among the common people, and it was a great cause of pride among the princes and princesses to be allowed to touch it."[49]

Thus, as a first approximation, we can say that power resides or is located in the negative of the human, that it is inherited, and that it is activated when humans assume its attributes through masquerade. The range of the negative is extensive, from nonsensical actions, such as Throwing Mud, to death itself, as Corpse. Since all names are equivalent insofar as they are all personifications of naxnox and share the same ritual context, we must assume that the animal names also represent the human negative. The naxnox name Part Porcupine, for example, was also the name given to children who were born with deformed feet. That is, the animal naxnox refers to the same kind of physical infirmity as many of the human naxnox, or stands in a metaphorical relationship to them. The previous exposition of the interaction between humans and land otters in the naxnox Land Otter Woman is a particularly strong expression of the negative dimensions of the ideal human, especially the equation of animality with unregulated sexual activity.

The relationship between name, or perhaps more properly "name-title," and person has not yet been well studied on the Northwest Coast, although it is discussed in some depth for the Kwakiutl by Goldman.[50] Kwakiutl names are the essentially autonomous spiritual essence of ancestors. The relations between persons and their names are reciprocal: "the name cannot fulfill its power-laden destiny without a carrier, the person without a name is incomplete"[51] The acquisition of names for the Kwakiutl was a spiritual obligation: "by reifying the name the bearer was giving the ancestor and the supernatural being life among man. In return he insured his own life and indirectly that of his lineage fellow."[52] Just as we have seen with the land otters, Goldman believes that the being of the name wishes to manifest in the human realm. A significant difference between the Kwakiutl chiefs' names and Tsimshian naxnox names is that the Kwakiutl names "would seem to sum up Kwakiutl character,"[53] whereas the Tsimshian names would seem to sum up character in reverse.

It requires but a short jump from the nature of the name to the necessity of the mask. Just as the land otter needs a receptive human in order to materialize in human form, to manifest in another realm, so does the naxnox. It manifests corporeally in the mask worn by a human. Just as the movement from the non-human animal realm to the human requires a relationship of similarity or contagion between an animal and a human, so does the movement from the non-human spiritual realm to the human. Power, like land otters, can manifest in humans insofar as it can find a reflection of itself in the human—thus naxnox masks as receptacles of power are human or humanlike. Just as does the land otter, power finds its reflection in those aspects of the human normally suppressed by cultural edict, including aspects of biological mortality and cultural insanity. That humans are required to purify themselves by suppressing their biological functions before power is manifested can be interpreted as keeping the resemblance from becoming too strong, as in land otter encounters. We might think of mirrors existing in the non-human realms in which these qualities of the human are reflected and magnified. When the reflection is recognized by the human, the human in turn becomes a mirror (or a mask), and the doubly reflected quality achieves independent existence. The human wearing the mask is pure spirit, an abstraction given concrete expression. The moving mask is power given form.

By bringing the negative and positive dimensions of themselves into juxtaposition with the mask, the Tsimshian achieve unity and the experience of power. It is important to remember that this is a collective or ritual experience, as opposed to the ba'wis and land otter encounters which occur in isolation. To experience the negative alone is to risk becoming overwhelmed by it; to experience it in ritual is to experience it in the security of the collective. Shamans can survive the lonely journey into other realms, ordinary mortals cannot.

In Tsimshian thought, then, Sasquatch is an animal whose resemblance to human beings is close enough to confuse the boundary between animals and humans. It is as "real" as a monkey, but also as "real" as wealth woman who assumes different shapes. Thus the Tsimshian cannot answer the question of whether the Sasquatch is real, as we pose the question. Indeed they do not perceive its resemblance to humans in the same way that North American Sasquatch witnesses do. While each ba'wis animal has some perceptual quality which "appears" human, the essence of ba'wis is that it is found throughout nature, although most malevolently concentrated in the land otters. It is found wherever man catches a glimpse of himself in nature, including in his own birth and death.

There are, however, a number of parallels and similarities between the Tsimshian Sasquatch and our own which might stimulate some new questions about the phenomena. When they are compared some of the essential features of each become clearer. First, both creatures exist at dangerously close intersections between the human and animal. In Tsimshian the animal's resemblance to the human can be transformed into an illusory human by the co-operating eye of someone who is already too close to the animal realm. That is, to see the Sasquatch raises questions about the moral purity of the witness. Similarly, in North American culture there are witnesses who sign affidavits attesting to their character and sobriety. John Green discusses a Mr. Tyfting who "was a man whom I already knew, and whom I know to have a good reputation in the community."[54] It is not just a matter of what is seen, it is a matter of who sees it.

Just as seeing a land otter person can drive a Tsimshian insane, people who see Sasquatches are reluctant to admit it, fearing to be labelled drunk or crazy. Green writes that "the people who know you well would ask you what you had been drinking, or at best they might take you seriously enough to start worrying about you."[55] A woman whose son reported seeing Sasquatch told me with some anxiety that "he wasn't that kind of boy."

Except for Albert Ostman, who was briefly captured by Sasquatches and ate some sweet-tasting grass they gave him,[56] North Americans are not reported to have either food or sex with Sasquatches. However, there are stories of Sasquatch-human interbreeding in Russia, and North Americans joke about having sexual intercourse with it.

Just as the Tsimshian believe that to see ba'wis as wealth woman is to become wealthy, there is a rumoured million dollar prize for the first Sasquatch captured in North America. On the other hand, both wealth woman and Sasquatch seem to appear to people who are not looking for them.

North Americans who believe in Sasquatch want very strongly to have its existence validated and explained by the scientific establishment; indeed, they often berate scientists for ignoring the creature and not mounting scientific expeditions in search of it. There is a need for consensus, which is perhaps to be expected in a democratic society which exalts conformity, but this need also reveals the strong control that science holds over our collective reality. It is popularly believed that Sasquatch will not exist until scientists say that it does. Since, however, there is no category in Western culture for creatures who mediate the animal-human realms, scientists have no category for the Sasquatch to exist in. Those few scientists who do accept it tend to place it in the category of a human predecessor which somehow managed to survive.

Finally, Tsimshian beliefs about ba'wis can be interpreted as expressing aspects of themselves that they normally deny but cannot eradicate. If the Sasquatch does the same for us, if it is our mirror, it is a rather sorry picture we find of a large and hairy beast with big feet who smells absolutely terrible.

The burden of my argument, however, has been to show that the Tsimshian have a quite different conceptualization of intermediate human-animal beings than the one we embody in Sasquatch. This is to be expected, since we live and think in terms of different cultural realities. In both cultures, though, there are beliefs that the normally distinct realms of the human and the animal can fuse or confuse into an order of being which has a special and unusual existence or form of manifestation. Such beings are sources of fear in both cultures, although to the Tsimshian they are also manifestations of the divine to be sought out in the collective security of ritual action. In embodying both the human and the animal realms, whether as a relic fossil or "missing link" or as a quality of ba'wis manifesting throughout nature, the Sasquatch is a recognition of the connection between the human and the natural.

Notes

1. Peabody Museum, catalogue no. 85877.
2. See, among others, Peter T. Furst, *Hallucinogens and Culture* (San Francisco: Chandler and Sharp, 1976) and Theodore R. Sarbin and Joseph B. Juhasz, "The Historical Background of the Concept of Hallucination," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 3, no. 4 (1967): 339–58.
3. James Keyes [G. Spencer Brown], *Only Two Can Play This Game* (Toronto, New York, and London: Bantam, 1971), p. 4.
4. Personal communication, 1976.
5. Royal Ontario Museum, catalogue no. HN-687.

6. George T. Emmons, "Tsimshian Stories in Carved Wood," *American Museum Journal* (November, 1915): 365–66.
7. *Tsimshian Mythology,* Thirty-First Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1916), pp. 154–58.
8. Ibid., p. 157.
9. Ibid., p. 221–25.
10. C. Marius Barbeau and William Beynon, unpublished fieldnotes, 1915–1957, on deposit at the Centre for the study of Canadian Folklore, National Museum of Man, Ottawa.
11. See Bruce Rigsby, "Some Pacific Northwest Native Language Names for Sasquatch Phenomenon," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 5, no. 2 (1971): 154, and John Ascher Dunn, "A Practical Dictionary of the Coast Tsimshian Language," mimeographed, 1976, entry 141.
12. Ibid.
13. Rigsby, "Names for Sasquatch," p. 154, and Bill Holm, *Crooked Beak of Heaven: Masks and Other Ceremonial Art of the Northwest Coast* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 41.
14. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* pp. 154–58 and 221–25, respectively.
15. Ibid., p. 157.
16. Ibid., p. 223.
17. Ibid., p. 224.
18. Ibid., p. 448.
19. Ibid., p. 224.
20. Ibid., p. 225.
21. Compare Brad Campbell, "The Shining Youth in Tsimshian Mythology," in *Proceedings of the Second Congress, Canadian Ethnology Society,* Canadian Ethology Service, Paper no. 28 (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, Mercury series, 1975), pp. 86–109.
22. Edward Park, *The World of the Otter* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 1.
23. C.J. Harris, *Otters, A Study of the Recent Lutrinae* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), p. 281.
24. Ibid., p. 192.
25. Ibid., pp. 4 and 5.
26. Ibid., p. 240.
27. Ibid., p. 271.
28. Ibid., p. 257.
29. See C. Marius Barbeau, *Medicine-Men on the North Pacific Coast,* Bulletin no. 152, Anthropological Series no. 12 (Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1958), pp. 44–57, and Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* p. 563.
30. Vojin Popovic and Pava Popovic, *Hypothermia in Biology and Medicine* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1974), p. 194.
31. Fred T. Darvill, *Mountaineering Medicine: A Wilderness Medical Guide,* 7th ed. (Mount Vernon, Wash.: Skagit Mountain Rescue Unit, 1975), p. 24.
32. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* p. 563. Emmons collected a Land Otter Woman mask from the Nass about 1900–1914. (National Museum of Canada, catalogue no. VII-C-1778). It has a broad nose and prominent teeth and resembles a human skull.
33. Personal communication, 1976.
34. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* p. 452.
35. Ibid., pp. 345–46. This is common in Tlingit myths as well; see Frederica De Laguna, *Under Mount Saint Elias: The History and Culture of the Yakutat Tlingit,* Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology, Vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1972), pp. 745–47.
36. In case it might seem that the connections between *ba'wis,* wealth woman, and land otter people are weak, we can find them cohering in the single figure of *bukwus* among the Kwakiutl. In Kwakiutl myths bukwus is the chief of those who have died by

drowning (see Franz Boas, *Kwakiutl Tales, New Series,* Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, vol 26, pt. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), pp. 24–25, *Kwakiutl Ethnography,* ed. Helen Codere (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 131–32; Boas and George Hunt, *Kwakiutl Texts I,* Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 5, Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, vol. 3 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1905), pp. 429–31, and *Kwakiutl Texts—Second Series,* Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, vol. 10 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1906), pp. 249–70; C.F. Newcombe, "The Wild Man Mask (Buquϵsϵmtl)," Field Columbian Museum Kwakiutl Notes, no. 46, item. no. 85816, British Columbia Provincial Archives, Victoria; and Diane Iona Persson, "Mask, Myth and Ritual: An Analysis of Interrelationships on the Northwest Coast" (M.A. thesis, University of Victoria, 1974) His body is cold, "just like ice, for he was indeed a dead person" (Boas and Hunt, *Kwakiutl Texts I*). He takes the shape of a women's lover and has sexual intercourse with her, taking her to his village where she eats his food, and he then takes possession of her heart. She begins to change, her face becoming ugly, although she still has the capacity to help other humans who are threatened by bukwus. His helpers are land otters who transform into people. He is described in the documentation for one of his masks as half-human, half-bird: "to the man belonged most of the face, the hair and the beard; to the bird, the hooked nose and feathers of the head" (Newcombe, "Wild Man Mask," p. 2). He could fly and "make people lose their strength and go crazy whenever he wished." He was a child whose cry is like a whistle (Boas and Hunt, *Kwakiutl Texts—Second Series*). He bestows wealth and shamanic power which is lost by a shaman when he has too many children (Boas, *Kwakiutl Ethnography*). The domain of the bukwus and the domain of the Tsimshian land otter are the same, although the two cultures differ in the details of its imagining.

37. That Tlingit land otter victims help their human relatives is well documented in De Laguna, *Under Mount Saint Elias,* p. 748.
38. Ibid., p. 747.
39. Viola E. Garfield, "The Tsimshian and Their Neighbors," in *The Tsimshian Indians and Their Arts,* ed Viola E. Garfield and Paul S. Wingert (Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1966), p. 40.
40. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* p. 449.
41. Dunn, "Dictionary," entry 1549.
42. C. Marius Barbeau, "Tsimshian Songs," part 3 of Viola E. Garfield, Paul S. Wingert, and Marius Barbeau, *The Tsimshian: Their Arts and Music,* Publications of the American Ethnological Society no. 18 (New York: J.J. Augustin, 1951), p. 21.
43. Ibid., p. 122.
44. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* p. 531.
45. Irving Goldman, *The Mouth of Heaven: An Introduction to Kwakiutl Religious Thought* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 200.
46. Ibid.
47. I discuss this in "Seeing in Stone: Tsimshian Masking and the Twin Stone Masks," forthcoming in a Wilson Duff memorial volume edited by Donald Abbott.
48. Boas, *Tsimshian Mythology,* pp. 554–58.
49. Ibid., p. 555.
50. Goldman, *Mouth of Heaven,* pp. 56–62.
51. Ibid., p. 57.
52. Ibid., p. 58.
53. Ibid., p. 61.
54. John Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch* (New York: Ballantine, 1973), p. 11.
55. Ibid., p. 99.
56. Ibid., p. 28.

Roderick Sprague

Carved Stone Heads of the Columbia River and Sasquatch

Several prehistoric carvings collected in the lower Columbia River valley share non-human but anthropoid features. A relationship between these stone heads and Sasquatch phenomena is suggested.

In an editorial published in 1970 I wrote "to the best of my knowledge no one has suggested in print that perhaps the carved stone anthropoid ape heads of James Terry and later workers from the John Day region on the Columbia River could well be associated with the sasquatch phenomena."[1] Since then, a review of the literature has revealed that the editorial was incorrect in stating "James Terry and later workers" because in reality James Terry was not the first to report these stone carvings. The first published mention of the Columbia River carvings is by the pioneer paleontologist O. C. Marsh in 1877. In an address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Nashville, he said:

> Among many stone carvings which I saw there [Columbia River] were a number of heads, which so strongly resemble those of apes that the likeness at once suggests itself.[2]

The first explicit report of anthropoid carvings on the lower Columbia comes from a brief article entitled "Relics in Eastern Oregon" by the Reverend Myron Eells. In this report Eells described the collection of Mrs. J. H. Kunzie of Umatilla Landing, Oregon: "she has a third baboon similar to those in Portland and East Portland, which has been traced to the region of Eastern Oregon. This one is seventeen inches around, five and a half high and weighs seven pounds."[3]

In a second article in the annual report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1886 Eells described private collections that he observed in Oregon in the

1880's. The three major collections belonged to Dr. D. Rafferty, of East Portland, H. C. Stevens, of Oregon City, and Mrs. Helen A. Kunzie, of Umatilla, Oregon. Eells describes these anthropoid carvings as follows:

> *Baboons.*-He [Dr. Rafferty] also has a baboon with the eyes, forehead, and nostrils plainly marked; it is 6½ inches long, 4 inches high, weighs 6 pounds 10 ounces, and is of volcanic rock. Mr. Steel, of Portland, has another well-made baboon, which is 7¾ inches long, 17½ inches around the body, and weighs 13½ pounds. The eyes are an inch in diameter; it is 2⅝ inches between the center of the two eyes, 4 inches from the eyes to the end of the nose, and 2 inches across the nose. He obtained it from the Dalles and has traced it some distance further east of the Cascade Mountains. Mrs. Kunzie has another of these stone baboons which likewise came from eastern Oregon, and Mr. Stevens has a fourth, very nearly the same size as that of Dr. Rafferty's, and all of them seem to be of similar stone. Where the Indians of this region obtained the idea of such perfect baboons is a mystery; or were the stones, in their present shape, imported?[4]

No further trace of the carvings belonging to Rafferty, Steel, and Stevens has been found. It is possible that one or two of these could be represented by the heads illustrated later in Terry[5]; however, without detailed measurement and weighing of these specimens this is left at the level of speculation. The one head belonging to Mrs. Kunzie is later mentioned in a dissertation by Galloway[6], but no location is indicated for that specimen.

In 1891 James Terry, a researcher working with the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, published his well-known but rare work entitled *Sculptured Anthropoid Ape Heads*, apparently as a private venture. In this work he describes three sculptured heads. The first (Plates 33 and 34) was collected by Terry in 1882 and is still in the American Museum of Natural History, James Terry Collection. Terry does not explain whether it was collected in the field or from a private collector but Skiff[7] suggests it was excavated. The fact that it was collected in 1882 would argue against it being one of those described by Eells.

The second specimen (Plates 35 and 36) was collected by O.C. Marsh and is still in the Peabody Museum of Natural History at Yale University. No date is given for the acquisition of this specimen; however, Terry[8] quotes Marsh's 1877 work, so logically it should have been collected prior to 1877.

The third specimen (Plate 37) was collected by Thomas Condon, an Oregon geologist. This specimen is reputedly in the Museum of Natural History, University of Oregon; however, verification of this has not been not received.

Except for one brief note which unfortunately moved the location to the Northwest Coast,[9] little attention was paid to these carvings until the publication of Frederick W. Skiff's *Adventures in Americana* in 1935. Skiff mentions Terry's field work and adds that his own collection of some thirty examples had recently been moved to the Museum of the American Indian in New York City (Heye Foundation).[10]

N. G. Seaman, in *Indian Relics of the Pacific Northwest*,[11] illustrates two heads found by R. H. Miller, the first of which is so poorly executed that it will not be considered here. The second head (Plate 38) is currently owned by George Marshall, Portland, who generously provided an opportunity to observe this specimen first hand.

The only example that has been observed in excavation by a professional archaeologist, thus giving us some idea of context, was one recovered by an amateur working in conjunction with the University of Washington excavations at Wakemap Mound in the early 1950's. B. Robert Butler has illustrated this one example previously and provided the illustration presented here (Plate 39). He places the carving in the Wakemap Middle Period, thus giving it a date of 1500 B.C. to A.D. 500.[12]

The publication by Paul S. Wingert of *Prehistoric Stone Sculpture of the Pacific Northwest* coincided with an exhibit at the Portland Art Museum. Wingert lists sixteen carvings in the Deschutes-John Day style of which six or seven could be classified as anthropoid carvings. Wingert gives an excellent general description for all of these works and suggests that they "closely adhere to a basic type."[13] He goes on to say that:

> the cranium is shallow; the eyes large, protruding ovals; the nose wide, convex and terminating in spreading nostrils; and the mouth large, with full lips, and sometimes partially open. Below the mouth, the protruding face recedes sharply, and in some examples folds of loose flesh are represented under the chin.[14]

All of those carvings of interest to this study he describes as being of animals and suggests that they are mountain sheep or mountain goats. Galloway completely rejects the idea that these carvings could be "anthropoid or ape heads, [but] represent quite clearly the image of the human face."[15] Several specimens at the Maryhill Museum near Wishram, Washington include both an excellent example of a true mountain sheep carving[16] and of one extremely interesting carving with no provenience listed in the museum records (Plate 40). This specimen is included among those illustrated and discussed later despite the lack of known provenience and authentication because it is known to have been in the museum collection for many years and because of the excellent workmanship not at all typical of several known fakes. It is also considered because of one outstanding anatomical feature to be discussed later. The final carving illustrated (Plate 41) was recovered by Dr. Harold Bergen of Yakima from a burial site in The Dalles area in 1960.

A stone carving contained in the Oregon Historical Society collection was donated by J. P. Lucas sometime prior to the mid 1920's. This carving is illustrated in Wingert,[17] and is a classic example of a carving not representing a Sasquatch but probably a seal.

Of all the anthropomorphic stone carvings from the lower Columbia that were available for study either through photographs or actual inspection, only the seven illustrated here were deemed worthy of further study.[18] All the others were eliminated because they were easily identifiable as representing human faces, mountain sheep, or seals, or their pedigrees were not sufficiently established to exclude the possibility of modern fakes. Future investigators should include the collections of Lloyd McLeod, The Dalles County Historical Museum, and the Museum of the American Indian.

In the period before the turn of the century, when little was known of the paleontological record of primates in the New World and even less was known of the peopling of the area, researchers immediately recognized the Terry, Marsh, and Condon carvings as representing primates. In more recent times, as people became more sophisticated and recognized that this explanation was not scientifically acceptable, both professionals and amateurs alike rejected the idea of these being anthropoid or even primate in appearance. Wingert and Galloway especially reject the earlier interpretation of these carvings. B. Robert Butler ridicules the idea that these could be representations of anthropoids and states emphatically that the parallel lines above the eyes on The Dalles specimen and others represent the horns of mountain sheep.[19]

After assembling the collection of figures illustrated here I presented them for comments to several Pacific Northwest zoologists. With one notable exception of a very broadminded biologist with a strong commitment to the scientific method, there was a perfect correlation between those who knew what I was up to in identifying them as not anthropoid and those who were innocent in identifying them as anthropoid. Some zoologists described the carvings as looking "extremely monkey or ape like, where are they from?" When the location was indicated the reaction was either one of anger or a concerted effort to erase their former comments. Thus, my conclusion based



Plate 31. Front view of a mask collected about 1914 from the Niska Indians in the Nass River area of northern British Columbia by Lt. G.T. Emmons.

Plate 32. Side view. Emmons wrote that it represented "a mythical being found in the woods and today called a monkey." Marjorie Halpin discusses the link between this mask and Sasquatch on pages 211-28.





Plate 33. The carved stone heads on the following pages were collected in the Columbia River valley. Front view of specimen collected by James Terry, now housed in the American Museum of Natural History, New York.



Plate 34. Side view of the same specimen. Roderick Sprague discusses the possible relationship between these carvings and Sasquatch phenomena on pages 229-34.



Plate 35. Front view of specimen collected by O.C. Marsh, now in the Peabody Museum, Yale University.



Plate 36. Side view of the same specimen. Note the pronounced, primate-like ridges above the eyes.



Plate 37. Front and side views of a specimen collected by Thomas Condon, now reputedly in the Museum of Natural History, University of Oregon.



Plate 38. Three-quarter view of specimen collected by R.H. Miller, now in the private collection of George Marshall, Portland, Oregon.



Plate 39. Side view of specimen collected by an amateur at The Dalles, Washington, now probably in the Burke Memorial Museum, University of Washington.



Plate 40. Three-quarter view of an unidentified specimen housed in the Maryhill Museum near Wishram, Washington.



Plate 41. Front view of specimen collected and owned by Harold Bergen, Yakima, Washington.

on the help of unsuspecting zoologists is that the seven specimens most closely resemble higher primates.

John Green, in an address presented at this conference, listed the outstanding characteristics of the Sasquatch head as derived from "about a dozen reports." These include: no hair on the head, no neck, flat face, flat nose, sloped forehead, and heavy brow ridges. Since the carvings studied here represent only heads, the question of the neck cannot be answered. The type of basalt used does not lend itself well to indicating hair, so we are forced to exclude that criterion also. But there can be no question that all specimens clearly represent a flat face and a flat nose. The Marshall specimen (Plate 38) and the Butler example (Plate 39) are both illustrated in other publications in an orientation that would argue against their resemblance to primates. Likewise, the unknown specimen from Maryhill Museum (Plate 40) is displayed in the museum in such an orientation as to argue against this interpretation. However, the specimens have been oriented here in what I think is a more likely position.

The sloped forehead does not appear in any specimens, especially when the orientation is adjusted to account for the flat face. The final criterion, heavy brow ridges, is again very evident in all the specimens illustrated. This is the portion of the carvings that other investigators would interpret as representing horns. I see this as representing not only supraorbital ridges but also folds of skin characteristic, for example, of adult male gorillas.

The one specimen from the Maryhill Museum is also of interest because is possesses what could be best described as a sagittal crest. The mouth on this specimen does not exhibit the grinning teeth typical of most of the other specimens, however; but the positioning of the nostrils, the bulging eyes, and the heavy brow ridges are all in character.

In summary, there seems to be a unity among the seven specimens that separates them from carvings of mountain sheep, seals, and human faces. The characteristics that draw them together are the same characteristics that lead unbiased observers to identify them as primate in character. These characteristics also have a strong correlation with those characteristics reported for the Sasquatch face and head. While not providing proof of the existence of the Sasquatch, this correlation certainly provides a working hypothesis for analysis of other undescribed stone carvings from the lower Columbia River.

Notes

1. Roderick Sprague, "Editorial," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 4, no. 2(1970): 127–28. Reprinted in *The Scientist Looks at the Sasquatch,* ed. Roderick Sprague and Grover Krantz (Moscow, Idaho: University Press of Idaho, 1977), pp. 27–29.
2. O. C. Marsh, "Introduction and Succession of Vertebrate Life in America," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Nashville, Tenn , 30 August 1877. Published as "Ancient Life in America," *Scientific American Supplement* 4, no. 90(1877): 1436–37 and 4, no. 91(1877): 1449–51.
3. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 8, no. 3(1886): 165.
4. Myron Eells, "The Stone Age of Oregon," *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for the Year Ending June 30, 1886,* Pt. 1, p. 293.
5. James Terry, *Sculptured Anthropoid Ape Heads* (New York: J.J. Little, 1891).
6. John C. Galloway, 'Prehistoric Stone Sculpture of the Western United States," (Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1956), Plate 100.
7. Frederick W. Skiff, *Adventures in Americana* (Portland, Ore.: Metropolitan Press, 1935), p. 186.
8. *Sculptured Anthropoid Ape Heads,* pp. 6–7.
9. [Anonymous], "Monkeys on the Northwest Coast," *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 13, no. 3(1891): 181–82.
10. Skiff, *Adventures,* p. 186. Unfortunately the Museum was in the process of recataloguing their collections when I was researching this paper, and no information could be gathered on this series of carvings.
11. (Portland, Ore.: Binfords and Mort, 1946), pp. 48–49.
12. See B. Robert Butler, "Art of the Lower Columbia Valley," *Archaeology* 10, no. 3(1957): 158–65, and "A Tentative History of Self-Handled Mauls at The Dalles of the Lower Columbia," *Tebiwa* 7, no. 2(1964): 37–41.
13. (Portland, Ore.: Portland Art Museum, 1952), pp. 18–19, 33.
14. Ibid.
15. "Prehistoric Stone Sculpture of the Western United States," p. 159.
16. Wingert, *Prehistoric Stone Sculpture of the Pacific Northwest,* Figure 30.
17. Ibid., Figure 29.
18. Those aiding in the research, not already mentioned in the text or figure captions include: Joan E. Cohen, Peabody Museum of Natural History, Yale University; Emory Strong, Skamania, Washington; Lloyd McLeod, The Dalles, Oregon; Dorothy Brokaw and Karen LaFollette, Maryhill Museum; Dale Archibald, Oregon Historical Society Museum; and Katherine Gates and Polly Eyerly, Portland Art Museum.
19. Personal communication, 1978.

PART III

Contemporary Sasquatch Investigation

This section reviews evidence in an attempt to answer the question of whether manlike monsters physically exist. It begins with a statistical overview of the characteristics and behaviour of North American manlike monsters, such as Bigfoot and Sasquatch, as noted by their numerous sighters. The second article presents linguistic evidence that the Sasquatch is believed by Northwest Coast Indians to be a natural creature, a stand which is reinforced in the following article by similar evidence from the culture of the Soviet Caucasus Mountains. In the last three articles, scientific methods and techniques are applied to purported physical evidence of these creatures, and it is found that there are not reasonable grounds to dismiss all the evidence as misperception or hoax.

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John Green

What Is the Sasquatch?

Based on a study of more than 1,000 reported sightings of manlike monsters, this article presents a statistical survey of the characteristics of the beings seen and of conditions under which they were sighted. The author notes similarities between these sightings and those contained in Russian studies. He concludes by making inferences from the sightings concerning the nature and distribution of the creature.

Whether a real creature is responsible for the many eyewitness reports of giant hairy bipeds in North America has not been established, and that may remain the case for many years. It can surely be assumed, however, that if such a creature does exist, then a substantial proportion of the reports involve genuine observations of it, and from them, if they prove consistent, an accurate picture of it can be drawn. It is my contention, based on the study of approximately one thousand such reports, that a consistent picture does exist and that it is not the one which is usually presented to the public. The reports portray not a semi-human, but an upright ape; not an endangered remnant of a species, but an extremely widespread and secure population; not a fearful monster, but a remarkably inoffensive animal.

If all the old and new information that has been assembled refers only to imaginary beings, then there should be no limit to the attributes with which those imaginary beings might be endowed by their creators. They could describe animals, or men, or something in between, or they could picture something or a variety of somethings entirely different. In that case anyone taking an interest in the subject is free to make of the Sasquatch whatever he chooses. There are no limitations.

But suppose that there actually is a living creature involved. If that should be the case, then it can surely be assumed that most of the stories of encounters with such a creature have a factual rather than an imaginary basis and that the information contained in the stories does in fact describe the creature. It follows that if we are in fact compiling information about a real creature then we cannot make of it whatever might suit our own fancies. It has to be the creature that the witnesses describe.

We are dealing with reports of something that walks upright like a human but is entirely covered with hair and is usually much larger than a human. I have no way of knowing how many reports about such creatures there may be, but from North America alone I have more than a thousand on file, plus several hundred more concerning footprints of a suitable size and shape for the animal described. With such a volume of reports, even allowing for the fact that an unknown number of them are manufactured or mistaken, some validity must be assumed for those attributes and actions that are frequently described, and consideration should also be given to those that are not described at all. There should be enough information to tell us not only what the creature is, but also what it is not. The following is a digest of some of the significant points that I have been able to glean from careful study of the reports:

1. Sasquatches are significantly larger than humans, and not only in height. Small hairy bipeds are reported fairly frequently, but only nine per cent of the reports involve creatures described as being smaller than men, while seventy-four per cent involve creatures larger than man-sized. Since the standard of comparison is the largest type of human, the adult male, it seems reasonable to assume that all Sasquatches are consistently taller than humans of comparable age and sex. The average of all the height estimates is more than seven and a half feet. In California and Oregon the averages exceed eight feet, and nowhere are they significantly less than seven feet. Perhaps more significant is the heavy build described. Compared to an average man, fifty-seven per cent are described as "very heavy" and thirty-four per cent as "heavy," with only six per cent "medium" and three per cent "slim." Viewed from the front, seventy-eight per cent are described as "wide" compared to an average human, and sixty-eight per cent are described as "wide" from the side view also.
2. They are solitary creatures. Only five per cent of reports involve more than one individual, and only one per cent involve more than two individuals.
3. Their hairiness is of the animal, not the human, sort. Only eight per cent of observers thought the hair was longer on the head than elsewhere on the animal, and descriptions of long head hair or of bodies only partially covered with hair do not constitute even one per cent.
4. The proportions of their limbs are more humanlike than apelike. Compared to a human and in relation to the general build, leg length is noted as "medium" in fifty-five per cent of descriptions and arm length as "medium" in fifty per cent.
5. From the shoulders up there is less resemblance to the average human. Shoulders are termed "wide" in more than ninety per cent of descriptions.

Seventy per cent of necks are "short" and twenty-five per cent have "no neck." Flat faces, large flat noses, sloped foreheads, and brow ridges are noted in nearly all descriptions resulting from close observation.

6. They are omnivorous. Gordon Strasenburgh describes such animals as herbivorous, but that cannot be supported.[1] Of sixty-four reports that I had by 1977 mentioning things apparently taken or carried for food, exactly half involved some form of meat.
7. They are largely nocturnal. In spite of the fact that there are far more human observers around in the daytime and that humans see very poorly at night, almost half of the sightings reported have been at night. The time when tracks were made is not generally known, but when it has been almost ninety per cent have been made at night.
8. They are not active in cold weather. Everywhere except in Florida there are only half as many reports in winter as in summer or fall, and tracks are rarely found in snow. Less than nine per cent of the reports, including tracks and sightings, mention snow. Oddly, there are also few reports in spring, and consistently less in May than in April. At my most recent count, out of 804 sighting and track reports for which a specific month was known only thirty-nine were in May, compared to fifty-three in April and fifty-six in June. There were forty-two in each of February and March. Leaving out the Florida reports there were thirty-six in February, thirty-seven in March and thirty-seven in May.
9. Sasquatches make considerable use of water. I have six reports of tracks ending in bodies of deep water, five reports of Sasquatches swimming, and a dozen of them standing or walking in bodies of water. In one survey I did of 289 track reports, eighty-three were beside water. Of twenty-eight reports located near towns in four states east of the continental divide, seventy-one per cent of the towns were right beside a stream or lake large enough to be shown on an ordinary road map. A sample consisting of all the towns in two counties chosen at random in each of those states indicated that on the average only fifty-one per cent of towns were beside water.

Almost all of the foregoing observations involve substantial numbers of reports, although the numbers vary from several hundred down to a few dozen. The one exception concerns details of the face and head, which are based on as few as a dozen observations. There are in addition a number of significant observations that have been reported only a few times:

1. The only time Sasquatches have been reported sleeping they were in the open, although it was snowing and there were trees close by.
2. I have six reports of running Sasquatches being clocked by people in cars.

Speeds reported were thirty-five, forty-five, fifty to sixty, seventy, and eighty miles per hour. None of those reports were from west of the continental divide, and I have not talked to any of the informants.

3. I have six reports of Sasquatches shaking or hitting vehicles, five of them jumping on vehicles, and five of them pushing at or damaging buildings.
4. I have eight reports of Sasquatches seen to throw things at people, without hitting anyone, and seventeen of them chasing people, without catching anyone. Five people have reported being rushed in what appeared to be a bluffing action. Reports of Sasquatches looking in the windows of houses and even vehicles are fairly common, but it is far more usual for a Sasquatch encountering a human to leave, often hurriedly.
5. Three people have reported being grabbed at while in their vehicles, and four have reported being picked up and dropped, but none have been much hurt. All reports of people being killed by Sasquatches, of which I have seven, have been very indirect or very old, usually both. There are perhaps a dozen reports of Sasquatches being seen to kill animals, but I have never been able to talk to any eyewitness.
6. Reports specifically identifying females and young are very rare. I have only nine substantial and specific descriptions of females and only three of young animals seen with adults.
7. One observer has reported two incidents in which it seemed that a Sasquatch did not have an opposable thumb, or at least did not use it in that way. I have no specific report of a Sasquatch using the thumb in opposition.

There are also a number of things about Sasquatches that seem to me to be significant because they have not been reported:

1. I have no report of a Sasquatch throwing anything overhand or in a straight line.
2. Although the creatures have been reported making sounds in almost nine per cent of sightings I have only one report of anything that could be considered a possible form of speech. By far the most common sounds are screams.
3. I have no report of a Sasquatch using fire.
4. I have no report of a Sasquatch using any object as a tool and only a very few and indirect reports of one carrying anything that could not be considered food.
5. I have no report of a Sasquatch having a home, even in a cave.
6. Although I have talked to people who say they have shot at Sasquatches I have no concrete evidence that anyone has ever killed one, and I have no reports indicating that they have learned to fear guns.

Those are the observations that I wish to make based on my own research. In addition, there is a collection of Russian observations published by the late Professor Boris Porshnev.[2] He notes the following points:

> Height five to six feet, but with great variations; bodies covered entirely with hair; neck appears very short with head right on top of trunk; teeth like a man's but larger; bridge of the nose usually flat; thumb less opposed than a man's, objects often grasped between fingers and palm; toes and fingers have nails, not claws; creatures capable of running as fast as horses and of swimming swift currents; breeding pairs remain together, but males range over wider territory; no permanent homes; they do not make tools, but can throw stones; both meat and vegetables eaten; they are active mainly at twilight or at night; in northern regions they sleep during the winter; they avoid leaving tracks by walking on hard ground; towards man they are not usually aggressive[3]

I do not think that anyone could fail to note that except for the size of the creatures there are not many points of difference between the reports studied by Professor Porshnev in Russia and those that I have been summarizing, while on the other hand there is exact agreement on many specific points. It should be noted, however, that the difference in size alone puts the two creatures in very different relationships to their environment. The Russian creatures are literally man-sized. There is no mention that they are any bulkier than men, and they are no taller. A six-foot man of substantial build weighs about two hundred pounds. An eight-foot creature of proportions one-and-a-half times as large would weigh about one thousand pounds, and a nine-foot one would weigh fifteen hundred pounds.

I have given the information from my own files in order to draw conclusions from it about the nature of the animal described. The Russian information, even though it may refer to a different species, will generally support the same conclusions:

1. The Sasquatch is not normally a dangerous animal.

It has the size and appearance of a monster, and it might frighten to death a person with a weak heart, but there is nothing in its record to suggest a species that preys on humans or tends to attack them for any reason. In fact if those people who tell of being grabbed or picked up are telling the truth it is a creature that makes very restrained use of its strength in its infrequent contact with humans. It is not uncommon, however, for humans to disappear in wild areas and never be found, so one might bear in mind the possibility that a lone human attacked by a Sasquatch might not be able to return to tell the story.

2. The relationship between the Sasquatch and Homo sapiens has not been proven to be any closer than that between our species and the other great apes, except in shared posture and means of locomotion.

The physical attributes that we do share will make the Sasquatch a very important animal in man's quest for knowledge about himself, but it is not likely a "missing link" in his evolution or a "near human."

With the exception of his upright posture and loss of hair, man's differences from other primates are mainly in his brain, and those differences obviously result from a radical departure, a very long time ago, from the normal primate lifestyles. While all other species have relied on physical abilities and on instincts to hold a place in a competitive world, man has shifted his reliance to his brain. Millions of years ago he learned to use objects to increase the effectiveness of his muscles, and from that developed the making of tools and weapons for specific purposes. He also relied on the co-operative effort of many individuals, and somewhere along the line he learned to increase greatly the effectiveness of that co-operation through verbal communication of ideas. The precise manipulation of objects with his hands and of sounds with his throat and tongue, repeated through countless generations, have been the keys to the development of his tremendous brain. At the same time he has ceased to rely primarily on physical strength, with the result that pound for pound he has only a fraction of the muscular strength of his primate relatives.[4]

The creature described in the Sasquatch reports has obviously taken an opposite route, although by no means the same one as the other apes. Unlike them it has learned to swim, to see in the dark, and to survive in a wide variety of climates. As a result of its greater versatility it has become a highly successful species, able to establish itself, if all the reports refer to a single species, all over the world. In that respect it is like man, but unlike him its adaptions have been entirely physical. It does not need or appear to desire the company of its fellows, so it would obviously never have needed to develop sophisticated vocal communication, and there is no indication that it has done so. Its size and strength have plainly proved to be sufficient both for protection and for obtaining food without reliance on tools or weapons, and it has never even learned to throw things effectively. Hard though it may be to accept, there are reports indicating that it has developed speed of foot sufficient to flee from or to catch almost any other animal. Certainly it has never lost its fur coat and is able to get along in cold weather without either clothing or fire.

There is simply nothing in its lifestyle that would ever have put pressure on it to develop its brain, and it obviously has not done so. Some suggestions have been made that its elusiveness in relation to man is proof of intelligence, but in fact Sasquatches are reported seen quite frequently, almost certainly more often than cougars would be if they could not be hunted with dogs. In short, if upright posture is what makes an animal a human, then the reports describe a human, but if it is his brain that distinguishes Homo sapiens from his animal relatives, then the Sasquatch is an animal—an upright ape—and nothing more.

3. The Sasquatch is not an endangered species in most of its range.

On the mountainous western slope of the continent there are may hundreds of thousands of square miles of suitable habitat for it in which pressure from humans is minimal. In fact there is far more territory available for the Sasquatches than there is for the humans, and the volume of reports from every area where there are humans to do the reporting indicates that virtually all that territory is occupied.

East of the mountains there is a wide area of level, open country that the Sasquatch apparently does not occupy, but there is nothing to suggest that it ever did. In the vast area drained by the Mississippi and its eastern tributaries as well as along the east coast there is presumably a great deal less forested area suitable for Sasquatches than was once the case, but there are plenty of reports to indicate an established population throughout the area.

There is room for disagreement as to how many animals would be required to occupy all of that territory, but considering that the number of grizzly bears, which require large territories and occupy a much smaller area, is always estimated in multiples of ten thousand, the Sasquatch population must surely number at least in the thousands. It would appear that the "skunk apes" in Florida may be endangered by the destruction of their habitat to provide land for housing, and there may be other specific areas where populations of Sasquatches are threatened, but if man does threaten Sasquatches in any way it is obviously the land developer who is responsible, not the hunter. There is no record of man ever successfully hunting a single one.

Notes

1. Gordon R. Strasenburgh, Jr., "Perceptions and Images of the Wild Man," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 9, no. 2 (1975): 281–98.
2. The work of Porshnev is discussed in my *Sasquatch: The Apes among Us* (Saanichton, B.C.: Hancock House, 1978), pp. 137–45. Russian research is presently centred around the Hominid Research Seminar which regularly meets at the Darwin Museum in Moscow. Other Russian investigators (works are listed in the general bibliography) include Dmitri Baianov and Igor Bourtsev, who have worked extensively on the Roger Patterson film, and Marie-Jeanne Kofman, who has carried out field investigations in the Caucasus.
3. Boris F. Porshnev, "The Problem of Relic Paleoanthropus," *Soviet Ethnography* 2 (1969): 115–30.
4. See John E. Bauman, "The Strength of the Chimpanzee and Orang," *Scientific Monthly* (April, 1923): 432–39.

Wayne Suttles

Sasquatch: The Testimony of Tradition

The author discusses Coast Salish and other Northwest Coast Indian beliefs in manlike beings as they find their expression in native languages. He demonstrates that Native Indian terms for and beliefs about giant hominids do not make a good case either for or against the reality, as Western science sees reality, of these beings: the question "Are they real or mythical, natural or supernatural to the Indians?" is irrelevant to the scientific question. On the other hand, the question "Are they real as defined by Western science?" is not irrelevant to the *anthropological* study of the "mythical" and "supernatural."

Are Native Indian traditions good evidence for the existence of the Sasquatch? Non-Indian believers in the beast have evidently thought so ever since the word "Sasquatch" itself was adopted from an Indian word, evidently supposing that the Indians would not have such traditions if there were not a real animal there. But a contrary argument can also be made—that the Indian traditions in this region resemble what we know to be mere folklore elsewhere, and therefore the Sasquatch is simply a myth. This paper is concerned with this question. I shall outline the history of the growth of interest in the Sasquatch, summarize what is known of Indian traditions, and comment on their relevance as evidence.[1]

The word "Sasquatch" is an anglicization of a Coast Salish Indian word sɛ́sq̓əc (from the Stalo dialect of the Halkomelem language). It was introduced to non-Indians across Canada and in the United States during the 1920's as the name of a huge, hairy, human-looking creature said to live in the Coast Mountains of British Columbia, where Indians occasionally encountered it. The word was used in a series of newspaper and magazine articles by John W. Burns, who had long been a school teacher at the Chehalis Indian Reserve on the Harrison River west of the resort village of Harrison Hot Springs.[2] The Harrison River flows out of Harrison Lake, which lies between high, wild, mountain ranges capable of concealing mysteries, and into the Fraser River just below the town of Agassiz, about sixty miles east of Vancouver. The Sasquatch image was adopted by Harrison Hot Springs as an advertising device and for a while there were local celebrations called "Sasquatch Days."

Local interest then seems to have died down until 1957, when the village decided to stage a "Sasquatch hunt" as its centennial project for the British Columbia centennial of 1958. At this point John Green, then editor of the Agassiz weekly newspaper, entered the picture. Green says that he had regarded the whole business as a joke until the new publicity and search for newsworthy material uncovered earlier reports of encounters with Sasquatches and so encouraged people who had before been reluctant to discuss their experiences to come out with them.[3] Green then began seriously to collect reports of sightings and meetings, old and new, and to investigate phenomena thought to be material evidence, such as footprints.

Meanwhile, reports of "Bigfoot" in northwestern California, "Abominable Snowmen" or "Yeti" in Asia, and other such mysterious creatures were in the news. It was inevitable that comparisons would be made and inferences drawn about their identity. Perhaps the most ambitious comparison and interpretation appeared in 1961, when Ivan Sanderson, a naturalist and popular writer on animals, published *Abominable Snowman: Legend Come to Life, The Story of Sub-Humans on Five Continents from the Early Ice Age until Today.*[4] Sanderson argued that several non-human hominids survive in mountain forests in both the Old World and the New World. Prominent among them was the Sasquatch.

John Green has published four reports on his growing files.[5] His 1973 report shows that sightings and tracks have been reported from all over North America but most frequently from British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and northwestern California, and with increasing frequency in the last few years. Other books on these phenomena in this region have been published by Roger Patterson, Don Hunter and Rene Dahinden, and Peter Byrne.[6] Also, several people have worked to establish organizations to collect data and investigate reports; these include the late Roger Patterson at Yakima, Washington, succeeded by Ron Olson at Eugene, Oregon, Peter Byrne at The Dalles, Oregon, and Jon Beckjord at Marietta, Washington, and more recently Seattle. All of these people, and many more, have been engaged in a quest for a creature they believe does indeed exist. And all that I have named are, I believe, "laymen" in the sense that they are not degree-holding, academically based zoologists, anthropologists, or scholars in some other relevant discipline.

Most professional people in the relevant disciplines have, publicly, remained pretty quiet about the whole thing. However, one important negative response came shortly after the publication of Sanderson's book. In 1964, Bacil F. Kirtley, a folklorist, published an article entitled "Unknown Hominids and New World Legends."[7] Kirtley showed that beliefs about legendary hominids in Latin America are listed in Stith Thompson's *Motif Index of Folk Literature*[8] for other parts of the world and that these beings are believed to exist even on oceanic islands beyond the range of prehistoric hominids and hardly the mountain refuges of Sanderson's theory. Kirtley concluded that the unknown hominids are simply myths. The argument runs, I think, that if the people of the Solomon Islands can imagine apemen in the forest then so can the people of Tibet or British Columbia, and therefore that is what has happened. The witnesses are not lying, but simply allowing their memories to translate baffling or disturbing experiences into a language provided by their heritage of folklore. I suspect that most folklorists and cultural anthropologists might agree with Kirtley.

But while folklore may explain why people see Sasquatches and other non-human hominids, it does not explain the footprints. And these have made a few professionals respond positively. An archeologist, Don Abbott, a physical anthropologist, Grover Krantz, and a primatologist, John Napier, have asserted that this physical evidence cannot be explained away.[10] Krantz has been especially resolute in this stance. The foot- and hand-prints are too numerous, in too many remote and inaccessible places, and too true to what the prints of a giant hominid ought to look like to be a hoax. Creating them as a hoax, says Krantz, is beyond the technical skill, anatomical knowledge, and capacity for co-operation and secrecy of any imaginable hoaxers. It is easier to believe that they are real.[11]

Partly, I believe, as a result of Krantz's work, another anthropologist, Roderick Sprague, who edits *NARN* (*Northwest Anthropological Research Notes*), decided to respond to a charge made by John Green. Green had asserted that we cultural anthropologists have been ignoring—and so in effect concealing—data on the Sasquatch because we have failed to recognize that our Indian informants have been talking about real rather than mythical animals.[12] In an editorial, Sprague invited papers presenting and/or analyzing ethnographic, folkloristic, and linguistic data relevant to the Sasquatch and presenting models for the study of Sasquatch phenomena.[13] There have been a number of responses, including Krantz's papers already cited and two on native terms and traditions, by Bruce Rigsby and by me.[14]

Rigsby presented linguistic data from the southern Plateau (Sahaptin and Molala terms) and from the northern Northwest Coast (Kwakiutlan, Bella Coola, and Tsimshian terms) indicating the borrowing of terms or coining of loan translations across language family boundaries. My paper presented both linguistic and cultural data for the Coast Salish peoples of southwestern British Columbia and western Washington. The native terms from both sources, with a few additions, are presented in the accompanying table.

My paper was in part a response to Green's view of the reality of the Sasquatch to the Indians. A review of the evidence for Coast Salish beliefs in human-looking beings living in the forests and mountains around them showed that most Coast Salish peoples acknowledge the existence of several such creatures, ranging in size from dwarves to giants and varying considerable in resemblance to humanity. Of all of these creatures, only the Basket Ogress appears in narratives that the Coast Salish themselves might classify as myths. The evidence for belief in the others—the tree fellers, earth-dwelling dwarves, wild men, and Sasquatch-like mountain giants—consists mainly of brief statements describing the creatures and narratives telling of encounters with them. These statements and narratives do not seem different in kind from statements and narratives about other creatures the Coast Salish know about, including those well known to Western zoologists, like beavers and grizzlies, and others unknown to them, like giant two-headed serpents and thunderbirds. Thus, the being whose native name was anglicized "Sasquatch" exists less in native mythology than in native zoology, though in a zoology that includes creatures we Europeans would call "mythical" or "supernatural." Moreover, the appearance of the Basket Ogress in myths need not imply that she or her kind are unreal, any more than the appearance of Mink or Raven in myths implies that minks and ravens do not exist in the real world. So if we have, as Green suspected, put the Sasquatch into a native category of "supernatural," we have indeed been wrong. For the Coast Salish the Sasquatch is part of the natural world. But if on that basis we must seriously consider the possibility that the Sasquatch is part of our natural world, then to be consistent we must consider the same possibility for the tree-striker, the giant two-headed serpent, and the thunderbird. Of course, only Indians have reported encounters with tree-strikers, two-headed serpents, and thunderbirds, while both Indians and non-Indians have reported encounters with Sasquatches. But using that as an argument for the reality of the Sasquatch would be begging the question. We cannot suppose from the outset that non-Indians are any less inclined to rely on folklore in interpreting experiences than are Indians.

This review of the Coast Salish data also showed that native descriptions of those creatures that sound like giant hominids (disregarding now the tree-strikers, dwarves, and such) are not very consistent. Nocturnal habits are mentioned most often but not always. Hair covering the body is not consistently mentioned, and some descriptions seem to imply a more human covering. About half the descriptions mention the habit of stealing food, less than half the stealing of women and children. In some accounts they speak but in others they only whistle. They may travel through water or avoid water. In one area they have unbending legs that allow them to run downhill only. In another they have spikes on their toes for kicking people. Some of them seem to have the rudiments of culture, others do not. Because of this inconsistency I concluded that the Coast Salish cultural evidence does not add up to a good case for the existence of a real animal.[15]

To the north, the Kwakiutl tell of two kinds of creatures that have recently been identified with the Sasquatch. These are the bək̓ʷə́s (*woodman*) and the dzónoq̓ʷa. But the woodman, as described by Boas, seems to be a rather different sort of creature.[16] He is nocturnal, like most Coast Salish Sasquatch-like beings, but he travels by canoe, is as cold as ice, and takes away drowned people. Boas likens him to the land-otter beings of the northern Northwest Coast peoples. The Kwakiutl dzónoq̓ʷa might make a somewhat better condidate for giant hominid status. This creature is described as a race of beings who live inland or on mountains, are twice the size of a man, with hairy hands, wide but deep-set eyes, black bodies, and peculiarities of speech.[17] The female has large, hanging breasts; she comes to villages and steals fish and children; she is the Basket Ogress of the Kwakiutl versions of stories told as far south as the Columbia River.

I do not have enough information on the *man of the woods* (or "ape") of the more northerly coast peoples nor on the Sasquatch-like creatures of the Plateau to make any further comparisons.

The native terms are also variable. Within the area of contiguous Coast Salish languages (Squamish to Upper Chehalis in the table, but with several languages unrepresented), we find two terms (marked *a* and *b*) of restricted distribution and three (*c*, *d*, and *e*) of wider distribution. Of these five, term *d* is analyzable, I believe, as *from upriver* and probably referred simply to hunting parties from the Interior that were occasionally taken for non-human creatures. The other four terms are, at the present state of knowledge, not analyzable. Also, it is not now possible to say whether the various forms of term *e*, for example, are true cognates and a heritage from proto-Coast Salish or are simply recent loans from one language into the others.

Outside the Salish area, as Rigsby pointed out, there is clear evidence of the borrowing of terms. Sahaptin and Molala are only very remotely related, and so the fairly close resemblance of a Sahaptin and a Molala word must mean that one language borrowed it from the other.

To the north, we can even say which way the borrowing went. The Kwakiutl term bək̓ʷə́s is clearly identifiable as Kwakiutl in origin, being composed of the root bəkʷ-, *man*-, and the suffix -'əs, -*woods*, -*ground* (which glottalizes the preceding consonant). The term may be equally at home in the other Northern Wakashan languages, Heiltsuk and Haisla. But the Bella Coola must have borrowed their term from Northern Wakashan. The Coast Tsimshian and Nass-Gitksan terms, on the other hand, are phrases made up of native materials, but they seem to be loan translations. This suggests that the Tsimishian adopted the Northern Wakashan image of the "man of the woods."

From this review of data from a part of northwestern North America, my tentative conclusions are: that while Sasquatch-like creatures may inhabit the real world of the Indians, this may not be relevant to the question of whether they inhabit the real world of Western science; that the Sasquatch-like creatures of the Native peoples have a range of attributes somewhat wider and less consistent than what we might expect a real animal to have; and that some of the names, and presumably some beliefs about them, have spread from one people to another. All of this does not make for a very persuasive argument that the Sasquatch is real.

But it does not disprove the existence of the Sasquatch either. In the native belief systems real animals like beavers exist in the same world as giant two-headed serpents, and real animals like beavers are given fanciful attributes in these beliefs. In the languages of the region, as elsewhere, names for real animals and beliefs about them can diffuse from one people to another.

I remain skeptical about the existence of a Sasquatch, but I do not see the question as trivial. It is important not only for the significance a Sasquatch would have for the study of primate evolution but also for the importance it would have for the study of myths. Sooner or later I expect to hear someone say, "It does not really matter whether there is a Sasquatch, because just by studying the stories people have told about it we can learn so much about man's myth-making propensities." Though I might once have agreed, I must now respectfully disagree.

Any hypothesis that we human beings have an innate propensity to create mythical wild men or apemen might be plausible if there are *no* wild men or apemen in the real world. But if there *are,* then this hypothesis becomes unnecessary; beliefs in wild men everywhere might then be the result of direct observation plus that old anthropological explanation—diffusion. Thus, the argument that if South Sea islanders tell about non-human hominids where none could possibly be, therefore wherever people tell about non-human hominids there are really none, is a non-sequitur. We could as easily say that if people in British Columbia are found to believe in twenty-foot-long snakes and we know that there are really none there, therefore the belief in twenty-foot-long snakes is everywhere false—even in the Amazon Basin. Showing that some beliefs are unfounded does not prove that all beliefs are unfounded, only that people are capable of imagining things, and that we must therefore be critical of all reports from anywhere.

Finally, I would end with the usual plea that more facts are needed about Native traditions but also with the observation that the Native peoples today may be as much influenced by mass media images of the Sasquatch as the rest of us. This means that images of the Sasquatch are and will be changing. And that too is worth study.

TABLE: NORTHWEST COAST NATIVE TERMS FOR MANLIKE MONSTERS

Languages are listed in geographical order from north to south. Native terms are given in a modern linguistic orthography. Glosses are in italics. Anglicizations and identifying terms are enclosed in quotation marks. Sources are in parentheses.

Sasquatch-Like Beings

Nass-Gitksan			
	gʸɛ́dm gʸilílixʸ	*man of the woods*	(Rigsby)
	gʸɛ́dm lax̣ sgʸiníst	*man of the jackpines*	(Rigsby)
Coast Tsimshian			
	gʸɛ́dm gʸilháwli	*man of the woods*	(Rigsby)
Haisla			
	búk̓ʷus	*man of the woods*, "ape"	(Rigsby)
Heiltsuk			
	bák̓ʷəs	*man of the woods*, "ape"	(Risgby)
Bella Coola			
	pk̓ʷús		(Rigsby)
Kwakiutl			
	bək̓ʷə́s	*man of the woods*	(Boas)
Squamish			
	a smáyʔil	"wild men"	(Kuipers, Hill-Tout)
Halkomelem			
Stalo dialect			
	b sɛ́sq̓əc	"Sasquatch"	(Duff, Suttles)
Cowichan dialect			
	c t̓θáməq̓ʷəs		(Suttles)
Straits			
Saanich dialect			
	c t̓θámək̓ʷəs		(Suttles)
Lummi dialect			
	c c̓ámək̓ʷəs		(Suttles)
	d stə́y̓tał	*from upriver* [?]	(Suttles)
Clallam dialect			
	e c̓yátkʷ	"seeahtik"	(Suttles)
Lushootseed (Puget)			
	e c̓yátkʷuʔ	"seatco"	(Hess)
	d stíʔtał		(Hess)
Twana			
	e c̓iátqo		(Elmendorf)
Quinault			
	e c̓əǰátko		(Olson)

Upper Chehalis		
e ċiátkʷ	"Stick Indian"	(Kinkade)
d stíʔtał	"Stick Indian"	(Kinkade)
Columbian (Interior Salish)		
sc̓wanáy̓təxʷ	"Stick Indians"	(Kinkade)
Sahaptin		
Taidnapam dialect		
st̓iyahá		(Rigsby)
kwi · kwiyái	*whistler*	(Rigsby)
Umatilla dialect		
st̓iyaháma		(Rigsby)
Molala		
št̓íya		(Rigsby)
łipáni		(Rigsby)

Ogress Terms

Kwakiutl	
dzónoq̓ʷa	(Boas)
Squamish	
qálqalił	(Kuipers)
Halkomelem	
Stalo dialect	
qəlqəlí · ł	(Suttles)
Cowichan dialect	
c̓əwx̣ɛ́ʔləc	(Suttles)
Straits	
Lummi dialect	
c̓əwx̣ɛ́ʔ ləč	(Suttles)
Clallam dialect	
słapu	(Gunther)
Lushootseed	
Skagit dialect	
ʔáx̣ʷədus	(Hess)
Snohomish dialect	
sxʷəyúq̓ʷ	(Hess)
Kathlamet	
aq̓asx̣ensx̣ena	(Hymes)
Kiksht (Wasco)	
at̓at̓ałia	(Sapir)

Sources: Terms listed above are taken from the following: Franz Boas, *Kwakiutl Culture as Reflected in Mythology*, Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, vol. 28 (1935); Wilson Duff, *The Upper Stalo Indians of the Fraser Valley, British Columbia*, Anthropology in British Columbia memoir 1 (1953); William W. Elmendorf, *The Structure of Twana Culture*, Research Studies Monograph supplement 2 (Pullman: Washington State University, 1960); Erna Gunther, "Klallam Folk Tales," *University of Washington Publications in Anthropology* 1 (1925): 113–69; Thom Hess, *Dictionary of Puget Salish* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976); Charles Hill-Tout, "Notes on the Sk·qo mic of British Columbia, a branch of the great Salish Stock of North America," *British Association for the Advancement of Science 70th Meeting* ([London], 1900), pp. 472–549; Dell Hymes, personal communication, 1974; M. Dale Kinkade, personal communication, 1972, 1974; Aert Kuipers, *The Squamish Language: Grammar, Texts, Dictionary*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Mouton, 1967, 1969); Ronald J. Olson, "The Quinault Indians," *University of Washington Publications in Anthropology* 6 (1936): 1; Rigsby, "Some Pacific Northwest Native Language Names for the Sasquatch"; Edward Sapir, *Wishram Texts*, American Ethnological Society Publications, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1909); Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch."

Notes

1. A part of the material contained in this paper was included in "Some Questions about the Sasquatch," which I presented at the annual meeting of the American Folklore Society at Portland, Oregon, 1 November 1974.
2. For example, J.W. Burns, "Introducing B.C.'s Hairy Giants," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 April 1921. See also, Alex MacGillivray, "'Shouldn't Be Captured' . . . Nothing Monstrous about Sasquatch, Says Their Pal," Vancouver *Sun*, 25 May 1957, and John Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch* (Harrison Hot Springs, B.C.: John Green, 1968), p. 1.
3. Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch*, pp. 1–3.
4. (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton, 1961).
5. *On the Track of the Sasquatch*; *The Year of the Sasquatch* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1970); *The Sasquatch File* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1973); and *Sasquatch: The Apes among Us* (Saanichton, B.C.: Hancock House, 1978).
6. Respectively, *Do Abominable Snowmen of America Really Exist*? (Yakima, WA: Franklin

Press, 1966), *Sasquatch* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), and *The Search for Big Foot: Monster, Myth or Man?* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis, 1975).

7. *Western Folklore* 28 (1964): 77–90.
8. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).
9. Kirtley, "Unknown Hominids," pp. 87–89.
10. Abbott, in James B. Shuman, "Does an 'Abominable Snowman' Lurk in the Rockies, *Reader's Digest*, January 1969, pp. 46–50; Krantz, "Sasquatch Handprints," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes (NARN)* 5, no. 2 (1971): 145–51, "Anatomy of the Sasquatch Foot," *NARN* 6, no. 1 (1972): 91–104, and "Additional Notes on Sasquatch Foot Anatomy," *NARN* 6, no. 2 (1972): no. 2 (1972): 230–41; Napier, *Bigfoot* (New York: Berkeley Medallion, 1972).
11. Krantz, "Anatomy of the Sasquatch Foot," p. 103.
12. Green, *On the Track of the Sasquatch*, pp. 67–68.
13. "Editorial," *NARN* 4, no. 2 (1970): 127–28.
14. Rigsby, "Some Pacific Northwest Native Language Names for the Sasquatch Phenomenon," *NARN* 5, no. 2 (1971): 153–56, and Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch," *NARN* 6, no. 1 (1972): 65–90. A collection of these papers has been published as *The Scientist Looks at the Sasquatch*, vol. 1, Anthropological Monographs of the University of Idaho no. 3 (Moscow, ID: University Press of Idaho, 1977), and vol. 2, Monograph no. 4 (1979).
15. I have only recently discovered that George Gibbs anticipated me by more than a century in commenting on this variation in attributes in a description of beliefs in Sasquatch-like beings in Washington (see Ella E. Clark, "George Gibbs' Account of Indian Mythology in Oregon and Washington Territories," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* (1955–56): 313–15.
16. Franz Boas, *Kwakiutl Culture as Reflected in Mythology*, Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, vol. 28 (New York: American Folklore Society, 1935), p. 146.
17. Ibid., pp. 144–46, 178.

John Colarusso

Ethnographic Information on a Wild Man of the Caucasus

While conducting research on the languages of the Northwest Caucasus, the author encountered a set of words which denote a manlike creature, native to that area of the Soviet Union, which is described as a hairy "half man and half beast" that lives in thick forests on mountainsides. This creature plays little part in local folklore; conversely it is considered a mundane beast which occasionally raids crops or waylays hunters. The author draws some parallels between the reputed linguistic, social, and ecological behaviour of the Caucasian Wild Man and that of the Sasquatch.

It is best at the very outset of this paper to make absolutely clear what will be discussed and asserted so that no confusions or misinterpretations will be permitted to form. First, there is no evidence whatsoever of a concrete nature known to the author that would allow one to infer scientifically that there was indeed some unknown species of hominid surviving in the Caucasus. This study, therefore, does not assert that such a creature exists. Second, the data examined are solely ethnographic, that is, they consist solely of facts about the beliefs in and attitudes toward a man-beast-like creature held by a particular Caucasian people, the Circassians, and indeed by a limited number of individuals from this group. In an important sense the paper is about the Circassians and their kinsmen, and only indirectly about a wild man. Third, these beliefs will be compared with those from Canada and the United States and speculation will be made as to what such a creature would be like, if in fact it were to exist. While not asserting the existence of any such creature, it would be negligent not to subject the data to some scrutiny and to assess their worth for any hypotheses that other workers might wish to construct concerning relict hominids.

The work which led to the present study involved etymologies. The languages under study were West and East Circassian, the latter also frequently covered by the rubric "Kabardian," Ubykh, Abkhaz, and Abaza. These form the Northwest Caucasian language family, originally spoken as their family name implies in the Northwest Caucasus mountain region of the U.S.S.R. There are emigré communities of these peoples, particularly Circassians, scattered throughout the Middle East and in a few cities in Europe and the U.S. My chief informant was Adnan Saygili, a young Abadzakh (West Circassian) speaker born in Turkey but living in Vienna, Austria. Further work was done with Rashid Dahabsu and Isa Tarquaho, both of the U.S., and by mail with several Abkhazian informants in the U.S.S.R. through the kind help of B. G. Hewitt of Cambridge, England. I had been working with Saygili on Circassian folklore, in particular fables, and had elicited several striking tales involving a cyclopean giant (see the appended table for this and other Northwest Caucasian terms). I had known of an Ubykh word usually glossed as "a fabulous being who lives in the forests." This word contained what appeared to be an Ubykh form for "montane forest." The words for "valley," "gorge," and "mountain slope" present etymological difficulties within this language family. I sought, therefore, to gain some etymological insights while furthering my inquiry into fables by asking Saygili if he knew the Abadzakh word for such a forest creature. Luckily he did. Not only did I acquire a satisfying etymology, but I unexpectedly came upon a surprising folk belief.

THE CONTENT OF THE BELIEF IN THE WILD MAN

Saygili asserted that he had been taken on a hunting trip to the mountains of eastern Turkey by his father. While there his father made efforts to familiarize him with the spoor of various animals. At one point he drew a rough impression that resembled a human footprint. He told Saygili that this was what the footprint of the "montane-forest-man" looked like and that if he ever came upon such a spoor not to try to track the creature. It was not dangerous, but might attack a lone hunter if the man were to wander into thick brush. Saygili's father further asserted that while he had never seen such spoor in Turkey, he had seen such tracks while hunting in the mountains of his native Caucasus. He believed that the creature did not live as far south as Turkey, but he felt that for the sake of thoroughness and safety he should tell his son about it nonetheless. Saygili said that the human-like footprints which his father drew were somewhat wider and "cruder" than what one would expect of a normal man's print. Unfortunately, no other details were obtainable on this matter of the prints. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of lore concerning such a wild man was obtained.

Saygili asserted that such a creature was commonly known by those Circassians who hunted frequently. It was said to be short, approximately five feet tall, to be covered with a brownish hair, to have an ugly, protruding face, to be very agile and strong, and to walk perfectly upright like a man. The face was also thought to be hairy, but some doubt was expressed over this. It was said to inhabit the thick forests on mountain slopes and in valleys, but would occasionally come down to villages where it would raid crops such as corn. It was thought to be smart or cunning, but nevertheless to be "half man and half animal." It should be noted here that while Saygili was training to be a civil engineer he seemed to have no knowledge whatsoever of modern paleontology or anthropology.

The most surprising aspect of this folk belief is the assertion, again by Saygili, that there were Circassian men in the various communities in Turkey who had gained great esteem for having gone into the mountains and traded with this wild man when they were still young men back in the Caucasus. It seems that at least two men were supposed to have gone as a team to a clearing on a forested mountain slope. This area was known to be one of several haunts of the wild man. The men would camp for some time with their trading goods on the ground in the clearing. After a day or two one of the wild men would appear at the edge of the clearing, concealing one side of his body behind a tree trunk while exposing the other. This was thought to be the head wild man, and the gesture involved was taken to be one of a desire to make contact. The men would open up their packages of goods and spread them on the ground. The wild man would then come forward with something, and some simple bartering would take place. Despite several efforts, I was unfortunately unable to ascertain what the items involved on either side might have been except that the human items were "trinkets" and the wild man's contributions were "vegetables and things." Nothing of any great economic importance, at least to the Circassians, was supposed to have been involved. The wild man was supposed to have engaged in active dickering, making extensive use of gesture and trying very inadequately to use a crude, broken Circassian. The dangerous part of this expedition was supposed to occur when the trading was finished and the men made their way back through the forest. The wild man trader was always presumed to be the head of a small band, the other members of which remained concealed in the underbrush while they watched the trading. The band would then stalk the men through the brush and would often attempt to waylay them in order to get any remaining trinkets or artifacts as well as to take back whatever items they had originally given to the men. The bravery displayed by the men in risking this kind of ambush was the basis for the esteem which such trading expeditions conferred upon the participants. It seems that hunters were also supposed to be subject to the danger of wild man attacks for the sake of their artifacts. It was thought that a wild man could kill a man in such an attack, but that the wild man was not a carnivore or a particularly fierce or savage creature. On the contrary, the wild man was held to be quite meek and furtive but inordinately fond of shiny artifacts and willing to use his cunning and strength to get them. For this reason, efforts were made to avoid him, and he was considered dangerous.

CIRCASSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WILD MAN

The most striking aspect of Saygili's story was his obviously indifferent attitude toward what he was telling me. Indeed, he seemed to view the supposed creature as a rather mundane beast. There seemed to be nothing special about the wild man except that he was a nuisance to farmers and a mild danger to hunters. He seemed to be too rare to be of any importance. When I tried to suggest that this wild man was comparable to the giant in the fables that Saygili had previously been relating to me, he became offended. He accused me of thinking him stupid and not able to tell a fairy tale from a real animal. He did not find the wild man interesting and was anxious to resume our work on folklore, a subject of ethnic pride that much more engaged his interest.

My two Bzhedukh (West Circassian) informants, Rashid Dahabsu and Isa Tarquaho, knew nothing of this wild man. In answer to my queries, Dahabsu sent me a clipping about the Himalayan yeti! Lore about such a creature is apparently more widespread among the Abkhaz and Abaza. Some of the Abkhaz had heard of it, but none had seen it, although people were known who might have seen it. For Ubykh, nearly extinct, the term was recorded by J. von Mészáros[1] but no ethnographic data was preserved. It would seem that terms for such a creature are widespread throughout the language family. West Circassian, Abkhaz, Abaza, and Ubykh each have one term. East Circassian has two. The universal term means either "mountain-man" or "montane-forest-man." A term unique to East Circassian means "mountain-den-mother" (see appendix).

The lore associated with such terms, however, appears to be restricted to those individuals who hunt or who lead a more bucolic existence. Unfortunately, most of my informants, apart from Saygili and his father, were from urban backgrounds. Their attitude to such wild man lore was comparable to ours: scepticism and some disbelief. This taken together with Saygili's and his father's attitude is interesting, because there appear to be no fairy tales or fables that contain this wild man as a character. It is not part of the general lore of these peoples but seems to be narrowly confined to particular economic sub-groups. Within the Northwest Caucasian's world the wild man is not a bogey man or a monster, but rather a mundane part of the Caucasian fauna. There is nothing fabulous about it in the eyes of those who believe it to exist. It is simply a nuisance.

ASSESSMENT OF THE WILD MAN LORE AND COMPARISON WITH THAT OF THE SASQUATCH AND BIGFOOT

Clearly the Caucasian wild man is supposed to be much smaller than our native Sasquatch or Bigfoot, again not asserting that the latter exists. Nevertheless, some similarities appear. The overall appearance of the Caucasian wild man and the Sasquatch are held to be similar.[2] Both are supposed to be "half man and half animal"; both are supposed to be covered with hair or fur that is in the main brownish; both are supposed to be quite ugly and to have prognathous faces; the footprints of both are supposedly wide and generally humanoid in outline. The posture of both involves an upright gait, a very human aspect. The wild man is known for his cunning, whereas reports of the Sasquatch rarely refer to any intellectual ability on the creature's part, though a few speak of it as showing some intelligence. The chief difference between the two creatures is size. The wild man is never supposed to exceed five feet whereas the Sasquatch is reported as ranging from six to ten feet and occasionally much taller. If there were such things, one would have to assume that they were entirely distinct races of early hominid, if not in fact different species or genuses.

The habitat of both creatures is supposed to be similar; thick forest appears to be a common element. It should be noted that whereas Sasquatch sightings do come from wooded areas that are not mountainous, the majority of reports come from the Pacific Northwest, a region of extensive montane forests. Such habitats present problems to any animal living in them in that they are low in nutrients.

If the Caucasian wild man and the Sasquatch were to be considered real, they would be most likely primitive hominids, considering their upright gait. Since all men and the gorilla and the chimpanzee among the higher apes are gregarious it would be surprising if a primitive hominid were to be truly solitary. Therefore, it would be most likely that relict hominids would be gregarious. Such a social structure would cause feeding problems in a montane forest environment. To solve these, any such creature would have to scatter widely to forage either singly or in pairs for long periods of time, coming together periodically for brief times in pre-selected territories. Such a picture would accord well with the notion that the wild man has haunts near certain woodland clearings. I know of no comparable assertions for the Sasquatch apart from the fact that some regions show a high incidence of sightings whereas others show very few. The significance of this, however, is unclear. It should be noted that the strategy of foraging in widely scattered small bands or as individuals is known to be used by various peoples in nutrient poor environments, such as some groups of Australian aborigines and most of the Shoshonean peoples of the American Great Basin.

Any hypothesis that held relict hominids to be gregarious must further lead to the hypothesis that such hominids would also have means of interspecies communication; that is, certain vocalizations, gestures, movements, and so on would be intended to convey information. There is one aspect of the behaviour of the Caucasian wild man that is striking: his peering from behind a tree as a gesture intended to initiate contact. Many Sasquatch reports mention a comparable behaviour.[3] People reporting such sightings seem frequently to infer that such behaviour is furtive. If the wild man is used for comparison, quite the contrary may be inferred. Such behavior might be construed as an effort to make contact. It would seem that to date the Sasquatch has been rebuffed in his efforts, perhaps unintentionally.

One might also expect relict hominids to have some primitive form of language. Some recent work on Neanderthal speech has emphasized the limited articulatory abilities of pre-modern man.[4] The crude attempts to speak in Circassian, reported for the Caucasian wild man, might not allow one to infer a great deal since Circassian and its sister tongues are extraordinarily complex, Bzhedukh (West Circassian) having sixty-eight consonants and Ubykh having perhaps eighty-one. Thus, it would not be surprising if such a wild man were to fail in his attempts to speak any such language. It should be noted, nonetheless, that Circassian and its sister languages exhibit an abundance of "guttural" sounds—palatals, velars, uvulars, pharyngeals, and laryngeals—all sounds made in the back of the mouth. It is just these sounds that are presumed to mark a linguistic innovation with modern man. Any relict hominid would find such sounds difficult if not impossible. The accounts of the linguistic shortcomings of the wild man are therefore consistent with modern theories of early hominid speech. As to the Sasquatch, I know of no solid information concerning any speech habits apart from the occasional report that mentions grunts or cries. Nonetheless, any investigator should be aware of the possibility that a creature such as a Sasquatch might have some rudimentary form of speech or "pre-language."

There is at least one folktale in Ubykh which contains a wild man.[5] The story is about a hunter who goes to a forest on a mountain slope and there kills a deer. While roasting the meat he hears a loud cry. Taking his food with him he climbs into a tree for safety, but leaves his shaggy wool cloak draped over a bush near the fire. To his astonishment and fright a wild man appears, covered all over with hair. The wild man looks about and seeing the cloak mistakes it for a man, whereupon he pounces on it. The hunter is frightened, takes aim with his pistol and fires at the wild man. The wild man's hair catches fire (apparently from the campfire) and he beats a retreat into the forest. The story then shifts. The hunter wanders into a beautiful plain where he encounters a giant bound to a stone. The giant asks him to bring him a hook made from the wood of the plant which blooms before all others, but bears fruit after all others. After one unsuccessful attempt he starts to cut a dogwood. He hears a voice that tells him not to touch the tree. He returns to the giant to tell him that he has been unable to find the plant. The giant is angered and curses at him. There is a sudden shift, and the giant asks him is there not abundance in the world, many sheep, lambs, and bees. The hero is non-commital, but demands to know why the giant wants such a hook. The giant replies that with such a hook he will be able to dig his sword out of the earth and go about doing what he intends to do. The hero refuses to help any further, knowing that if the giant were to retrieve his sword it would spell the end of the world and the human race. So ends the story.

A few brief comments are in order. There are two tales here, both fantastical, but of a clearly different quality. The only thing that is fantastic about the encounter with the wild man is the wild man himself. The second story involves a Prometheus-like figure, as Dumézil's and Namitok's title for the tale suggests. Themes of abundance, fertility, and doomsday are centered around this figure in a peculiar and largely unclear way. Unlike the Greek Prometheus, who brings fire and hence power to man, this giant is a destroyer of man and his world, a sort of anti-Prometheus. Therefore, there is little of the mundane and factual that characterizes the second story. It is very much a faery tale, whereas the first story has very much the air of an anecdote. There seems to be little association made between the wild man and the giant. The hero of the tale actually has a name, something which is not the case in many of the faery tales from this tradition. This suggests the possibility that the story may recount the adventures of an actual person and has become the vehicle for the tale of the anti-Prometheus. This would account for the poor integration of the two episodes. This implies, of course, that in the story teller's mind the tale of the encounter with the wild man and the tale of the anti-Prometheus are similar pieces (perhaps both are considered scary), and hence that the wild man and the giant may be considered similar beings or beings with like dramatic qualities. This may be a peculiarity of the narrator, Mr. Tevfik Esenç. Mr. Saygili, my Circassian informant, clearly had no connection between his notions of a wild man and of a giant.

The behaviour of the wild man is noteworthy. He pounces upon the shaggy wool cloak of the hero. The story says that the wild man mistakes the cloak for a man. Of course the wild man may have mistaken the cloak for an "ordinary" man wearing a cloak, but it is also possible that the wild man mistook the cloak for another shaggy wild man. Such conduct could be readily interpreted as territorial defense against other wild men. Going one step further, it is noteworthy that, unlike an animal, the wild man shows no fear of the fire, coming right up to it. If he takes the cloak for another wild man, this implies that he expects to find another wild man around a fire, hence that wild men know and use fire. But such speculations as these, built upon the slightest evidence, are, I freely admit, quite unprovable and perhaps even a little wild.

The aura of fable that surrounds the Sasquatch among native peoples[6] is conspicuously absent from the Northwest Caucasian lore of the wild man. Indeed the Caucasian lore is the type that one would expect for some actual local animal. This point bears emphasizing, for this is in some ways an atypical account of a wild man or Sasquatch-like monster in that it is considered quite mundane and plausible, lacking the cultural accoutrements that often go with monsters. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the creature exists or ever existed. Even an accumulation of comparable reports would only supply us with fuel for hypotheses and perhaps inspiration for a search for such a creature. Nothing short of a living specimen or recent remains of one would provide us with anything of lasting scientific value, however plausible reportings and accounts might be. With this said I must frankly confess that I do not know what to make of the Caucasian wild man.

TABLE: NORTHWEST CAUCASIAN WORDS FOR A CAUCASIAN WILD MAN[7]

I. The following are not cognates, but are patterned along similar lines so that they mean basically the same thing:

1) Bzhedukh (West Circassian) /qʷəśḥaƛ’/ ‘mountain-slope-man’
2) Kabardian (East Circassian) /q’ʷəśḥaƛ’/ ‘mountain-slope-man’
3) Turkish Abadzakh (West Circassian) /qʷəšʸḥaƛ’/ ‘mountain-slope-man’

from an original */qʷəśḥaƛ’/, built upon */qʷ(a)/ ‘mountain valley, ravine’[8], */śḥa/ from earlier */ƛḥa/ ‘mountain, montane forest, wooded side of a valley’, and */ƛ’ə/ ‘man’. The Proto-Circassian form */ƛḥa/ is cognate with the following form, /łaxá/ from Ubykh.

4) Ubykh /łaxatə̀t/ ‘a fabulous being who lives in the forests’,[9] literally ‘montane-forest-man’, from /łaxá/ ‘montane forest’ and /tə̀t/ ‘man’.
5) Abkhaz /(a-)bnawaʕʷə̀/ i) ‘shy boy’, ii) ‘forest-man’

This is a simple compound of /-bna/ ‘forest’ and /-waʕʷə̀/ ‘man, being’, with /a-/ the definite article, used as a noun-marker. That the Abkhaz word can mean both 'shy boy' as well as 'wild man' is nicely illustrative of a semantic shift, especially when one recalls the supposed furtive character of the wild man. This Abkhaz term is cognate, with some minor differences, with the following Abaza term.

6) Abaza /bnaʕʷə̀/ 'forest-man' or 'forest-being'
with /bna/ 'forest' and /-ʕʷə̀/ a suffix meaning 'man', 'being', or 'agent'.

II. The following term is from Kabardian. I know of no parallel term or construction in the other languages.

7) Kabardian (East Circassian) /ɣʷabğənaana/ 'den-mountain-mamma',

from /ɣʷa/ 'burrow, den, hole',[10] /bğə/ 'height, mountain, steep bank, etc.'[11] and /naana/ 'mamma, grandmother, granny',[12] a hypochoristic kinship term, but formally 'mother's mother'. One wonders what folk beliefs may have been or may still be associated with term (7).

III. The following terms denote a creature which is involved in a number of tales that closely parallel the Greek adventures of Odysseus and Polyphemus, the cyclops. There seems to be no connection whatsoever between this creature and its tales and the wild man and its lore.

8) Bzhedukh (West Circassian) /yənəź/ 'giant (with one eye)'
9) Turkish Abadzakh (West Circassian) /yənəžʸ/ 'giant (with one eye)'
10) Kabardian (East Circassian) /yənəź/ 'giant (with one eye)'

These are perhaps analyzable as /yə/ 'large', /-n-/ a connective particle found in compounds, and /-ź/ 'old, venerable'. The Circassian terms are cognate with the following Ubykh and Abaza forms.

11) Ubykh /yanə̀ż/ 'giant'
12) Abaza /aynəžʷ/ 'giant'

The Abkhaz from is unrelated to the above,

13) Abkhaz /a-dàw/ '(the) giant'.

Note: An * placed before a word denotes it as being hypothetical. The following symbols are used in addition to those in the Phonetic key: ḥ—a voiceless pharyngeal spirant, a harsh, *h*-like sound, almost as in gagging; ʕ^{w}—a rounded voiced pharyngeal spirant, similar to the previous sound but with a buzzing quality and a rounding of the lips; ǧ—a voiced palatal spirant, a drawn out, "gummy" version of *y*; ś—a voiceless alveo-palatal spirant, halfway between an *s* and a *sh*; ź—a voiced alveo-palatal spirant, like the preceding sound, but with a buzzing quality; ż—a voiced apico-alveolar spirant, like an English *z*, but made by bringing the tip of the tongue near the tooth ridge; in general, a superscript ^{w} indicates rounding of the lips.

Notes

1. *Die Päkhy Sprache* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
2. For reports of sightings, see John Green, *Bigfoot* (New York: Ballantine, 1973) and *Sasquatch: The Apes Among Us* (Saanichton, B.C.: Cheam Publishing and Hancock House, 1978); D. Hunter, with Rene Dahinden, *Sasquatch* (Scarborough, Ont : New American Library of Canada, 1973), and John Napier, *Bigfoot* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Berkeley Publishing, 1972).
3. For example, B. Rensberger, "Is It Bigfoot, or Can It Be Just a Hoax?" New York *Times*, 30 June 1976, pp. 39, 70.
4. P. Lieberman, "On the Evolution of Human Language," in *A Festschrift for Morris Halle*, eds. S.R. Anderson and P. Kiparsky (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 107–27.
5. Georges Dumézil and Aytek Namitok, "Recits oubykh," *Journal asiatique* 243 (1955): 1–47; see V. "Un Prométhée oubykh" on pp. 30–33.
6. See Wayne Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 1 (1972): 65–90, and his contribution to this volume.
7. For further reference, see X.S. Bgažba et al., *Russko-abxazskij slovar'* (Suxumi: Akademija Nauk Gruzinskoj SSR, Abxazskij Institut jazyka, literatury i istorii im D.I. Gulia, 1964); B.M. Kardanov and A.T. Bičoev, eds., *Russko-kabardinsko-čerkesskij slovar'* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Inostrannyx i Nacional'nyx Slovarej, 1955); and X.D. Žirov and N.B. Ékba, eds., *Russko-abazinskij slovar'* (Moscow: Čerkesskij Naučno-issledovatel'skij Institut, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Inostrannyx i Nacional'nyx Slovarej, 1956).
8. A.H. Kuipers, *A Dictionary of Proto-Circassian Roots* (Lisse, The Netherlands: Peter de Ridder Press, 1975), p. 71.
9. H. Vogt, *Dictionnaire de la Langue Oubykh* (Oslo: Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning, Universitetsforlaget, 1963), p. 144, 1030.
10. Kuipers, *Dictionary*, p. 77,
11. Ibid., p. 57.
12. Ibid., p. 89.

George W. Gill

Population Clines of the North American Sasquatch as Evidenced by Track Lengths and Estimated Statures[1]

This article notes that there is a striking degree of internal consistency amongst reports of purported Sasquatch sightings and footprints. The author applies zoological rules of distribution to the reported stature, track length, and fur colour of the creatures and finds that the conformity of sighted characteristics to these rules is high. He concludes that such evidence argues against considering all such sightings as hoaxes and that it supports the possibility that these beings are natural phenomena.

Scientific attention to the mystery of the North American Sasquatch has increased markedly over the past decade due to the rapidly expanding body of "soft evidence" for the actual existence of this giant hominid primate. Evidence for its existence consists of a large number of supposed eyewitness accounts reported by both American Indian and white hunters, trappers, and others;[2] reports, photographs, and casts of tracks;[3] feces and hair found near the tracks; a large body of American Indian folklore relating to the subject;[4] tape recordings of purported vocalizations; and the famous Patterson film which apparently shows a fleeing female Sasquatch.[5] Most reports come from the heavily forested region of western North America, extending from northern California in the south to British Columbia in the north, and encompass a temporal span of some ninety-four years. A few accounts do antedate these and come from the earliest centuries of European settlement.

Grover Krantz and John Napier have been the first physical anthropologists to undertake serious examination of much of this Bigfoot evidence. Even though some appear to be obvious hoaxes, the degree of internal consistency within most of them is striking. Napier, in his thorough examination of both track evidence and the supposed eyewitness reports, also notes this high degree of internal consistency. Regarding the tracks Napier states,

> There is a curious and persuasive consistency about the hourglass footprints. They present an aberrant but, nevertheless, uniform pattern. This is hard to reconcile with fakery. One might pose the question:

> who other than God or natural selection is sufficiently conversant with the subtleties of the human foot and the human walking style to 'design' an artificial foot which is so perfectly harmonious in terms of structure and function?[6]

Krantz provides further specific details about the unique anatomy of the Sasquatch foot.[7] He has discovered a large width of heel, a double ball, and an unusually straight row of similarly sized toes. Close examination of several of the more consistent and convincing sets of tracks reveal these features. He thinks these traits are due to changes in proportion of the various bones of the feet—an adaptation to great body weight upon a pair of bipedally adapted legs.

Even more convincing to Napier and some other scientists have been the Bossburg tracks, a series of 1,089 prints in all, from an area near Bossburg, Washington. The remarkable feature of the Bossburg tracks is that they appear to have been made by a crippled Sasquatch whose right foot was a clubfoot, technically referred to as *talipes-equino-varus.* Napier has diagnosed the deformity as most likely being the result of a crushing injury to the foot during childhood, a condition that would be almost impossible to deliberately fake.

John Green, journalist and author from Victoria, British Columbia, has collected over fifteen hundred Sasquatch reports over the past twenty years, and has noted a number of remarkable consistencies within them. Of particular interest here is his observation about range and distribution. He has noted that, "where the annual rainfall is under 20 inches a year there are hardly any sasquatch reports,"[8] as opposed to the situation in moister areas, especially in the Northwest, where sightings are frequent. Regarding this point Green goes on to say, "Why mankind's supposed need to imagine monsters should dry up where it doesn't rain much I will leave to someone else to explain."[9]

The particular kind of consistency within the reports considered here, however, is not the combination of features described either by Napier, Green, or Krantz (even though these certainly constitute important lines of evidence), but rather it is the consistent variation in size, geographically, of not only Sasquatch tracks but of the hypothetical animals themselves.

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

Attention to the Bigfoot reports led to the discovery of what was thought to be a clinal pattern within them regarding body size. Reports of both the tracks and the eyewitness sightings seemed to characterize a larger creature in the northern part of the hypothetical species range.

Subsequent compilation of data in 1973 (both track measurements and estimated statures) from the collections of reports available at that time, strongly reinforced this hypothesis (see Table 1). The particular reports utilized in that preliminary study were all of those listed by Napier,[10] a few others collected and published by Roger Patterson and not included by Napier,[11] additional Canadian reports compiled by John Green[12], and some 1973 Canadian newspaper accounts. *The Sasquatch File*, a more complete compilation of reports than the earlier ones, was not available at the time of preliminary analysis, but it has since been screened for pertinent information about both tracks and estimated statures. Also, additional files of more recent reports, from 1974 to the present, have since been offered for study. Comments concerning recent findings will be made at the end of this section.

The results of the preliminary investigation, listed in Table 1, show that the average length of tracks (n = 44) vary gradually in a south-north direction from an average of 15″ in California to 18½″ in Canada. Corresponding to this is a gradual increase in average stature, as estimated by alleged eyewitness observers (n = 47), from 7′4″ in California to 8′8″ in western Canada.

A statistical test of the Table 1 data shows that the clines are in all probability quite real and not the product of chance sampling bias. By plotting track lengths and estimated statures against latitude, regression lines were produced (Figure 1), and the t-test was applied to the slope estimates.[13]

Application of the t-test to the slope estimate of the track-length regression lines shows that if the true slope were zero, then the slope of .12 inches/degree of latitude shown in Figure 1 would have less than a 15 per cent chance of being produced. Application of the same test to the slope estimate of the stature regression(.0746 feet/degree of latitude) shows less than a 10 per cent chance that such a slope would exist in face of an actual slope of zero. The two regression lines, then, appear to be showing actual clines and not sampl-

TABLE 1: NORTH AMERICAN SASQUATCH SIZE VARIATION FOLLOWING BERGMANN'S RULE

Location	Tracks			Stature		
	Mean	No.	Range	Mean	No.	Range
California	15″	17	12½″–18″	7′4″	11	6′–9′
Oregon	$16\frac{9}{10}$″	5	13½″–20″	8′0″	7	6½′–9½′
Washington	$17\frac{1}{10}$″	15	13½″–22″	8′4″	12	7′–10′
W. Canada	18½″	7	15″–24″	8′8″	17	6½′–14′



FIGURE 1: LINEAR REGRESSION LINES AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS "R" FOR FOOT LENGTH AND ESTIMATED HEIGHT VS. LATITUDE

• = one point x = two points * = three points ing bias. This is not to say that the Sasquatch itself has to be real, only that the reported size variations are real and apparently regular from south to north.

All of this is of particular scientific interest because the suggested increase in body size from south to north within the hypothetical species range is exactly what one would predict in nature according to the well-known ecogeographical principle, Bergmann's Rule. Bergmann's Rule states that, among many species and genera of homeotherm vertebrates, those populations closer to the equator tend to have a smaller mean body size than those toward the poles at cooler latitudes. The size differences are thought to exist because of the relationship of body mass to exposed surface area. A large body simply has a smaller surface area per unit volume than does a small one, thus heat conservation is promoted in the cooler regions and heat loss



FIGURE 2: BODY SIZE (WEIGHT) CLINES WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL RACES OF *Homo sapiens*, SHOWING A MARKED CONFORMITY TO BERGMANN'S RULE

Source: Mark L. Weiss and Alan E. Mann, *Human Biology and Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

in warmer regions.[14] For many years North American hunters have known that the moose, coyote, wolf, and several other mammalian species vary in size according to this rule from south to north. Actual studies have been conducted on some of these, such as the cougar and the barren ground caribou; as well as several species of birds. Basically, these studies show conformity to Bergmann's Rule; the deviations among some of the bird populations probably result from local influences and other variables not well understood at present.

Perhaps more important to our concern here is the fact that the various geographical races of *Homo sapiens* likewise show marked conformity to Bergmann's Rule (Figure 2). Various studies of both stature and body weight over the years have tended to confirm this even though local exceptions do exist within human samples.[15] The reason that human conformity to Bergmann's Rule is of particular interest here, of course, is due to the assumed phylogenetic closeness of the alleged Sasquatch to *Homo sapiens.*

The very few recent reports that have been examined thus far (since the 1973 published data) seem to conform generally to the established clines, but a much broader study of this information will be necessary before anything meaningful can be said about trends within it.

Results of a recent tabulation from *The Sasquatch Flie*, however, have presented a few problems in terms of comparability with the earlier findings of our preliminary study. *The Sasquatch File* is no more current than the sources utilized in our 1973 preliminary analysis, but it is much more complete. It contains over two hundred reports from California to western Canada that contain mention of track lengths, estimated statures, or both. The tabulations from these data show a certain conformity to the patterns established in the preliminary study, but the clines are not as sharply defined. Furthermore, recent calculations by Green from his entire file (both published and unpublished reports) show the expected increases in track sizes and estimated statures only from California through Oregon, but *not* farther northward;[16] that is, from Washington through British Columbia sizes decline again. In fact, his reported sizes from Washington and western Canada are smaller than for either Oregon or California.

This raises the question of why the results differ between the various tabulations. Examination of procedures used in the three approaches does show some important differences between the sources used in the original study presented here and the later tabulations that draw from broader samples of reports. First of all, in the preliminary study those Sasquatches reported as definite juveniles were eliminated from the samples. This type of screening was not performed in Green's 1978 tabulation, nor was it in our own tabulation from *The Sasquatch File.* Screening becomes a more difficult task with a greater volume of reports and even more of a problem when only tracks are reported. Secondly, according to Green there are clearly more females and juveniles reported from the more northerly parts of the range, particularly in Canada, than from California or Oregon. Therefore, if Green's generalization bears up under the close scrutiny of future examination, it could certainly account for the drop in northern average statures found in both of the more recent, broader surveys. Lastly, the earlier published accounts which constitute the basis for the results presented here come from newspapers and popular books containing only the quite "readable" and sometimes sensational accounts, mostly of direct encounters with what appear to be in almost all instances male Sasquatches.

Therefore, at this point it would seem as though the only data studied thus far which actually traces from south to north a single age group (and to some extent a single sex group) is the original data of the preliminary study presented here. The other tabulations, as they come to include a broader spectrum of reports, seem to entail more and more reports of females and juveniles, and this then reduces or even reverses the cline.

Of course it is also possible (although statistically improbable) that the two clines have been produced fortuitously as a result of the relatively small samples in the initial study. In this case, if the clines are not real, then a broadening of the samples could also be expected to eventually remove all appearances of the clinal differences. Further study utilizing some established standard for screening reports to eliminate obvious hoaxes as well as reports of juveniles will likely settle the question as to whether the clines are real or have been accidentally produced by sampling bias.

Perhaps it should be mentioned at this point that during the screening of Sasquatch reports it appeared as though not only size but also coat colour varied in similar fashion from south to north. Coat colour variations do exist within mammalian species, and they do often vary by latitude. This zoological principle is sometimes referred to as Gloger's Rule, and holds that darker shades tend to occur more frequently in moister, warmer regions (such as the more southerly zones in North America) and that blonder tones are more frequent in cooler, drier places. Among the California and Oregon Bigfoot reports surveyed so far, only 13.6 per cent are reported beige or white in colour and the vast majority are listed as brown or black. In Washington and western Canada, on the other hand, 26 per cent are reported as beige or white. Still, the majority in Washington and Canada are reported as brown, reddish, or black, but the much larger percentage of light coat colours in the north may be significant. Since, however, Gloger's Rule is not well understood (and often imperfectly expressed within mammalian species), little more can be said about the whole subject of coat colour at this time.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present analysis of reports of alleged eyewitness sightings and tracks of the Sasquatch was undertaken as a result of the increasing seriousness of this anthropological mystery. The preliminary results of our study support the hypothesis that the Sasquatch actually exists, in that population clines in reported body size and track lengths (and apparently coat colour) not only seem to exist but conform to ecogeographical rules. Statistical tests applied to the track and stature data support the assumption that the clines are actual and not the function of sampling bias. Of course, the problems presented by the addition of more recent data and broader samples must be re-examined, and the generalizations presented here tested further. This will be accomplished by careful screening of additional reports with regard to age group and perhaps sex group. Also, attempts will be made to plot reported sizes against mean annual temperature within the hypothetical species range, not merely latitude. According to the principles of Bergmann's Rule this should produce a steeper cline since adaptive size features are actually more climatic than geographic.

If further analysis confirms the clinal patterns shown within this report, and in light of the fact that the reports constituting the data base for the study encompass a geographical span of over a thousand miles and a temporal span of ninety-four years, the likelihood of a hoax would appear minimal. The possibility of a hoax is still possible, however, even if the clines are eventually proven real. Such a hoax could be perpetrated perhaps by zoologists or other very knowledgeable individuals conversant in the basic tenets of Bergmann's and Gloger's Rules.

In summary, assuming that future analysis does demonstrate that random data have not fortuitously produced the meaningful results shown here, then the following alternate hypotheses must be listed as the two possible explanations for our results:

1. that the most complex and sophisticated hoax in the history of anthropology has continued for centuries without being exposed;
2. that the most manlike (and largest) non-human primate on earth has managed to survive in parts of North America and remains undiscovered by modern science.

Either conclusion appears totally preposterous in light of the problem-solving capability of modern science; yet, one of these two possible conclusions must be true.

Notes

1. Travel funds to the conference were provided by the University of Wyoming.
2. See Roger Patterson, *Do Abominable Snowmen of America Really Exist*? (Yakima, Wash.: Franklin Press, 1966); Don Hunter and Rene Dahinden, *Sasquatch* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973); John Green, *Bigfoot: On the Track of the Sasquatch* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), *The Sasquatch File* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1973), and *Sasquatch: The Apes among Us* (Sannichton, B.C.: Hancock House, 1978); and Peter Byrne, *The Search for Bigfoot: Monster, Myth or Man*? (New York: Pocket Books, 1975).
3. See Roderick Sprague and Grover S. Krantz, *The Scientist Looks at the Sasquatch* (Moscow, Idaho: University Press of Idaho, 1977) and John Napier, *Bigfoot: The Yeti and Sasquatch in Myth and Reality* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972).
4. See Wayne Suttles, "On the Cultural Track of the Sasquatch," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 1 (1972): 65–90.
5. See Hunter and Dahinden, *Sasquatch*, and Green, *The Apes among Us*.
6. Napier, *Bigfoot*, p. 123.
7. Grover S. Krantz, "Anatomy of the Sasquatch Foot," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 1 (1972): 91–103 and "Additional Notes on Sasquatch Foot Anatomy," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 6, no. 2 (1972): 230–41.
8. Green, *The Apes among Us*, p. 171.
9. Ibid., p. 172.
10. Napier, *Bigfoot*, Table 2, pp. 210–12.
11. See Patterson, *Abominable Snowmen of America*.
12. In *On the Track of the Sasquatch*.
13. A University of Wyoming colleague, R. Lynn Kirlin, plotted the regression lines and. performed the statistical tests. His contribution to the study is particularly significant because it required researching the reports that formed the data base for Table 1 in order to obtain the actual latitude for the sightings.
14. See L.S. Dillon, *Evolution: Concepts and Consequences* (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1973).
15. See C.S. Coon, "Some Problems of Human Variability and Natural Selection in Climate and Culture," *American Naturalist* 89 (1955): 257–80 and *The Living Races of Man* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).
16. In *The Apes among Us*.

R. Lynn Kirlin and Lasse Hertel

Estimates of Pitch and Vocal Tract Length from Recorded Vocalizations of Purported Bigfoot*

Having analyzed a taperecording of purported Bigfoot speech using accepted techniques of signal processing, the authors conclude that the means and ranges of the recorded pitch and estimated vocal tract length of the speakers indicate that the sounds were made by a creature with "vocal features corresponding to a larger physical size than man." They also conclude that the tape shows none of the expected signs of being prerecorded or rerecorded at altered speed and hence diminish the probability of a hoax.

This paper is based on the analysis of a tape recording which was received by the authors in the spring of 1977. The circumstances under which the recording was made were reported as follows. On the night of 21 October 1972, Alan Berry, a journalist presently living in Sacramento, California, participated in the recording of what he and others believed to be one or more Bigfoot.[1] The event took place in the High Sierras of northern California "at about 8500 feet in late October after the first snowfall, some 2000 feet higher than the nearest road and about eight miles distant to the nearest established trail."[2] There were previous and subsequent recordings by members of the group at the same location, but the recording of 21 October is of exceptionally high quality and allows direct processing of the vocalizations without first specially filtering the noise. In addition, there is a wide range of vocalization, much of which shows a human-like level of articulation. There are also considerable lengths of what might be termed moans, whines, growls, grunts, and even some whistles, which no primates other than man are known to produce. The phrase might be written, "Gob-uh-gob-uh-gob, ugh, muy tail." Other professionals have listened to the tapes and have expressed their opinions, which have essentially been qualitative.[3]

The authors of this paper are neither linguists, anthropologists, nor speech pathologists, but have skills applicable to the processing of signals, including speech. The information which might be derived from speech is considerable, but only some of it is useful in attempting to answer the questions raised by the existence of these recordings. Given the constraints of the available equipment, which is really quite state-of-the-art, the first problem to the researchers was to determine what features of the vocalizations might lead to a decision as to the authenticity of the tapes. It was quickly determined that pitch frequency, the rate of opening and closing of the glottis, would be easy to extract from vowel segments and should be indicative of vocalizer size, reasoning that an extraordinarily low distribution of pitch in comparison with that of human would correspond to heavier or larger vocal chords.

Subsequently, it was also realized that formant frequencies, the resonances in speech, are an indication of the size of the vocal tract. Indeed, a review of the literature showed that speech signals can provide estimates of not only vocal tract length but also vocal tract cross-sectional area as a function of distance from the glottis to the lips.[4] However, using present techniques, the area functions are apt to be quite inaccurate for small errors in length estimation. Therefore, only length estimates and not area estimates were subsequently found, but these are sufficient for statistical comparison with known lengths of potential vocalizers other than the hypothesized Bigfoot.

Estimates of both pitch and vocal tract length are therefore extracted from segments on the tapes. This information is displayed via scattergram of pitch versus length, which allows easy visual comparison with human data, probability intervals for which are shown on the same plot. This approach is suggested for comparing data with that of other potential vocalizers, and it also allows determination of results if tape speed were changed. Lastly, extrapolation of average pitch and length estimates to body size is given, corresponding to human proportions; the results indicate a significantly large size.

VOCAL TRACT LENGTH ESTIMATES

The known estimators of human vocal tract length all have inherent variances. An estimator, which we will refer to as L_1,[5] requires knowledge of both resonant and antiresonant frequencies, but was found by the authors to work fairly well with only the resonances (formants). A modification of that estimator, which we will call L_2, uses only known formants and iterates through possible tract lengths to find a "best" length.

A more recent paper by Wakita included considerable data on human inter-speaker formant variances and length estimates for each of nine English vowels.[6] This data allowed formulation by Kirlin of a third length estimator, L_3, using maximum *a posteriori* estimation, given the formants of the vowel.[7] L_3 is quite accurate for human speech. Without *a priori* information on the human tract lengths this estimator becomes a maximum-likelihood estimator,

L_4, which allows a greater, less accurate range of lengths, more appropriate to tracts which are larger than human but which are also human-like.

The human-like criteria for L_3 and L_4 warrants further comment. The literature dealing with speech production and the evolution of the necessary vocal tract reveals that tracts of non-human anthropoids are very different in that, when body size is normalized, human tracts are considerably longer.[8] This results from the fact that human vocal chords are low in the neck, whereas others are immediately at the rear of the oral cavity, as shown in Figure 1. This difference allows human-like tracts to produce certain unique plosive consonants (|g|, |k|, for example) and formant sets as in the vowels |i|, |a|, |u|.[9] Since |g| is used in the "gob" phrase on the tape, it cannot be produced by a known non-human-like anthropoid tract. That is, the speaker is either human or has a human-like tract. If it is human, the tract length will fall in the known range for humans. If it is exceptionally long, it is likely not human. However, if length falls within human range, that does not, of course, prove it to be human.

The estimators for tract length are given in Appendix A. All four were used and the results averaged. L_3 tends to force the results to be more typically human.

PITCH PERIOD ESTIMATION

The reciprocal of pitch frequency is pitch period. A nominal frequency for an adult male is 115 Hz, and the corresponding period is 8.7 milliseconds. Longer periods would indicate longer or thicker vocal chords. Due to the wide range of pitch for any human, much less all humans, only extremely low pitches (or long pitch periods) could be considered conclusive, barring tape speed changes.

Estimation algorithms for pitch are also of wide variety, but one which has been considered the best recently is that given by the cepstrum.[10] The cepstrum is defined as the inverse Fourier transform of the log-magnitude of the frequency spectrum. When a vowel is sustained for 30–50 milliseconds the resulting sound wave will normally contain several pitch periods. Processing the speech segment to yield a cepstrum produces a plot as is shown in Figure 2. The peak will occur at a time equal to the pitch period. Only those segments which have a well-defined pitch are used in the results.

FORMANT EXTRACTION

In order to estimate vocal tract length, resonances in vowel sounds must



FIGURE 1: SKETCHES OF SCALED CHIMPANZEE AND HUMAN VOCAL TRACTS SHOWING DIFFERENCE IN PLACEMENT OF VOCAL CHORDS AND DIFFERENCE IN TRACT LENGTH



FIGURE 2: CEPSTRUM PLOT SHOWING TYPICAL HUMAN PITCH MARKER

be determined. The preliminary results of this research utilized the windowed (or weighted) cepstrum technique,[11] which essentially removes frequency variations in the power spectrum which are due to the pitch-rate impulses of glottal pressure. However, the smoothed frequency spectrum which results by Fourier-transforming the windowed cepstrum still often contains ambiguous peaks which may be erroneously interpreted as formants. The tendency is to count too many low-frequency peaks as formants, thus effecting vocal tract length estimates which become too long.

A more accurate means of determining formants is provided by "linear prediction" techniques which have been developed over the last six to eight years.[12] Linear prediction algorithms make a least-squared-error fit to the speech segment, using a predetermined number of resonances. This technique is much preferred by the authors, and the results obtained are quite reliable.[13]

Formants themselves allow comparison with human data, and this is the subject of continuing work.

RESULTS

The resulting estimates of pitch and vocal tract length are plotted in the scattergram of Figure 4. Superimposed on the data points are region borders approximately corresponding to ninety-five per cent probability intervals around means for equivalent data from human males. Human pitch statistics are given in various literature, some of which is reproduced in Figure 3.[14]

It can be seen in Figure 4 that, even though both pitch and length esti-



FIGURE 3: SMOOTHED HISTOGRAMS OF PITCH PERIOD

Source: After L.R. Rabiner et al., "A Comparative Study of Several Pitch Detection Algorithms," *IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing* ASSP-24, no. 5 (October 1976): 399–423)



FIGURE 4. PITCH AND VOCAL TRACT LENGTH ESTIMATES WITH APPROXIMATE 95 PER CENT PROBABILITY REGION FOR NORMAL HUMAN MALE SUPERIMPOSED



FIGURE 5: SAME DATA AS IN FIGURE 4, BUT 95 PER CENT PROBABILITY CORRESPONDS TO LOW-PITCHED HUMAN MALE AND THE VOWEL ɜ WHICH REQUIRES A LONG TRACT LENGTH

mates vary considerably, the means and ranges indicate a creature with vocal features corresponding to a larger physical size than man.

Assuming 5′11″ to be the height for an average man, 115 Hz his average pitch, and 17.8 cm his average tract length, the creature or creatures on the recording, using all data shown, may be estimated to have a proportional height of 7′3″ by pitch or 6′4″ by tract length. Data from the "grr" or growl sounds alone shows quite different means, and yield heights of 8′2″ by pitch and 7′4″ by tract length.

Figure 5 repeats the same data, but superimposes the ninety-five per cent pitch and length region of a "deep voiced male" producing the vowel ɜ , which requires the longest human tract length. Note that the "grr" data falls outside this region.

The possibility of tape speed alteration should be considered. The effect of speed change on Figures 4 and 5 is easily determined. A speed-up on playback causes all recorded frequencies to appear higher; a slow-down on playback moves them lower. Playback slow-down is the situation of concern. Formant frequencies and pitch frequencies will both appear lower in proportion to the speed change. As both pitch period and vocal tract lengths are inversely proportionate to frequency, these estimates will be lengthened, both by the same proportion. For example, a tape slow-down by a factor of three would lengthen both pitch period and vocal tract length estimates by three; therefore, a data point will move along a line through the origin $\hat{p} = c\hat{L}$, where c is the constant which forces the line through the data point. This means that pitch-length ranges of any known creature could be shifted along lines of $\hat{p} = c\hat{L}$, as shown in Figure 6. Any resulting good match of these regions with the region of the Bigfoot data makes that creature a possible source of the vocalization, but on the basis of pitch and length comparison alone. Such a match concludes nothing with regard to linguistics or articulation rate. It is the opinion of the authors that the vocalizations on the tape were recorded at the speed they appear to be because the articulation rate and the range of vocal tract lengths are quite broad at constant pitch during the growl or "grr" sounds. However, the suggested matching of regions for other possible vocalizers should eventually be done.

Consideration of a human source should include the possibility of the human simply lowering his pitch. It should first be realized that 60–80 Hz pitches are difficult for most male humans to produce, and when one can it is with an accompanying decrease in volume which was not evident on the recordings.[15] An alternative possibility is prerecording with subsequent slow-down in playback, which would also proportionally increase vocal tract length estimates as shown in Figure 6. The mean pitch period estimate of about 12–13 milliseconds does show this corresponding lengthening of tract length with respect to the means of the other data, but the tract length



FIGURE 6: PITCH AND VOCAL TRACT LENGTH ESTIMATES WITH DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT OF DATA FOR TAPE SPEED ALTERATION SHOWN WITH APPROXIMATE 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR AVERAGE HUMAN PITCH AND TRACT LENGTH

range is considerably greater and not easily explained. A second alternative is prerecording with greater amplification or "close microphone" during segments of low pitch. Although this may be possible, examination of the original tape showed no 60 Hz frequencies, which would have been present in a prerecording if it had been recorded using alternating-current rather than battery power.[16] Thus any possible prerecording would fall under the constraints of battery power.

The possibility of prerecording normal language segments and rerecording by playing backward at varied speeds has been mentioned in some of the qualitative observations on spectrograms and listenings. The authors of this paper have played the tape backward and find no clearly identifiable speech. It should be realized that if any recording of any language were made and played backwards, eventually some phrase will occur which could "sound like" a known phrase in any language. Tape speed alteration is very unlikely in the "huu-u" and "gob" sequences because of the narrow range of vocal tract lengths extracted. Similarly, the growlings are quite consistent in pitch, even though tract length varies considerably. This fact is not consistent with tape speed alteration.

The possibility of more than one speaker, or even species, should also be explored. A look at the data in Figures 4 and 5 does show some gross separate clustering of tract length estimators between "grr" and the other data, but the two clusters overlap; the 2-σintervals are shown in Fig. 7. The sounds are potentially from the same species. The listener could very well imagine two creatures "conversing." (Three distinct sets of foot tracks were found the morning following the recordings session.) Vocal tract length estimates taken from these two separate segments do not show a significant difference, but even though pitch averages do, the suggestion of two creatures in these segments is not confirmed because wide pitch variations are too easy to produce. However, the "grr" cluster is a more acceptable reason for suspecting two creatures.

ANALYSIS OF THE WHISTLES

The recording contains some whistle exchanges between humans and the creatures. Analysis of the whistling is not included in the data groups used for analysis of pitch and vocal tract length, but is treated separately in this section.

There are two types of whistles found in the recordings. First, there are human types of whistling, both where there are no harmonics or formants present, and also where there are exact harmonics present, probably caused



FIGURE 7: TRACT LENGTH 95 PER CENT PROBABILITY REGIONS FROM VARIOUS TAPE SEGMENTS; NUMBER OF SAMPLES = N



FIGURE 8: SMOOTHED POWER SPECTRUM OF A TYPICAL HUMAN WHISTLE

by a saturated microphone. A smoothed power spectrum of a typical human whistle is shown in Figure 8. Note that there are no formants or harmonics present. The low frequency components are due to the noise from the airstream. Second, there are whistles which are found to have non-harmonic formant frequencies, but no pitches.

Table 1 shows for six data segments the three first formant frequencies together with their respective vocal tract length estimates.

TABLE 1: THE THREE FIRST FORMANTS AND THE ESTIMATED VOCAL TRACT LENGTHS FOR THE ABNORMAL WHISTLES

F_1	F_2	F_3	L_1	L_2	L_3	L_4	$\bar{L}$	$^{\sigma}L$
732	1610	2509	14.8	15.2	16.5	16.5	15.7	0.86
1040	1869	3012	10.9	12.0	14.7	13.4	12.7	1.63
855	2196	2585	11.4	11.8	13.7	12.0	12.2	1.02
1102	2175	3794	9.9	10.5	13.1	11.1	11.3	1.40
359	2083	3232	14.6	14.9	15.2	14.3	14.8	0.4
959	1764	2929	12.4	13.4	15.0	14.0	13.7	1.09
Average			14.7	13.6	12.3	13.0	13.4	1.07
Standard Deviation			2.00	1.86	1.19	1.89	1.65	0.43
Average Variation between Estimators $\bar{V} = 8.3\%$								



FIGURE 9: SMOOTHED POWER SPECTRUM OF A TYPICAL HUMAN WHISTLE, PRODUCED WITH A SATURATED MICROPHONE

By amplifying the whistle, the microphone can be saturated, and it will then produce harmonics as shown in Figure 9.

The formants were found using the linear prediction technique, and the values were checked using a smoothed power spectrum of each segment.

The formants and corresponding short vocal tract lengths found indicate the likelihood that the creatures could be able to whistle utilizing only a part of their vocal tract. If the creatures have a human-like vocal tract, they might be able to whistle using the constriction between the two vocal cavities. Such whistles can also be produced using some kind of a musical instrument, known to produce both harmonic and non-harmonic overtones.

CONCLUSIONS

The results indicate more than one speaker, one or more of which is of larger physical size than an average human adult male.

The formant frequencies found were clearly lower than for human data, and their distribution does not indicate that they were a product of human vocalizations and tape speed alteration. Although a time-varying speed could possibly produce such formant distributions, an objective hearing and the articulation rate do not support that hypothesis.

Statistical analysis was applied to groups of vocal tract estimates from different vocalizations, and a significant difference was found between the groups. When compared with human data the results indicated that there could possibly be three speakers, one of which is non-human. The average vocal tract length was found to be 20.2 cm. This is significantly longer than for a normal human male. Extrapolation of average estimators, using human proportions, gives height estimates of between 6′4″ and 8′2″.

Analysis of the rapid articulations in the beginning of the recording (gob-gob) resulted in human-like vocal tract lengths. Also, the sound /g/ in "gob" suggests a human-like vocal tract (two vocal cavities).

The pitch periods found cover the broad range of pitch periods for both normal human male and low pitched human male. However, they are mainly distributed around the data for the low-pitched human male.

Pitch and length estimates vary considerably but they are all found to be within the 95 per cent confidence interval for human speech with varying tape speed; however, assuming that there is only one vocalizer, then time-varying tape speed is necessary to produce data over such a wide range.

Both typical human whistles and some abnormal types of whistles were found. By using the formants from the abnormal whistles, very short vocal tract lengths were estimated. These whistles could either have been produced with some kind of a musical instrument or by the creature using only a part of its vocal tract.

It is hoped that the remaining uncertainties will not be considered reason for dismissing the recordings. The possibilities for prerecording are many, but there is no clear reason to believe it is likely. If Bigfoot is actually proven to exist, the vocalizations on these tapes may well be of great anthropological value, being a unique observation of Bigfoot in his natural environment.

Appendix: Vocal Tract Length Estimators

Four of the best vocal tract length estimators were used in producing the results in this paper.[17] All four involve a weighting of the speech signal's resonant and antiresonant (critical) frequencies f_k, $k = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$, which include the formants F_i, $k = 2i - 1$; that is, odd k correspond to the formants. Tract length is determined by [18]

$$\hat{L} = \frac{35300}{4\hat{f}_0} \text{ cm.} \tag{1}$$

where $\hat{f}_0$ is an estimate of a "fundamental" frequency which is the source of "harmonics" (the resonances), which can be thought of as being displaced from their normal position by the non-uniformity of the vocal tract tube.

Paige and Zue,[19] use

$$\hat{f}_0 = \Sigma(f_k/k)^2/\Sigma(f_k/k). \tag{2}$$

Knowledge of f_k for $k = 1, 3, 5$ gives the estimate L_1 through (2) and (1). Paige and Zue produced another estimator by choosing that $\hat{L}$ which, after extrapolating known f_k to higher $\hat{f}_k$ using the assumed $\hat{L}$, minimized the area-function perturbation. The estimator so produced is L_2.

Using formant mean and variance data listed by vowels and sex of speaker, given by Wakita,[20] Kirlin produced a third estimator,

$$L_3 = \frac{35300(\Sigma k^2/\sigma_k^2 + 1/\sigma_0^2)}{4\Sigma k f_k/\sigma_k^2 + \bar{f}_0/\sigma_0^2}, \tag{3}$$

where, over the speaker population and all vowels, σ_k^2, $= 1, 3, 5\ldots$, is the variance of the kth critical frequency, $\sigma_0^2 =$ the variance of the $\hat{f}_0$, and $\bar{f}_0$ is the mean tract length. By Wakita's data (mixed male and female), $\sigma_1 = 166$, $\sigma_3 = 417$, $\sigma_5 = 348$, $\sigma_0 = 62.3$ and $\bar{f}_0 = 537$.

If $\sigma_0^2 \rightarrow \infty$, L_3 becomes L_4, a maximum-likelihood estimator, which uses information about the variation of the formants, but not information about the population mean f_0. L_3 and L_4 are applicable to human-like vocal tracts.

The order of accuracy for humans is (best first) L_3, L_2, L_1, L_4, with the mean-squared errors (over nine vowels) ranging from 3.05 per cent to 10.4 per cent accepting Wakita's length estimates as correct.[21]

Notes

*This article includes, in addition to material presented at the Conference, data from Lasse Hertel, "An Application of Speech Processing Techniques to Recordings of Purported Bigfoot Vocalizations to Estimate Physical Parameters" (M.S. thesis, University of Wyoming, 1978).

1. A description of the circumstances surrounding the recording is given in Alan Berry and A. Slate, *Bigfoot* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), chapters 1, 2, and 3, and Appendix B.
2. Ibid.
3. Some of these are reproduced in ibid., Appendix B, including a spectrograph of about

four seconds of the recording, in which the "speech" is highly articulated and thus the subject of controversy.

4. See, especially, A. Paige and V. Zue, "Calculation of Vocal Tract Length," *IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics* 18, no. 3 (1970): 268–70, and "Computation of Vocal Tract Area Functions," *IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics* 18, no. 1 (1970): 7–18; M.R. Schroeder, "Determination of the Geometry of the Human Vocal Tract by Acoustic Measurements," *Journal of the Acoustic Society of America* 41, no. 4, part 2 (1967): 1002–10; P. Mermelstein, "Determination of the Vocal-Tract Shape from Measured Formant Frequencies," *Journal of the Acoustic Society of America* 41, no. 5 (1967): 1283–94; H. Wakita, "Direct Estimation of the Vocal Tract Shape by Inverse Filtering of Acoustic Speech Waveforms," *IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics* 21, no. 5 (1973): 417–27, and "Normalization of Vowels by Vocal-Tract Length and Its Application to Vowel Identification," *IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics* 25, no. 2 (1977): 183–92; and H. Wakita and A.H. Gray, Jr., "Numerical Determination of the Lip Impedance and Vocal Tract Area Functions," *IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroacoustics* 23, no. 6 (1975): 574–80.
5. See "Calculation of Vocal Tract Length."
6. "Direct Estimation of Vocal Tract Length."
7. R.L. Kirlin, "A Maximum A-Posteriori Estimation of Vocal Tract Length," *IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing* (Dec. 1978): 571-74.
8. See P. Lieberman, "On the Evolution of Language: A Unified View," in *Primate Functional Morphology and Evolution*, ed. Russell H. Tuttle (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1975).
9. Ibid.
10. See A.M. Noll, "Cepstrum Speech Determination," *Journal of the Acoustic Society of America* 41 (1967): 293–309, and L.R. Rabiner et al., "A Comparative Study of Several Speech Detection Algorithms," *IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing* 24, no. 5 (1976): 399–423.
11. See J.L. Flanagan, *Speech Analysis, Synthesis, and Perception* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1972).
12. See J.D. Markel and A.H. Gray, Jr., *Linear Prediction of Speech* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1976).
13. The computer algorithm is described in ibid. A polynomial root-finding subroutine is also required.
14. Reproduced from ibid. Vocal tract estimates for male humans are given in Wakita, "Normalization of Vowels."
15. Some pitches in the low sixties were recorded but are not shown in this data.
16. See Berry and Slate, *Bigfoot*, Appendix A.
17. A comparison of many vocal tract length estimators is given in Kirlin, "Maximum A-Posteriori Estimation."
18. See ibid. and Paige and Zue, "Calculation of Vocal Tract Length."
19. "Calculation of Vocal Tract Length."
20. In "Normalization of Vowels."

Vaughn M. Bryant, Jr., and Burleigh Trevor-Deutsch

Analysis of Feces and Hair Suspected to Be of Sasquatch Origin

The authors have examined five specimens of preserved feces and three specimens of animal hair suspected to be of Sasquatch or Bigfoot origin. They find that two of the fecal and two of the hair specimens are definitely attributable to known animals, but the remaining samples are not. Recognizing the limited sample studied, they call for further such analyses to ascertain the origin of the unidentified specimens.

The major problem associated with the phenomenon of Sasquatch is proof of its physical existence. Many types of circumstantial evidence already exist and are used by believers and skeptics alike. Believers consider that the Sasquatch phenomenon results from the existence of a large group of these creatures which have thus far eluded capture. These people also argue that each piece of circumstantial evidence by itself is not sufficient, yet when all the circumstantial evidence is combined, the proof for Sasquatch existence is overwhelming. Likewise, the skeptics argue that since all available evidence for the existence of this creature is purely circumstantial it cannot be used as convincing evidence of this creature's existence.

Our interest in Sasquatch spans a decade of research and effort. As biologists and anthropologists, we feel that the knowledge of these disciplines can bring new insight to the scientific study of certain types of phenomena, especially those for which only circumstantial evidence exists. We also hope that our studies may help to locate and identify some of the first tangible pieces of evidence that might help prove, beyond doubt, whether or not this creature actually exists. Our areas of research expertise pertain to the identification and evaluation of fossil and modern mammal hairs and to the analysis of mammalian fecal samples. These areas have become highly specialized over the past several decades, and we feel that the techniques developed for these disciplines can be applied to the search for the Sasquatch.

Obtaining well-documented fecal and hair samples of suspected Sasquatch origin has been difficult for several reasons. First, not many people who find those kinds of samples realize what they are or realize the important role the samples might play in proving the existence of these creatures. Second, some people believe that every hair or fecal sample found in a region of past or recent Sasquatch sightings must belong to that creature; and, third, even when a suspected fecal or hair sample has been located, few people know where to send it for analysis. In spite of these problems, we have had an opportunity to analyze several suspected Sasquatch hair and fecal samples. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to achieve the breakthrough we are seeking and thus, for the present, can only provide additional pieces of circumstantial data. However, we hope that this article we will make our research and our willingness to examine well-documented hair and fecal samples of suspected Sasquatch origin known to others. In this way we hope that someday we may find that one piece of conclusive evidence which might help move current Sasquatch research out of the realm of the circumstantial.

COPROLITE RESEARCH

Scientists have been conducting analyses of prehistoric fecal specimens, called coprolites, for more than one hundred and fifty years. Mantell was one of the first to investigate ancient coprolites when he examined specimens of preserved fish (probably shark) feces found in Cretaceous chalk deposits in Sussex, England.[1] His examination of those specimens did not reveal much evidence about the diets of ancient sharks, but he recognized the potential scientific value of those coprolites. For example, he noted that the coprolites could be used as one type of evidence for the past existence of sharks in the Sussex region more than a hundred million years ago when the Cretaceous chalk deposits were being formed.

Other investigations of non-human coprolites followed, many of which are summarized in a recent book on coprolite research.[2] However, it was the later research on preserved human feces that helped to provide the greatest amount of coprolite data and which eventually led to the refined methodology which we are currently applying to our studies of suspected Sasquatch fecal specimens.

Harshberger may have been the first to realize the potential value of prehistoric human coprolites when he suggested that the undigested seeds and bones found in the feces of prehistoric man not only proved man's presence, but also could be used as a clue to the understanding of prehistoric human diets.[3] For the next sixty years few other scientists examined prehistoric human coprolites, mainly because no one had yet discovered a useful method of analysis that would prevent damage to the delicate tissue remains of animals and plants contained in coprolite specimens. Early investigators, such as Jones,[4] employed mortar and pestle to crush dried human coprolites and found that they contained the remains of seeds, acorns, and hickory nuts. Later, Webb and Baby broke open human coprolites recovered from caves in eastern Kentucky and found that the samples contained the remains of seeds and insects which were once part of prehistoric man's diet.[5] The next year, MacNeish noted that he had found broken fragments of ancient human coprolites in Mexico which contained evidence that prehistoric man in that area had eaten a diet of snails, insects, squash, and maguay.[6] Each of these early researchers provided data concerning man's ancient dietary record, but each was unable to derive a complete list of prehistoric diets since they had had to break or crush the coprolite specimens in order or examine the material inside. In doing so they inadvertently destroyed evidence of fragile components.

The real breakthrough in coprolite research occurred in 1950, when two Canadians[7] discovered a new method of coprolite reconstitution which returned the ancient dried specimens to their original moist condition and permitted the careful separation and analysis of all components. This new technique led to an expansion in coprolite work because it provided scientists with a processing technique that permitted a more precise evaluation of dietary components and also allowed researchers to examine for remains of fragile items such as parasite eggs and cysts. Unfortunately, one side effect of the newly discovered technique was that during the processing phase it allowed ancient coprolites to emit a noxious odor similar to the odor of fresh feces.

Another new development in coprolite research occurred when Martin and Sharrock introduced the idea of searching for preserved pollen in human coprolite specimens.[8] This approach not only provided new data on dietary components, but also permitted speculation concerning the season in which individual coprolites may have been deposited.

During the 1960's, Eric Callen became the recognized leader in coprolite research and after his untimely death in 1970, Texas A&M University became the new centre for coprolite research.[9] Since 1970 we have tried to continue the fine example set by Callen.[10]

At the Texas A&M University Anthropology Laboratory coprolite samples, such as those of suspected Sasquatch origin, are initially measured, weighed, and photographed, and their general appearance is described before the laboratory process is begun. Next, the samples are thoroughly cleaned in order to remove any surface contamination which may have adhered after the coprolite was deposited. Once cleaned, coprolite samples are subdivided for analysis and then placed in airtight containers. The amount of coprolite that is actually used for analysis varies. In some cases, where large-size specimens are available, a relatively large portion can be analyzed. In other cases, only a very small fragment is available for analysis.

Once the fecal material is selected for analysis, each specimen is placed in an airtight container, and to each sample is added a 0.5 per cent trisodium phosphate solution. The strength of the solution must be carefully regulated since Callen[11] showed that concentrations greater than 0.5 per cent will destroy the middle lamella of plant cells and thus cause the destruction of delicate plant tissues. Samples are then sealed and allowed to soak for periods ranging from three days to several weeks. The length of time needed to soak each sample is dependent upon a number of factors; however, deterioration does not seem to occur even after prolonged periods in the solution. For example, our studies have shown that there is no detectable sample deterioration even when coprolite specimens are allowed to soak for periods of up to three years.

When the rehydration process is complete, a notation is made of its colour, smell, and whether or not a thin scum appears on the surface. According to Callen,[12] the presence of a thin surface scum is an indication that meat was a part of the diet. Once these data are recorded, the material is processed through a series of clean brass screens. During this process the larger pieces of debris that are trapped on each screen are gently agitated to liberate any trapped pollen grains. The residue on each screen is stored for later analysis. The filtrate is then centrifuged and analyzed for pollen.

It is often difficult to determine the precise identity of a coprolite producer. To solve this potential problem identification is made at three stages of analysis: during the initial examination prior to reconstitution; during reconstitution; and during the analysis of coprolite contents.

Prior to reconstitution, the shapes of coprolites can give clues as to their origins. Fecal pellets from certain types of rodents, such as mice, pack rats, gophers, and moles, and from many herbivores, such as elk, deer, antelope, sheep, rabbits, and horses, can easily be recognized by their shapes. Coprolites from large carnivores are characterized by their hard outer coating of dried intestinal lubricant secreted as protection against intestinal wall perforation by ingested bone fragments. However, it is often more difficult to distinguish human specimens from animal coprolites which may be shaped like those of humans. The problem is compounded when samples have been crushed or fragmented. Another factor that makes fecal identification of samples from humans difficult is the great variety of shapes and sizes found in stools which result from varied methods of consumption or from widely varying human diets.

During chemical reconstitution, additional clues as to coprolite origin can be found. When they are placed in a trisodium phosphate reconstitutive solution, the liquid generally becomes tinted within seventy-two hours. The resulting colour and the degree of transparency are fairly reliable indicators of coprolite origin. Coprolites from carnivores usually leave the trisodium phosphate solution colourless or turn it pale brown to yellow-brown in colour. Transparency of the liquid is unchanged. Herbivores' coprolites turn the reconstitutive solution pale yellow to light brown in colour and do not change the fluid's transparency. Human coprolites, on the other hand, turn the trisodium phosphate solution dark brown to black and render it opaque. There is one additional clue that can be of use at this second level of identification—odor. In our experience, most non-human coprolites generally emit a musty odor during rehydration. Human coprolites, on the other hand, produce an intense fecal odor.

At the final stage, during the actual analysis of coprolite contents, coprolites can be separated based upon probable origin. Since herbivores generally eat a purely vegetal diet of foods such as grasses, leaves, and twigs, coprolite specimens that are composed entirely of these components probably represent the fecal remains of these types of animals. The carnivore diet consist mainly of animal tissues, thus their coprolites almost always contain traces of hair, bone fragments, feathers, scales, and insect exoskeletons. On the other hand, coprolites from omnivorous animals, such as bears and man, often contain the remains of both plant and animal debris. Therefore, knowing the diets of the potential animal sources of coprolites being examined is always useful. Unfortunately, in the case of Sasquatch this is a luxury we do not enjoy, even though some writers do discuss suspected dietary habits.[13]

Eyewitness accounts do offer some indications about the diet of Sasquatch. John Green reported that, based on newspaper reports, personal letters, and eyewitness accounts, Sasquatch is probably an omnivore. Among dietary items which apparently are most favoured by Sasquatch are: tree roots, grass, berries, deer meat, and garbage. Other foods apparently eaten in lesser quantities include: bear, sheep, chickens, cows, horses, rodents and other small animals, grubs, clams, fish, salmon, leaves and evergreen buds, grapes, flour, eggs and bacon, milk, and doughnuts. Green pointed out that nine of the reliable eyewitness reports refer to Sasquatch eating vegetal foods while only four refer to eating of meat.[14]

It is difficult to use the above data to formulate a Sasquatch dietary pattern, yet they do suggest a preference for vegetal foods. However, one fact is certain: if Sasquatch does exist, its primary diet item is not the meat of domestic animals such as cows, horses, sheep, or goats. Modern history shows that animals like the wolf, coyote, puma, cougar, and eagle have been hunted to near extinction because they have occasionally preyed upon domestic animals. If Sasquatch regularly preyed on livestock, then surely one would have been killed by now.

HAIR RESEARCH

The analysis of suspected Sasquatch hair specimens holds more promise of providing conclusive evidence for the existence of Sasquatch than does coprolite research. However, the advantage of coprolite analysis is that it can provide far more data and a greater variety of information than can the analysis of a single hair sample.

Our laboratory has thus far examined a number of suspected Sasquatch hairs. However, we were not the first to search for suspected Sasquatch hair specimens. John Green reported that in 1968 Wayne Twitchell found six hairs on a bush near Riggins, Idaho, near a reported sighting of two Sasquatch.[15] The hair specimens were sent for analysis to Ray Pinker, an instructor of police science at California State College in Los Angeles. His study revealed that the hairs did not match specimens from any known animal species and that they had some characteristics common to both humans and non-humans. In his final report, Pinker stated that he could not identify the hairs until he had had an opportunity to examine some authentic Sasquatch hair specimens.

Other people have collected and, in some cases, have sent suspected Sasquatch hair specimens to various laboratories for analysis. As reported by Green and John Napier,[16] some of the hair samples have been identified as being from known animals, yet others cannot be attributed to any known animal species.

During the past few months, we have spoken with several other scientists who, like us, are involved in the analysis of hair specimens thought to be associated with the suspected Sasquatch. However, to date neither they nor we have yet found a single hair specimen which we can definitely attribute to being of Sasquatch origin. Some of our hair specimens are puzzling and are not yet identified because they show similarities to certain known mammals yet are not identical to known hair samples from those mammals. We hope that as our research continues we will soon be able to determine whether or not these unknown hair specimens are from some as yet unknown animal group.

HAIR ANALYSIS

Mammal pelage is composed of several types of hair which are classified as guard hairs, body or underfur hairs, and bristles. The most useful type is guard hair. These are generally long and spear-shaped. Beneath the guard hairs are the softer, finer body or underfur hairs. They are often short, can be curly or straight, and are usually the same diameter throughout their entire length. It is the body hairs which provide most mammals with insulation and protection against the natural elements. Bristles, when present, are generally long, stiff, and straight, and often serve as sensory organs, as with the whiskers of most mammals.

Hair identification is sometimes difficult since many mammals grow two sets of pelage each year; a thinner, shorter one in summer and a longer, denser one during the winter. In some animal species the problem of hair identification is further complicated by seasonal changes in hair colour. Other identification problems can occur with the hairs of some animal species in which juveniles have hair colouration patterns which differ from those of mature adults. Despite these difficulties, morphological clues remain sufficiently constant so that accurate hair identifications, at least to the generic level, can generally be accomplished.

Typically, the structure of a mammal hair can be divided into three parts: the medulla, the cortex and the outer cuticle.[17] The central portion of a mammal hair often contains a medulla region, yet in some cases, as with man, this structure may be largely absent. When present, the medulla can be categorized as being: continuous (air spaces arranged in the form of a column); intermediate (separate air spaces arranged in a pattern); discontinuous (air spaces present but widely separated in the medulla); or fragmented (air spaces arranged in an irregular manner).[18] Surrounding the medulla is a dense, amorphous layer of keratin called the cortex. It makes up the bulk of a hair and contains most of the pigmentation. Outside the cortex is a layer of flat, overlapping, keratinized cells called the cuticular scales. It is the combined characteristics of these three structures, along with the hair colour, that are used for making identification of mammal hairs. This is possible since each animal species produces hair which contains a unique combination of the above characteristics.

SUMMARY

Thus far, we have examined five coprolite samples of suspected Sasquatch origin. Two of the fecal specimens were found in the Pacific Northwest region. We were unable to use the coprolite analysis to confirm the identity of the animal which deposited these samples. Our analysis showed that in almost every respect these samples were similar. However, some minor differences did exist. One sample did not contain any conifer needles. This could have reflected a slightly different diet preference, sampling bias due to having only one sample from each locale, or it could have meant that these samples reflected the diets of two different animal species. The pollen content of each coprolite was also somewhat different, but that was expected since the samples were recovered from different locales, each of which was characterized by different flora. We consider that the specimens could have been deposited by a cow or by some other large animal which had similar eating habits—a diet composed entirely of plant foods—and which produces large, unsegmented fecal masses. For both specimens we are able to rule out many large animals such as man, moose, elk, deer, and bear as being the organism that produced these samples.

The three remaining coprolite samples we have examined were collected on Mound Key in Florida. Everything about these specimens was radically different from the two coprolite specimens we examined from the Pacific Northwest. All three samples consisted primarily of remains of non-vegetal diets, only one containing a significant amount of any vegetal material (grass stems and leaves). None of these samples contained parasites. The Florida samples were produced by an organism or organisms which ate mainly small mammals, insects, birds, and crustaceans. One sample resembled coprolites produced by owls; however we cannot be certain that it was of owl origin. Two other samples were similar in many respects (smell, colour, dietary components) yet could have been produced by either the same or two different kinds of animals. The origin of these three coprolites remains a mystery. None of the specimens appear to be of human origin and whether or not they were of Sasquatch origin remains unknown.

As is the case with many scientists working with other types of Sasquatch evidence, we have not yet found a hair specimen which could be used as conclusive evidence to prove the existence of this creature. We have received specimens from three locations, each associated with Sasquatch sightings or footprints—two in California and one in Idaho. One set of hair specimens was that originally sent to Ray Pinker for identification. We have now had an opportunity to examine the hairs ourselves and have thus far been unable to match them to the hairs of any known animal. However, we are planning to send these hairs to other scientists and also plan to expand our own hair reference collection before we arrive at any definite conclusion concerning these hairs. Another hair sample expresses its greatest diameter at the base, a rare morphological trait which is typical of the tail hair of domestic cows. Also, the lack of a well-defined medulla region adds further strength to our conclusion that this hair came from the tail of a domestic cow (*Bos taurus*). The remaining samples have a granular medulla like that found in the hair of the black bear and not like the small discontinuous hair medulla characteristically found in anthropoids. On the basis of size, colour, and medulla structure and based upon comparisons with our collections of reference hairs, we conclude that these samples are from the black bear (*Ursus americanus*).

As scientists, we remain open-minded about the possibility of the existence of Sasquatch. A decade of research has shown us that there are many aspects about the Sasquatch phenomenon which cannot easily be attributed to any known animal species or be easily explained as fakery. However, from our studies there remains no conclusive evidence for or against the existence of Sasquatch and, as such, its existence remains an open question.

TABLE: MACROFOSSIL CONTENTS OF UNIDENTIFIED COPROLITE SAMPLES FROM MOUND KEY, FLORIDA

Macrofossil	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Mammal hair	A	F	C
Mammal bones			A
Reptile bones	B		
Reptile skin and scales	A		
Grass stems and leaves	A		
Insect chitin	C	A	A
Feathers	B		B
Bird bones			A
Seeds	A		
Diatoms			A
Phytoliths			A
Crustacean fragments	C		A

Key: A = 0–5%; B = 6–25%; C = 26–50%; D = 51–75%; E = 76–95%; F = 96–100%

Notes

1. See G.A. Mantell, *The Fossils of the South Downs; Or Illustrations of the Geology of Sussex* (London, 1822).
2. Walter Hantzschel et al., *Coprolites: An Annotated Bibliography*, Geological Society of America Memoir no. 108 (Boulder, Col.: G.J.A, 1968) pp. 1–132.

3. See J.W. Harshberger, "The Purpose of Ethnobotany," *American Antiquarian* 17, no. 2 (1896): 73–81.
4. See Volney H. Jones, "The Vegetal Remains of Newt Kash Hollow Shelter," *University of Kentucky Reports in Archeology and Anthropology* 3, no. 4 (1936): 147–65.
5. W.S. Webb and R.S. Baby, *The Adena People, No. 2* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1957).
6. Richard S. MacNeish, "Preliminary Archeological Investigations in the Sierra de Tamaulipas, Mexico," *American Philosophical Society Transactions* 44, no. 5 (1958).
7. See Eric O. Callen and T.W.M. Cameron, "A Prehistoric Diet Revealed in Coprolites," *New Scientist* 8, no. 190 (1960): 35–40.
8. See Paul S. Martin and F.W. Sharrock, "Pollen Analysis of Prehistoric Human Feces: A New Approach to Ethnobotany," *American Antiquity* 30, no. 2 (1964): 168–80.
9. Callen's reputation stems from a series of articles: "Diet as Revealed by Coprolites," in *Science and Archeology* (London: [?], 1963), pp. 186–94, "Food Habits of Some Pre-Columbian Indians," *Economic Botany* 19, no. 4 (1965): 335–43, "Analysis of the Tehuacan Coprolites," in *The Prehistory of the Tehuacan Valley: Vol. 1, Environment and Subsistence* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), pp. 261–89, and "Les Coprolithes de la Cabane Acheuleene du Lazaret: Analyse and Diagnostic," *Memoires de la Societe Prehistorique Francaise* 7 (1969): 123–24.
10. Results of this research are published in Vaughn M. Bryant, Jr., "Prehistoric Diet in Southwest Texas: The Coprolite Evidence," *American Antiquity* 39, no. 3 (1974): 250–74, "Pollen Analysis of Prehistoric Feces from Mammoth Cave, Kentucky," in *Archeology of the Mammoth Cave Area* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 203–9, "Pollen as an Indicator of Prehistoric Diets in Coahuila, Mexico," *Bulletin of the Texas Archeological Society* 45 (1975): 87–106; Vaughn M. Bryant, Jr., and Glenna Williams-Dean, "The Coprolites of Man," *Scientific American* 232, no. 1 (1975): 100–109; and Burleigh Trevor-Deutsch and V.M. Bryant, Jr., "Analysis of Suspected Human Coprolites from Terra Amata, Nice, France," *Journal of Archeological Science* 5 (1978): 387–90.
11. See "Tehuacan Coprolites."
12. Ibid.
13. Such as John Green, *The Sasquatch File* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1973) and John Napier, *Bigfoot: The Yeti and Sasquatch in Myth and Reality* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1973).
14. John Green, *Year of the Sasquatch* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1970).
15. *On the Track of the Sasquatch* (Agassiz, B.C.: Cheam Publishing, 1969).
16. Green, ibid., and *Sasquatch: The Apes among Us* (Saanichton, B.C.: Hancock House, 1978); Napier, *Bigfoot.*
17. See Martin F. Brown, "The Microscopy of Mammalian Hair for Anthropologists," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 85, no. 3 (1942): 250–74.
18. See Charles L. Douglas, "Biological Techniques in Archeology," *American Antiquity* 31, no. 2, part 2 (1965): 193–201.

Michael M. Ames

Epilogue to *Manlike Monsters On Trial*

If monsters did not exist we would invent them, because we need them. And there lies the problem regarding the Sasquatch and other humanoid monsters. It is easy to make a case for monsters being inventions of culture; it is more difficult to demonstrate that they might also exist as creatures of nature, roaming real forests as well as the forests of the human mind. However, the urge to "prove" the natural existence of these anonymous creatures is a persisting one. Though neither the U.B.C. Conference on Humanoid Monsters nor this publication that resulted from it will likely satisfy that urge, the papers and discussions do suggest directions for further research and, the editors hope, will also help to establish parameters within which that work can be carried out.

Probably the strongest point established at the conference was the ubiquity of humanoid monsters through both time and space, from ancient times to the present, from the Wild Man of Europe to the little people of Newfoundland, from wood sprites to hairy giants, from little fox people to stone-clad ogres, and, of course, the Sasquatch in its various manifestations. Most of these creatures share in common wilderness habitats threatened by the expansion of human settlements or resource industries; but they also differ from one another in many ways. Anthropologists attending the conference were quick to emphasize that the principle of cultural relativity applied equally to monsters. Humanoid monsters, or at least beliefs in them, may be widespread, but we are advised that their meaning is determined by specific cultural contexts.

Even whether or not they can be recognized seems to be dictated by cultural categories of perception. The Wild Man of the Woods means one thing to the Salish Indian on the Pacific coast of North America, and something else to white man, though we now customarily refer to both by the terms Sasquatch or Bigfoot. But applying the same label to disparate phenomenon does not make them more alike. On the other hand, as John Green pointed out at the conference, whether an Indian said he saw a Sasquatch, he is at least saying that he saw something; whatever the meaning the Indian ascribed to the sighting, it nevertheless remains a report of an anomaly from the point of view of the investigator. And yet, to go one step further, what one considers to be anomalous may also be culturally conditioned. Since the Newfoundland world view does not include the Sasquatch as a possibility, Michael Taft writes, unusual sightings are more likely to be reported as bears or wild Indians. The Sasquatch may very well be lurking in the forests of Newfoundland, but people are unable to recognize it because of their perceptual categories. People, Taft argues, are inclined to view most phenomena in those conceptual terms which seem most logical to them. If we accept that possibility, however, then we must also grant another: that the Sasquatch may not be lurking in the western forests, but people nevertheless "see it" because of their perceptual expectations. "The instrument of the search will determine the nature of what is found," Graburn asserts, "and the instrument is the human mind, in its particular cultural milieu, with all the technical equipment that the culture puts at its command."

Most anthropologists, then, readily accept the proposition that humanoid monsters are cultural creations. But might they also be creatures of nature, actual living beings? This question was asked over and over again at the conference, and though participants, and representatives of the media reporting the event, took sides, most agreed that no generally acceptable answer was available. And though some expressed cautious interest in footprints and in the Patterson film, most of the participants concurred with Grover Krantz's statement that only an actual specimen would resolve the debate. I suspect it will take more than one specimen to satisfy the skeptics—preferably a tribe of them for anthropologists to study at their leisure.

One of the nicest things about monsters is that they lend themselves to interesting debates, and one of the more enlightening discussions during the conference concerned the role of evidence and the nature of the scientific method. How are we to deal with anomalous creatures? What are the proper relations between the scientific establishment and those amateurs, like the Sasquatch investigators, who toil on the frontiers of knowledge? How can members of the scholarly establishment resolve the contradiction between their commitment to the fundamental importance of free inquiry and the intellectual conservatism that derives from their scientific skepticism? To what extent should a scholar risk his or her professional reputation by pursuing non-respectable topics? Are amateur investigators denied research support because they lack professional credentials or because they, too, pursue illicit topics? Once again, none of the questions were answered very clearly or to the satisfaction of many people, and it is doubtful that anyone changed his or her opinions on the major issues. The debates nevertheless did serve to highlight the important problems.

One useful point made was the need to appreciate the necessary limitations of science: its inherent skepticism, its conservative attitude towards evidence, its concentration on the known and knowable, and its dealing with probabilities rather than certainties. Normal science is most efficiently pursued by ignoring anomalies and by mistrusting circumstantial evidence.

The conference also engendered a greater respect for the role of amateur investigators, those individuals who, for whatever reasons, feel impelled to go beyond the boundaries of established knowledge and to stretch their investigations beyond the limits of established scientific methods. It is not suggested here, however, that professional scientists and the amateur investigators should accept one another's standards and interests, as some advocated during the debates. To turn one perspective into the other, either by expanding the limits of science or by limiting the freedom of amateurs, would destroy the potentially creative contradictions that exist between the two. The urge to probe beyond the realm of established knowledge and certainty, to explore the anomalous and unknown worlds, and to criticize the scientific establishment for its self-interested motivation is no less important than the practice of science itself. At the same time, however, it is important to reaffirm the value of a scientific establishment that is conservative about the rule of evidence, respects its own theories, and pursues its own intellectual interests rather than those of outsiders. Both perspectives are needed, each doing what it alone can do best, though each should be continuously exposed to the other, with their contradictions expressed through creative criticism. The professionals and the amateurs can help to keep one another honest. Possibly the greatest success of the Monster Conference was that it brought professional scientists and amateur investigators together in a setting where they were able to talk to one another rationally and with good humour. People actually listened to one another, a major achievement for any conference.

How, then, are we to account for these human/animal-like Sasquatch monsters? Do they actually exist as a part of nature; or, if not, how do we account for widespread beliefs in them? The evidence for existence is scattered, circumstantial, and heavily laden with mythology, so discussions of existence usually devolve into epistemological debates regarding the nature of evidence, the origin of perceptions, the reliability of witnesses, and the need for physical specimens. The few scientific analyses of "physical evidence" presented were considerably more sophisticated than the data on which they were based. There is always the danger, Richard Preston observed on one occasion, that we may overwhelm little known phenomena by our elaborate methodologies and interpretations. And indeed, this may very well be the destiny of the lonely Sasquatch, to be perpetually obscured by those who try hardest to discover it. Anthropologists are more at ease dealing with the realm of beliefs, with the cultural rather than the natural existence of anomalous creatures. Majorie Halpin noted in her introduction how Durkheim has taught us that beliefs would not persist over so wide an area and through so deep a period of time without them serving some existential purpose. What purpose, then, is served by beliefs in humanoid monsters? How do we explain the persistence of beliefs in monsters, even if we cannot account for the monsters themselves?

Two general types of explanation are offered in this book, one psychological in nature and the other structural. On the psychological side, it is suggested that beliefs in monsters are metaphors or projections for sublimated feelings of hostility, aggression, or other deep-seated emotions or sentiments. Alternatively, Halpin herself has suggested that monster beliefs may be the product of the mind's cognitive functions, "the action of the brain upon the environment." Monsters provide explanations. Structuralist explanations are different only in degree, for they too rest upon certain assumptions regarding the operations and needs of the human mind. Monsters, structuralists say, serve as transformations, reflections, or resolutions of contradictions prevalent in beliefs and action; or they may be seen as markers that help do draw the line between nature and culture, wild and domesticated, savagery and civilization. "Monsters, as anomalous creatures," Buckley writes, "constitute ruptures in the fabric of ordinary classification." These ruptures are the boundary markers. According to the marker theory, one I personally find congenial though not always convincing, a culture must symbolically define its boundaries or spheres of concern in relation to what it is not—the pre-cultural, the past, the future, and what is not ordinary or proper. Ambiguous creatures, like monsters and gods, that combine cultural with non-cultural traits, serve to mark these boundaries. The Wild Man of the Woods or Sasquatch, of course, marks the transition from nature to culture, from our wilderness past to our domesticated present, from savagery to civilization. Aliens from outer space presumably symbolize the contrast between present culture and an unknown, technologically dominated future. And for Christians, at least, the Devil and Christ divide us from, and link us to, the worlds below and the heavens above. These propositions are summarized in the accompanying chart, which can be adjusted to fit any cultural content. Readers may wish to add their own favorite humanoid monsters.

We could speculate about several interesting parallels between the Sasquatch and Christ, to pursue the structuralist perspective a little further. Both are monstrous, in size and power; both are anomalous, part human and part animal or god; both serve basic human needs, presumably; and the existence of both are matters of some dispute. Both the example and the chart demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of structuralist and psychological approaches. As theories they stretch our credulity; they are no less speculative or interpretive than theories regarding the natural existence of the Sasquatch. As such, they belong more on the frontiers of normal science than in

The Symbolic Boundaries of Modern Society

(Anomalous beings, part cultural and part non-cultural, mark the boundaries.)



Superior culture: the world to which we should aspire (Christ, benevolent spirits)

Pre-culture: the world out of which culture emerged; raw nature, wild (Wild Man of the Woods, wood sprites)

Culture: the world as we now know it and live in it

Future Culture: the world of the unknown future (aliens from outer space, little men in flying saucers)

Inferior Culture: the world (or underworld) we should overcome, avoid, reject (Devil, malevolent spirits)

the centre, as parallels to the theories of the amateur investigators. And they are heavily mentalistic in orientation, ignoring, by and large, the role of social or economic factors that influence emotions and beliefs. (The papers by Kassovic and Graburn, though also structuralist to some degree, are exceptions to this generalization.)

Speculative theories also serve to enliven our imaginations and to stretch our minds by allowing us to see things differently (to make the familiar strange again, as Halpin likes to say), and by helping us to place specific phenomena in wider contexts of discourse and discovery. What we must do, Halpin argues, is to expand the context within which the Sasquatch is considered: "we should examine the full context within which the creature is seen, rather than continue to dwell almost exclusively on *what* is seen." I agree, especially if we expand the context to include consideration of the social and material basis of beliefs and sightings. The brain does not simply act upon the environment, it *reworks* it, just as it is itself constantly being reworked in return. The context is one of forces—physical, social, economic and cultural—locked in interaction. The structuralist model of contradictions and mediations, supplemented by recognition of the importance of concrete real and ideal interests, is what I have in mind.

I can think of no more fitting way to conclude this epilogue than by calling upon the poetic imagination of one of Canada's leading writers, Margaret Atwood. In a poem she wrote some years ago, long before this book was thought of, she captured in her own compelling language the very essence of the monster quest. It is all there in her poem, "Oratorio for Sasquatch, Man, and Two Androids."[1]

The man and the two androids set out to find the elusive Sasquatch, talking about it as they go.

Man:
Here there are no maps,
here there are no trails;
the treetrunks you slashed
to show you the way back
have already healed themselves behind you.

Android 1:
It has been lurking
blurred near the edges of jerky
films, of damaged photographs
for too long; its deep footprints dissolve
in the rain as soon as they are
seen. It slides away
from us into caves of air, into burrows
made by treeshadows, takes refuge
in the eye's confusions.

I want it to be seen,
want it placed
among the mind's white
lists of things;
                                        it is my
past, it must be known,
it must be legible.

Man:
He cannot be read,
he can only be heard;
because he has no language.
He speaks to each man in his own language.
The syllables are within you.
Once you have been to his land
you may enter and leave at will,
though few return from that journey
unchanged.

The man sees traces of the Sasquatch, but the androids do not. "I see only fallen leaves, I see only ferns," one android says. And the man replies:

That is because you have not yet learned
to use your true eyes.
Your eyes are locked,
your eyes are frozen:
you have used them too long as lenses.

You must discard these failed eyes,
these pieces of dead glass
that come between you and the world.
Let your hard sight melt:
then you will see as I do.

"Then tell us how to find it," the second android says, and he continues:

Android 2:
How do we recognize it?
Does it lie in wait?
Does it howl?
Does it leave signs, scratches
in soft earth? Does it walk in snow?
How do we recognize it?
Tell us how to find it.

Man:
I came to know him first
when I was young;
I wanted to learn wisdom.
He met me in a dream,
we struggled and I named him.
He ran towards me
and disappeared into my head.
Since then I have talked with him many times.
Some say he is an animal: he has fur
like an animal's, and sharp teeth;
others say he is a man, or something
that was once a man; his hands are a man's,
his eyes face forward.

To me he is neither,
what he is for you
will depend on what he wishes to show you,
what he is for you
will depend on what you want from him.

Android 1:
I want to drain the
shade cast by its furred
history across my clean
rubberskin body,
delete its growled hog
sounds, its rancid
armpit smell.

I want to explain
it: fit it
in; pin it; label
its separate parts, its habits;
with the small blades of my
fingers trace its outline.

I want to turn it to
plastic, to metal;
clear, functional
as I am.
I want to forget.

Android 2:
I have hunted in other jungles,
each one pushed me closer.
I have hunted other animals:
behind the brown mask
of the bear, the yellow
mask of the lion, the
horned mask of the deer,
I expected always to see it,
the beast no-one acknowledges,

the final mask: the animal
who is a man covered with fur.
It tracks me, it walks
at night over the lawn,
in through the neo-
colonial door, over
the walls of my room.

Soon I must kill the last fear,
nail it to the wall,
a neat hole marked on its forehead.

Man:
I have not understood.
I thought the guns were to shoot food.
I thought you wanted to learn from him
as I learn; now I see
you want to know, to control him
in your hands, pick him apart,
number and separate
his lungs, his arteries, his brain
so you can call the pieces
by your names, not by his own.

But you are wrong: he can never
be known: he can teach you only
about yourself.

I must go alone to ask his forgiveness
for having brought you; and to ask him
what must be done with you.

The man disappears into the bush, and the two androids continue their learned discussion of the Sasquatch's importance to knowledge.

Android 1: *(rapidly) (in almost a prose voice)*
My aim is knowledge,
to know a thing I must probe it.

First I will capture it
with nets traps helicopters dogs pieces
of string holes dug in the ground doped food
tranquilizer guns buckshot thrown stones
bows and arrows

Then I will name the species
after myself

Then I will examine it
with pins tweezers flashlights microscopes telescopes
envelopes statistics elastics
scalpels scissors razors lasers cleavers axes
rotary saws incisors osterizers pulverizers and fertilizers.

I will publish the results
in learned journals.

Then I will place a specimen
in each of the principle zoos
and a stuffed skin
in each of the principle museums
of the western world.

When the breed nears extinction due to
hunters trappers loggers miners farmers
directors collectors inspectors

I will set aside a preserve consisting of:
    1 mountain
    1 lake
    1 river
    1 tree

    1 flower
    1 rock
and 1 tall electric fence.

Android 2:
The things I want from it are:
1) power
2) fame
3) money
I will get these things
pardon me, achieve these goals
by:

1) shooting it, thus proving it can be killed
   but only by one with skill and courage
   such as myself
2) posing for a front-page picture and/or a
   TV documentary with my boot on its neck and
   one hand casually on my hip
3) exhibiting, for a fee, the remains
   which will have been preserved by:
   a) stuffing
   b) formaldehyde
   c) freezing in ice

I will then make replicas from
—fur coats
—leather gloves
—putty
—inner tubes
—piano keys
—modelling clay
—human hair

I will open a nationwide chain of man-monsters
I will retire at forty
and go fishing

The forest suddenly begins to stir, the androids hear strange sounds. Is it a Sasquatch? The androids fire their guns.

Android 1:
My eyes hurt. What
was it? What did we hit?

Android 2:
It was a thing like a grizzly bear
walking on its hind legs;
I saw its teeth, it had
pig's eyes, tiny and brute
with the thought of slaughter

Android 1:
It was
a giant man, his eyes thundered, his hair
was standing up all over his head
like red fire; his fingers were
sharp claws; but he was smiling,
he was looking through my face and smiling,
he lifted one hand. . . .

But it was the man they shot, as he was returning from his encounter with the Sasquatch.

Man:
There was no animal,
there was no man with claws.
It was my body you shot at.

When I had spoken with him
I turned back to find you;
I heard his owl's voice calling my name;
it was noon; I knew then I would die.

At the edge of the clearing
I paused; you were sitting down;
by your eyes I could tell
that he was near.

Suddenly he came upon me,

the crash of a tree falling;
for an instant I felt his strength, his power
within me; the god
and I were one;
through me he was speaking to you.

Android 2:
It was a bear

Android 1:
It was
a giant man, his hair
was flames

Man:
You were not used to seeing
You could see only through your fear
which blurs vision.

But the god has not denied you.
It is you who have denied the god.

He would have given you knowledge of life,
you chose instead the knowledge
of death. He has shown you what you are.

He has gone out of my body,
he leaves me here for you,
a husk, a trophy,
an animal skin,
a memory to take back with you
from the dark forest
to your lighted cities.

Now you have killed the god;
you have what you wanted.

In this tale composed by Margaret Atwood, the Sasquatch is given the final word.

Sasquatch:
A wound has been made in me,
a hole opens in my green flesh;
I see that I can be broken.

Two are moving away,
the third remains.

Come, my brother,
your blood runs into the earth,
at last I can hear you clearly;

you are telling me
that those who have destroyed you
will return in other bodies
to destroy me also;
already their saws, their axes
hack at my borders;
to murder my pines, my cedars
is to murder me.

Their straight roads diminish
my space, my kingdom.

We will go to the other country.
Under the mountains there is a sea,

it is summer here, there
it is winter. We will sit

together by that frozen shore

until the killers have been changed
to roots, to birds

until the killers have become
the guardians and have learned
our language

waiting to be delivered,
waiting to be made whole.

"When dreams come true," Kenelm Burridge mused during the conference, "what happens to the truth?" Indeed, but more important, what then will become of our dreams?

Notes

1. Margaret Atwood, "Oratorio for Sasquatch, Man, and Two Androids," in *Poems for Voices* (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1970), pp. 14–28.

L.G.M. Ruus

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Hominidae have been defined for the purposes of this bibliography as those elusive 'manimals' occuring primarily in North America and Asia which are known by many names, the most common of which are abominable snowman (or metoh-kangmi), yeti, and Sasquatch. Only occasional references have been included to their ancient cousins in Europe and to their diminutive cousins in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. These areas have not been thoroughly treated primarily because of the comparative lack of adequate bibliographic control of publications in these parts of the world. Also excluded have been references to prehistoric ancestors, such as Gigantopithecus.

This preliminary edition of the bibliography includes only verified published materials, both serial and monographic, which, with the exception of the Slavic languages materials, have been examined by the compilor. Types of material which have been excluded from the bibliography include juvenile literature, unpublished reports of sightings, audio-visual materials such as films, sound recordings, photographs, or plaster casts. In addition, newspaper articles have, with a few exceptions, been excluded, as the lack of bibliographic coverage of newspapers makes it an almost impossible task to produce an adequate bibliography.

A future, expanded edition of this bibliography will include a large additional amount of material which has as yet not been verified as well as a listing of selected newspaper articles and citations of myths and folktales. I would welcome any suggestions as to publications which should be included in the bibliography which have been omitted in this edition.

Sources consulted in the compilation of this bibliography include, as well as the bibliographies and bibliographic footnotes in the listed publications, a number of bibliographies and indexes, such as the Social Sciences Citation Index, Science Citation Index, Abstracts of Folklore Studies, Abstracts of Anthropology, Biological Abstracts, the Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur aus allen Gebieten des Wissens, British Humanities

Index, the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, and the Canadian Periodical Index.

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